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Summary 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  examine  the  educational  and  psychological  theories  of  the 
renaissance  philosopher  Juan  Luis  Vives.  A  brief  history  of  Vives'  life  is  given  as  background 
information  and,  to  place  his  work  in  context,  the  central  concepts  of  Renaissance  Humanism 
are  explained.  As  Vives  was  influenced  by  Desiderius  Erasmus  and  by  the  central  tenets  of 
Northern  Humanism,  information  is  given  on  these  subjects. 
The  main  focus  of  the  research  is  a  study  of  Vives'  pedagogy  and  psychology  as  set  out  in  the 
texts  De  institutione  foeminae  Christianae,  De  tradendis  disciplinis  and  De  aninia  et  vita. 
Vives'  educational  work  is  discussed  in  Chapters  4  and  5,  and  comparison  is  made  with  other 
renaissance  theories  of  education.  It  will  be  explained  that  his  educational  philosophy  rests 
upon  his  theory  of  the  soul.  This  led  him  to  consider  such  things  as  the  role  of  memory  in  the 
learning  process,  the  need  to  take  account  of  children's  psychological  maturation  when 
planning  a  course  of  study,  and  the  way  in  which  sensate  information  is  'translated'  into 
percepts.  Chapter  6  deals  with  Vives'  treatise  on  psychological  processes  (De  anima  et  vita) 
and  includes  description  and  analysis  of  his  epistemology  together  with  his  examination  of  the 
'passions'  and  their  effect  on  cognitive  functioning. 
will  be  argued  in  Chapters  7  and  8  that  aspects  of  Vives'  work  are  forerunners  of  later 
theories:  specifically,  the  philosophy  of  Pierre  Gassendi,  the  study  of  the  soul  by  Rene Descartes,  and  the  pedagogy  of  John  Locke.  Gassendi  was  instrumental  in  reviving  interest  in 
Epicurianism  and  in  the  work  of  Sextus  Emipricus.  In  turn,  this  contributed  to  widespread 
interest  in  the  classical  concept  of  'empirical'  philosophy.  Gassendi  relied  on  the  work  of 
several  earlier  authors  in  the  development  of  his  theories,  and  he  acknowledged  Vives' 
philosophy  as  being  of  influence.  In  contrast  to  the  empirical  approach  to  philosophy  attempted 
by  Gassendi,  and  later  by  Locke  in  a  more  sophisticated  form,  Descartes  adopted  a  rationalist 
approach  to  epistemology.  As  with  Vives,  however,  he  offered  a  description  of  the  soul  in  his 
text  Les  Passions  de  I'Ame.  Descartes'  concepts  of  psychology  are  delineated  in  Chapter  7  and 
compared  with  those  set  out  in  Vives'  De  anima  et  vita.  Chapter  8  also  explores  the 
development  of  empirical  philosophy  as  evinced  by  the  theories  of  John  Locke. 
This  research  offers  description,  analysis  and  interpretation  of  Vives'  ideas  which  have  been 
largely  ignored  in  the  history  of  education  and  psychology.  Moreover,  it  places  his  work  in  its 
wider  context  of  the  development  of  humanism  and  philosophical  empiricism  in  Europe. Contents 
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The  primary  interest  of  this  thesis  is  the  educational  and  psychological  theories  of  the 
Spanish  humanist  Juan  Luis  Vives  as  set  out  in  his  texts  De  tradendis  disciplinis,  De 
instittrtione  foeminaeChristianae  and  De  anima  et  vita.  These  works  will  be  examined  in 
detail  to  illustrate  Vives'  pedagogy  and  to  demonstrate  how  his  theory  of  education  is 
underscored  by  his  inquiry  into  the  human  'soul'.  In  this  introduction  the  content  of  the 
thesis  will  firstly  be  described  together  with  clarification  of  some  of  the  main  terms  which 
arise  in  the  work.  Thereafter,  the  historical  method  used  will  be  explained  in  a  sub-section 
which  will  also  discuss  some  of  the  alternatives  available  and  justify  the  reasons  for 
rejecting  them  as  viable  for  this  research. 
In  analyzing  Vives'  theories  on  psychology  and  education  the  case  will  be  made  that  while 
his  thought  is  in  some  ways  typical  of  renaissance  humanism,  his  ideas  are  in  other 
respects  forward  thinking.  To  provide  background  for  this  analysis,  Chapters  1-3  of  the 
thesis  will  give  both  biographical  information  and  information  on  renaissance  humanism. 
Of  particular  interest  will  be  the  growth  of  humanism  in  Northern  Europe  and  the 
importance  of  the  work  of  Desiderius  Erasmus.  As  the  biographical  detail  explains,  Vives 
was  a  `product'  of  Northern  European  humanism  and,  as  such,  was  influenced  by 
Erasmus.  Discussion  of  Erasmus'  thought  is  merited  in  its  own  right,  given  its  dominance 
of  the  intellectual  climate  of  Northern  Europe  in  the  early  decades  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
quite  apart  from  its  influence  on  individual  humanists  stich  as  Vives.  Erasmus'  work  is 
therefore  dealt  with  in  Chapter  3. 
1 Vives'  main  texts  are  examined  in  Chapters  4-6.  Thereafter,  those  elements  of  his  thought 
which  anticipate  the  work  of  later  authors  will  be  described  in  Chapters  7  and  8.  The 
authors  concerned  are  Pierre  Gassendi,  Rene  Descartes  and  John  Locke.  When  studying 
the  three  principal  areas  of  concern  in  Part  2(  Vives'  ideas  on  the  education  of  women,  and 
his  theories  of  pedagogy  and  psychology)  information  will  be  given  to  place  the  discussion 
in  context.  The  development  of  thought  relevant  to  each  area  will  be  delineated  and,  where 
necessary,  mention  will  be  made  of  specific  authors  whose  work  contributed  to  intellectual 
trends.  There  is  a  possibility  that  such  an  enquiry  will  become  infected  with  what  Georges 
Canguilhem  referred  to  (with  respect  to  the  history  of  scientific  ideas)  as  the  "virus  of  the 
precursor"',  of  making  this  type  of  analysis  the  mainstay  of  historical  research.  However, 
as  Gary  Gutting  comments,  Canguilhem's  statement  does  not  mean  that  he  "denies  the 
need  to  understand  the  influence  of  earlier  scientific  work  on  later.  Because  science  is  a  part 
of  human  culture,  its  discoveries  are  conditioned  by  the  (explicit  and  implicit)  education  of 
those  who  make  them...  "2  The  intention  in  this  thesis,  then,  is  not  to  give  the  impression 
that  historical  development  is  being  viewed  as  a  linear  progression.  An  evolutionary 
continuum  of  some  overarching  concepts  may  be  discernible  in  an  historical  period,  but  it 
is  recognised  that  historical  development  does  not  necessarily  occur  in  a  structured 
sequence  of  events. 
Arising  from  the  discussion  of  Vives'  theories  about  the  intellect  and  epistemological 
processes  (as  elaborated  in  De  anima  et  vita),  attention  is  given  to  the  development  of 
scientific  method.  Although  study  of  this  aspect  is  not  afforded  primacy  in  this  thesis,  it 
underlies  the  arguments  presented  in  Chapters  6-8.  The  Renaissance  has  been  regarded  as  a 
time  when  `natural  philosophy'  was  the  overriding  means  to  investigate  the  world,  and 
`science'  based  on  empirical  research  was  not  evident.  This  is  not  quite  the  case,  despite 
evidence  that  philosophical  speculation  about  the  nature  of  physical  phenomena  was  still 
apparent.  Moreover,  during  the  Enlightenment,  the  'new'  science  was  still  regarded  as 
2 dangerous  where  it  related  to  such  primary  considerations  as  the 
soul.  It  is  this  focus  on  the  soul  and  its  relation  to  the  body  that 
determines  much  of  the  debate  about  what  the  new  science  meant. 
Because  of  the  uncertainties  concerning  the  definition  of  the  soul, 
the  issue  of  the  passions  and  the  imagination  also  came  to  be  of 
major  importance.  ' 
Thus,  in  the  eighteenth  century  there  remained  a  drive  to  descri  be  the  faculties  of  the  soul, 
with  the  role  of  the  'passions'  commanding  as  much  importance  as  it  had  in  Vives'  analysis 
two  hundred  years  before.  This  highlights  the  relevance  to  this  thesis  of  studying 
psychological  theory  as  it  was  depicted  in  De  anima  et  vita,  and  of  considering  this  text  in 
relation  to  the  concern  with  psychological  and  emotional  motivation  which  was  shown  later 
by  writers  like  Descartes  and  Locke. 
Emergence  of  a  scientific  approach  to  the  study  of  natural  phenomena  is  often  viewed  as 
one  characteristic  of  the  Enlightenment  in  Europe,  although  aspects  of  such  an  approach 
may  be  discernable  in  earlier  historical  periods.  Progressive  adjustments  in  the 
connotations  associated  with  the  term  science  indicate  how  complex  and  multilinear  was  the 
evolution  of  a  scientific  outlook.  Jorge  Gracia  notes  that 
until  the  eighteenth  century  the  word  'science'  (scientia,  from  scio,  to 
know)  was  commonly  used  to  refer  to  philosophy  as  well  as  to  what 
today  we  refer  to  as  the  natural  sciences,  and  the  word  'philosophy' 
was  used  to  refer  to  the  natural  sciences  as  well  as  to  philosophy. 
The  uses  of  'science'  and  'philosophy'  in  these  rather  broad 
(senses),  if  measured  by  contemporary  usage,  ...  go  back  to  the 
Middle  Ages,  although  their  ultimate  bases  are  to  be  found  in  ancient 
Greek  thought.  These  uses  can  easily  be  illustrated  in  the 
philosophical  and  scientific  literature  of  various  times...  Newton,  for 
example,  thought  that  he  was  doing  philosophy  in  his  Philosophiae 
natetralisprincipiamathematica(1687)  and  Descartes  thought  he  was 
doing  science  in  Le  discours  de  la  methode  (1637) 
Precisely  because  of  such  alterations  in  the  concepts  associated  with  these  terms  it  is 
difficult,  in  dealing  with  this  aspect  of  the  history  of  ideas,  to  define  exactly  what  it  means  - 
and  what  it  meant  -  to  adopt  a  `scientific  approach'  to  the  study  of  natural  phenomena.  It  is 
3 generally  accepted  that  use  of  empirical  methods  of  gathering  information  is  central  to 
scientific  method.  If  one  aspect  of  empirical  method  is  said  to  be  the  observation  of  natural 
phenomena,  then  Vives  can  be  said  to  utilise  rudimentary  empiricism  (in  Deaninue).  While 
use  of  observation  alone  cannot  define  `scientific  method',  it  is  a  significant  aspect  of  a 
scientific  approach  to  the  research  of  natural  phenomena.  What  is  of  concern  to  this  thesis 
is  the  use  of  elementary  empirical  methods  to  gather  information  although  that  information 
is  located  within  an  essentially  philosophical  form  of  discourse.  It  will  be  argued  that  this  is 
significant  in  the  overall  evolution  of  a  scientific  approach  to  studying  the  world. 
Furthermore,  the  elaboration  of  an  empirical  approach  was  of  fundamental  importance  to 
the  growth  of  scientific  method  and,  with  respect  to  the  history  of  ideas,  'empiricism'  was 
of  particular  relevance  to  the  epistemology  of  John  Locke. 
However,  the  use  of  a  term  like  'empiricism'  should  not  obscure  the  complexity  inherent  in 
the  attempt  to  characterise  such  bodies  of  thought.  The  work  of  Vives  and  Locke  can  be 
described  as  displaying  elements  of  empirical  philosophy,  whereas  the  work  of  Descartes  - 
who  did  not  eschew  experimentation  -  is  primarily  `rationalist'.  Aspects  of  Vives'  work 
stress  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  through  observation  and  experience.  As  with  Locke, 
Vives  no  longer  accepts  intellection  a  priori  (except  in  the  case  of  belief  in  God). 
Knowledge  about  the  world  and  the  nature  of  man  is  thus  knowledge  a  posteriori,  and  it 
will  be  argued  that  this  is  an  important  shift  from  earlier  methods  of  natural  inquiry.  It  is  a 
shift  that  characterised  the  intellectual  climate  which  facilitated  the  growth  of  scientific 
method. 
In  discussing  these  issues,  a  distinction  will  be  made  between  philosophers  whose  work 
rests  upon  methodological  rationalism  (Aristotle,  Aquinas,  Descartes)  and  those  who 
accord  some  importance  to  philosophical  empiricism  (Vives,  Locke).  However  the  terms 
rationalism  and  empiricism  require  some  explanation  as  they  are  used  in  this  thesis.  Where 
4 rationalist  philosophy  is  spoken  of,  it  is  considered  to  have  specific  underlying 
assumptions.  Description  of  these  assumptions  follows  that  given  by  Frankfort-Nachmias 
and  Nachmias5,  namely  that  rationalism,  and  rationalist  philosophy,  assume: 
a)  that  the  human  mind  can  understand  the  world  independent  of  phenomena; 
and 
b)  that  forms  of  knowledge  exist  which  are  prior  to  personal  experience. 
Therefore,  to  state  that  Aristotle's  (or  Descartes')  philosophical  method  was  predominantly 
rationalist  does  not  mean  that  they  never  observed  the  natural  world.  It  means,  rather,  that 
they  regarded  abstract  formal  logic  as  the  way  to  understand  certain  aspects  of  the  world, 
and  that  they  did  not  regard  empirical  observation  as  the  principal  method  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  Although,  as  Gracia  states,  many  philosophers  from  the  Classical  era  to  the 
Enlightenment  believed  that  there  were  limiting  factors  on  "the human  capacity  to  know"6  - 
for  instance,  factors  arising  from  a  reliance  on  sensate  information  -  they  remained 
confident  that  "the  natural  faculties  possessed  by  human  beings,  namely  reason  and 
perception,  were  effective  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  task"  of  knowing  and  describing 
"what  there  is"7.  In  terms  of  the  case  which  will  be  advanced  in  this  thesis,  the  crucial 
consideration  is  that  these  philosophers  (including  Descartes)  regarded  metaphysical 
enquiry  as  a  valid  means  to  understand  the  world  as  it  is,  and  to  understand  this  with 
certainty.  Despite  holding  reservations  about  the  reliability  of  sensate  information,  many 
pre-Enlightenment  philosophers  did  not  consider  that  "such  limitations  necessitated 
fundamental  changes  in  the  mode  of  philosophical  enquiry"8  that  they  used  to  inquire  into 
natural  phenomena. 
n  arguing  that  a  shift  occurred  in  the  method  used  by  `natural  philosophers'  to  describe 
physical  phenomena,  it  will  be  accepted  that  there  was  development  of  a  `scientific 
5 approach'  to  observing,  describing  and  analysing  such  phenomena.  The  term  'scientific 
approach'  is  again  regarded  as  having  key  underlying  assumptions.  Once  more  the 
delineation  of  these  by  Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias"  is  useful: 
that  nature  is  orderly  (where  `nature'  refers  to  all  empirically  observable  objects, 
conditions  and  phenomena  existing  independently  of  the  observer); 
that  man  can  know  nature  (that  is,  by  way  of  empirical  observation); 
that  all  natural  phenomena  have  natural  causes; 
that  nothing  is  self-evident  (truth  must  therefore  be  demonstrated  objectively  and  not 
accepted  u  priori  ); 
that  knowledge  is  derived  from  the  acquisition  of  experience. 
The  scientific  approach  relies  above  all  on  perception,  experience  and  observation.  While 
Vives'  approach  to  study  of  the  soul  and  processes  of  intellection  can  in  no  way  be  said  to 
epitomise  such  an  approach,  a  case  will  be  made  that  his  work  displays  specific  elements  of 
the  approach,  in  an  early  form  (for  example,  reliance  on  observation  and  the  perceptual 
process,  and  appeal  to  reasoning  a  po.  steriori.  )  Where  empirical  observation  is  described  as 
occurring  in  Vives'  work,  it  is  of  a  rudimentary  type  and  principally  related  to  his 
epistemological  and  psychological  theory.  Thus,  the  main  concern  will  be  his  analysis  of 
how  perceptual  information  is  accessed  by  the  percipient.  Two  elements  are  deemed  central 
to  this  discussion:  reliance  on  observation  and  denial  of  apriori  knowledge.  Thus  it  will  be 
argued  that  his  philosophy  indicates  tentative  use  of  a  method  which  begins  to  move  away 
from  the  rationalist  philosophy  typical  of  earlier  historical  eras,  towards  the  epistemological 
position  adopted  by  John  Locke. 
6 Historical  methodology 
In  undertaking  historical  research  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  possible  methods  which 
are  available  for  the  task.  Description  of  the  main  alternative  methods  will  be  given,  and  the 
methodology  which  underlies  this  thesis  will  be  discussed,  Perhaps  the  place  to  begin  is 
with  the  traditional  view  of  historical  research,  one  which  might  best  be  called  realist. 
Those  who  accept  the  use  of  a  realist  methodology  in  historical  research  regard  certain 
historical  data  as  existing  outwith  the  mind  and  perceptions  of  the  researcher.  They  will 
regard  such  data  as  'facts'  and  look  upon  history  as  an  empirical  endeavour.  Maurice 
Mandelbaum  has  written  that  "in  laying  claim  to  truth  [historical  research]  must  be  able  to 
advance  external  evidence  that  vouches  for  its  truth;  in  default  of  this,  it  is  not  to  be 
considered  a  historical  study.  ""°  The  realist  position  considers  history  to  be  capable  of 
being  an  objective  pursuit  which  can  lead  to  objective  knowledge  about  the  subject  of  the 
research.  Thus  the  fundamental  structure  of  an  historical  account  is  imposed  by  the 
evidence  on  which  the  account  rests  rather  than  by  the  historian's  analysis. 
However,  alternative  methodologies  evolved  from  traditional  acceptance  of  the  realist 
position.  Theorists  such  as  Becker  and  Beard  developed  concepts  of  historical 
methodology  (partially  relying  on  ideas  advanced  in  an  earlier  form  by  Hegel  and  Marx). 
They  promoted  a  sceptical  element,  prompting  the  question:  how  can  we  prove  that  the 
historical  data  we  utilise  is  true.  The  sceptical  standpoint  introduced  a  relevant  caveat  to 
processes  of  historical  research  in  that  it  stressed  the  importance  of  the  historian's  role  in 
interpreting  historical  data.  According  to  this  approach,  historical  research  is  a  subjective 
undertaking  where  claims  to  truth  are  not  verifiable  in  any  strong  form.  The  heart  of 
7 Becker's  methodology  lay  in  his  contentions  that  members  of  every  generation  will 
understand  the  past  in  the  light  of  their  own  contemporaneous  experiences.  He  believed 
that  knowledge  of  history  is  "worthless  except  to  those  who  have  made  it...  a  personal 
possession.  The  value  of  history  is...  not  scientific  but  moral...  ""  For  Becker,  historical 
knowledge  could  give  those  who  studied  the  moral  lessons  in  history  the  means  for  self, 
rather  than  social,  control. 
Arguably  there  is  some  validity  in  the  sceptical  position  in  that  it  induces  historical 
researchers  to  consider  their  associations  with  the  evidence  which  they  gather,  and  on 
which  they  build  their  historical  analyses.  It  is  acceptable  to  stress  the  relationship  which 
the  historical  researcher  has  with  the  artefacts  of  the  past,  and  to  highlight  the  possibility 
that  historical  research  does  not  uncover  truth  about  past  events  but  instead  represents  the 
researcher's  subjective,  qualitative,  analysis  of  the  artefacts  under  study  influenced  by 
current  societal  values  and  beliefs.  Of  course,  in  undertaking  any  historical  research,  the 
researcher  must  rely  on  historical  artefacts  (for  instance,  documents  and  texts).  This  thesis 
rests  upon  evidence  which  lies  in  primary  textual  sources.  The  research  process  thus 
recognises  the  need  for  evidence  to  underpin  the  analysis  of  Vives'  ideas,  but  the 
researcher  accepts  that  the  evaluation  of  the  evidence  is  based  on  a  subjective  interpretation 
of  the  primary  texts  and  the  secondary  sources.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  research 
disregards  any  attempt  to  construct  a  reasonable  analysis  based  on  the  evidence  used.  It 
does  attempt  this.  Further,  it  is  recognised  that  historical  researchers  must  guard  against 
making  claims  which  textual  evidence  does  not  support.  There  is  therefore  acceptance  of 
the  importance  of  textual  evidence,  but  the  subjective  element  in  interpretation  is 
acknowledged. 
However,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  while  every  effort  has  been  made  to  ensure  that  the 
analysis  is  reinforced  by  textual  evidence  and  embedded  in  ideas  supported  by  more  recent 
8 interpretations  of  historical  events,  there  is  a  problematic  aspect  to  any  such  form  of 
research.  That  is,  there  is  an  inevitable  imposition  of  coherence  and  structure  on  historical 
events/ideas  which  may  or  may  not  reflect  past  actuality.  To  an  extent  this  is  due  to  the 
narrative  and  analytical  structure  of  historical  research,  especially  research  which  is 
undertaken  with  respect  to  the  conventions  imposed  by  a  doctoral  thesis.  In  order  to 
present  historical  analysis  in  a  structured,  logical  way,  imposition  of  coherence  on 
historical  events/ideas  may  well  be  unavoidable  unless  there  is  a  conscious  rejection  of 
traditional  forms  of  historical  methodology. 
Such  a  conscious  rejection  of  traditional  historical  methods  might  be  attempted  through 
acceptance  of  postmodernist  theory  and  the  rejection  of  what  the  postmodernists  would  call 
meta-theory  and  meta-narrative.  To  do  so  would  mean  that  an  historical  researcher  would 
have  to  attempt  to  understand  the  past  by  embracing  historical  discontinuities  and 
fragmentations  while  consciously  rejecting  the  imposition  of  coherence  or  cohesion  upon 
the  events/ideas  being  studied.  Historical  research  would  therefore  become  a  search  for 
understanding  largely  based  on  describing  disparate,  isolated  historical  elements.  While 
Michel  Foucault  would  be  termed  a  poststructuralist  rather  than  a  postmodernist,  the 
method  of  historical  research  which  he  outlines  in  The  Archaeology  of  Knowledge'2  could 
well  be  the  most  apposite  one  for  those  who  reject  the  imposition  of  coherence. 
Foucault's  archaeological  method  is  not  designed  to  facilitate  a  search  for  truth,  or  to 
analyse  historical  events  with  regard  to  cause  and  effect.  Instead,  it  is  an  attempt  to  uncover 
historical  artefacts  and  accept  them  for  what  they  are  in  themselves  (not  for  any 
significatory  aspect  they  might  be  said  to  have).  This  extends  even  to  discourse,  which 
Foucault  writes  should  not  be  treated  as  a  "document,  as  a  sign  of  something  else"13,  but  as 
"a  monument.  [Archaeology]  is  not  an  interpretative  discipline...  "I-'  Foucault  writes  that 
his  method  does  not  "try  to  restore  what  has  been  thought,  wished,  aimed  at,  experienced, 
9 desired  by  men  in  the  very  moment  at  which  they  expressed  it  in  discourse"  ýS.  Archaeology 
is  instead  "nothing  more  than  a  rewriting",  a  "regulated  transformation  of  what  has  already 
been  written...  ;  it  is  the  systematic  description  of  a  discourse-object"16.  Foucault's 
historian  ceases  to  be  an  interpreter  or  analyst  and  becomes  instead  an  "archaeologist"  of 
knowledge  -  the  historian  becomes  a  describer  of  discourses,  rather  than  an  analyst  of  "the 
thoughts,  representations,  images,  themes,  preoccupations  that  are  concealed  or  revealed" 
in  them'7. 
This  method  has  grave  repercussions  for  such  disciplines  as  the  history  of  ideas,  and  was 
rejected  by  this  researcher  as  being  too  problematic  to  utilise  successfully.  Foucault's 
method  abandons  such  a  concept  as  the  history  of  ideas  in  what  he  intends  as  a  "systematic 
rejection  of  its  postulates  and  procedures,  an  attempt  to  practise  a  quite  different  history  of 
what  men  have  said.  ""'  Yet  Foucault's  own  analyses  of  historical  trends  and  events  do  not 
follow  successfully  the  method  he  suggests.  His  historical  work,  as  opposed  to  his 
philosophy,  generally  adopts  a  fairly  traditional  Marxist/structuralist  method  of  inquiry. 
And  as  Gary  Gutting  suggests,  when  Foucault  is  more  attuned  to  the  archaeological 
method,  for  instance  in  The  Order  of  Things,  he  "seldom  makes  any  effort  to  show  that  his 
claims  are  supported  by  the  relevant  texts  of  a  given  period,  nor  does  he  pay  much  attention 
to  the  apparent  counterexamples  to  his  views.  "19  Although  this  refers  to  Foucault's  work 
from  a  conventional  standpoint,  the  remark  demonstrates  one  difficulty  which  his  method 
encounters:  that  what  is  written  by  the  historian,  using  this  method,  is  prey  to  the 
accusation  of  simple  assertion. 
Furthermore,  as  Adrian  Kuzminski  states,  the  poststructuralist  "refusal  to  elevate  any  type 
of  representation  over  any  other"  leads  to  an  insistence  that  "no  representations  [of 
experience]  are  real...  they  are  equally  illusory"20.  Thus,  Kuzminski  notes,  the 
poststructuralist  can  dispense  with  the  "worry  of  doing  justice  to  objective  truth",  while  the 
10 question  of  what  might  actually  have  happened  in  the  past  becomes  "irrelevant,  even 
meaningless"''.  Kuzminski's  critique  of  the  method  advocated  by  poststructuralists  leads 
him  to  state  that  the 
initiate  in  such  matters  is  invited  into  a  difficult  and  abstruse  form... 
aimed  at  the  elucidation  of  various  second-order  meta-speculative 
abstractions;  or,  alternatively,  such  privileged  second-order 
abstractions  are  presupposed  in  the  unmasking  or  "deconstruction"  of 
the  pretensions  to  privilege  of  first-order  abstractions.  This  prolix  and 
complex  meta-speculative  "play,  "  simultaneously  dogmatic  and 
ironic,  is  achieved  at  the  expense  of  the  texts  taken  up  in  the  exercise; 
the  destruction  of  the  integrity  of  past  texts  is  synonymous  with  their 
metahistorical  appropriation.  " 
It  is  a  significant  deficiency  of  poststructuralist  method  that  it  too  easily  appears  to  abandon 
"commitment  to  accurate  description  of  past  events  by  postulating  contextual  notions  to 
define  what  is  to  be  recognised  as  evidence"23. 
Foucault's  archaeological  method  centres  on  discourse,  and  in  particular  it  is  concerned 
with  the  notion  of  "knowledge  as  the  outcome  of  linguistic  practices"24.  The  stress  on 
linguistic  practices  is  also  evident  in  the  theory  of  Quentin  Skinner,  who  claims  that  it  is 
unacceptable  to  assume  either  that  a  text  can  be  considered  autonomously  in  the  search  for 
its  meaning,  or  that  the  religious  and  socio-political  context  of  a  text  can  lead  to 
understanding  of  the  work.  25  Instead,  Skinner  advocates  that  any  given  statements  in  an 
historical  text  have  to  be  comprehended  in  terms  of  "how  what  was  said  was  meant"26: 
people  are  a  product  of  the  time  in  which  they  live  and  because  this  influences  the  language 
they  use  to  express  their  ideas  the  linguistic  contexts  of  an  historical  text  must  be  fully 
understood  and  must  take  precedence  over  other  aspects  of  historical  analysis.  The  task  of 
the  historian  is  therefore  to  convey  the  original  author's  actual  meaning  rather  than  what  the 
researcher  perceives  the  meaning  to  be.  Thus  Skinner  maintains  that  it  is  possible  to 
11 understand  authorial  intent  from  knowledge  of  the  linguistic  context  of  an  historical  work. 
Moreover,  he  insists  that  the  result  of  accepting  the  validity  of  studying  the  socio-political 
background  of  an  historical  text  will  be  "a  series  of  conceptual  muddles  and  mistaken 
empirical  claims"27. 
In  contrast  with  Skinner's  case,  this  thesis  does  offer  context  for  the  primary  sources 
which  are  discussed  and  for  the  analyses  presented.  It  does  so  as  evidential  underpinning 
for  the  central  arguments  posited  in  the  examination  of  Vives'  ideas  as  represented  in  his 
major  works.  The  importance  of  taking  care  in  the  analysis  of  textual  evidence  is  not 
denied,  particularly  where  the  texts  being  used  have  been  translated  from  the  original.  In 
this  research,  Vives'  De  anima  et  vita  was  accessible  to  the  researcher  in  its  entirity  only  in 
Lorenzo  Riber's  Spanish  translation.  Similarly,  Detradendis  disciplinis  and  De  institutione 
foeminaeChristianae  were  available  only  in  English  translations  by  Foster  Watson.  Given 
this,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  terms  and  expressions  used  in  the  translated  versions 
may  not  always  reflect,  in  an  entirely  accurate  way,  Vives'  original  meanings  and 
intentions.  Illustrative  of  this  is  the  problem  of  applying  the  term  psychology  to  renaissance 
and  pre-renaissance  investigations  of  the  soul,  given  the  modern  connotations  of  the  term. 
Accordingly,  this  aspect  is  taken  account  of  in  the  thesis  (in  Chapter  6)  when  Vives'  De 
anima  is  discussed.  But  being  alert  to  such  problems,  acknowledging  that  they  exist  and 
that  they  influence  historical  interpretation,  does  not  mean  that  linguistic  contextualism 
must  be  accepted  as  the  only  legitimate  method  for  textual  elucidation. 
As  with  Foucault,  if  Skinner's  hypothesis  is  accepted  there  are  serious  repercussions  for 
historical  research  in  the  history  of  ideas.  Skinner  asserts  that  "tracking  a  grand  but  elusive 
theme"  is  an  "inadequacy",  and  histories  which  attempt  to  do  so  "can  never  go  right" 
because  they  involve  the  study  of  an  "idea"28.  Study  of  the  history  of  ideas  should  not 
involve  the  search  for  any  "essential"  meaning,  he  writes,  but  must  study 
12 all  the  various  situations,  which  may  change  in  complex  ways,  in 
which  a  given  form  of  words  can  logically  be  used  -  all  the 
functions  the  words  can  serve,  all  the  various  things  that  can  be 
done  with  them.  29 
This  would  be  a  colossal  undertaking,  one  which  could  well  prove  impossible  -a  point 
accepted  by  Skinner,  although  he  continues  to  argue  that  linguistic  contextualism  is  the 
only  form  of  study  which  is  "at  least  conceptually  proper"30.  As  Mark  Bevir  observes, 
linguistic  contextualists  argue  that 
considerations  in  the  philosophy  of  meaning  show  that  we  can 
understand  an  utterance  only  if  we  grasp  the  paradigm  to  which  that 
utterance  belongs  or  if  we  place  that  utterance  within 
contemporaneous  linguistic  conventions.  Consequently,  if  historians 
wish  to  understand  a  text,  they  must  study  the  linguistic  context  of 
that  text. 
The  injunction  to  consider  linguistic  contexts  is  seen  as  a 
prerequisite  for  writing  good  history  in  the  history  of  ideas.  If,  the 
argument  goes,  historians  stubbornly  refuse  to  consider  linguistic 
contexts,  they  will  be  bad  historians  31 
However,  the  method  advocated  by  Skinner  and  the  linguistic  contextualists  inevitably 
rests  upon  a  subjective  interpretation  of  what  historical  figures  meant  when  they  used  a 
particular  word,  and  what  the  common  meanings  associated  with  the  word  would  have 
been  in  a  contemporaneous  setting.  Skinner's  description  of  correct  historical  research  has 
an  aim  which  may  not  be  achievable:  is  it  really  possible  for  an  historian  to  know, 
unequivocally,  what  an  author's  intent  was  when  (s)he  wrote  a  text?  It  would  seem  that 
unless  authorial  intent  is  explicitly  expressed  the  answer  must  be  a  negative  one.  The 
historical  researcher  may  infer  authorial  intent  but  cannot  derive  absolute  knowledge.  To 
attempt  to  do  so  via  study  of  the  text's  linguistic  context  could  well  be  to  impose  the 
researcher's  assumptions  about  authorial  intent  onto  the  research  findings,  and  then  to 
suggest  that  on  the  basis  of  doing  so  the  researcher  understands  the  meaning  of  the  text 
more  successfully  than  would  have  been  possible  using  any  other  method.  Linguistic 
13 contextualism  denies  the  claims  to  accuracy  of  any  other  historical  method.  Yet,  as  Bevir 
rightly  states,  linguistic  contexts 
have  no  greater  claim  on  the  historian  than  do  other  possible  sources 
of  evidence,  such  as  other  texts  by  the  author,  or  the  biography  of  the 
author,  or  the  social  and  political  context  of  the  text  in  question. 
Historians  will  consider  as  much  evidence  as  they  can,  selecting 
therefrom  whatever  they  think  most  relevant.  Linguistic  contexts  have 
no  privileged  status.  32 
Bevir  concludes  that  the  test  of  a  sound  historical  analysis  "lies...  in  the  accuracy  and 
reasonableness  of  the  evidence  that  historians  offer  to  support  their  understanding  of  a 
text"-33.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  analyses  contained  in  this  thesis  are  put  forward. 
14 Chapter  1:  Vives'  life  and  background 
Science  is  not  a  neutral  or  innocent  commodity  which 
can  be  employed  as  a  convenience...  Rather  it  is 
spiritually  corrosive,  burning  away  ancient  authorities 
and  traditions.  It  cannot  really  co-exist  with  anything. 
Scientists  inevitably  take  on  the  mantle  of  the  wizards, 
sorcerers  and  witch-doctors.  Their  miracle  cures  are 
our  spells,  their  experiments  our  rituals.  ' 
Such  is  one  contemporary  view  of  science.  Yet  how  did  science  develop  to  the  stage  where 
such  a  comment  can  fairly  be  made  of  it?  Arguably,  the  embryonic  form  of  empirical  science 
-  Brian  Appleyard's  ritualistic  experiments  -  had  its  renaissance  inception  in  the  work  of 
Juan  Luis  Vives,  amongst  others.  Similarly,  this  is  the  case  with  the  beginnings  of  `modem' 
psychology.  Writers  in  the  empirical  tradition  such  as  Francis  Bacon,  Pierre  Gassendi  and 
John  Locke  were  both  directly  and  indirectly  influenced  by  Vives'  work.  They  have  been 
hailed  as  innovators  in  areas  of  science,  education  and  psychological  observation  in  which 
Vives  was  writing  a  century  or  more  beforehand,  towards  the  end  of  that  period  of 
humanism  which  saw  `science'  move  significantly  from  the  realms  of  the  occult.  However, 
while  the  work  of  men  like  Bacon  and  Locke  has  been  accorded  fame,  if  also  criticism, 
Vives'  work  remains  largely  forgotten. 
In  preparation  for  an  examination  of  Vives'  possible  influence  on  certain  philosophers 
(Gassendi,  Descartes  and  Locke)  and  of  claims  to  his  originality  in  the  fields  of  education 
and  psychology,  it  is  first  necessary  to  describe  something  of  his  background.  Explanation 
15 of  those  humanist  influences  which  formed  the  intellectual  atmosphere  in  which  he  worked 
will  be  given  in  the  following  two  chapters  to  demonstrate  that  Vives'  work  was  part  of  an 
historical  continuum  that  was  not  perfectly  linear  but  which  presented  a  complex  of  ideas 
affecting  his  epistemology,  ontology,  and  pedagogy.  Vives'  reputed  influence  on  Bacon  has 
been  studied  elsewhere'  and  falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  study.  However,  what 
will  be  considered  (in  chapters  7  and  8)  is  the  direct  effect  his  work  may  have  had  on 
Gassendi  and  Descartes  and  in  what  ways  Vives'  epistemology  and  pedagogy  is  a  precursor 
of  Locke's.  These  considerations  will  be  made  in  the  context  firstly  of  the  application  of 
theories  of  psychology  to  education  and  secondly  of  the  emergence  of  empiricism  as  an 
accepted  scientific  method.  Vives'  work  on  education  and  psychology  will  be  discussed  in 
chapters  4,5  and  6. 
Vives'  origins 
In  recent  work  on  the  history  of  education  and  science  Luis  Vives  usually  merits  little 
comment,  if  any.  Authors  who  write  in  English  about  his  work  (for  example,  Brubacher, 
Cole,  Good  and  Teller3,  )  tend  to  rely  almost  exclusively  on  what  was  produced  by  Foster 
Watson  in  the  early  decades  of  the  present  century.  Those  whose  concern  is  the  history  of 
science  or  of  metaphysics  generally  neglect  to  mention  his  contribution  to  these  subjects  and 
it  is  rare  to  find  a  history  of  science  which  accords  him  some  credit  as  does  Mason-. 
Furthermore,  in  analyses  of  renaissance  humanism,  where  Vives'  work  is  discussed  at  all 
he  is  presented  as  someone  whose  educational  thought  takes  second  place  to  the  more 
famous  figure  of  Desiderius  Erasmus.  This  arises  because  Erasmus  dominated  the  cultural 
world  in  the  first  two  decades  of  the  sixteenth  century.  While  it  may  be  of  some  interest  to 
debate  which  of  these  men  developed  the  more  original,  or  sophisticated,  theories  of 
pedagogy,  the  important  point  to  realise  is  that  Vives  was  not  merely  Erasmus'  understudy, 
16 regurgitating  wholesale  Erasmian  concepts.  On  the  contrary,  Vives'  educational  philosophy 
and  analysis  of  empirical  and  psychological  investigation  were,  to  a  considerable  extent, 
original  in  outlook,  despite  the  fact  that  aspects  of  them  seem  naive  today.  They  also 
departed  in  many  respects  from  the  views  of  his  forerunners,  even  one  as  distinguished  as 
Erasmus. 
Luis  Vives  was  born  in  Valencia  in  1492.  At  this  time  Valencia  City  was  the  most 
prosperous  town  belonging  to  the  Crown  of  Aragon,  and  was  a  centre  of  administrative  skill 
and  cultural  life.  Although  Vives  left  the  town  when  he  was  seventeen,  he  remained 
permanently  nostalgic  about  his  time  spent  in  this  place  which  "is  so  beautiful  that  there  is 
no  time  of  year  in  which  both  the  meadows  and  the  abundant  trees  are  not  clothed  and 
painted  with  foliage,  flowers...  and  a  variety  of  colors.  "5  The  countryside  and  the  cultural 
life  may  have  been  agreeable,  but  the  policies  of  the  Spanish  Crown  often  were  not, 
particularly  with  regard  to  religious  tolerance.  This  aspect  of  Spanish  internal  policy  had  an 
immense  effect  on  Vives:  his  family  was  Jewish  during  a  time  in  which  Ferdinand  and 
Isabella  expelled,  directly  or  by  threat  alone,  approximately  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
Jews.  (The  edict  of  expulsion  was  signed  at  Granada  in  1492.  )  Vives'  parents  were,  socio- 
economically,  typical  of  many  in  the  Valencian  Jewish  community:  educated,  respected, 
prosperous.  And,  like  many  others,  they  would  be  forced  to  convert  to  Christianity.  The 
prosperity  and  status  of  certain  of  the  Jewish  community  had  been  long  established,  but  was 
to  be  eroded  following  the  consequences  of  the  edict  of  expulsion.  An  explanation  of  the 
background  to  the  tradition  of  antisemitism  which  so  drastically  affected  this  community  will 
set  Vives'  life  and  heritage  in  context.  Although  the  crown  (through  its  instrument  the 
Consejo  de  la  Suprema  y  General  Inquisicion)  was  to  inflict  appalling  `punishment'  upon 
Jews  for  a  trumped  up  cultural  `crime',  things  had  not  always  been  so.  The  process  of 
'cleansing'  which  would  directly  affect  Vives'  family  was  one  which  gradually  increased  in 
virulence  from  disparate  origins  to  become  a  concrete  expression  of  Spanish  crown  policy. 
17 Inner  exile:  the  legacy  of  Spanish  policy  against  the  Jews. 
In  the  twelfth  century  a  general  ethos  of  religious  tolerance  meant  that 
[in]  the  commercial  sphere,  no  visible  barrier  separated  Jewish, 
Christian  and  Saracen  merchants  during  the  major  period  of  Jewish 
life  in  Spain.  Christian  contractors  built  Jewish  houses  and  Jewish 
craftsmen  worked  for  Christian  employers.  Jewish  advocates 
represented  gentile  clients  in  the  secular  courts.  Jewish  brokers 
acted  as  intermediaries  between  Christian  and  Moorish  principals.  6 
However,  political  rivalry  during  the  thirteenth  century  was  to  undermine  this  way  of  life. 
Anti-Jewish  legislation  became  increasingly  prevalent  throughout  Europe,  although  for  a 
time  such  legalised  bigotry  was  resisted  in  the  Spanish  Kingdoms  (where  Jews  represented 
a  sizeable  socio-economic  group).  But  the  Cortes  repeatedly  argued  for  antisemitic  rulings 
amidst  growing  hostility  to  the  Jewish  community.  This  hostility  largely  came  from 
the  urban  elites  who  were  debtors  to  the  Jews,  from  the  ordinary 
Christian  population  who  lived  beside  the  Jews  in  the  towns  but 
resented  their  separateness  and  their  apparent  success,  and  from 
some  rural  communities  which  considered  the  urban  Jews  as  their 
exploiters.  Jews  were,  of  course,  culturally  different;  but  they  were 
Spaniards  and  in  no  sense  a  separate  race,  nor  at  any  time  were  their 
numbers  augmented  from  abroad.  Their  spoken  language  was 
moreover  the  same...  in  the  Muslim  kingdoms  they  spoke  Arabic... 
and  in  Castille  they  spoke  Castillian.  7 
Meanwhile,  Jews  continued  to  follow  a  variety  of  professions  and  trades.  Many  owned  or 
leased  rural  properties  (small  farms,  vineyards,  orchards,  )  or  were  chemists,  doctors, 
butchers,  jewellers,  financiers,  grocers,  weavers.  Indeed,  there  was  a  tradition  of 
cosmopolitanism  amongst  the  Jewish  community  in  Spain: 
[R]arely  did  Christian  or  Muslim  scholars  visit  the  cultural  centres 
of  the  opposing  faith,  but  there  were  many  Jews  who...  travelled 
extensively.  Moreover  when  Jews  conversed  with  Christians  or 
Muslims  they  had  to  use  the  language  of  the  people  they  were 
talking  to.  The  result  was  a  formidable  linguistic  proficiency  even 
18 at  non-scholarly  levels...  Jews,  therefore,  made  excellent 
diplomats  and  ambassadors...  More  importantly  they  played  a  vital 
role  in  the  translation  of  scholarly  works  and  in  the  transmission  to 
Europe  of  Arabic-Greek  learning  8. 
By  the  fourteenth  century,  economic  conditions  were  causing  distress  and  the  period  of 
conviviencia  crumbled.  Riots  occurred  against  those  deemed  to  be  privileged  and  these  riots 
spread  through  Seville,  Valencia,  Cordoba  and  Barcelona.  But  Jewish  prosperity  had 
become  exaggerated  in  the  public  perception.  Henry  Kamen9  states  that  contemporary 
statistics  for  many  aljanurs  (Jewish  `quarters')  show  that  while  Jews  were  most  active  in 
trade,  they  were  rarely  wealthy  merchants.  In  addition,  the  numbers  of  Jewish  farmers  and 
peasants  was  increasing  10.  Legislation  was  to  deny  Jews  the  right  to  hold  political  office, 
bear  a  title,  bear  arms,  change  their  `domicile',  practice  the  trades  of  butcher,  carpenter, 
tailor,  grocer,  and  to  hire  Christian  employees.  This  legislation  was  not  always  enforced, 
but  indicates  a  change  in  how  Jews  were  regarded  in  political  spheres,  if  not  indeed  in 
public  opinion. 
It  may  be  argued  that  institutional  antisemitism  reached  its  apogee  during  the  reign  of 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  although  the  charge  of  antisemitism  would  surely  not  have  been 
recognised  by  the  monarchy,  or  by  members  of  church  and  state  hierarchy.  Legislation 
curtailing  the  freedoms  due  to  Christian  groups  had  long  been  instigated  against  Jewish 
citizens,  and  such  legislation  was  accepted  as  legitimate  by  the  Spanish  monarchy. 
Seemingly  at  odds  with  this  legislation,  Isabella  did  give  protection  to  some  Jewish 
communities  (in  1477  to  that  at  Trujillo,  in  1479  to  that  in  Caceres)  though  protectionist 
policy  was  to  change.  Initially  it  may  have  been  that  these  communities  were  protected 
because  of  benefits  accruing  from  their  commercial  activities  rather  than  because  Isabella 
viewed  Jews  as  meriting  crown  protection  as  people.  On  the  subject  of  crown  protection, 
Kamen  writes: 
19 [Al  policy  of  partial  expulsion  of  Jews,  with  the  aim  of  separating 
them  from  their  converso  brethren,  was  gradually  introduced  by  the 
Inquisition.  At  the  end  of  1482,  a  partial  expulsion  of  the  Jews  of 
Andalucia  was  ordered.  In  January  1483  Jews  were  ordered  to  be 
expelled  from  the  dioceses  of  Seville,  Cordoba  and  Cadiz;  the  crown 
delayed  implementation  and  they  were  not  actually  driven  out  from 
Seville  until  summer  1484.  In  1486  Jews  were  expelled  from  the 
dioceses  of  Saragossa,  Abarracin  and  Teruel  in  Aragon...  Though 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  intervened  repeatedly  to  protect  their  Jews 
from  excesses  (as  late  as  1490  they  began  an  enquiry  into  Medina 
del  Campo's  ban  on  Jews  setting  up  shops  in  the  main  square),  the 
monarchs  appear  to  have  been  thoroughly  convinced  by  Inquisitor 
General  Torquemada  of  the  necessity  for  the  separation  of  Jews. 
When  the  local  expulsions  failed,  after  ten  long  years,  to  stem  the 
heresies  of  the  conversos,  the  crown  decided  on  the  most  drastic 
measure  of  all  -a  total  expulsion  of  Jews.  " 
It  could  be  reasoned  that  certain  of  these  protective  policies  were  mere  lipservice  paid  to 
what  was  after  all  a  significant  minority  group.  Questions  are  raised  as  to  how  consistent 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  were  in  their  intention  to  protect  the  Jews  as  a  people,  and  to  how 
much  sway  Torquemada  had  over  them.  Crown  policy  regarding  Jewish  subjects  seems  at 
best  erratic,  at  worst  antisemitic. 
Jews  were  a  significant  minority  in  Spain  and  were  integral  to  commercial  society  and  to 
urban  economics.  Initial  crown  policy  has  a  tone  of  appeasement,  of  doing  just  enough  to 
seem  to  protect  Jews  without  really  wielding  much  authority  over  cortes  or  Inquisition  to 
stop  their  antisemitism.  (The  hope  may  have  been  to  retain  the  loyalty  of  the  majority.  )  At 
first,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  were  reluctant  to  expel  all  Jews  because  they  did  not  want  to 
"lose  revenue  from  the  disappearance  of  a  community  whose  taxes  were  paid  directly  to  the 
crown,  and  which  moreover  had  helped  to  finance  the  war  in  Granada"12.  Their  decision  to 
expel  could  have  been  based  upon  religious  conviction  and  no  doubt  a  prevailing  ethos  of 
Christian  superiority  gave  rise  to  an  atmosphere  in  which  Jews,  for  political  purposes,  could 
be  regarded  as  non-people  having  no  rights  within  the  law  to  live  as  they  chose.  The  decree 
of  expulsion  of  1492  gave  the  Jews  a  simple  order:  convert  to  Christianity  within  four 
months  or  leave  the  country.  Many  conversos  were,  or  would  become,  powerful  members 
20 of  Spanish  society  (including  Torquemada,  who  was  of  Jewish  ancestry)  but  this  does  not 
alter  the  fact  that  the  policy  of  expulsion  had  considerable,  irreversible  effects. 
Furthermore,  on  the  question  of  whether  the  Inquisition  was  motivated  by  faith  or  not,  it 
should  be  noted  that  in  1482  Pope  Sixtus  IV  issued  a  bull  which  complained  that  the 
Inquisition  was  motivated  not  by  faith  but  by  greed.  He  wrote: 
many  true  and  faithful  Christians,  on  the  testimony  of  enemies, 
rivals,  slaves...  have  without  any  legitimate  proof  been  thrust  into 
secular  prisons,  tortured  and  condemned  as  relapsed  heretics, 
deprived  of  their  goods  and  property  and...  executed,  to  the  peril  of 
their  souls...  13 
In  the  face  of  written  pressure  from  Ferdinand,  Sixtus  renounced  this  bull.  It  seems  that  by 
"giving  their  blessing  to  the  persecution  of  conversos,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  gained 
support  among  the  popular  masses  and  the  clergy,  while  at  the  same  time  they  increased  the 
power  of  the  state.  ""4  Subsequently,  the  text  of  the  1492  edict  may  have  given  a  religious 
reason  for  expulsion,  but  many  of  the  documents  which  followed  it  are  "concerned  with  the 
appropriation  of  Jewish  capital  and  property"  1  5.  Eleazar  Gutwith  makes  a  further  point,  that 
[in]  a  number  of  cases,  the  expulsion  meant  that  the  quarters  in 
which  there  had  been  a  Jewish  presence  for  centuries  became 
abandoned  and  hence  degraded,  creating  municipal  problems  and 
devaluing  the  property.  Thus,  in  Teruel,  after  the  expulsion,  there 
followed  looting,  mainly  of  the  door  posts,  the  windows  and  the 
beams  of  Jewish  houses  which  were  used  for  rebuilding  or  as 
firewood.  16 
This  stands  as  a  metaphor  for  what  was  happening  to  Jewish  culture  in  Spain;  under 
Suprema  procedure  the  accused  was  "a  priori  guilty  and  had  to  prove  his  innocence"". 
Even  before  the  1492  edict,  then,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  had  organised  the  Consejo  de  la 
Suprema  y  General  Inquisicion  to  investigate  conversos  who  were  suspected  of  relapsing  to 
Judaism.  The  holy  war  against  Moslem  settlement  in  Spain  had  ended  in  1492  and  the 
21 reinforcement  of  a  common  (Catholic)  faith  had  obvious  political  overtones.  Spanish 
territorial  unity  did  not  of  itself  ensure  a  common  concept  of  nationality.  Indeed  the  creation 
of  nations  as  singular  entities  was  still  in  its  early  stages,  though  a  "feudal  organization  of 
society  was  giving  place  to  a  more  modern  concept,  that  of  the  state,  enclosed  by  precise 
boundaries  and  endowed  with  rights  over  all  who  lived  within  them.  "'  8A  new  `emotional' 
bond  had  to  be  created  between  the  peoples  of  Spain  who  had  individualised  perceptions  of 
cultural  identity:  to  be  Aragonese  was  far  different  to  being  Castillian  and  factionalism  was 
an  incipient  possibility  where  cultural  identity  was  fragmented.  One  overt  way  of  creating 
such  a  bond  was  to  direct  a  common  cause.  Now  that  the  infidel  had  been  driven  out, 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  capitalised  on  a  tradition  of  antisemitic  feeling  dating  at  least  from  the 
middle  ages  (though  interspersed  by  periods  of  religious  tolerance).  By  their  policies  they 
attempted  to  encourage  Spanish  Catholics  to  view  the  indigenous  Jewish  community  as  an 
infection  of  which  `their'  nation  must  be  cauterised.  The  Inquisition  would  burn  two 
thousand  condemned  conversos.  These  deaths,  coupled  with  the  exodus  of  those  expelled, 
were  an  enormous  drain  on  the  population  and  the  loss  of  these  people  weakened  the 
economic  base  of  the  country  and  constituted  a  constriction  of  cultural  identity.  In  addition, 
with  regard  to  religious  identity,  force  could  rarely  provoke  anything  but  a  nominal 
conversion,  particularly  since  an  unwilling  Jewish  convert  to  Christianity  could  hold  to  the 
Talmudic  principle  that  a  Jew  "even  though  he  has  sinned  remains  a  Jew"  9.  This  was  a 
principle  which  covered  subsequent  generations  brought  up  in  the  Christian  faith  as  well  as 
the  converso  him/herself.  Thus  in  most  ways,  the  decree  of  expulsion  was  "a  scourge  but 
not  a  final  solution"20. 
Only  superficially  does  the  argument  hold  that  the  Inquisition  was  set  up  principally  to 
investigate  conversos;  the  reality  was  more  complex.  The  case  of  the  Inquisition's  dealings 
in  Valencia  will  serve  as  illustration: 
22 [WJhen  the  Inquisition  began  its  operations  in  the  mid-1480's  it 
found  three  categories:  those  who  were  Jewish  in  all  but  name;  those 
who  practised  both  religions  simultaneously;  and  those  who  held 
themselves  to  be  complete  Catholics.  In  the  first  group  hundreds 
were  executed.  Those  in  the  second  group  were  also  executed.  The 
third  group  contained  Christians  with  inherited  remnants  of  Jewish 
ways,  subsequently  abandoned;  but  if  they  failed  to  confess  they 
were  prosecuted  and  could  be  executed.  Informers  and  witnesses 
were  often  servants  who  had  been  mistreated,  or  others  with  a 
grievance  against  the  accused.  So  the  Inquisition  provided  the 
community  with  a  powerful  weapon  of  social  control,  by  permitting 
them  to  settle  disputes  at  the  expense  of  outcasts,  and  to  frustrate  the 
ambitions  of  conversos.  2' 
The  Inquisition  was  thus  the  agent  of  antisemitism  and  many  of  its  officials  were 
automatically  suspicious  of  conversos. 
Haim  Beinart  stresses22  that  many  conversos  had  no  real  allegiance  to  their  new  religion, 
having  been  converted  by  force.  And  conversion  did  not  "open  Christian  society's  gates  to 
the  converted;  they  were  left  to  their  fate.  Neither  Christian  society  in  Spain  nor  the  Church 
created  means  for  their  assimilation,  doing  nothing  to  teach  them  its  tenets  or  to  accept  them 
as  equals  in  its  fold.  "23  Actually,  conversos  were  forbidden  to  leave  Spain,  so  even  in  their 
apparent  obedience  to  the  edict  they  were  still  being  victimised  by  the  crown  and  the 
Inquisition.  As  Moshe  Idel  writes, 
...  one  of  the  most  dreadful  consequences  of  the  decision  to  expel 
the  Jews  from  the  Iberian  Peninsula  was  to  augment  the  existing 
numbers  of  conversos.  Faced  with  the  depressing  alternative  of 
either  leaving  the  Peninsula  or  converting  to  Christianity,  many  of 
the  Jews  preferred  water  to  wandering...  [After]  the  expulsion  the 
conversos  became  a  major  problem  for  both  Jews  and  Christians... 
[who]  tried  to  ensure  the  complete  divorce  of  the  neophytes  from 
their  former  religion.  24 
Those  who  remained  were  condemned  to  an  "inner  exile,  usually  just  as  terrifying  and 
fateful  as  that  embarked  upon  by  the  refugees"'-5.  The  impact  of  this  hidden  imprisonment 
was  one  of  such  enormity  that,  for  instance,  Sephardi  communities  "always  remembered  the 
expulsion  as  crucial  both  materially  and  spiritually",  a  time  in  which  important  "centres  of 
23 learning  disintegrated;  great  spiritual  leaders  died;  and  in  the  new  environments  into  which 
the  Jews  were  thrown...  [the  focus  of  cultural  identity]  had  to  be  rebuilt.  "26 
Wider  Spanish  society  may  have  supported  the  Inquisition  passively  as  a  social  organism 
but  at  an  individual  level 
[tJhe  records  of  the  Inquisition  are  full  of  instances  where 
neighbours  denounced  neighbours,  friends  denounced  friends,  and 
members  of  the  same  family  denounced  each  other.  Many  of  these 
cases  would  have  arisen  through  sheer  malice  or  hatred.  But  there 
were  others,  more  significant  and  terrible,  where  fear  of 
denunciation  alone  became  a  spur  to  confession  and  counter- 
denunciation.  27 
Racism  was  encapsulated  in  Church  and  State  office.  By  the  time  of  Vives'  birth  the 
concepts  of  "honour,  pride  and  reputation"  had  become  "chauvinistic  and  exclusivist...  It 
was  felt  by  many  that  one's  faith  and  nation  could  be  preserved  only  by  ensuring  that  one's 
lineage  was  preserved  free  of  contamination  by  Jews  and  MUSliMS.  "211  Worse,  the 
acceptance  of  limpieza  ('purity'  of  the  blood  line)  meant  that  ancestry  could  be  termed  a 
crime  of  which  generations  could  never  be  free  and  though 
limpieza  was  practised  in  only  a  limited  number  of  public 
institutions,  those  were  undeniably  so  important  that  a  serious 
barrier  to  status  and  mobility  was  created.  In  theory  canon  law 
limited  the  extent  to  which  the  sins  of  the  fathers  could  be  visited  on 
their  sons  and  grandsons.  But  limpieza  in  practice  adopted  no  such 
limits.  If  it  were  proved  that  an  ancestor  on  any  side  of  the  family 
had  been  penanced  by  the  Inquisition  or  was  a  Moor  or  a  Jew,  the 
descendant  could  be  accused  of  impure  blood  and  disabled  from 
office.  Applicants  for  many  posts  had  to  present  genealogical  proofs 
of  the  purity  of  their  lineage.  The  fraud,  perjury,  extortion  and 
blackmail  that  came  into  existence  because  of  the  need  to  prove 
limpieza  was  widely  recognized  as  a  moral  evil.  ' 
This  was  a  legacy  which  Luis  Vives  experienced,  as  shall  now  be  explained. 
24 Vives' 
family 
Once  Vives  had  left  Valencia  to  go  to  the  university  of  Paris  to  study,  he  was  never  to  return 
to  his  "beloved  Spain".  His  childhood  was  shaped  by  his  parents  who  were  conversos.  He 
was  given  a  Christian  education  at  home,  though  it  seems  likely  that  he  would  also  have 
been  taught  in  the  Jewish  tradition.  As  late  as  March  1500,  Valencian  inquisitors  "raided  a 
fully  equipped  clandestine  synagogue"  which  was  operating  in  the  home  of  Vives'  uncle, 
Miguel3o. 
With  regard  to  family  life  in  general,  Vives'  mother  (Blanquina  March  y  Almenara)  made  a 
great  impression  on  him.  He  wrote: 
[No]  mother  loved  her  child  better  than  mine  did  me,  nor  any  child 
did  ever  less  perceive  himself  loved  of  his  mother  than  did  I.  She 
never  lightly  laughed  upon  me...  and  yet,  when  I  had  been  three  or 
four  days  out  of  her  house,  she  wist  not  where,  she  was  almost 
sore  sick...  [A]fter  I  came  to  a  young  man's  estate  there  was 
nobody  whom  I  delighted  more  to  have  in  sight  [than  Blanquina]; 
whose  memory  now  I  have  in  reverence,  and  as  oft  as  she  cometh 
to  my  remembrance,  I  embrace  her  within  my  mind  and  thought, 
when  I  cannot  with  my  body  31 
Luis  Vives  was  Jewish  by  maternal  and  paternal  heritage.  His  mother  had  converted  to 
Catholicism  one  year  before  the  edict  of  expulsion  was  passed,  but  she  was  descended  from 
the  March  and  Almenara  lineages  and  this  was  to  pose  problems.  Both  families  were 
investigated  by  the  Valencian  inquisition,  indeed  the  "converso  origins  of  the  Almenara 
family,  in  particular,  were  so  well  known  in  Valencia  that  as  recently  as...  1697,  the 
Suprema  had  stated  categorically  that  no  descendant  of  that  family  could  ever  be  considered 
by  the  tribunal"  for  an  official  post32.  Vives'  father,  Luis  Vives  Valeriola,  was  probably  the 
son  of  conversos,  but  had  been  periodically  investigated  by  the  Valencian  wing  of  the 
Inquisition  since  the  age  of  sixteen  33.  Vives'  parents  were  never  considered  by  the 
25 authorities  to  have  remained  Christian  and  the  discovery  of  the  clandestine  synagogue  in 
Miguel  Vives'  home  would  have  been  taken  as  confirmation  of  their  suspicions. 
Vives'  father  was  executed  in  1524  by  the  Inquisition  and  his  sisters  were  deprived  of  any 
rights  to  the  family  property.  Vives  watched  his  Jewish  heritage  being  used  to  destroy  his 
father's  life,  his  mother's  reputation  (she  was  reinvestigated  after  her  death  and  deemed  to 
have  relapsed  to  Judaism  during  her  lifetime),  and  his  sisters'  economic  security.  It  is  not 
unfounded  to  claim,  as  Carlos  Norefla  does,  that  Vives'  "concrete  introspection  of  the  self, 
his  increasing  isolationism  from  friends  and  society,  the  startling  mixture  of  his  biting 
scepticism  and  comforting  religious  faith"34  are,  to  some  extent,  a  legacy  of  his  experience 
of  being  a  part  of  an  unfairly  despised,  outcast  and  devalued  social  group.  In  1529  Vives 
wrote  about  the  concept  of  `homeland'  in  Depacificatione.  He  refers  to  the  effects  of 
Inquisition  policies  in  Spain  and  comments  that  some  people  forget  their  homeland  and  go  to 
a  place  where  life  passes  quietly  and  peacefully...  Such  a  place  they 
regard  as  their  homeland...  and  they  regard  as  the  place  of  their 
exile  the  place  where  one  citizen  harasses  another  or  a  newcomer... 
where  one's  spirit  is  disturbed  by  a  relative,  a  friend,  a  slight 
acquaintance,  or  an  utter  stranger,  and  one  is  torn  from  his  repose. 
It  is  not  only  impossible  to  endure  this;  to  see  it  is  so  revolting  that 
many  prefer  to  abandon  their  houses  and  their  homeland...  and  go 
away  to  distant  lands,  where  they  will  not  perceive  such 
disagreeable  things...  Who  can  regard  the  dissensions  of  citizens  or 
neighbors  with  pleasure,  knowing  that  the  tempest  will  either 
suddenly  or  little  by  little  engulf  him?  35 
Clearly,  Vives  has  his  own  situation  in  mind. 
Apart  from  the  situation  created  by  the  1492  edict  of  expulsion,  Vives  lived  in  a  time  when 
population  decrease  and  migration  occurred  for  other  reasons  and  where  persecution  of 
various  groups  was  widespread  in  Europe.  Sixteenth  century  Europe  was  a  place  where 
every  four  to  five  years  (usually  for  climatic  reasons)  there  was  a  harvest  failure  in  most 
countries,  where  disease  was  endemic  and  malnourishment  commonplace,  where  fifty  per 
26 cent  of  children  died  in  the  first  year  of  life,  where  urban  violence  was  frequent,  born  out 
of  "sheer  misery"36.  Migration  to  find  work  was  epidemic  as  was  emigration  to  escape 
persecution.  It  was  also  common  for  those  who  wished  a  university  education  to  leave  their 
country  of  birth  and  travel  elsewhere  to  a  centre  of  learning,  as  Vives  was  to  do. 
Vives'  education 
In  1509  Luis  Vives  left  Valencia  to  go  to  Paris,  to  the  college  of  Montaigu  (where  Erasmus 
had  also  studied).  He  was  to  endure  the  rigorous  asceticism  of  Montaigu  for  three  years, 
studying  only  for  a  Bachelor  of  Arts  degree.  He  did  not  continue  to  gain  a  Master's  or  to  do 
Doctoral  work.  At  Montaigu  he  studied  philosophy  but  became  quickly  disenchanted  by  the 
"silly  and  empty  sophismata"  which  he  had  to  learn,  by  the  "folly  of  academic  honours  and 
degrees"37  and  by  the  archaic  influence  of  the  teachers.  His  time  at  Montaigu  gave  him 
experience  of  teaching  methods  and  of  educational  content  firmly  rooted  in  medieval 
practices,  for  example  disputation,  reliance  on  the  study  of  rhetoric  and  an  emphasis  placed 
on  Aristotelian  logic.  The  beliefs  which  he  began  to  develop  while  he  was  studying  there 
were  written  down  six  years  after  Vives  left  Paris  in  his  first  major  work  (In 
pseudodialecticos,  1519).  This  text  was  both  an  attack  on  the  University  of  Paris  and  a 
rudimentary  attempt  to  analyse  the  existing  system  of  teaching  there  with  a  view  to  stating 
why  it  had  become  an  educational  irrelevance.  Vives  left  Paris  profoundly  aware  that,  as  far 
as  his  intellectual  development  was  concerned,  his  time  there  had  been  wasted.  The 
universities  of  Louvain  and  Oxford  were  similarly  to  disappoint  him  when  he  taught  there. 
He  began  teaching  at  Louvain  in  1517  but  was  put  off  by  the  petty  controversies  and 
personal  rivalries  which  were  endemic  to  academic  life.  In  general,  he  felt  that  universities 
27 acted  for  the  benefit  of  the  existing  intellectual  establishment  rather  than  to  encourage 
educational  relevance  or  progress.  His  view  may  have  been  jaundiced,  however,  because  he 
seemed  not  to  like  the  actual  business  of  teaching.  In  a  letter  to  Erasmus  written  in  1522 
Vives  states  that  he  has  been  teaching  in  Bruges  but  adds:  "I  am  so  tired  of  teaching  that  I 
would  do  anything  rather  than  return  to  this  dreary  life  and  have  schoolboys  for 
company.  "'8 
Before  going  to  England  in  1523,  Vives  spent  time  in  Bruges  and  Louvain.  Bruges  would 
become  his  home  and  he  would  eventually  marry  a  woman  from  the  town,  Margaret 
Valdaura.  During  Vives'  lifetime  Bruges  was  to  decline  in  economic  importance  as 
Amsterdam  grew,  and  the  social  effects  of  this  decline  led  him  to  write  De  subventione 
pauperum  in  1526  as  a  reaction  to  the  growth  of  unemployment  and  the  suffering  caused  by 
a  failing  economy.  This  work  is  a  comment  upon  the  causes  of  social  injustice  as  well  as  a 
manual  of  public  welfare.  Vives  wrote  that  he  would  "not  have  as  a  Christian  he  who, 
within  his  means,  gives  no  help  to  an  indigent  brother"39.  While  Vives  suggestions  were  at 
heart  "undeniably  trying  to  control  the  aberrant  and  criminal  behaviour  of  vagabonds  in  an 
age  of  demographic  and  economic  displacement"-ý°,  he  did  base  his  scheme  of  poor  relief  on 
ideals  of  (Christian)  brotherhood.  In  his  outlook  Vives  was  "exceptional",  arguing  for  "a 
fundamental  unity  among  all  Christians"41.  According  to  Abel  Athougia  Alves  this  made 
Vives  "despised  and  alien  in  the  eyes  of  both  arch-Catholics  and  arch-Protestants"42. 
Moreover,  like  many  humanists,  he  did  not  extend  'Christian'  sympathy  to  non-Christian 
peoples.  This  was  most  notably  the  case  with  his  attitudes  towards  the  Turks,  the  subject  of 
his  De  Europae  dividers  et  bello  Turcio  and  De  conditione  vitae  Christianorurm  sub  Turca 
(both  1526). 
28 Crisis  In  England 
There  was  to  be  a  period  of  tension  and  uncertainty  in  Vives'  life,  though  at  first  there  was 
no  hint  of  the  unsettling  events  to  come.  His  work  and  study  continued,  and,  as  with  many 
humanists  living  and  working  in  Northern  Europe,  he  was  influenced  by  Erasmian 
concepts.  Vives  and  Erasmus  met,  as  far  as  is  known,  in  1516  and  were  to  correspond  until 
1534.  But  once  Vives  began  to  develop  his  own  philosophy,  independent  of  Erasmian 
thought,  the  friendship  cooled  and  letters  became  infrequent.  For  Erasmus  the  relationship 
seems  to  have  been  that  of  teacher  and  pupil  and  it  was  cordial  at  least  until  1520,  with 
Erasmus  ending  one  letter  to  Vives:  "Farewell,  Luis  my  scholarly  friend,  and  pray  let  us  see 
you  here  (in  Louvain)  well  and  cheerful,  as  soon  as  possible.  "43  The  breakdown  began  in 
1521  during  the  preparation  of  Augustine's  DecivitateDei,  which  Erasmus  had  asked  Vives 
to  annotate.  While  working  on  the  project,  Vives  became  ill  but,  despite  this,  Erasmus 
pressed  for  completion  of  the  text.  Vives  wrote  to  him  saying  that  although  six  books  were 
completed  they  had  not  yet  been  sent.  He  apologised,  explaining: 
I  thought  it  better  to  postpone  Augustine  than  to  work  myself  to 
death,  or  end  up  useless  for  anything  else,  laid  low  by  sickness... 
Augustine,  if  he  is  put  off,  I  can  easily  pick  up  again  whenever  I 
please.  I  beg  you  urgently,  if  you  do  not  think  the  blame  for  this  lies 
with  time  or  fate...  at  least  to  forgive  this  mistake,  if  I  really  was 
mistaken  +4 
But  Vives'  decision  to  suspend  work  on  Augustine  was  no  mistake;  his  health  was  poor 
and  his  patron,  William  of  Croy,  had  recently  died  leaving  him  with  little  income. 
However,  Erasmus  appeared  to  be  annoyed  at  the  delays,  while  Vives  became  anxious  at 
Erasmus'  lack  of  communication.  He  ends  the  above  letter:  "Be  sure  and  send  me  an 
answer  by  the  bearer  of  this  letter...  and  if  you  either  cannot  or  will  not  do  so  in  writing,  at 
least  let  me  know  by  word  of  mouth...  how  things  are  going.  "45  The  annotated  Decivitate 
29 Del  would  not  be  published  until  1528  and  Erasmus  would  blame  Vives  for  the  financial 
failure  of  the  commentaries-".  What  may  have  been  underlying  the  breakdown  of  the 
relationship  was  that  Vives  intellectually  outgrew  dependency  on  Erasmus'  counsel  as  far  as 
work  was  concerned  and  this  did  not  suit  Erasmus'  ego.  Erasmus  offered  Vives  no  support 
when  he  really  needed  it  during  the  time  he  was  in  England  and  involved  in  the  problems 
arising  from  Henry  Vlll's  moves  to  divorce  Catherine.  By  1522  Erasmus  was  addressing 
Vives  as  "my  admirable  friend"  to  which  Vives  responded  "I  do  beg  you  not  to  be  so  distant 
with  me"47.  Eventually,  exasperated  at  Erasmus'  tone,  Vives  wrote:  "If  from  now  on  you 
allow  your  amanuenses  to  write  to  me  in  this  style  I  will  have  to  throw  away  your  letters"48. 
Gradually,  Vives'  health  deteriorated.  Disturbed  by  political  and  religious  tensions  in 
Europe,  and  undergoing  something  of  an  emotional  crisis,  he  wrote  (in  1522): 
Everything  here  in  Louvain  remains  the  same,  dirty,  stupid,  and 
intolerable.  There  is  something  about  this  city  that  I  simply  hate  and 
always  did.  Nowhere  in  the  whole  world  do  I  feel  more  miserable 
than  here. 
My  health  is  now  worse  than  ever.  My  whole  body  is  about  to 
collapse.  The  uncleanliness  and  the  misery  of  this  place  is  going  to 
kill  me.  49 
Although  Vives'  religious  faith  remained,  his  faith  in  men's  ability  to  uphold  Christian 
practice  without  hypocrisy  was  shaken.  He  wrote:  "I  am  totally  benumbed  by  these  crazy 
wars.  Let  all  these  soldiers  go  mad.  Where  is  the  gospel  of  Christ?  Where  are  the  theologians 
now?  Where  are  the  priests?  "50  In  his  De  concordia  et  discordia  generis  huntani  (1529) 
which  examines  the  consequences  of  political  and  religious  machinations,  Vives  reflected  on 
what  he  saw  as  general  Godlessness: 
The  world  has  never  before  seen  such  a  lack  of  piety;  never  before 
was  there  more  calumny  and  defamation.  The  reproach  of  impiety  is 
mutual:  individuals  blame  individuals,  nations  accuse  nations  of  poor 
Christian  spirit...  Unfortunately,  their  reproach  is  well  founded;  their 
only  mistake  is  that  each  one  excluded  himself  from  it.  All  are  equally 
30 impious,  having  lost  even  the  shadow  of  Christianity  they  dare  to 
inquire  into  the  life  of  other  people,  to  condemn  and  to  punish  with 
the  loss  of  fame,  possessions,  and  even  life...  51 
Again,  his  allusions  to  the  situation  in  Spain  and  the  practises  of  the  Inquisition  are  plain.  In 
December  1522  matters  were  not  helped  when  Vives  heard  of  his  brother's  death  and  of  his 
father's  rearrest  by  Inquisition  agents.  Realising  that  he  might  himself  be  at  risk  should  he  go 
back  to  his  home,  Vives  nevertheless  decided  to  return,  travelling  via  England  (where  he 
would  be  given  a  readership  at  Oxford  University).  However,  his  intention  to  travel  to  Spain 
was  not  fulfilled. 
Once  in  England,  Vives  sought  the  help  of  Thomas  More  to  obtain  the  patronage  of 
Catherine  of  Aragon,  which  he  secured.  During  Vives'  first  visit  to  England  he  met 
Catherine  whose  daughter  he  would  tutor  and  for  whom  he  wrote  De  ratione  studii. 
Furthermore,  he  would  write  the  Office  and  Ditties  of  a  Husband  in  tribute  to  Catherine  and 
in  which  he  gives  his  opinion  that  she  has  "suffered  cruel  fortune"  with  "constancy  of 
mind"52.  Vives'  admiration  of  Catherine  centred  on  her  intelligence  and  she  was  certainly  an 
educated  woman.  In  his  De  instittttione  foerninae  christiani  Vives  advocated  a  programme  of 
learning  for  women  which  was  broad  in  comparison  with  contemporary  concepts  of 
women's  education  (as  will  be  argued  in  Chapter  4).  But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  exaggerate 
the  extent  of  Vives'  influence  on  this  aspect  of  learning  with  respect  to  the  majority  of 
women  during  the  sixteenth  century.  A  tiny  minority  of  women  became  highly  educated  at 
this  time,  but  the  impact  of  Vives'  De  instittttione  foemninae  Christiani,  was  minimal. 
During  the  period  1523  -  1526,  Vives  visited  England  on  three  occasions.  Between  these 
visits  he  returned  to  his  home  in  Bruges.  After  the  third  journey  to  England  he  remained  in 
Bruges  for  a  year,  but  was  persuaded  to  return  by  Catherine  who  wanted  him  to  teach  Latin 
to  the  Princess  Mary.  Because  his  friendship  with  Catherine  was  by  this  time  surrounded  by 
the  tensions  caused  by  Henry's  decision  to  divorce  the  Queen,  Vives  was  treated  as  an 
31 unwelcome  presence  at  court.  In  February  of  1528,  Vives  was  cross-examined  by  Wolsey 
about  his  relationship  with  Catherine.  Wolsey  demanded  to  be  told  the  content  of  Vives' 
private  conversations  with  Catherine.  Even  though  Vives  did  not  at  this  stage  say  anything 
which  would  openly  show  disloyalty  to,  or  denigration  of  Henry,  he  understood  how  the 
episode  was  affecting  the  Queen.  He  retorted  in  answer  to  Wolsey's  questioning:  "Who  can 
blame  me  for  listening  to  a  sad  and  unfortunate  woman?  for  talking  to  her  with  sympathy?  "53 
Wolsey  placed  the  Spaniard  under  house  arrest  for  thirty-eight  days,  releasing  him  only  on 
the  condition  that  he  did  not  return  to  the  royal  palace.  Catherine  sent  a  message  to  Vives 
advising  him  to  leave  the  country  for  his  own  safety. 
Once  Vives  was  home  in  Bruges  it  is  unlikely,  Diven  the  circumstances  of  his  return,  that  he 
intended  ever  to  go  back  to  England.  He  did  so  in  November  1528  only  because  Catherine 
chose  him  as  one  of  her  advocates  during  the  examination  into  her  marriage  by  Cardinal 
Campeggio.  This  was  to  be  the  precursor  to  divorce.  In  the  aftermath,  Vives  would  lose 
Catherine's  patronage  and  when  he  left  England  it  would  be  as  an  enemy  of  Henry  and  with 
Catherine  enraged  because  he  would  not  do  what  she  asked  of  him.  He  had  told  her  that  it 
would  be  pointless  to  continue  in  her  attempt  to  defend  her  position  as  Queen.  Vives  wrote 
of  the  episode  to  Juan  Vergara,  telling  him  that  "[t]he  Queen  was  furious  at  me  because  I 
would  not  comply  with  her  wishes...  But  I  will  obey  my  reason...  "54.  Vives  knew  that  the 
fight  for  Catherine  to  remain  as  Henry's  wife  was,  basically,  over;  it  would  only  be  a  matter 
of  time  before  Henry's  cynical  game  would  have  the  outcome  which  suited  him.  Vives 
stated:  "In  these  rough  and  cruel  times,  my  voice  has  been  almost  reduced  to  silence.  "55 
The  "rough  and  cruel  times"  which  arose  from  the  king's  determination  to  divorce  had  also 
been  inflicted  upon  Thomas  More,  who  would  eventually  be  killed  because  he  would  not 
swear  an  oath  which  denied  the  Pope's  authority.  The  resolution  to  the  "great  matter"  of  the 
royal  marriage  would  not  come  quickly;  Henry's  manipulations  continued  and  in  1534  More 
32 wrote  to  Thomas  Cromwell  of  a  meeting  with  Henry  in  which  the  king  stated  that 
his  manage  was  not  onely  agaynst  the  posytive  lawis  of  the  Chirch 
and  the  written  lawe  of  God,  but  also  in  such  wise  agaynst  the  lawe 
of  nature... 
... 
[The]  Kingis  Grace  sheaved  it  me  hymself,  and  layed  the  Bible 
open  byfore  me.  And  there  red  me  the  wordis  that  moved  his 
Highness  and  diverse  other  erudite  persons  so  to  thinke...  56 
Bearing  in  mind  what  was  to  happen  to  More,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Vives  would  comment 
to  Erasmus  in  1535:  "these  are  times  when  to  keep  silence  is  as  dangerous  as  to  speak 
out.  "57  Faced  with  Henry's  requirement  to  be  rid  of  his  wife,  any  prominent  person  could 
be  damned  if  he  argued,  or  if,  like  More,  he  chose  a  course  which  followed  their  own 
principles  against  the  King's.  For  Vives,  the  direct  result  of  this  episode  was  that  patronage 
and  regular  income  were  to  be  sporadic  for  him  after  1528.  The  thought  of  poverty  terrified 
him,  but  in  this  whole  business  the  emotional  cost  was  as  apparent  as  the  financial. 
Vives'  final  years 
In  the  last  decade  of  his  life  Luis  Vives  had  to  deal  not  just  with  the  threat  of  poverty  but 
with  ill-health.  He  was  plagued  by  headaches  and  suffered  from  what  was  probably  an 
ulcer.  At  the  age  of  thirty-six  he  wrote:  "In  the  storms  of  this  life  how  can  death  be  anything 
but  a  gift?  So  far  as  I  am  concerned,  life  is  not  very  pleasant  and  I  am  glad  that,  most  of  it,  I 
think,  has  already  been  thrown  away.  "58  But  Vives  continued  to  work,  voicing  a  concern 
for  social  welfare  in  his  treatise  De  concordia  et  discordia  generis  humanii  (1529).  His  belief 
in  education  as  a  palliative  for  social  problems  gave  rise  to  his  examination  of  the  subject  in 
more  depth  than  he  had  done  previously.  Also  in  1529  he  wrote  De  disciplinis  which, 
although  it  is  a  treatise  on  the  arts  as  a  whole,  contains  his  advocacy  of  a  system  of 
33 education  that  is  radical  in  comparison  to  existing  educational  provision.  In  De  disciplinis 
Vives  attempts  to  analyse  the  limits  and  purposes  of  culture,  the  causes  of  its  corruption, 
and  how  it  might  eventually  be  reformed.  In  another  major  work,  De  anima  et  vita,  he 
proposes  the  study  of  man  from  a  psychological  standpoint,  utilising  the  techniques  of 
observation  and  reflection.  These  works  contain  the  essence  of  Vives'  educational 
philosophy  and,  arguably,  they  were  to  have  both  direct  and  indirect  influence  upon  the 
development  of  European  pedagogy. 
Luis  Vives  died  in  Bruges  in  1540.  He  always  appeared  to  be  troubled  by  the  problems 
surrounding  the  causes  of  human  suffering,  yet  he  did  not  renounce  his  belief  that  education 
has  the  ability  to  reform  and  to  effect  change  in  individuals.  He  retained  a  vision  of  the 
benefits  which  might  be  possible  in  (his)  contemporary  society,  if  people  would  study  and 
learn  from  the  past.  Vives  was,  above  all,  a  humanist  educator,  but  before  looking  at  his 
major  works  in  depth,  the  term  'humanist  educator'  will  be  explored  in  order  to  clarify  its 
meaning  with  reference  to  the  time  in  which  Vives  lived.  It  will  be  necessary  (in  chapters  2 
and  3)  to  address  questions  about  which  influences  shaped  the  humanist  movement  and  thus 
influenced  Vives  himself,  before  studying  the  importance  of  Vives'  work  to  the  history  of 
education  and  its  possible  relations  to  the  framework  of  the  epistemology  of  Pierre 
Gassendi,  Rene  Descartes  and  John  Locke. 
34 Chapter  2:  The  growth  and  spread  of  Italian  humanism 
... 
Renaissance  ideas...  ran  by  a  concealed  conduit  into 
a  strange  land.  The  humanists  exerted  a  huge  influence 
on  art,  moral  philosophy,  classical  scholarship, 
historiography  and  political  theory.  Nevertheless,  their 
chief  effect  was  religious.  Their  moral  notions  helped 
to  fill  a  vacuum  in  Italy  where  the  church  was  weak 
and  pastoral  self-help  the  order  of  the  day.  They  were 
almost  always  assumed  by  the  Italian  humanists  to  be 
in  conformity  with  Christian  doctrines;  all  the  more 
easily  could  they  be  absorbed  into  the  mainstream  of 
religious  thinking,  and  this  happened  after  1500.1 
The  religious  repercussions  of  renaissance  humanism  were  immense.  Humanism  was  a 
movement  which  would  create  a  "critical  spirit  with  which  the  Reformers  belaboured 
orthodoxy"'.  (The  Reformation  grew  partly  from  humanism  which  had  itself  evolved  from 
medieval  scholasticism.  )  Humanists  challenged  the  accepted  philosophical  and  educational 
reliance  upon  the  works  of  Aristotle  fostering,  through  education,  a  more  analytical  and 
critical  approach  to  the  study  of  classical  texts.  Humanist  philosophy  attempted  a  synthesis 
between  pagan  learning  and  Christian  wisdom  and  this  was  indeed  a  "strange  land"  as  it 
might  be  held  that  paganism  and  Christianity  are  irreconcilable.  Yet  humanists  thought 
otherwise,  as  shall  be  explained  in  the  course  of  this  chapter. 
The  humanists'  world-view  emphasised  the  role  of  the  individual  in  society:  that  is, 
individual  wisdom,  virtue  and  conduct  centred  upon  an  education  which  could  teach  and 
35 enhance  those  values  which  had  hitherto  been  the  preserve  of  church  learning.  Personal 
values  had  been  thought  achievable  only  through  Christianity;  humanists,  to  a  certain  extent, 
wrested  personal  salvation  from  the  organised  church  (which  was  widely  regarded  as 
corrupt).  Humanism  taught  that  through  knowledge  of  the  Bible  and  of  classical  texts 
wisdom  could  be  attained;  if  a  man  had  wisdom  he  would  act  virtuously  to  the  benefit  of 
society  and  to  his  own  salvation  through  Christ. 
Beneath  the  title  'renaissance  humanism'  lies  a  complex  philosophy.  The  more  famous 
humanists  such  as  Francesco  Petrarca,  Lorenzo  Valla,  Coluccio  Salutati,  Leonardo  Bruni 
and  later,  Desiderius  Erasmus,  created  work  which  was  of  significant  influence  on  the 
literary  and  artistic  world.  In  general,  humanists  would  reorient  philosophical  thought  and 
education  from  medieval  practice.  This  would  eventually  become  evident  in  university 
education  which  had  traditionally  been  dominated  by  scholastic  theology  and  philosophy. 
Perhaps  the  main  contribution  of  humanism  lay  "above  all  in  the  break  with  scholastic 
traditions  of  education  and  the  incorporation  of  rediscovered  antiquity  in  the  mainstream  of 
European  culture.  "3  This  reorientation  of  pedagogy  would  provide  "the  basis  of  school  and 
university  curricula  all  over  Europe"4. 
In  the  ensuing  discussion  some  explanation  of  scholasticism  will  be  given  in  order  to 
provide  a  framework  for  an  analysis  of  the  specific  criteria  implied  by  the  terms  'humanism' 
and'humanist  education'.  Because  of  the  breadth  of  the  subject  of  humanism,  this  chapter 
will  deal  only  with  Italian  humanism.  Northern  (European)  humanism  will  be  dealt  with  in 
Chapter  3  and  mention  of  Vives'  work  will  not  be  central  until  Chapter  4.  In  the  meantime, 
the  analysis  will  be  confined  to  scholasticism  and  to  an  illustration  of  the  defining  aspects  of 
Italian  humanist  philosophy,  involving  the  following  aspects:  humanist  philosophy  itself, 
the  question  of  'civic'  humanism,  and  humanist  educational  provision  and  curricula. 
36 Scholasticism  and  the  legacy  of  Aristotle 
Aristotle's  thought  had  been  central  to  epistemology  and  to  questions  about  man's  place  in 
the  world,  from  the  classical  era  to  the  Renaissance.  Until  the  growth  of  humanism, 
Aristotle  was  considered  to  be  the  authority  on  non-Christian  philosophy  and  scholasticism 
was  founded  upon  that  authority.  Aristotle's  philosophy  was  built  on  formal  logic  utilised 
less  as  a  specialised  subject  area  and  more  as  the  basic  method  of  reasoning  which  could  be 
used  in  other  intellectual  disciplines  such  as  metaphysics.  Formal  logical  rules  permit 
argument  from  a  premise  the  truth  of  which  is  known,  to  a  conclusion  the  truth  of  which  is 
being  demonstrated.  (if  A  is  B,  and  B  is  C,  then  A  is  C.  )  This  is  a  crucial  aspect  to 
Aristotle's  use  of  logic  and  it  was  an  aspect  upon  which  scholasticism  would  place  its  faith 
in  the  logical  value  of  the  syllogism  as  philosophical  method.  Syllogistic  reasoning  was 
considered  to  be  the  means  of  understanding  the  nature  of  things.  Central  to  Aristotle's 
epistemology  and  philosophy  was  the  quest  for  knowledge  of  things  and  he  framed  four 
questions  to  be  asked  of  particular  things,  but  not  of  universals:  - 
1.  What  is  it? 
2.  What  is  it  made  of? 
3.  How  was  it  made? 
4.  Why  was  it  made? 
This  questioning  implies  that  to  know  a  thing  means  knowing  what  it  is  for  and  to 
understand  this  we  must  know  its  nature  or'form'. 
At  the  heart  of  knowledge,  for  Aristotle  and  for  the  scholastics,  was  knowledge  of  the 
essence  of  things,  or  that  which  makes  a  thing  uniquely  itself,  and  the  means  of  gaining  this 
knowledge  was  linguistic,  resting  upon  syllogistic  reasoning.  In  his  Metaphysics,  Aristotle 
presupposes  a  straightforward  correspondence  between  the  structure  of  language  and  the 
37 structure  of  the  world.  It  is  a  presupposition  which  the  scholastics  also  adopted.  Anything 
which  is  not  the  subject  of  a  proposition  (the  subject  might  be:  man,  cat,  world)  has  to  be  an 
attribute  or  quality  of  a  substance  (tall,  white,  round).  Aristotle's  metaphysical  inquiries  are 
concerned  with  the  study  of  substance  but  in  them  he  attempts  to  apply  language  to  the 
world  as  it  is  known  in  order  to  describe  or  discover  essences  of  things. 
Formal  logic  and  scholasticism 
In  his  Posterior  Analytics  Aristotle  developed  his  theories  of  syllogistic  language  as  it 
affects  'knowing'.  He  wrote:  "All  instruction  and  all  learning  through  discussion  proceed 
from  what  is  known  already.  "5  This  holds  for  dialectical  argument,  the  mainstay  of 
scholastic  logical  analysis  and  the  method  used  for  discovering  knowledge.  (A  simple 
example  would  be:  "All  dogs  bark.  If  an  animal  barks,  it  is  a  dog.  ")  Aristotle  took  knowing 
something  to  mean  the  state  when  we  think  we  know  the  cause  or  reason  as  to  why 
something  is,  or  is  not,  the  case.  This  requires  demonstrable  proof,  although  not  all 
knowledge  is demonstrable  for  Aristotle.  After  all,  there  is  a  starting  point  to  knowledge,  a 
premise  from  which  a  demonstration  begins.  Aristotle  called  these  immediate  premises  and 
did  not  consider  them  to  be  demonstrable.  Demonstration  proceeded  from  prior  (known) 
terms.  ("I  know  that  dogs  bark.  Therefore  if  I  see  an  animal  which  barks,  I  can  deduce  that 
it  is  a  dog.  ")  Syllogisms  were  an  important  tool  in  arguing  from  prior  points  of  knowledge. 
Scholastics  accepted  the  belief  that  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  things  is  possible  while 
elevating  syllogistic  reasoning  to  an  integral  part  of  logical  analysis  in  the  attempt  to 
determine  'truth'.  Both  these  tenets  were  to  be  rejected  or  criticised  by  many  humanist 
scholars. 
38 In  explaining  the  scholastic  concept  of  syllogistic  reasoning  it  may  be  seen  why  humanists 
poured  scorn  upon  it  and  considered  it  to  be  spurious.  Such  reasoning  was  considered  vital 
by  scholastic  dialecticians  (condemned  by  Luis  Vives  in  his  In  pseudodialecticos).  The 
theories  with  which  they  worked  had  their  inception  not  just  with  Aristotle  but  with  the 
development  in  the  twelfth  century  of  the  concept  of  the  properties  of  terms.  Compositely 
known  as  the  Summulists  (after  the  Saanmulae  logicales  by  Peter  of  Spain),  terminist 
logicians  constructed  a  complex  logico-semantic  set  of  concepts.  Peter  of  Spain's  Suunmulae 
became  the  standard  university  textbook  as  terminism  monopolised  university  curricula,  and 
had  been  intended  as  a  compilation  of  Aristotelian  doctrine  completed  after  the  discovery  of 
Aristotle's  Organon.  However,  it  spawned  a  dialectical  logic  which  would,  in  its  use  by 
dialecticians,  seem  to  overturn  Aristotle's  belief  that  no  single  person  can  adequately 
understand  the  nature  of  truth. 
Terminism  was  central  to  scholasticism  and  entailed  the  study  of  the  meaning  of  words  both 
as  singularities  and  in  relation  to  other  words.  Terminist  logicians  argued  for  the  possibility 
that  a  science  of  language  could  exist.  Medieval  nominalist  scholars  (such  as  William  of 
Ockham)  paid  great  attention  to  the  analysis  of  the  functions  of  terms  as  parts  of 
propositions.  Important  to  this,  and  following  Peter  of  Spain,  was  the  insistence  that  formal 
logic  has  to  begin  with  the  study  of  the  properties  of  linguistic  components  (terms).  William 
of  Sherwood's  work  Syncategoreinata  was  also  influential  to  the  terminist  movement.  This 
text  contains  discussion  of  the  properties  and  use  of  syncategorematic  terms  (that  is, 
grammatical  modifiers  like  not,  if,  or  -  terms  which  cannot  function  as  subject  or  predicate 
in  a  proposition  and  which  have  no  referential  functions).  The  properties  of  terms  were 
central  to  the  dialectical  process  of  disputation  which  was  so  important  to  scholastic  logic. 
The  two  principal  properties  discussed  were  signification  (the  meaning  of  a  word  regardless 
of  its  context)  and  supposition  (the  meaning  of  a  word  in  context).  Whatever  spurious 
dialectical  displays  this  would  degenerate  into,  it  was  initially  a  serious  attempt  to  define  a 
39 science  of  language  useful  to  logic  and  to  the  pursuit  of  knowledge.  Scholastic  dialecticians 
may  have  relied  upon  disputation  of  convoluted  syllogisms  ("Socrates,  confined  in  prison 
and  seeing  one  star,  sees  every  star,  although  he  may  not  see  every  star"6)  but  this  was  a 
bastardisation  of  the  original  intent  of  scholars  like  John  of  Salisbury  who  deplored  the  "use 
of  dialectic  as  a  sort  of  game,  as  an  instrument,  that  is,  of  verbal  acrobatics  or  in  the 
discussion  of  unimportant  questions  and,  still  worse,  as  an  instrument  for  gain"'.  This  is 
exactly  what  would  happen,  however,  and,  until  the  Renaissance,  scholastic  logicians  and 
dialecticians,  who  relied  upon  sophistry  as  a  method  of  logical  analysis,  held  a  virtual 
monopoly  on  education. 
Humanists  were  concerned  with  education  as  a  means  to  develop  an  individual's  humanity 
and,  given  this  aim,  they  were  disparaging  of  sophistic  exercises.  They  regarded  the 
scholastics'  insistence  on  the  primacy  of  logic  in  the  curriculum  and  on  the  practice  of 
disputation  as  damaging  to  students'  intellectual  development.  Many  humanists  criticised 
dialectic  as  a  process  which  served  no  proper  function  for  students  studying  logic  and  one 
which  was  based  upon  an  obsession  with  discussing  syllogisms  which  had  no  correct  or 
incorrect  answers.  This  method  of  disputation  ran  counter  to  Aristotle's  comment  that 
the  right  way  to  start  is  not  to  ask  one's  opponent  to  say  that 
something  is  or  is  not  so...  but  rather  to  ask  him  to  say  something 
that  has  meaning  both  for  himself  and  for  someone  else.  For  this  he 
must  do  if  he  is  to  say  anything  at  all.  Otherwise  he  could  not  engage 
in  discussion  either  with  himself  or  with  anyone  else  .  13 
Most  humanists  did  not  believe  that  scholastic  education,  based  as  it  was  on  a  logical 
process  which  was  a  trading  of  verbal  sophistries,  encouraged  students  to  think  or  enquire 
about  the  unknown  or  about  specific  problems.  Philosophers  like  Vives  did  not  consider 
that  scholasticism  enabled  students  to  cope  with  the  realities  of  life,  a  failing  which  was 
becoming  increasingly  evident  as  European  society  changed  in  the  type  of  skills  demanded 
of  certain  areas  of  the  workforce.  Scholastic  methods  were  not  educating  students  in 
40 necessary  abilities.  Vives  wrote  from  first-hand  experience  of  scholastic  pedagogy  that 
students  trained  in  this  way  were 
quite  unsuited  to  conduct  business,  to...  administer  public  or  private 
affairs,  or  deal  with  popular  opinion;  they  are  of  no  more  use  in 
affairs  of  this  kind  than  men  of  straw  [for]  they  have  not  applied 
themselves  to  the  arts  from  which  all  these  things  can  be  learned, 
and  which  govern  human  life  and  thought,  such  as  moral 
philosophy,  which  equips  and  embellishes  the  character;  history, 
which  is  the  mother  of  knowledge  and  experience,  that  is,  of 
practical  wisdom;  oratory,  which  both  teaches  and  tempers  life  and 
common  sense;  political  science  and  economics,  by  which  are 
established  the  condition  and  government  of  civil  and  domestic 
affairs.  9 
This  effectively  summarises  the  general  humanist  'core'  curriculum  and  the  functions  and 
outcomes  of  education  as  humanists  saw  it.  Partly  in  answer  to  an  education  system  which 
many  had  come  to  regard  as  obsolete  and  partly  in  response  to  changes  in  urban  society 
(notably  to  the  growing  demand  for  educated  people  with  the  skills  to  fill  a  widening  range 
of  professions,  especially  in  the  legal  field)  humanist  philosophy  developed.  The  essential 
aspects  of  this  philosophy  will  now  be  discussed. 
Renaissance  humanism  and  education 
The  continuous,  pervasive  influence  of 
(Petrarch's)  writings,  his  discovery  of 
manuscripts,  his  talk  to  other  scholars,  and  to  a 
whole  younger  generation  made  the  way  clear  for 
the  new  outlook,  at  once  Christian  and  classical, 
which  came  to  be  called  Humanism.  '° 
41 It  is  Francesco  Petrarca  (1304-74)  who  is  usually  credited  with  providing  the  essentials  of 
the  character  of  what  would  become  the  humanist  movement.  Having  said  that,  it  would  be 
incorrect  to  state  that  humanism  had  a  specific  beginning  because  it  was  a  development  of 
ideas  over  time.  Humanist  philosophy  would  become  more  complex  and  more  cohesive  in 
its  ideology  and  aims  (though  this  is  not  to  imply  that  its  aims  were  ever  fully  realised),  and 
was  to  encapsulate  concepts  and  reactions  which  Petrarca  did  not  envisage.  What  he  gave  to 
humanism  was  a  reverence  for  classical  texts,  some  of  which  he  rediscovered  (such  as 
Cicero'sProarchia  in  1333),  engendering  the  widespread  consolidation  of  the  influence  of 
Cicero  from  whose  De  republica  was  taken  the  ideal  of  the  arses  hunuinitatis  (liberal/humane 
arts)  so  important  to  humanist  education.  Perhaps  Cicero  "more  than  any  other  writer" 
influenced  "the  early  humanists  by  the  infusion  of  ethical  ingredients  into  politics.  ""  With 
his  "single-minded  energy""'-  Petrarca  inspired  many  contemporaries  as  well  as  the 
`humanists'  who  would  follow.  His  thoughts  were  often  characterised  by  "the  loss  of 
religious  hegemony  and  the  beginning  of  the  search  for  a  more  constructive  wordliness"13,  a 
characteristic  which  was  to  be  advanced  by  humanism  in  general  (although  later  humanists 
such  as  Erasmus  would  attempt  to  reinstate  what  they  took  to  be  the  church's  lost  control). 
Humanists  would  come  to  use  classical  authorities  in  the  "struggle  with  what  they  judged  to 
be  the  barbarities  and  irrelevancies  of  scholastic  theology"  14.  In  their  attack  on  scholasticism 
they  used  not  just  'pagan'  classical  authors  (who  stressed  the  functional  importance  of 
rhetoric  and  eloquence)  but  the  Church  Fathers  (relying  most  commonly  on  Jerome, 
Augustine,  Basil  and  Gregory  of  Nazanius).  They  believed  that  the  Church  Fathers 
had  not  cluttered  their  theology  and  moral  teachings  with 
philosophical  theories  and  inelegant  language  which  distracted  the 
Christian's  attention  from  the  plain  message  of  Scripture.  Rather 
they  had  offered  a  rhetorical  presentation  of  doctrine  meant  to  move 
the  believer  to  accept  those  ideals.  The  Fathers  presented  a  rhetorical 
framework  rather  than  an  Aristotelian-metaphysical  one.  To  the 
humanist  theologians  the  Fathers'  language  was  a  beautiful  idiom 
free  of  philosophical  neologisms  and  useless  speculations.  15 
42 Partly,  Petrarca's  insistence  on  the  value  of  classical  wisdom  derived  from  his  reaction 
against  medieval  ideas  of  natural  philosophy.  He  was  concerned  that  university  curricula 
were  not  catering  adequately  for  the  sciences,  indeed  that  'scientific'  study  could  not 
advance  because  under  the  scholastic  system  such  study  had  become  moribund.  Concern  for 
education  in  general  would  become  a  typical  component  of  humanist  philosophy. 
At  first,  concern  with  the  trivium  subjects  (grammar,  logic  and  rhetoric),  rather  than  those  of 
the  quadrivium,  was  at  the  forefront  of  humanist  reform.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  grammar 
dominated  the  trivium,  but  humanists  would  regard  it  as  subordinate  to  rhetoric.  As 
education  began  to  respond  to  social  changes,  rhetoric  ascended  in  favour  and  rhetorical 
skills  came  to  be  in  demand.  However,  this  response  was  slow  and  education  remained  long 
entrenched  in  scholastic  methodology  and  philosophy.  Furthermore,  education  could  only 
respond  to  humanism  once  there  was  a  recognisable  and  coherent  humanist  philosophy 
accepted  by  an  intellectual  elite  who  could  be  of  influence  in  the  dissemination  of  humanist 
ideas  and  who  would  create  a  demand  for  humanist  education.  The  importance  of  Petrarca 
and  of  other  early  humanists  (for  example,  Salutati,  Niccoli,  da  Verona,  Bracciolini  and 
Vergerio)  was  not  that  they  suddenly  produced  something  called  'humanism'  in  a  complete, 
identifiable  form.  They  did  not;  humanism  evolved  and  gathered  momentum,  amassing 
elements  from  individual  authors  and  responding  to  employment  demands  partly  created  by 
urban  development.  Crucially,  early  humanists  spread  ideas  to  men  who  would  take  up 
positions  of  influence  in  teaching,  the  law,  the  civil  service,  the  church.  These  men  would  in 
turn  often  elaborate  those  ideas  and  further  popularise  them.  This  gradual  amassing  of  ideas 
eventually  formed  the  philosophy  of  humanism. 
43 Entering  the  "humanist  terrain":  humanism  as  philosophy 
In  entering  the  "humanist  terrain"  16  it  should  be  remembered  that  humanists  following 
Petrarca  "employed  various  ancient  sources,  and  reached  different  conclusion  s"17. 
However,  certain  aspects  of  their  thought  were  definitively  'humanist'  and  these  will  be 
outlined  below.  Humanists  also  "saw  their  own  roles  in  remarkably  similar  ways.  For  them, 
as  for  ancient  intellectuals,  philosophy  was  not  the  property  of  a  professional  elite  but  of  an 
educated  lay  class"'  8.  In  practice,  this  educated  lay  class  did  tend  to  form  an  intellectual,  if 
not  financial,  elite.  Early  humanists  often  professed  the  need  for  education  as  a  means  to  the 
gaining  of  wisdom  for  all  men,  but  in  actuality  this  was  never  really  considered  to  be  a 
practical  aim  (for'all  men'read'all  men  of  social  standing').  The  emphasis  should  perhaps 
be  on  the  fact  that  it  was  an  education  aimed  at  laymen  rather  than  at  prospective 
ecclesiastics.  Moreover,  in  examining  the  rise  of  humanist  philosophy,  it  may  be  stated  that 
there  is 
every  justification  for  advancing  the  thesis  that  what  is  commonly 
called  renaissance  humanism  was  an  epiphenomenon,  a 
concomitant  feature  and  integral  part  of  the  overall  ecclesiological, 
philosophical,  governmental  and  political  thinking  that  pervaded  the 
age.  The  impact  which  renaissance  humanism  made  upon  society  at 
large  then  becomes  intelligible,  because  only  historically 
conditioned  movements  can  achieve  such  deep  and  profound 
influence.  19 
Humanism  first  burgeoned  in  Italy  most  probably  because  Italy  had  a  great  tradition  of 
ecclesiastical  and  legal  studies  and  urban  governmental  infrastructures,  all  of  which 
demanded  civil  servants,  notaries,  lawyers  and  churchmen  with  requisite  skills  in  literacy 
and/or  rhetoric.  There  were  also  literary  collections  in  lay  and  secular  institutions,  including 
major  collections  of  classical  works,  which  provided  for  and  responded  to  demands  for 
access  to  classical  authors.  There  was,  too,  a  patriotic  impulse  in  the  development  of 
44 humanism  in  Italy.  Early  Renaissance  scholars  sometimes  felt  that  by  rejecting  scholastic 
philosophy  and  Gothic  art  they  were  reviving  Italian  culture,  which  had  faded  since  the  fall 
of  the  Roman  Empire.  Law  was  especially  important  to  the  development  of  Italian 
humanism  and  with  changes  in  rhetorical  practice  in  education,  practice  in  lawcourts  was 
affected  in  turn.  In  time,  "[ajll  those  who  became  Roman  advocates  had  passed  through  the 
hands  of  the  rhetor  and  been  exposed  to  his  graded  exercises"20.  What  Roman  law, 
its  study,  and  its  application  in  the  public  field  did  was  to  set  in 
motion  the  process  of  secularization  on  the  governmental  level.  It 
was  this  secularization  of  governmental  foundations  and,  therefore, 
of  powers,  which  eventually  conditioned  the  numerous  other 
features  related  to  the  so-called  humanist  renaissance:  their 
emergence  and  development  was  contingent  upon  the  secularization 
of  public  government.  '-' 
It  was  Coluccio  Salutati  (1331-1406),  a  secretary  in  the  Florentine  republic  and  a  noted 
humanist  writer,  who  was  instrumental  in  encouraging  the  demand  for  appointing 
humanists  to  civic  posts  which  continued  in  Florence  after  his  death.  It  was  a  practice  which 
became  increasingly  prevalent  in  other  urban  centres.  In  this,  not  only  did  the  "prestige  and 
emolluments  of  office  make  a  humanist  career  seem  a  lucrative  one",  but  "even  more 
attractive  was  the  fact  that  humanists  were  placed  in  positions  to  advise  the  powerful  and 
wealthy  to  undertake  major  scholarly,  educational,  architectural,  and  artistic  programs"". 
Claims  for  such  'civic'  humanism  will  be  examined  in  greater  depth  later  in  this  chapter. 
45 Humanist  ideals:  eloquence  and  virtue 
Typical  features  of  humanist  philosophy  were,  then,  aspects  such  as  the  study  of  classical 
texts  (with  a  view  to  gaining  wisdom  from  them),  emphasis  on  the  individual  as  an  active 
citizen  and  the  belief  that  personal  virtue  could  be  learned  through  education  based  upon 
study  of  the  humanities.  The  term  'humanist'  was  first  used  to  describe  a  professional 
teacher  of  the  studiahumanitatis  23,  focussing  on  rhetorical  proficiency.  As  the  Renaissance 
progressed,  many  who  adhered  to  humanist  trends  were  no  longer  professional  teachers.  As 
we  have  seen,  scholasticism  had  an  important  role  defined  for  disputation  and  dialectic  and 
it  might  seem  that  the  humanist  centrality  of  rhetoric  and  eloquence  was  simply  a 
continuance  of  this.  But  humanists  distinguished  between  eloquence  (a  virtue  which  could 
be  learned  and  utilised  in  public  service)  and  scholastic  sophistry. 
The  model  for  eloquent  speech  was  found  not  in  scholastic  literature  but  in  classical  authors 
such  as  Cicero  and  Quintilian  from  whom  humanists  developed  the  concept  of  an  education 
capable  of  producing  a  citizen.  Quintilian,  whose  work  was  of  considerable  influence  upon 
humanists,  believed  that  correct  training  could  mould  citizens  and  fit  them  "to  the  demands 
of  both  private  and  public  business"24.  Such  a  citizen  could  "guide  a  state  by  his  counsel, 
ground  it  in  law,  and  correct  it  by  his  judicial  decisions"=5.  The  classical  ideal  of  the  'active' 
citizen  was  adopted  by  most  humanists  who  assumed  that  man's  nature  was  inherently 
corrupt  but  redeemable,  able  to  be  shaped  by  an  educative  process.  It  was  in  the  rediscovery 
of  classical  works  that  a  prime  impulse  was  given  to  the  humanist  ideal  of  the  virtuous  man 
able  to  use  rhetoric  wisely  for  the  common  good.  In  particular,  Cicero's  writings 
46 formed  a  window  through  which  Italian  humanists  looked  into 
antiquity.  In  them  they  found  the  value-system  of  late  Greek 
ethics,  the  potentialities  of  Greek  philosophy  for  the  study  of 
history  and  law,  an  exalted  view  of  art,  a  reverence  for  antiquity 
and  the  idea  of  the  intellectual  as  a  sage  whose  wisdom  could 
guide  his  fellow  citizens.  26 
In  the  Deoratore,  which  was  brought  to  Florence  in  its  newly  discovered  complete  form  by 
Niccolo  Niccoli  27,  Cicero  described  the  orator's  role: 
[It]  is  the  part  of  the  orator,  when  advising  on  affairs  of  extreme 
importance,  to  unfold  his  opinion  as  a  man  having  authority;  his 
duty  too  is  to  arouse  a  listless  nation,  and  to  curb  its  unbridled 
impetuosity.  By  one  and  the  same  power  of  eloquence  the  deceitful 
among  mankind  are  brought  to  destruction,  and  the  righteous  to 
deliverance.  Who  more  passionately  than  the  orator  can  encourage 
to  virtuous  conduct,  or  more  zealously  than  he  reclaim  from 
vicious  courses?  28 
If  the  orator  could  potentially  hold  such  power  it  was  imperative  that  he  be  virtuous  and  use 
that  power  for  the  benefit  of  the  state  and  its  people. 
In  both  classical  and  humanist  philosophy  eloquence  was  equated  with  power  and 
goodness,  and  this  amounted  to  the  effective  laicization  of  the  religious  concept  of  virtuous 
conduct  through  Christian  belief.  Eloquence  was  regarded  by  humanists  as  an  art  which  had 
to  be  taught.  Art  could  therefore  triumph  over  nature.  None  of  which  is  to  say  that  oration 
always  had  the  desired  power  to  affect  the  listener;  frequently  humanist  oratory  could  be  a 
stultifying  and  imitative  stringing  together  of  expected  cliches,  [or] 
it  could  also  become  an  elegant,  imaginative,  and  serious 
argument.  The  compelling  motive  behind  its  use  was  the 
humanists'  belief  in  the  importance  of  moving,  swaying,  and 
entertaining  as  a  part  of  persuasive  instruction,  in  the  necessity  of 
lending  immediacy,  color,  concrete  force  to  their  appeals.  29 
Petrarca  emphasised  the  persuasive  force  of  rhetoric  stating  that  orators  must  first  seek 
wisdom  and  virtue,  although  he  was  aware  of  people's  moral  limitations.  Petrarca  himself 
47 thought  that  he  behaved  differently  when  engaged  in  moral  philosophy  than  when  involved 
in  everyday  life.  The  problem  was  to  put  the  tenets  of  moral  philosophy  into  practice  and 
thereby  effect  the  sort  of  changes  to  behaviour  which  will  now  be  discussed. 
Humanist  philosophy  and  human  nature 
Petrarca's  concern  with  the  nature  of  man  encapsulates  a  critical  aspect  of  humanist  thought 
which  would  be  broadened  by  later  humanist  authors.  As  has  been  mentioned,  humanists 
saw  in  classical  works  the  power  to  produce  'good'  citizens.  Petrarca's  belief  that 
knowledge  was  a  useful,  if  not  a  fundamental,  civilizing  influence  in  the  shaping  of  man's 
nature  was  shared  by  most,  possibly  all,  humanists.  Knowledge  was  only  regarded  as 
beneficial  if  study  moulded  the  character  of  the  students  towards  virtuous  and  dignified 
behaviour.  Thus  the  stadia  humanitatis  placed  the  nature  of  the  individual  at  its  heart.  In  a 
sense  the  humanists  sought  humanity  through  knowledge.  Scholastic  education  was  not 
thought  to  produce  useful  knowledge  and  students  could  not  as  a  result  gain  wisdom.  In 
ridiculing  a  scholastic  opponent  Petrarca  had  this  to  say  on  the  knowledge  being  imparted: 
[H]e  has  much  to  say  about  animals,  birds  and  fishes:  how  many 
hairs  there  are  in  a  lion's  main;  how  many  tail  feathers  there  are; 
with  how  many  arms  the  squid  binds  a  shipwrecked  sailor,  that 
elephants  copulate  from  behind  and  grow  for  two  years  in  the 
womb...  that  the  phoenix  is  consumed  by  aromatic  fire  and  is 
reborn  after  burning...  All  these  things  or  the  greater  part  of  it  is 
wrong...  And  even  if  they  were  true,  they  would  not  contribute 
anything  to  the  blessed  life.  What  is  the  use...  of  knowing  the 
nature  of  beasts,  birds,  fishes  and  serpents,  and  not  knowing,  or 
spurning  the  nature  of  man,  to  what  end  we  are  born,  and  from 
where  and  whither  we  pilgrimage?  30 
48 Thus  Petrarca  rejected  what  he  saw  as  educational  irrelevance  while  reinforcing  the  central 
aspect  of  the  nature  of  man  in  the  process  of  educational  transformation. 
The  notion  of  the  centrality  of  the  individual  was  widened  to  emphasise  the  unique  place  of 
man  in  the  universe;  man  was  viewed  as  the  focal  point  of  the  world,  a  concept  which 
would  develop  into  the  idea  that  nature  existed  for  the  benefit  of  man.  Humanists  regarded 
man  as  a  social  being  and  this  led  to  a  concentration  on  humanity  as  part  of  the  social 
organization.  Humanism  could  be  said,  therefore,  to  have  encouraged  the  "enquiry  into  the 
reborn  citizen  who  was  an  integral  member  of  the  natural  state"  and  what  is  seen  in  this  is 
"renaissance  humanism  in  the  literal  meaning  of  the  term:  it  is  the  rebirth  of  humanity"31. 
Bound  in  with  this  concept  is  the  belief  in  human  dignity.  In  his  Oratio  de  hominis  dignitate 
(1486),  Pico  della  Mirandola  made  human  dignity  his  focus,  believing  that  man  could 
choose  to  become  better.  With  this  in  mind  della  Mirandola  wrote:  "nothing  in  the  world  can 
be  found  that  is  more  worthy  of  admiration  than  man"32.  The  means  to  this  improvement 
was  to  be  learning  of  a  different  type  to  scholasticism:  humanist  learning  which  would 
evolve  from  humanist  philosophy,  in  itself  a  curious  mixture  of  the  pagan  and  the  classical. 
The  effect  of  the  Christian/pagan  synthesis 
Intellectual  accomplishment  was  linked  to  the  concept  of  humanitas  initially  under  Stoic 
influence  and  later  as  a  fundamental  aspect  of  humanist  philosophy.  Man  had  a  divine 
attribute  in  reason  and  by  using  his  reason  he  could  achieve  understanding.  To  Cicero, 
hiimanitas  denoted  the  "pursuit  of  wisdom  by  which  the  rational  soul  would  know  itself 
and  discover  its  fellowship  with  God"33.  This  purpose  suited  humanists  perfectly,  because 
49 they  were  mainly  Christians  and  'fellowship'  with  God  was  an  impeccable  goal.  Classical 
learning  could  thus  provide  wisdom  which  was  not  contradictory  to  Christian  teaching.  This 
was  a  stance  which  the  Church  Fathers  had  not  taken  because,  for  them,  attempts  to 
reconcile  the  pagan  and  the  Christian  were  highly  problematic. 
The  synthesis  of  pagan  and  Christian  concepts  became  increasingly  important  to  humanists 
during  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  They  tried  to  fuse  humanist  philosophy,  based 
upon  classical  theology,  philosophy  and  literature,  with  Christian  belief.  However, 
never  for  a  moment  did  it  occur  to  the  humanists  that  they  were 
wrenching  texts  out  of  context  or  distorting  them,  that  they  were 
reconciling  what  we  now  consider  to  be  irreconcilable.  They  were 
convinced...  that  unity  was  there,  that  all  the  ancient  theologians 
and  philosophers  had  said  the  same.  The  revelations  granted  to 
Orpheus,  Pythagoras,  Plato,  Moses,  Christ...  were  essentially  the 
same,  even  if  they  were  formulated  in  different  ways.  34 
Christianity  thus  became  moulded  within  neo-Platonism  and  this  is  generally  referred  to  as 
Christian  humanism  (where  the  latter  can  be  delineated).  This  synthesis  built  upon 
Petrarca's  earlier  emphasis  upon  the  continuity  between  pagan  and  Christian  thought  in  his 
Deignorantia  in  which  he  writes  of  Cicero  as  "a  visionary  who,  while  speaking  of  the 
nature  of  the  Gods  in  Denaturadeorian,  intuited,  before  the  birth  of  Christ,  the  existence  of 
one  God"35.  Petrarca's  thought,  while  it  in  no  way  denies  Christian  ethics  or  beliefs,  is  a 
partial  response  to  the  lessening  of  religious  hegemony  in  a  situation  where  the  institutional 
church  was  widely  regarded  as  dissolute. 
With  their  study  of  classical  authors,  humanists  developed  a  more  analytical  method  of 
reading  texts  and  a  more  critical  overview  of  history.  They  became  more  aware  of 
sophisticated  historical  processes  involving  psychological  motivation  and  human  interaction 
reviving,  to  an  extent,  a  style  of  "analytical,  political  narrative"36  which  had  been  utilised  by 
50 classical  historians  such  as  Tacitus  and  Polybius.  At  its  most  advanced,  renaissance 
humanism  would  concede  that  socio-political  lessons  could  be  learned  from  history  and 
these  lessons  applied  to  the  modern  era.  This  view  was  promoted  by  Niccolo  Machiavelli 
who  wrote: 
[W]hoever  considers  the  past  and  the  present  will  readily  observe 
that  all  cities  and  all  peoples  are  and  ever  have  been  animated  by 
the  same  desires  and  the  same  passions;  so  that  it  is  easy,  by 
diligent  study  of  the  past,  to  foresee  what  is  likely  to  happen  in  the 
future  in  any  republic,  and  to  apply  those  remedies  that  were  used 
by  the  ancients,  or...  to  devise  new  ones  from  the  similarity  of 
events  37 
Machiavelli's  opinion  was  tempered  by  his  understanding  that  "we  never  know  the  whole 
truth  about  the  past"38  though  he  held  to  a  cyclical  theory  of  history  in  which  "monarchy 
becomes  tyranny;  aristocracy  degenerates  into  oligarchy;  and  the  popular  government  lapses 
readily  into  licentiousness...  "39  Some  renaissance  authors,  like  Machiavelli,  became  skilled 
analysts  of  contemporary  society  and  compared  what  they  learned  in  their  classical  research 
to  the  world  as  they  saw  it. 
If  improved  ability  in  philology  was  displayed  by  some  humanists,  it  is  also  fair  to  say  that 
several  major  classical  works  popular  at  that  time  are  now  considered  to  be  forgeries.  This 
list  includes  the  writings  of  'Hermes  Trismegistus',  the  Centiloquium  attributed  to  Ptolemy, 
and  the  De  spirita  et  anima  attributed  to  Augustine.  But  this  does  not  negate  the  fact  that 
many  humanists  developed  skills  in  textual  exegesis  and  philology  which  enabled  forged 
texts  to  be  discovered.  (Valla's  discreditation  of  the  Donation  of  Constantine  is  perhaps  the 
most  famous.  )  Humanists'  "methods  and  their  historical  and  philological  understanding  of 
classical  antiquity  had  become  increasingly  firm  and  professional;  in  many  instances  their 
standards  approached  those  of  modem  scholarship"40.  Importantly, 
51 ...  the  literary  and  philosophical  studies  of  the  humanists  led  them 
to  important  insights  concerning  the  historical  character  of 
humanist  thought  and  culture...  [In]  the  depth,  sharpness  and 
range  of  their  views  of  human  nature  and  its  societal,  political  and 
religious  ramifications,  the  humanists  clearly  laid  the  foundations 
for  early  modern  discussions  of  man...  1 
But  it  has  to  be  remembered  that  the  humanists'  views  came  from  a  certain  social  and 
political  context,  from  a  specific  sector  of  renaissance  culture  and  their  views  of  the  nature 
of  man  reflected  both  Christian  concepts  and  cultural  elitism. 
Furthermore,  humanists  brought  their  own  moral  values  to  textual  readings,  sometimes 
condemning  the  (reported)  behaviour  of  authors.  This  can  be  seen  in  Zanobi  Acciauoli's 
acceptance  of  Theodoret's  moral  criticisms  of  Plato  in  his  translated  text.  Acciauoli's  stated 
purpose  was 
to  counter  the  errors  of  Hellenism.  Through  the  Curratio  of 
Theodoret  [Zanobi]  warned  his  contemporaries  against  Plato's 
community  of  wives  and  his  foolish  notions  about  the 
transmigration  of  souls  and  showed  that  Socrates,  whom  all 
proclaimed  "the  best  of  the  Greek  philosophers",  was  an  irascible 
and  libidinous  old  man  who  went  to  the  gymnasium  to  look  at 
handsome  boys,  got  drunk  with  Aristophenes  and  Alcibiades,  had 
two  wives  at  once  and  frequented  prostitutes  as  well  42 
Whatever  the  truth  about  Socrates'  personal  life  and  behaviour,  Zanobi's  intent  is  to  cast 
doubt  upon  Socrates'  ability  and  influence  as  a  philosopher  by  linking  assertions  about  his 
morality  to  claims  about  his  philosophical  standing.  The  implicit  question  is:  "How  can  a 
man  whom  Christians  judge  to  be  a  moral  dissolute  also  be  held  in  intellectual  esteem?  " 
Thus,  many  humanists,  though  they  stressed  man's  free  will  to  become  morally  better 
through  knowledge,  tied  this  concept  irrevocably  to  Christian  mores.  Man  could  choose  his 
moral  behaviour  but  within  strictly  defined  parameters  of  which  choices  were  'correct'. 
Despite  these  reservations  it  must  be  said  that  philology  was  a  skill  which  humanists 
52 refined,  using  exegesis  to  enhance  even  a  revered  text  like  the  Bible.  Lorenzo  Valla  argued 
the  importance  of  reading  the  testaments  in  the  same  way  as  any  other  historical  source,  of 
treating  them  philologically  in  order  to  produce  a  clear,  precise  Latin  version  of  them.  This 
epitomises  one  aspect  of  friction  which  became  evident:  the  "humanist  claims  to  biblical 
exegesis"  did  not  "go  unquestioned  by  the  professional  scholastic  theologians"43. 
Scholastics  argued  that  humanists  could  only  bring  "literary  credentials,  which  constitute  no 
guarantee  of  expertise"44  to  biblical  study.  The  humanists  countered  with  the  argument  that 
it  was  precisely  their  "literary  credentials"  which  could  give  them  the  necessary  talent  for 
textual  analysis  which  would  render  the  Bible  more  compelling  to  renaissance  readers  once 
translated  into  Latin  by  humanist  scholars. 
An  extremely  important  aspect,  then,  of  the  rediscovery  and  reading  of  a  wide  range  of 
classical  works  and  of  the  moves  to  create  a  pagan/Christian  synthesis  was  the  way  in 
which  humanists  studied  texts.  This  applied  particularly  to  the  appropriation  of  religious  and 
classical  textual  analysis  by  secular  scholars  from  theologians.  Formerly, 
[the]  contents  or  substance  of  ancient  writings  were  of  little  concern 
to  those  who  profited  from  reading  them  or  who  wrote  with  their 
help.  Now  this  same  literature  began  to  be  read,  seen  and 
interpreted  from  a  much  wider  angle  and  in  an  extensive 
comprehensive  and  material  way.  Lessons  of  substance  were 
drawn  from  it  and  the  main  object  of  consulting  the  ancient  works 
was  no  longer  of  a  mere  ancillary  or  auxiliary  or  didactic  kind,  but 
lay  in  relating  what  they  revealed  about  the  vita  activa...  45 
Classical  wisdom  was  looked  upon  as  being  of  use  in  daily  life  as  well  as  being  morally 
edifying,  which  was  a  significant  development  in  the  way  in  which  classical  knowledge  was 
regarded.  This,  together  with  the  fact  that  many  humanists  (especially  in  the  Florentine 
Republic)  worked  in  government  or  in  public  service,  has  led  to  the  highlighting  of  what  has 
been  called  'civic'  humanism  as  delineated  in  the  work  of  men  such  as  Salutati  and  Bruni. 
53 The  question  of  civic  humanism 
Because  humanism  was  initially  expressed  most  forcefully  in  Florence,  it  has  been  asked  - 
most  famously  by  Eugenio  Garin  -  whether  there  was  a  connection  between  the  growth  of 
humanism  and  the  Florentine  political  scene.  Garin  thinks  that  there  undoubtedly  was,  that 
humanism  was  a  "glorification  of  civic  life"46 
. 
This  idea  was  also  forcefully  expressed  by 
Hans  Baron  who  stated  that  'civic'  humanism  was  only  possible  in  a  republic  such  as 
Florence.  Humanists  in  Florence 
were  identified  with  the  wealthy  ruling  families,  shared  their 
interests,  and  developed  a  positive  evaluation  of  social  activity. 
Such  a  development  was  only  possible  in  a  republic;  humanists 
who  patronized  the  courts  of  despots  were  contemptuous  of  the 
business  enterprises  of  the  Florentine  burgher  and  extolled  the  life 
of  leisure.  Thus  civic  humanism  cannot  be  separated  from 
Florence's  republican  political  tradition...  47 
Baron  goes  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  civic  humanism  could  not  have  developed  anywhere 
else  -  at  least,  anywhere  that  was  not  politically  republican.  Now,  there  are  several 
suppositions  at  work  here,  not  least  that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  'civic'  humanism  and  that 
if  civic  humanism  had  not  evolved  western  Europe  would  not  have  developed  political  and 
cultural  pluralism.  Arguably,  the  civic  element  to  humanism  was  not  as  distinct  as  Baron 
suggests  and  it  may  be  that  political  pluralism  would  have  developed  without  a  humanist 
movement. 
Baron  seems  to  regard  'civic'  humanists  as  an  embodiment  of  political  pluralism  rather  than 
as  people  involved  in  government  as  a  job,  people  who  may  not  have  had  any  specific  civic 
or  political  aim  to  their  professional  interests.  Nor  need  such  people  have  had  a  coherent 
humanist  outlook  to  their  professional  raison  d'etre.  Baron  thus  argues  for  particular 
54 qualities  of  civic  humanism  which  may  not  take  enough  account  of  self-interest,  qualities 
which  he  sees  as  a  crucial  part  of  Florentine  polity  and  which  produced  a  "pattern  of 
conduct  and  thought  which  was  not  to  remain  limited  to  Florentine  humanism"48.  According 
to  Baron,  there  came  to  exist 
a  kind  of  Humanism  which  endeavoured  to  educate  a  man  as  a 
member  of  his  society  and  state;  a  Humanism  which  refused  to 
follow  the  medieval  precedent  of  looking  upon  the  Rome  of  the 
emperors  as  the  divinely  guided  preparation  for  a  Christian  'Holy 
Empire'  and  the  center  of  all  interest  in  the  ancient  world;  a 
Humanism  which  sought  to  learn  from  antiquity  by  looking  upon 
it  not  melancholically  as  a  golden  age  never  again  to  be  realized, 
but  as  an  exemplary  parallel  to  the  present...  49 
Certainly  this  is  what  is  embodied  in  the  philosophical  writings  of  many  humanists,  but  it 
cannot  be  taken  as  read  that  all  -  even  most  -  Florentine  politicians  or  political  servants  either 
genuinely  accepted  or  put  into  practice  these  qualities.  Baron  appears  to  merge  philosophy 
with  practice  and  humanism  with  political  pluralism,  which  is in  turn  conflated  with  cultural 
achievement. 
Civic  humanism  may  not  have  been  a  distinct  movement,  although  humanist  thought  often 
developed  civic  aspects  where  the  classical  ideal  was  fused  with  civic  elements.  While 
espousing  the  studiahunianitatis  as  a  means  to  produce  men  of  integrity  suitable  for  civil 
service,  many  humanists  remained  aloof  from  social  realities  and  detached  from  political 
actualities.  Indeed,  a  "purely  scholarly  attitude  that  seeks  to  avoid  identification  with  civic 
life  -  exemplified  chiefly  in  marriage  and  service  to  the  state  -  was  a  strong  tendency  among 
literati...  "  50  In  discussing  Baron's  thesis,  Albert  Rabil  Jnr.  asserts  that  the  emergence  of 
civic  humanism  "short-circuited"  this  tendency  in  Florence.  If  any  body  of  writers  or 
philosophers  were  exclusively  'civic'  humanists  both  in  theory  and  practice  then  this  could 
well  have  been  the  case.  But,  in  general,  humanists  probably  adopted  a  more  broadly  based 
philosophy,  with  civic  aspects. 
55 But,  as  Albert  Rabil  Jnr.  points  out,  Baron's  argument  has  to  be  seen  in  the  a  particular 
light.  His  acceptance  of  the  positive  nature  of  renaissance  culture  and  Florentine 
republicanism  as  a  precursor  to  political  pluralism 
began  to  emerge  in  the  1920's,  when  he  first  used  the  phrase  "civic 
humanism",  and...  he  documented  its  presence  during  the  1930's 
while  he  was  fleeing  Hitler's  Germany  first  for  Italy  and 
subsequently  for  the  United  States.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  way 
in  which  he  finally  formulated  his  thesis  has  an  intrinsic  relation  to 
the  rise  of  tyranny  before  his  eyes  and  its  opposition  by  political 
democracies.  Doubtless  the  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  political 
democracy  and  cultural  pluralism  were  the  hallmarks  of  the 
humanism  that  marks  the  real  birth  of  the  Renaissance  and  that  this 
humanism  was  not,  as  earlier  interpreters  had  believed,  indifferent 
to  politics  or  more  intimately  related  to  tyrannical  than  to  republican 
politics,  was  an  important  motivation.  The  most  problematic  aspects 
of  Baron's  thesis  rest  on  it.  -51 
The  main  problem  is  that  there  has  been  a  line  of  thought  extrapolated  from  Baron's  thesis 
(notably  by  Paul  Oskar  Kristeller)  which  not  only  accepts  civic  humanism  as  part  of 
humanist  philosophy  but  which  identifies  it  with  'despotic'  humanism  (whatever  that  may 
be).  Kristeller  writes  that  while  it  is  mistaken  to  identify  renaissance  humanism  exclusively 
with  Florentine  civic  humanism,  there  was  "a  great  deal  of  'despotic  humanism'  even  in 
fifteenth-century  Italy"52.  But  as  with  Baron's  argument,  this  explanation  invents  a  term 
('despotic  humanism')  which  implies  an  identifiable  current  of  thought/practice.  Charles 
Trinkaus  comments  pertinently  that  the  "well-known  fact  that  humanists  with  similar  moral 
philosophies"  served  both  despots  and  republicans  "with  equal  praise  for  the  ruling  power 
has  given  rise  to  the  facetious  suggestion  that  there  was  a  "despotic  humanism".  "53 
Humanists  no  doubt  had  a  variety  of  reasons  for  working  for  their  employers.  Many 
possibly  took  work  where  it  was  available  to  them  and  where  opportunities  arose,  others 
possibly  for  reasons  of  self-advancement  or  for  socio-political  furtherance.  However,  to 
work  for  despotic  governing  powers  need  not  imply  acceptance  of  despotism;  humanists 
56 who  did  so  may  have  agreed  with  the  tenor  of  despotic  policies,  or  they  may  have  been 
indifferent  to  them,  or  disagreed  but  kept  silent.  Furthermore,  concepts  of  what  qualities 
were  considered  despotic  would  have  been  different  during  the  Renaissance  than  during  the 
twentieth  century  when  there  is  widespread  belief  in  the  existence  and  possibility  of 
democracy.  This  belief  has  somewhat  polarised  thought  on  what  is  democratic  and  what 
dictatorial.  Perhaps  many  humanists  saw  despotic  government  as  defining  the  parameters 
within  which  they  had  to  work.  In  a  way  this  diverts  from  the  main  issue.  The  entire 
question  of  civic  and  despotic  humanism 
has  been  too  narrowly  conceived,  and...  it  is  in  the  humanists' 
affirmation  of  an  activist,  constructivist,  industrious  view  of  man's 
nature,  within  a  societal  rather  than  a  political  nexus,  that  their 
significance  may  be  discovered.  The  true  significance  of  the 
Renaissance  and  of  the  humanist  movement...  lies  more  in  what 
Burckhardt  and  Michelet  called  "The  Discovery  of  the  World  of 
Man"  than  in  a  poorly  founded,  premature  vision  of  political 
democracy.  54 
In  as  much  as  there  may  be  some  humanists  whose  writing  has  a  predominately  'civic'  tone 
to  it,  they  have  some  claim  to  be  the  "first  historicists  in  the  western  tradition"55.  This 
argument  really  extends  to  those  who,  like  Machiavelli,  were  seminal  thinkers  in  civics, 
politics  and  history.  Such  writers  did  establish  a  change  in  orientation,  for  when 
[humanists]  began  to  write,  words  like,  stability,  immobility, 
monarchy,  authority,  eternity,  hierarchy,  and  universality 
dominated  political  writing;  in  their  own  works  and 
subsequently...  these  [they]...  replaced  by  republicanism, 
secularism,  progress,  patriotism,  equality,  liberty  and  utopia.  Only 
the  terms  reason,  virtue,  and  experience  survived  from  the  earlier 
tradition  of  political.  56 
This  then,  rather  than  whether  'civic'  humanism  existed  as  a  separate  strand  of  humanist 
thought,  is  one  enduring  legacy  of  humanism  in  western  culture. 
57 Humanist  curricula  and  educational  provision 
Schooling  was  not  taken  for  granted,  it  did  not 
involve  uniform...  or  a  special  code  of 
behaviour...  no  convention,  but  only 
circumstance,  divided  the  carefree  years  from  the 
responsible  years.  57 
Before  the  Renaissance,  organised  educational  provision  was  mostly  confined  to  monastic 
schools.  Education  was  closely  linked  to  religious  institutions  which  were  centres  of 
learning  in  the  early  Middle  Ages.  In  some  countries,  most  markedly  Italy,  even  church 
schools  (monastic  or  chapter  schools)  went  into  decline  between  1100  and  130058.  Although 
some  survived  until  the  mid-sixteenth  century  (Verona  and  Venice)  and  individual  clergy 
carried  on  educating  children  in  rudimentary  Latin  grammar,  they  had  little  effect  upon 
education  in  general  during  the  Renaissance. 
As  Italy  gives  the  paradigm  of  the  growth  of  renaissance  humanist  education  it  is 
noteworthy  that  the  impetus  to  increased  school  provision  here  came  with  both  urban 
growth  and  the  demand  for  relevant  skills  required  in  secular  professions.  There  was  also  a 
growth  in  the  mercantile  class  which,  though  small,  did  create  demand  for  business  abilities 
like  numeracy  (which  led  to  the  evolution  of  Abbaco  schools,  separate  from  grammar 
schools,  which  taught  the  practical  maths  called  Abbaco  ).  In  addition,  with  the  development 
of  urban  communities  people  of  the  same  occupation  grouped  together  and  this  led  to  the 
introduction  of  the  gild  system  in  the  craft  and  mercantile  industries.  Gilds  responded  to  the 
need  for  a  standard  of  entry  to  professions  and  they  regulated  the  training  conditions  of 
apprentices.  Gradually,  secular  education  would  become  institutionalised,  especially  once 
the  impact  of  humanism  affected  concepts  of  pedagogy  and  curricular  provision.  Until  then, 
58 lay  education  tended  to  be  provided  either  by  private  tutors  or  by  gilds,  to  which  those  not 
involved  in  training  for  a  specific  profession  began  to  look  for  education. 
Societal  changes,  then,  prompted  many  people  to  seek  education  for  their  children  outwith 
religious  institutions.  Increasingly  -  and  again  Italy  is  the  paradigm  -  town  communes 
decided  to  pay  for  the  provision  of  small  local  schools  and  individual  teachers.  Therefore  it 
was  often  necessity 
rather  than  a  greater  commitment  to  education,  [which]  drove  the 
smaller  towns  to  support  communal  schools.  The  leading  citizens 
of  small  communes  lacked  personal  wealth  to  hire  household 
tutors  or  as  a  group  to  support  an  independent  master...  Hence, 
the  council  of  a  small  town  used  communal  revenues  to  hire  a 
master,  who  supplemented  his  salary  with  student  fees.  By 
contrast,  the  much  wealthier  merchants,  nobles,  and  professionals 
of  major  urban  centres  who  ruled  subject  lands  and  commercial 
empires  had  ample  incomes  to  support  other  independent 
masters.  -59 
In  Italy  some  universities  (for  example,  Bologna)  supported  communal  teachers  in  schools 
under  university  auspices. 
Independent  schools  also  existed,  centred  upon  particular  teachers  (for  instance,  Plazon's 
Venetian  Academy).  Two  of  the  more  influential  early  humanists,  Guarino  Guarini  and 
Vittorino  da  Feltre,  were  teachers  in  independent  schools.  Teachers  did  not  require  a  degree 
in  order  to  practice  and  men  would  often  assist  an  established  teacher  in  order  to  learn  how 
to  teach.  Levels  of  teaching  ability  tended  to  be  low:  "[at]  the  bottom  of  the  profession, 
reading  and  writing  teachers  needed  only  a  modicum  of  skill  in  order  to  teach  small  children 
basic  skills"60.  Although  teachers  could  achieve  a  relatively  comfortable  standard  of  living 
many  lived  in  poverty;  the  low  status  of  the  work  was  often  reflected  in  poor  wages.  While 
it  is  perhaps  exaggerated,  Erasmus'  description  gives  some  indication  of  teachers,  a  group 
of  men  "the  most  miserable"  who  grow 
59 old  in  penury  and  filth  in  their  schools  -  schools  did  I  say?  Prisons, 
dungeons  I  should  have  said  -  among  their  boys  deafened  by  the 
din,  poisoned  by  the  foetid  atmosphere,  but,  thanks  to  their  folly, 
perfectly  self  satisfied  so  long  as  they  can  bawl  and  shout  to  their 
terrified  pupils  and...  flog  them,  and  so  indulge  in  all  kinds  of  ways 
their  cruel  disposition  S.  61 
After  gaining  basic  literacy,  the  next  stage  of  a  child's  education  would  be  learning  Latin 
grammar  and  usually,  where  there  was  no  recourse  to  a  private  tutor,  they  would  be  sent  to 
a  Latin  teacher  at  what  was  known  as  a  'grammar'  school.  Increasingly  in  Italy  during  the 
early  Renaissance,  teachers  instructed  young  children  not  just  in  grammar  but  professed  to 
provide  an  education  in  "ifondamenti  dell'uunanita  ".  Practically,  this  was  simply  the 
fundamentals  of  grammar  and  literature,  but  such  teachers  were  consciously  appealing  to  a 
growing  awareness  of  the  studiahumanitatis  as  a  move  from  the  'old'  style  of  scholastic 
education.  However,  apart  from  what  kind  of  educational  provision  was  available,  it  was 
social  class  which  determined  the  quality  and  type  of  education  a  child  would  receive  and  to 
what  level  of  proficiency  that  education  would  be  taught.  Almost  all 
sons  of  nobles  and  wealthy  merchants,  and  sons  of  professionals 
such  as  lawyers,  physicians,  notaries,  high  civil  servants, 
university,  and  pre-university  teachers,  attended  school,  usually  a 
Latin  school.  Many  boys  from  the  next  rank  of  society,  master 
craftsmen  and  major  shopkeepers,  also  attended  school.  62 
Girls  from  wealthy  backgrounds  might  be  given  an  extremely  curtailed  version  of  a  boy's 
education,  but  for  the  most  part  they  were  expected  to  learn  only  rudimentary  literacy  and 
domestic  skills  such  as  spinning  and  needlework. 
60 Changes  in  curricular  provision 
As  has  been  explained,  the  most  important  changes  in  philosophical  outlook  which  occurred 
during  the  Renaissance  were  the  emphases  upon  classical  wisdom  (including  the  imitation  of 
classical  style)  and  the  gaining  of  rhetorical  skill.  Humanist  philosophy  had  a  significant 
impact  on  the  ethos  of  education  and  on  pedagogy;  certain  definitive  aspects  were  required  if 
an  education  was  to  be  called  'humanist'.  Crucially,  it  must  be  based  upon  the  (critical) 
reading  of  classical  texts  and  the  study  of  the  liberal  arts.  Essential  also  was  a  belief  in  the 
reforming  capacity  of  education  upon  the  individual,  as  we  have  seen,  a  conviction  that  (as 
Collucio  Salutati  wrote)  "all  forms  of  human  knowledge  should  only  be  treated  as  a  means 
to  a  higher  goal"63.  In  other  words,  the  goal  was  the  gaining  of  wisdom  and  virtue. 
The  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  were  marked  by  an  intense  development  of  interest  in 
classical  studies  and  by  the  institutionalization  of  classical  works  in  the  schooling  system. 
(This  institutionalization  would  form  the  core  of  modern  European  secondary  school 
curricula.  )  Initially,  however,  humanist  influence  would  be  felt  in  the  schools  of  leading 
teachers,  prestigious  schools,  universities,  or  via  private  tutors.  Humanist  education  was  an 
elitist  provision  and  it  has  to  be  said  that  in  terms  of  its  reforming  capacity  it  was  of  doubtful 
efficacy.  It  may  not  even  have  succeeded  in  imparting  functional  skills  at  a  high  level  except 
to  the  more  able  pupils.  Schooling  still  tended  to  be  regarded,  by  the  majority  of  people,  as  a 
narrowly  defined  vocational  process,  with  children  commonly  leaving  elementary  education 
as  soon  as  they  achieved  the  minimum  level  of  literacy  required  by  a  gild,  or  as  soon  as  they 
were  old  enough  to  join  the  family  business. 
Most  schooling  in  the  fourteenth  century  followed  a  medieval  curriculum.  Pre-university 
education  in  the  quattrocento  tended  to  rely  upon  prescribed  texts,  for  example  the  more 
61 simple  classical  works  such  as  the  Ars  minor  (ascribed  to  Donatus)  and  stories  by  Aesop. 
Children  would  then  advance  to  more  complicated  texts  by  Vergil,  Ovid  and  Lucan.  Many 
of  these  texts  were  not  presented  in  the  original  but  in  forms  specifically  used  for  the 
teaching  of  grammar.  Students  were  usually  taught  the  art  of  writing  letters  (  arsdictaminis 
)  following  Cicero's  De  inventione.  Humanists,  of  course,  decried  such  elements  in  the 
medieval  curriculum  and  in  their  efforts  to  "win  elite  public  opinion  to  their  cause"  many 
wrote  "pedagogical  treatises  that  advertised  the  rosy  promise  of  the  new  studies"64.  The 
earliest  Italian  humanist  treatise  on  education  was  the  De  ingenctis  moribus  et  liberalihus 
studiisadulescentiae  by  Pier  Paolo  Vergerio  (c1368-1444)  which  was  disseminated  in  Italy 
and  northern  Europe.  Vergerio  promoted  liberal  education  as  creating  men  prepared  for  civic 
life  and  work,  and  it  is  in  this  limited  sense  that  the  term  'civic'  humanism  may  be 
meaningful.  He  wrote  that  for  those  with 
noble  minds  and  those  who  must  involve  themselves  in  public 
affairs  (in  publicis  rebus)  and  the  community,...  it  is  useful  to 
study  history  and  moral  philosophy...  From  moral  philosophy  we 
learn  what  it  is  appropriate  to  do,  while  from  history  we  extract  the 
examples  to  follow...  To  these  two  disciplines...  comes  next  a 
third,  eloquence...  With  eloquence,  instead,  one  learns  to  speak 
gracefully,  with  gravity,  in  order  to  win  over  the  hearts  of  the 
multitude.  65 
Vergerio  here  delineates  the  essence  of  a  purposeful  humanist  education,  while  elsewhere  in 
his  treatise  he  stresses  the  trivium  and  quadrivium  subjects.  Renaissance  pedagogy  was 
partly  about  communicating  an  ideal  about  a  privileged  communal  life,  not  about  dealing 
with  or  altering  the  realities  of  living  for  the  majority. 
One  noticeable  shift  from  scholastic  education  was  evident  in  the  attitudes  of  humanists 
towards  language;  words  came  to  be  regarded  as  signifying  reality,  rather  than  -  as  the 
medieval  concept  defined  them  -  being  what  they  denoted.  It  was  therefore  important  to 
humanists  that  the  content  of  a  text  was  stressed  as  well  as  the  form.  Leonardo  Bruni 
62 emphasised  the  teaching  of  res  rather  than  verba,  and  this,  if  anything,  became  the  humanist 
cliche. 
However  the  methodology  of  education  continued  to  rely  upon  rote  learning,  both  in 
schools  and  universities  and  teaching  methods  would  seem,  to  a  modern  observer,  tedious 
beyond  belief.  Humanists  did  recognise  that  memorization  and  repetition  was  not  really 
enough  and  that  study  should  be  graded  in  difficulty  and  presented  in  a  structured  way. 
Once  reading  and  writing  had  been  learned  from  a  ntagister  hidi,  a  child  would  be  sent  to  a 
grammarian  who,  in  studying  a  poem,  would  discuss  the  text  line  by  line,  explaining 
the  author's  biography,  the  historical  and  mythological  references 
found  in  the  work,  together  with  the  metric,  the  etymology  of  the 
vocabulary,  and  the  various  figures  used  by  the  poet.  He  taught 
the  student  to  search  for  truth  hidden  beneath  a  veil  of  imagery. 
Close  study  of  the  text  incidentally  revealed  discrepancies  in 
different  copies  and  easily  encouraged  the  grammarian  to  engage  in 
textual  criticism.  66 
Students  would  learn  to  write  short  prose  passages,  but  this  was  more  the  province  of  the 
rhetor  who  undertook  the  next  stage  of  the  pupils'  tutelage. 
Rhetoric  was  deemed  to  include  the  writing  and  delivery  of  speeches  and  the  ability  to 
produce  fine  written  style  across  literary  genres.  In  time,  a  pupil  or  university  student  would 
be  expected  to  imitate  the  styles  of  the  best  classical  authors  which  was  regarded  as  having 
the  purpose  of  imparting  stylistic  flair  and  (to  a  limited  extent)  enabling  students  to  develop 
their  own  ideas  of  content  within  set  frameworks.  But  mostly  pupils  were  not  expected  to 
show  independent  thought  or  style.  Essays  or  poems  were  formalised  and  rules  given  to 
guide  expositions  on  any  subject.  Guarino's  advice  to  his  pupils  was  as  follows: 
Remember  when  you  praise  the  countryside  or  denounce  the  city 
to  take  the  reasons  for  the  praise  or  blame  from  our  four  'places'. 
That  is,  to  show  that  utility,  pleasure,  virtue  and  excellence  belong 
63 to  the  country.  Contrariwise,  damage,  wretchedness,  defects  and 
flaws  belong  to  the  city.  I  recall  that  I  set  those  rules  out  in  a 
couplet  67 
The  exposition  of  commentaries  on  classical  texts  was  a  popular  method  of  teaching  and 
these  commentaries  tended  to  explain  absolutely  everything  about  a  text.  Even  with  the 
influence  of  humanism,  teaching  was  still  characterised  by  poor  textual  awareness,  by 
"misinformation...  elicited  from  the  text  by  aid  of  unjustified  inferences"68.  Many  teachers 
were,  therefore, 
forced  to  waste  time  and  pages  on  the  donkey-work  of  listing 
synonyms  -  which  is  all  that  thousands  of  humanists'  short 
glosses  amount  to.  Worst  of  all,  in  a  period  of  intense  literary 
competition,  the  commentary  made  it  impossible  for  its  author  to 
shine.  For  the  most  noticeable  aspect  of  all  the  humanists' 
commentaries  is  their  similarity  to  one  another.  Especially  in  their 
printed  form...  the  commentaries  are  nearly  indistinguishable. 
Waves  of  notes  printed  in  minute  type  break  on  all  sides  of  a 
small  island  of  text  set  in  large  roman.  69 
Humanist  education  did  give  students,  particularly  in  universities,  more  scope  for  critical 
thinking  than  had  scholasticism.  Humanists  made  the  study  of  some  subjects,  notably 
history,  more  analytical  and  removed  the  medieval  concentration  on  grammar  from  the 
curriculum.  They  "made  valiant  efforts  to...  reduce  the  study  of  rules  to  a  minimum...:  the 
rules  for  both  correctness  and  elegance,  that  is,  grammar  and  rhetoric,  could  best  be  learned 
by  direct  exposure  to  the  good...  texts,  after  only  a  modicum  of  introductory,  schematic 
paradigms.  "70 
By  and  large,  humanism  attempted  to  introduce  an  education  which  would  be  more 
meaningful  and  useful  than  scholastic  learning  had  been,  especially  in  the  universities  where 
there  was  often  a  tension  felt  by  some  students  between  "the  psychological  and  moral 
contrast  between  the  humanistic  optimism  about  the  dignity  of  man  on  the  one  hand  and,  on 
the  other,  the  medieval  pessimism  about  human  nature,  which  affected  most  medieval 
64 institutions  including  schools  and  universities.  "7'  This  is  perhaps  to  trade  in  stereotypes  of 
what  exactly  constituted  humanist  and  medieval  philosophy,  but  as  a  general  comment  it  is 
valid.  It  could  not  have  been  entirely  comfortable  for  older  students  to  be  constrained  to 
study  a  curriculum  the  elements  of  which  were  becoming  explicitly  termed  outmoded,  or  to 
be  largely  denied  access  during  a  course  to  newer  philosophical  methods  and  texts.  This 
was  particularly  true  at  the  University  of  Paris  where  (in  an  effort  to  enforce  correct 
behaviour  and  study  habits,  plus  adherence  to  traditional  curricular  values)  "reporting,  even 
informing  on  colleagues  and  schoolmates  was  institutionally  encouraged  as  the  best  way  to 
ensure  cooperation"72. 
There  were  some  humanists  who  were  perceptive  teachers  and  who  did  "clarify  and 
crystallise  their  notion  of  the  foundation  core  of  humanistic  studies"73.  By  the  sixteenth 
century  some  humanist  teachers  (notably  Vives)  were  reorienting  the  early  humanist 
pedagogical  concentration  towards  education  as  a  generally  applicable  process  rather  than 
simply  stressing  individual  ability.  Until  this  gave  rise  to  a  structured  curriculum  allowing 
graded  progress  through  its  core  subjects,  teaching  would  remain  most  effective  only  for  the 
highly  intellectual  student. 
Specifically  pedagogical  texts  became  more  prolific  as  the  Renaissance  developed,  although 
educational  ideas  were  likely  to  have  been  largely  negated  or  ignored  in  pedantry  of  practice. 
It  may  be  said  that  instead  of  "producing  the  free,  honourable,  and  eloquent  citizen,  Latin 
humanistic  schools  produced  docile,  obedient,  upper-class  servants  of  the  state"74.  It  is 
difficult  not  to  emphasise  the  drudgery  and  functionalism  of  renaissance  education,  but  at 
the  time  play  and  enjoyment  were  not  regarded  as  being  important  components  in  a  child's 
educational  life.  By  modern  educational  standards  renaissance  education  could  not  be  termed 
'stimulating'  or  encouraging  to  individual  creativity.  Yet  education  then,  as  now,  serves 
those  who  hold  power  in  society  and  responds  to  economic  and  social  needs.  Renaissance 
65 teachers  attempted  social  engineering  to  be  sure,  in  that  they  tried  to  teach  moral  values 
(both  personal  and  social)  to  retain  the  status  quo  of  a  reasonably  stable  urban  infrastructure 
(whether  despotic  or  republican).  Fundamentally,  renaissance  education  was  founded  on 
the  optimistic  presupposition  that  the  world  was  susceptible  to 
understanding  and  control.  Through  education  the  mind  can  be 
trained  to  understand,  the  will  can  be  persuaded  to  choose  good. 
With  a  few  notable  exceptions,  Renaissance  men  believed  that 
through  learning  people  could  improve  themselves  and  their 
world.  It  may  have  been  a  Utopian  belief,  but  all  education  is 
based  on  belief  in  a  civilized,  rational  universe.  75 
Conclusion 
Humanism  as  a  philosophical  movement  became  a  dominant  feature  of  European  culture  for 
the  social  and  intellectual  elite.  Humanist  philosophy  reoriented  educational  thought  and 
practice  from  scholastic  grammar  and  dialectic  to  an  emphasis  on  eloquence,  knowledge  of 
Latin  and  Greek,  and  learning  as  a  means  to  gaining  wisdom.  There  was  seen  to  be  a  new 
rationale  behind  the  teaching  of  the  liberal  arts,  the  content  of  which  had  not  necessarily 
been  agreed  in  medieval  times.  The  term  arses  liberales,  first  attributed  to  Cicero,  came  to 
encapsulate  for  humanists  both  the  concept  of  classical  study  for  its  own  sake  (as  a  means  to 
gain  access  to  classical  wisdom)  and  the  idea  of  education  as  being  devoted  to  a  continual 
refinement  of  human  personality. 
Humanist  philosophy  was,  obviously,  an  artificial  construct  but  one  which  "tolerated  many 
truths"76.  It  attempted  to  juxtapose  classical  pagan  insights  with  those  from  Christianity  in 
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humanists  regarded  education  as  central  to  the  process  of  enhancing  moral  growth  and  of 
transforming  human  nature,  their  philosophy  and  pedagogy  (such  as  that  developed  by 
Erasmus  and  Vives  from  early  humanist  concepts)  are  inseparable.  Humanists  were  not 
simply  rhetoricians  dealing  in  words  devoid  of  real  meaning  but  replete  with  tortuous 
artistry.  They  have  sometimes  been  maligned  as  merely  being  involved  in  the  preparation  of 
propaganda  which  could  serve  the  interests  of  those  who  controlled  the  political  power 
bases  of  Italian  city  states.  Some,  certainly  did  just  that.  However,  the  humanist  movement 
and  its  effect  upon  education  and  culture  cannot  entirely  be  reduced  to  such  cynical 
functionalism. 
Luis  Vives  was  a  humanist  educator  who  was  influenced  by  Christian  humanism.  He  also 
underwent  a  scholastic  education  at  the  University  of  Paris,  against  which  he  rebelled.  The 
effects  of  both  scholasticism  and  humanism  are  seen  in  his  works:  he  was  the  product  of 
northern  European  humanism  and  the  development  of  this  will  be  the  subject  of  Chapter  3. 
Central  to  the  discussion  will  be  the  contribution  of  northern  humanism's  foremost 
exponent,  Desiderius  Erasmus. 
67 Chapter  3:  Erasmus  and  the  Creation  of  Biblical  Humanism  in 
Northern  Europe 
The  emergence  of  'Biblical  humanism'  at  the  turn  of  the 
[fifteenth]  century  was  a  most  astonishing  phenomenon. 
The  platform  was  laid  here  for  an  alternative  culture: 
there  are  few  more  surprising  and  dramatic  events  in 
cultural  history  than  this  breakthrough  to  a  fresh, 
contextual  approach  to  the  Scriptures.  John  Colet...  with 
his  historical,  personal  approach;  Jacob  Wimpheling 
(1450-1528)  drawing  on  the  classics;  Jacques  Lefevre, 
combining  careful  scholarship  with  a  mystical  and 
devotional  sensitivity;  the  Hebraist  and  Cabbalist 
Reuchlin  (1455-1522),  and  many  others,  all  paved  the 
way  for  the  reform  programmes  of  Erasmus,  Luther  and 
the  Radicals  -  for  their  extraordinary  singleminded 
concentration  on  the  Bible.  ' 
The  above-named  humanists  were  all  northern  Europeans  and  they  were  part  of  a  cultural 
and  educational  development  which  arose  as  a  result  of  the  Italian  Renaissance.  The  central 
figure  of  what  became  known  as  'northern  humanism'  was  Desiderius  Erasmus  and  any 
delineation  of  the  humanist  movement  in  northern  Europe  must  deal  extensively  with  his 
work  and  with  the  concept  of  Christian  humanism  which  is  so  closely  related  to  him.  Before 
doing  so,  however,  some  explanation  of  the  spread  of  Italian  humanism  will  be  attempted. 
Erasmus,  like  many  humanists,  spent  time  in  Italy  specifically  to  undertake  humanist  studies 
and  to  meet  contemporary  exponents.  But  the  mechanisms  by  which  Italian  humanism 
spread  are  more  complex  than  this  example  suggests;  it  was  disseminated  in  more  ways  than 
by  students  and  intellectuals  visiting  the  centres  of  learning  in  Italy,  although  this  was 
68 perhaps  the  most  direct  means  by  which  the  transmission  of  cultural  and  intellectual 
concepts  was  effected. 
As  has  been  outlined  in  Chapter  1,  Luis  Vives'  work  was  produced  in  the  context  of 
northern  European  humanism.  Before  discussing  his  individual  contribution  to  renaissance 
education  the  current  chapter  will  discuss  the  intellectual  developments  which  took  place  in 
the  north  as  a  direct  result  of  the  Italian  Renaissance.  Vives  never  visited  Italy  and  his 
intellectual  growth  therefore  depended  on  the  influence  of  those  who  brought  Italian 
humanism  to  the  north,  particularly  Erasmus.  After  the  growth  of  the  humanist  phenomenon 
is  described,  this  chapter  will  indicate  some  of  the  Erasmian  thought  with  which  Vives  was 
familiar. 
The  dispersal  of  Italian  humanism 
During  the  Renaissance  there  was  a  vast  amount  of  travel  amongst  students  and 
(professional)  humanists.  Universities  tended  to  attract  students  and  teachers  from  most 
European  countries  and  while  many  Italian  universities  were  moving  their  curricula  away 
from  scholasticism,  universities  in  northern  Europe  (notably  Paris)  remained  entrenched. 
Nevertheless,  universities  which  were  perceived  to  be  centres  of  excellence  attracted 
students  regardless  of  whether  scholasticism  or  humanism  held  sway.  Even  if  a  university 
did  not  have  a  humanist  orientation,  it  was  still  a  gathering  place  for  students  who  could 
discuss  humanist  ideas.  Italian  universities  were  often  looked  to  as  epitomizing  the  new 
learning  and  if  students  could  not  attend  one  to  study  for  a  degree  then  they  tended  to  aspire 
to  visit  Italy,  perhaps  to  visit  particular  universities.  Some  students  completed  undergraduate 
69 work  in  a  northern  university  then  studied  for  part  or  all  of  their  doctorate  in  Italy  (as  was 
the  case  with  Erasmus  who  received  his  degree  of  Doctor  of  Theology  at  Turin).  This 
reveals  one  aspect  of  the  importance  of  patronage  to  the  facilitation  of  the  spread  of  Italian 
humanism;  initially,  patronage  fostered  an  intellectual  atmosphere  which  encouraged  Italian 
humanism  to  expand  and  thereafter  money  from  patrons  frequently  enabled  European 
humanists  to  study  abroad. 
Concurrently,  many  Italian  humanists  travelled  across  Europe,  often  because  they  were 
invited  to  teach  in,  or  to  visit,  a  university  faculty.  The  scope  of  countries  visited  during  the 
fifteenth  and  early  sixteenth  centuries  gives  an  indication  of  how  widely  humanist  ideas 
were  carried  by  men  of  significant  intellectual  repute.  Enea  Silvio  Piccolomini,  Francesco 
Barbaro,  Pico  della  Mirandola,  Baldassare  Castiglione,  Girolamo  Aleandro,  amongst 
others,  visited  various  countries  outside  Italy2.  Countries  visited  included  Spain,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  England  and  Scotland.  The  dissemination  of  Italian  humanism  was  at  its  most 
intense  from  1450-1500.  During  these  years  other  important  factors  in  the  impulse  to  travel 
are  recognizable:  the  humanists'  search  for  manuscripts  of  classical  texts,  for  instance. 
Professional  humanists  also  travelled  in  church  service,  or  in  service  to  a  royal  court  on 
diplomatic  missions.  Moreover,  royal  courts  attracted  humanist  intellectuals  to  work  in  non- 
diplomatic  capacities.  The  fact  that  Rome  was  the  site  of  the  papacy  was  fortuitous  as  many 
who  travelled  to  the  Vatican  on  church  business  had  the  opportunity  to  visit  the  country 
which  was  the  nucleus  of  renaissance  culture. 
Humanism  was  further  aided  in  its  circulation  by  the  availability  of  the  printed  word  and 
books  were  crucial  in  the  process  of  dissemination:  printing  made  for  the  greater  dispersal  of 
humanist  ideas,  especially  to  the  lay  populace  of  Europe.  During  the  late  fifteenth  and  early 
sixteenth  centuries,  humanist  books  were  increasingly  to  be  found  in  private  and  public 
collections  and  in  university  libraries.  Generative  in  this  spread  of  texts  were  the  printing 
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The  promulgation  of  humanism  was  also  aided  by  the  use  of  books  in  schools,  while 
correspondence  was  another  vital  means  of  transmission.  Many  humanists  wrote  copiously 
to  one  another  and  epistolary  discussions  often  involved  leading  renaissance  figures. 
Correspondence  between  lesser-known  humanists  and  those  whom  they  admired  (for 
example,  Vives'  letters  to  Erasmus)  provided  another  channel  for  broadcasting  ideas.  Letters 
were  a  means  towards  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  the  humanist  network  in  Europe:  of 
maintaining  contact,  of  airing  beliefs  and  new  ideas,  of  discussing  the  contentious  and  of 
issuing  invitations  to  travel  and  teach  abroad. 
The  key  point  is  that  there  was  a  receptive  audience  for  Italian  humanist  thought  and  for 
renaissance  culture  in  whatever  form  it  was  embodied.  Humanism  was  encouraged  to 
spread  by  this  very  receptiveness;  humanists  abroad,  if  they  had  met  with  widespread 
hostility  to  their  ideas,  would  have  been  little  able  to  promote  the  acceptance  of  the  new 
thinking.  Renaissance  culture  was  embraced  particularly  successfully  in  the  Low  Countries, 
France  and  Germany.  In  the  Low  Countries  the  most  famous  figure  of  the  age  was,  as  has 
been  said,  Erasmus  but  he  had  an  important  predecessor  in  the  north  in  Rudolph  Agricola. 
Agricola  studied  in  Italy  and  his  work  encouraged  enthusiasm  for  humanism  in  northern 
Europe.  Not  that  the  Low  Countries  were  devoid  of  a  cultural  identity  of  their  own;  for 
instance  they  had  produced  artists  of  significance  (such  as  Van  Eyck,  Bosch,  Breugel  and, 
latterly,  Holbein)  while  Cambrai,  Liege  and  Antwerp  were  famous  as  centres  for  music. 
There  was,  then,  an  existing  cultural  sphere  which  readily  accepted  renaissance  trends, 
including  humanism.  Initially,  the  intellectual  circle  which  adopted  humanist  philosophy 
was  focussed  around  Agricola  who  would  become  influential  not  just  in  the  Low  Countries 
but  in  the  German  states.  Agricola  was  an  important  writer  and  teacher  (of  Greek  and 
Hebrew  at  Heidelberg)  whom  Trithemius  described  as  being  "extremely  learned  on  every 
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Italy  for  his  work.  He  studied  there  for  varying  periods  between  1468  and  1479  and 
"brought  back  to  the  north  with  him  a  contagious  enthusiasm  for  Latin  and  Greek  studies". 
Agricola  was  not  only  responsible  for  promoting  Greek  and  Hebrew  studies,  but  for 
refining  a  dialectical  method  for  teaching  rhetoric  which  was  widely  adopted  in  the  north. 
What  Agricola  devised  was  "an  ingenious  set  of  readily  transmitted  routines  for  classifying 
the  accumulation  of  matter  for  debating  or  declaiming.  "5  This  was  popular  because  humanist 
pedagogy  still  lacked  rigour  in  its  methods  of  implementation. 
Such  was  the  standing  of  Agricola  as  the  leading  figure  of  the  northern  Renaissance  in  the 
late  fifteenth  century  that  Erasmus  would  attempt  to  convince  his  own  readership  that  there 
had  been  some  "inspirational  contact"6  between  himself  and  Agricola.  There  may  have  been 
a  meeting  between  them  when  Agricola  visited  the  monastery  at  Steyn  where  the  young 
Erasmus  had  taken  orders.  However,  this  is  not  certain,  though  Erasmus,  writing 
retrospectively,  sets  up  a  narrative  which  includes  such  a  meeting7.  Indeed  his  version  of 
events  implies  that  the  meeting  was  fateful:  the  first  great  northern  humanist  meeting  the  as 
yet  unknown  Erasmus  who  would  take  on  Agricola's  mantle. 
In  fact,  Agricola  taught  Alexander  Hegius  who  was  to  be  the  headteacher  of  the  school  at 
Deventer  which  Erasmus  attended  as  a  boy.  Hegius  began  his  tenure  at  Deventer  in  1483  - 
Erasmus  left  the  following  year,  therefore  any  influence  upon  him  by  Hegius  cannot  have 
been  extensive.  By  citing  a  direct  link  with  Agricola,  Erasmus  is  inventing  and  advertising 
what  Lisa  Jardine  calls  an  "intellectual  pedigree".  This  pedigree  was  further  enhanced  in 
retrospect  through  his  many  letters  in  which  he  sometimes  displays  an  arrogance  about  his 
fame.  He  admits  to  sounding  "presumptuous"  when  he  writes:  "wherever  I  have  lived...  I 
have  won  the  approval  of  those  men  who  were  most  approved,  the  praise  of  those  most 
praised.  "9  He  continues:  "[t]here  is  not  a  single  realm,  neither  Spain,  nor  Italy,  nor 
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guest"  °.  Strangely,  with  regard  to  his  description  of  the  Agricola  meeting,  once  Erasmus' 
reputation  was  more  secure  in  his  own  mind,  he  became  vehement  in  his  denial  that  Agricola 
influenced  him  at  all.  In  his  polemic  Spongia  (1523)  he  states:  "[d)id  I  not  praise  Rudolph 
Agricola  and  Alexander  Hegius  fulsomely,  to  whom  I  owed  absolutely  nothing?  "' 
The  growth  of  humanism  in  the  Low  Countries  was  further  assured  by  the  establishment  of 
the  Collegium  Trilingue  at  Louvain  in  1517.  The  foundation  of  the  Collegicun  again 
demonstrates  the  importance  of  patronage.  Just  before  he  died,  Jerome  de  Busleyden 
bequeathed  much  of  his  wealth,  together  with  a  fine  collection  of 
classical  manuscripts  which  he  brought  together  at  his...  residence 
at  Mechlin,  for  establishing  in  Louvain  a  college  with  adequate 
provision  for  both  professors  and  students  of  the  great  languages 
and  literatures  of  antiquity  ...  12 
This  college  became  effective  in  the  promotion  of  humanism  in  the  north,  particularly 
through  those  who,  once  they  had  graduated,  became  teachers  and  writers.  Moreover, 
scholars  of  repute  like  Vives  came  to  teach  at  Louvain. 
The  Low  Countries  were  not  the  only  area  to  receive  humanist  methods  and  philosophy. 
The  French  Renaissance  accelerated  following  1480,  encouraging  intellectuals  such  as 
Lefevre,  Bude  and  Rabelais  to  take  on  board  the  new  learning.  In  Paris  there  were  notable 
printing  presses:  those  of  Josse  Bade  and  Jean  Petit,  Chretien  Wechel  and  (at  the  Sorbonne) 
Guillaum  Fichet.  It  was  Bude  and  Lefevre  who  were  the  foremost  intellectuals.  Bude  (who 
died  in  1540)  dominated  French  humanism;  he  was  the  author  of  an  important  treatise  De 
philologia  and  was  instrumental  in  using  exegesis  in  jurisprudential  study13.  Before  him,  it 
had  been  Gaguin  (originally  Flemish)  and  Lefevre  who  were  the  most  influential  Parisian 
humanists  in  promoting  opposition  to  scholasticism.  Lefevre  D'Etaples  had  studied  in 
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developed  in  French  humanism:  the  cohesion  between  scholarship  and  societal  reform. 
Furthermore,  Lefevre  evolved  a  doctrine  of  justification  of  faith  which  anticipated  one  of  the 
main  tenets  of  Lutheran  theology.  Lefevre  differed  from  the  main  line  of  thought  as  regards 
human  will  maintaining,  as  would  Luther,  that  personal  will  was  bound  to  divine 
dispensation.  In  contrast,  current  humanist  theological  concepts  accorded  the  will  the 
capacity  to  act  towards  the  salvation  of  the  individual.  Finally,  there  is  another  interesting 
factor  in  French  humanism  which  should  be  mentioned.  Italian  humanism  was  not  always 
adopted  uncritically  and  in  France  there  was,  amongst  the  humanist  movement,  a  somewhat 
"hostile  reaction  to  certain  forms  of  art,  thought  and  style  emanating  from  Italy  which  were 
sometimes  seen  as  constituting...  a  paganising  phenomenon.  "14 
The  Renaissance  in  the  German  states 
As  has  been  mentioned,  the  work  of  Rudolph  Agricola  was  prominent  in  the  German 
Renaissance,  as  was  that  of  Johannes  Trithemius  (Abbot  of  Sponheim  Cloister,  which 
became  famous  for  its  humanist  learning).  Others  of  importance  were  similarly  enthusiastic 
about  humanism:  Conrad  Celtis,  Jacob  Wimpheling,  Johannes  von  Dalberg,  Johann 
Reuchlin,  Philipp  Melanchthon.  The  renaissance  of  learning  in  Germany  affected  culture  in 
the  wider  sense.  Again  artists  were  influenced  by  the  Italianate;  Durer  and  Cranach  achieved 
recognition  during  this  time.  In  terms  of  learning,  humanism  was  dispersed  through  the 
German  principalities  in  part  as  a  result  of  the  opportunities  afforded  for  monks  to  study  in 
monastery  libraries,  as  well  as  through  universities  and  work  done  at  ecclesiatic  and  secular 
courts.  Once  more,  patronage  was  crucial  and  the  court  of  the  Holy  Roman  Emperors,  in 
74 particular  Maximilian  1,  was  influential  in  giving  funding  to  humanist  scholars.  Maximilian 
was  a  patron  of  both  arts  and  learning  (establishing  a  chair  of  rhetoric  and  poetry  at  Vienna 
University15).  But  many  electors  in  the  principalities  which  constituted  the  'German'  states 
were  patrons.  Elector  Frederick  ("the  Wise")  was  one  such;  he  would  eventually  give 
protection  to  Martin  Luther  after  the  latter's  excommunication  following  the  'inquest'  at  the 
Diet  of  Worms. 
A  humanist  curriculum  was  gradually  introduced  into  universities  in  the  German  states: 
Heidelberg,  Vienna,  Basel,  Wittenberg,  for  instance.  However,  the  new  curricular  content 
tended  to  coexist  with  scholastic  methods  and  texts.  Many  German  universities  became 
popularly  adjudged  as  being  especially  meritorious  in  the  field  of  humanist  studies  and  they 
played  a  major  role  in  the  intellectual  life  of  sixteenth  century  Germany.  At  Erfurt,  to  give 
one  example,  intellectuals  grouped  around  Mutianus  Rufus  who  would  influence  Ulrich  von 
Hutten.  Von  Hutten  was  to  support  Luther's  ideas  and  together  they  were  a  prime  example 
of  the  leadership  of  the  Reformation  who  came  from  the  Augustinian/humanist  tradition. 
Generally,  then,  in  the  German  states,  humanists  "established  a  really  firm  hold  on  the 
schools  and  universities.  Nowhere  else  did  men  trained  as  humanist  teachers  occupy  so 
many  important  posts...  "'6.  However  important  any  of  the  northern  humanists  hitherto 
mentioned  were  to  the  acceptance  and  development  of  humanism  outside  Italy,  one  man  has 
become  associated  with  northern  humanism  more  than  any  other:  Erasmus  (born  circa 
1467),  whose  work  and  attitudes  will  be  discussed.  Vives  was  well  acquainted  with 
Erasmus'  work  and  it  was  of  considerable  influence  on  his  early  ideas.  Moreover,  Erasmian 
thought  was  crucial  to  the  development  of  Christian  humanism,  and  it  is  from  this  tradition 
that  Vives'  theories  evolved.  However,  preliminary  to  examining  these  aspects,  some 
details  of  Erasmus'  life  will  be  offered  to  place  the  subsequent  analysis  in  context. 
75 Paradigm  of  the  Christian  humanist 
Perhaps  Erasmus'  greatest  contribution  to  reform 
was  [the]  advocacy  of  a  pietaslitterata,  an  educated 
innocence,  a  faith  centred  on  a  teaching  Christ.  It 
has  been  argued  that  the  roots  of  this  go  right  back 
to  the  Italian  Renaissance's  emphasis  on  the  imago 
Dei,  the  inherent  dignity  of  the  human  as  the  image 
of  the  divine.  '? 
Without  doubt  Erasmus  developed  his  own  concept  of  a  humanist  learning  which  fused 
classical  humanism  with  Christianity  in  a  way  which  centralised  (far  more  than  had  Italian 
humanism)  the  place  of  Christian  theology  and  belief  in  a  classical  matrix.  This  'Christian 
humanism'  became  one  of  the  foremost  aspects  of  Erasmus'  reputation,  a  reputation  which 
made  him  the  dominant  literary  figure  during  the  first  two  decades  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
The  Christianising  of  humanism  had  its  most  ardent  exponent  in  him  and  much  of  his  work 
concentrated  on  theology  and  upon  Biblical  commentary.  Catholic  reform  (in  Italy,  Spain, 
the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  England)  would  owe  a  "massive  debt  to  humanism:  and  not 
least  because  the  synthesis  [between  Christianity  and  humanism]  had  been  so  generally  and 
attractively  incorporated  in  the  person  of  Erasmus"'8 
Erasmus  was  to  be  of  tremendous  influence  on  humanism.  He  was  a  complex,  not  to  say 
flawed,  character,  but  it  is  undeniable  that  his  work  was  extremely  popular  with  the 
'educated'  public.  He  edited  classical  material  and  had  it  published  so  that  texts  were 
available  for  others  to  use.  His  commentaries  on  these  works  provided  what  was  considered 
to  be  an  authoritative  interpretive  voice.  His  own  work  displayed  an  ideal  example  of  the 
humanist  combination  of  Christianity  and  Platonism.  Erasmus  is  the  Christian  humanist  and 
in  his  work  combines  "a  largely  Neo-Platonic  ontology,  anthropology,  epistemology  and  a 
largely  Stoic  ethic  with  fundamentals  of  rhetoric  drawn  primarily  from  Cicero,  Quintilian, 
76 and  Valla.  ""9  A  crucial  element  in  this  was  Erasmus'  enthusiasm  for  exegesis  as  a  means  of 
interpreting  the  Bible  and  this  aspect  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  overall  appraisal  of  his  work 
which  follows  later  in  this  chapter.  Even  today,  Erasmus  is  fascinating;  the  contradictions 
and  intricacies  of  his  personality  and  intellectual  outlook  can  be  seen  not  only  in  his  work 
but  in  the  ca.  3000  letters  which  are  extant.  He  assiduously  preserved  both  letters  he  wrote 
and  those  which  were  written  to  him  and  published  them  during  his  lifetime.  These 
epistolary  collections  were  printed  in  several  editions  and  were  edited  by  Erasmus  to  present 
a  favourable  image  of  himself.  Often  he  "cleared  up  some  points  which  had  been  unfairly 
construed,  expunged  some  passages  by  which  the  too  tender  and  irritable  minds  of  some 
people  had  been  offended,  and  softened  others.  "2° 
Erasmus  certainly  achieved  great  heights  despite  inauspicious  beginnings.  As  regards  his 
education,  after  his  early  years  in  Gouda,  Erasmus  went  to  the  chapter  school  of  St.  Lebwin 
in  Deventer,  where  many  of  the  teachers  were  from  the  Brethren  of  the  Common  Life21. 
Erasmus  had  little  good  to  say  of  them:  he  stated  that  the  Brethren  were  poorly  educated  and 
incompetent  pedagogues  who  punished  children  to  "break  their  spirit"  and  "depress  them"  in 
order  to  make  boys  "fit  for  the  monastic  life"22.  Erasmus  stressed  the  paucity  of  decent 
educational  provision  at  Deventer,  but  this  does  not  sit  comfortably  with  his  later  claims  that 
on  completion  of  his  schooling  he  had  taken  courses  in  logic,  metaphysics  and  morals, 
whilst  he  had  begun  to  learn  Greek23.  He  would  make  similar  complaints  about  the  teachers 
at  's-Hertogenbosch,  the  school  which  he  attended  after  leaving  Deventer.  However,  the 
standard  could  not  have  been  as  dismal  as  he  claimed  for,  although  he  was  not  an 
outstanding  scholar  at  this  stage,  he  was  asked  to  paraphrase  Valla's  Elegantiae  24 
Erasmus  next  decided  to  follow  his  brother  into  orders;  he  became  an  Augustinian  canon  at  a 
monastery  at  Steyn.  Though  he  would  later  deny  his  contentment  with  the  monastic  life,  he 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  unduly  happy  in  his  early  years  at  Steyn.  He  was  ordained  as  a 
77 monk  in  1492,  but  left  the  monastery  to  work  as  a  secretary  to  the  Bishop  of  Cambrai  (until 
1495).  Steyn  had  afforded  Erasmus  the  opportunity  to  further  his  studies;  it  had  a  good 
library  which  gave  him  access  to  a  wide  range  of  manuscripts  and  texts,  no  matter  how  full 
of  errors  he  would  later  claim  them  to  be. 
While  in  the  monastery,  Erasmus'  studies  built  upon  the  skills  he  had  learnt  at  school.  By 
the  time  he  had  joined  the  Steyn  brotherhood  he  had  acquired  an  excellent  grasp  of  Latin.  In 
1489  he  wrote  about  the  authors  who  were  his  inspiration: 
(I)n  poetry...  Vergil,  Horace,  Ovid,  Juvenal,  Statius,  Martial, 
Claudian,  Persius,  Lucan,  Tibullus,  and  Propertius;  in  prose, 
Cicero,  Quintilian,  Sallust,  Terence.  Then,  for  the  observing  of 
elegances,  there  is  no  one  in  whom  I  have  so  much  confidence  as 
Lorenzo  Valla,  who  is  unrivalled  both  in  the  sharpness  of  his 
intelligence  and  the  capacity  of  his  memory.  Whatever  had  not 
been  committed  to  writing  by  those  I  have  named,  I  confess  I  dare 
not  bring  into  use.  25 
Erasmus  particularly  admired  Valla  and  regarded  him  as  the  most  important  writer  on  Latin 
style  (something  for  which  Erasmus  would  himself  be  renowned).  The  range  of  authors 
cited  by  Erasmus  shows  that  he  had  recourse  to  a  fair  selection  of  material  whether  the 
reading  of  that  selection  was  done  clandestinely  or  openly  at  the  monastery.  Further,  his 
literary  proficiency  demonstrates  that  the  Deventer  teaching  methods  transmitted,  at  least  in 
his  case,  the  essentials  of  Latin  grammar  and  style. 
During  his  time  at  Steyn,  Erasmus  was  also  influenced  by  the  religious  spirit  iterated  in  the 
Devotio  Moderna  and  by  reading  such  works  as  the  Imitation  of  Christ.  At  this  time  in  his 
life,  a  change  in  orientation  begins  in  Erasmus'  writing  away  from  wordly  subjects  towards 
a  more  explicit  linking  of  classical  study  with  Christianity.  This  change  progressed  and 
culminated  in  the  explication  of  his  concept  of  theological  science  first  expressed  in 
complete  form  in  his  Enchiridion  militis  christiani  (1501). 
78 Leaving  Steyn:  the  development  of  a  Christian  humanist 
Erasmus  left  the  monastery  at  Steyn  to  undertake  the  position  of  secretary  to  the  Bishop  of 
Cambrai.  After  the  Bishop's  ambitions  to  be  a  cardinal  had  failed,  Erasmus  sought  his 
employer's  permission  to  attend  the  University  of  Paris  to  study  theology.  Permission  was 
granted  and,  at  the  age  of  twenty-eight,  Erasmus  went  to  the  College  of  Montaigu  (which, 
as  we  have  seen,  Vives  would  also  attend).  Erasmus  was,  however,  made  ill  by  the  harsh 
rule  by  which  the  living  quarters  at  Montaigu  were  governed.  He  wrote  that  when  he 
attended  the  college  it 
was  then  ruled  by  Jean  Standonck,  a  man  whose  intentions  were 
beyond  reproach  but  whom  you  would  have  found  entirely  lacking 
in  judgment.  Because  he  remembered  his  own  youth,  which  had 
been  spent  in  bitter  poverty,  he  took  special  account  of 
impoverished  students...  But  this  he  tried  to  do  by  means  of 
bedding  so  hard,  diet  so  coarse  and  scanty,  sleepless  nights  and 
labors  so  burdensome,  that  within  a  year  he  had  succeeded  in 
killing  many  very  capable,  gifted,  promising  students;  and  others, 
some  of  whom  I  knew,  he  reduced  to  blindness,  nervous 
breakdowns,  or  leprosy.  Not  a  single  student,  in  fact,  was  out  of 
danger.  26 
Erasmus  studied  theology  with  enthusiasm  despite  the  strictures  of  the  regime  and  gained  a 
Bachelor  of  Theology  in  149827  . 
During  his  studies,  he  never  really  subscribed  to  the 
scholasticism  which  was  to  be  found  at  the  core  of  theological  lectures  and  essential  texts. 
As  has  been  mentioned,  Vives  also  reacted  against  the  scholasticism  at  Paris.  Some 
professors  at  the  university  were  sympathetic  to  humanism,  most  notably  Robert  Gaguin. 
In  1496,  Erasmus  returned  to  Holland  for  six  months  in  order  to  recover  from  illness.  On 
his  return  to  Paris  he  would  no  longer  reside  at  Montaigu.  Despite  having  some  income 
79 from  the  Bishop  of  Cambrai  he  was  forced  to  tutor  in  order  to  support  himself.  It  was  as  a 
result  of  the  invitation  of  one  of  his  pupils,  William  Blount  (the  Earl  of  Mountjoy),  that 
Erasmus  visited  England.  Here,  his  theological  ideas  would  be  given  impetus  by  John  Colet 
and  in  England  he  would  also  meet  Thomas  More,  who  would  be  the  closest  that  Erasmus 
would  have  to  a  friend  throughout  his  life.  Erasmus  would  meet  many  illustrious  men  on 
this  first  visit  to  England:  Grocyn,  Linacre  and  John  Skelton  (who  tutored  the  future  Henry 
Vlll).  But  it  was  to  be  Colet  and  More  who  were  to  have  the  most  impact  on  Erasmus. 
Although  it  is  generally  argued  that  Colet  had  some  influence  on  Erasmus'  development 
towards  a  clearer  synthesis  between  humanism  and  religious  thought,  analysis  of  the 
relationship  is  speculative  as  little  evidence  seems  to  exist  which  might  clarify  things. 
There  is,  though,  a  series  of  letters  extant,  written  between  Colet  and  Erasmus  concerning 
their  debate  on  the  causes  of  Christ's  torment  at  Gethsemane.  Using  different  exegetical 
methods  they  reach  different  conclusions.  Here,  then,  can  be  recognised  the  developing 
skill  of  Biblical  exegesis  which  Erasmus  would  later  use  extensively  in  his  Biblical 
annotations  and  in  his  translation  of  the  New  Testament.  The  debate  between  Colet  and 
Erasmus  was  published  under  the  title  Disputatiuncula  de  taedio,  pavore,  tristitia  Jesu  (A 
little  dispute  on  the  weariness,  terror,  and  sadness  of  Jesus).  It  arose  from  the  longstanding 
problem  surrounding  the  interpretation  of  the  events  at  Gethsemane.  The  gospels  present 
Christ  as  going  through  an  agony  of  fear.  Christ  states  (Gospel  according  to  St.  Mark,  14, 
v34):  "My  soul  is  exceeding  sorrowful  unto  death"  and  prays  (v36),  "Father  all  things  are 
possible  unto  thee;  take  away  this  cup  from  me...  "=g.  The  critical  point  is  that  Christ  is 
portrayed  as  having  an  emotional  reaction  (fear,  sorrow,  sadness)  about  events  which, 
according  to  medieval  and  renaissance  theological  argument,  he  was  agreed  to  have 
foreknowledge.  In  this  contradiction  lay  the  argument  which  was  of  importance  to  Colet  and 
Erasmus:  either  Christ  foreknew  the  events  surrounding  his  death  and  resurrection  (in 
Which  case  an  emotional  response  was  pointless),  or  the  existence  of  an  emotional  reaction 
80 meant  that  Christ  did  not  know  with  certainty  what  was  it  happen  to  him  and  therefore  asked 
God  to  change  the  course  of  events.  The  problem  which  Colet  and  Erasmus  saw  in  this 
argument  was  that  agreeing  with  the  latter  view  went  against  theological  tradition  which 
accepted  that  God  foreknew  all  events,  as  did  Christ.  On  the  one  hand  Christ  was  made 
man,  but  he  was  still  God's  son  and,  as  such,  God  made  flesh.  Surely  therefore, 
foreknowledge  would  render  emotion  obsolete?  Erasmus  and  Colet  debated  this  because 
they  saw  a  problematic  question  arising  from  it:  if  it  were  conceded  that  the  emotional  side 
in  Christ  triumphed,  might  it  not  be  argued  that  he  had  no  foreknowledge  of  events  and  that 
he  was  only  a  man? 
Erasmus'  answer  is  to  take  Christ's  suffering  as  a'necessary  example'  given  deliberately  by 
God  to  mankind.  Erasmus  does  not  deny  foreknowledge  of  imminent  death  on  Christ's 
part  but  insists  that  He  could  still  have  had  a  'human'  response.  However,  Erasmus' 
answer  still  does  not  evade  the  logical  problem  outlined  above.  Colet,  meanwhile,  argues 
that  the  spiritual  side  of  Christ  would  have  been  uppermost,  where  Christ  suffers  "not  in  his 
human  but  in  his  divine  personage,  feeling  not  a  passionate,  affective  remorse  rooted  in  the 
recognition  and  fear  of  death",  but  rather  a  "divine  sadness  resulting  from  foresight  of  his 
betrayal  by  sinful  men"29.  Colet  attempts  to  resolve  the  paradox;  Erasmus  insists  upon  it  in 
the  sort  of  argument  which  came  to  typify  his  conception  of  Christianity  -  that  is,  his 
stressing  of  anthropomorphism  (Christ  as  the  ideal  of  humanity  to  which  all  men  must 
strive),  even  where  that  interpretation  had  to  rest  upon  apparent  logical  contradiction. 
81 Erasmus  in  Italy 
While  in  England,  Erasmus  decided  to  learn  Greek  and  to  this  end,  when  he  returned  to 
Paris  in  1500,  he  began  to  study.  He  wished  to  use  the  language  in  Biblical  exegesis,  a 
method  of  interpretation  with  which  he  became  particularly  enthused  after  his  discovery  (in 
1504)  of  Valla's  Notes  on  the  New  Testament  at  the  Abbey  au  Parc,  Louvain;  0  Erasmus 
came  to  believe  that  accuracy  of  interpretation  of  the  New  Testament  should  be  founded 
upon  analyses  of  the  Greek  texts,  not  upon  the  Vulgate.  He  wrote: 
I  would  prefer  to  see  the  original  with  my  own  eyes  rather  than 
through  someone  else's,  and  further,  the  ancient  exegetes,  granted 
that  they  have  said  a  great  deal,  left  much  for  later  interpreters  to 
explain.  Is  it  not  true  that  in  order  to  understand  their 
interpretations,  at  least  an  average  knowledge  of  languages  is 
required?  And  finally,  when  you  come  upon  old  texts  in  various 
languages  that  are  corrupt...  what  will  you  do?  -' 
In  order  that  he  might  further  his  knowledge  of  Greek,  but  also  to  study  for  a  doctorate  in 
theology,  Erasmus  went  to  Italy.  Here  was  Erasmus,  travelling  to  the  major  centre  of 
humanism,  visiting  Italy's  most  illustrious  cities,  yet  he  gave  no  impression  in  his 
subsequent  descriptions  of  his  travels  that  he  was  at  all  interested  in  Italian  culture  (with 
regard  to  art,  architecture,  civic  and  social  life).  Furthermore,  while  in  Florence,  Erasmus 
made  few  acquaintances,  an  episode  which  reveals  his  somewhat  aloof  nature.  Instead, 
he  translated  more  Lucian,  and  grumbled  about  his  lot.  It  was  a 
principle  with  him  to  refuse  to  learn  or  even  to  recognise 
vernacular  languages.  Thus  he  found  himself  cut  off  from 
intercourse  in  a  society  proud  of  its  Tuscan  speech.  You  speak  to 
a  deaf  man,  "  he  said  to  Rucellai,  who  pressed  his  Italian  upon 
him,  and  in  Italian  as  in  English,  he  remained  dumb  to  the  end  32 
Erasmus  would  appear  to  have  been  something  of  a  cultural  elitist  (but  based  upon  a  limited 
82 concept  of  'culture'  -  the  intellectual,  literary  world  of  letters);  many  of  his  attitudes, 
particularly  concerning  the  vernacular,  tend  to  be  quite  insular. 
It  was  in  an  effort  to  better  his  Greek  that  Erasmus  wrote  to  the  Venetian  printer  Aldus 
Manutius  who  ran  a  "New  Academy"  in  his  residence.  Admission  to  this  'academy'  was 
conditional  upon  being  able  to  speak  Greek,  or  upon  being  willing  to  learn  it.  While  staying 
with  Aldus,  Erasmus  undertook  editorial  work33  and  completed  a  new,  much  expanded 
version  of  his  Adagia  (first  published  in  1500)  which  the  Aldine  press  published  in  1508. 
Erasmus'  trip  to  Italy  began  with  him  as  an  unknown  and  ended  with  the  beginnings  of  his 
fame  assured.  Thereafter,  he  would  make  return  journeys  to  England,  spend  four  years  in 
Louvain  and  would  (from  1522  on)  spend  much  time  in  Basel.  The  publication  of  certain 
works,  in  addition  to  the  Adagia,  secured  his  reputation  and  popularity:  the  Encomium 
Moriae  (Praise  of  Folly,  1511),  the  Enchiridionntilitischristiani(1503),  Derationestudii 
(1511),  the  translation  of  the  New  Testament  (1516)  and  the  De  copia  (1512).  His  most 
popular  work  apart  from  the  Praise  of  Folly  was  probably  the  Colloquies  (1518ff). 
Erasmus'  educational  works  will  be  referred  to  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  5  while  his  attitude 
to  women  as  portrayed  in  the  Praise  of  Folly  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  4  (which  deals 
with  Vives'  educational  programme  for  women).  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  examine 
Erasmus'  work  and  letters  as  they  highlight  certain  aspects  of  his  thought  and  character. 
Underpinning  his  ecclesiastical  and  social  satires  (most  notably  the  Encomium)  is  a  striking 
political  naivety,  while  his  work  on  Biblical  exegesis  reveals  a  bias  against  the  Jewish 
people  rather  than,  as  Erasmus  himself  would  have  it,  an  argument  against  acceptance  of 
Mosaic  law. 
83 Erasmus:  a  reappraisal 
To  the  ancient  and  traditional  social  criticism  and 
satire  Erasmus  imparted  a  high  literary  polish,  and 
that  is  about  all.  His  partial  abandonment  of  the 
hierarchical  framework  on  which  that  criticism  had 
been  hung,  though  probably  not  altogether  conscious, 
is  interesting;  but  it  leaves  his  own  efforts  incoherent 
and  invertebrate,  lacking  in  the  structural  form  which 
that  framework  provided  for  the  writings  of  his 
predecessors.  The  Praise  of  Folly,  The  Complaint  of 
Peace,  and  the  long  satirical  adages  are  inadequate  as 
social  criticism  because  they  point  to  the  sickness  of 
early  sixteenth  century  Christendom  but  scarcely  ever 
penetrate  inward  to  discover  the  roots  of  the  disease. 
Therefore  their  prescriptions,  in  the  rare  instances 
when  anything  so  specific  is  suggested,  are  mere 
analgesics...  [not]  remedies.  34 
There  can  be  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  Erasmus  achieved  huge  popularity  and  acclaim  for 
his  Christian  humanism,  not  just  in  retrospect  but  during  his  lifetime.  Erasmus  stated  that  he 
was  not  "in  the  least  moved  by  the  glitter  of  fame"35  but  it  is  in  this  same  letter  that  he 
writes,  as  we  have  seen,  that  he  has  "won  the  approval  of  those  men  who  were  most 
approved,  the  praise  of  those  most  praised.  "36  Certainly  his  work  was  popular,  perhaps  due 
to  delight  in  his  polished  literary  style.  Whatever  the  explanation,  those  who  read  his  books 
during  his  lifetime  obviously  applauded  them  and  learned  from  their  content,  though  this 
does  not  negate  the  argument  that  there  are  fundamental  problems  associated  with  Erasmus' 
work,  aspects  of  which  were  criticised  while  he  was  alive:  for  example,  the  quality  of  the 
translation  in  his  first  edition  of  the  New  Testament,  for  which  Erasmus  blamed  his  junior 
collaborator  Johann  Reuchlin,  and  the  quality  of  his  arguments  and  his  unwillingness  to 
express  them  outright  (for  instance  during  the  Lutheran  affair).  He  tended  to  pour  scorn  on 
his  critics,  even  upon  those  who  had  been  unconditional  admirers,  but  who  perhaps,  like 
84 Vives,  developed  their  own  views  and  ventured  to  present  another  philosophical  stance 
from  that  which  Erasmus  adopted. 
Despite  his  undoubted  appeal  to  renaissance  readers,  there  are  aspects  of  Erasmus'  work 
which  invite  reappraisal.  At  its  most  extreme  such  reappraisal  leads  to  assertions  which  have 
a  degree  of  truth  but  which  do  not  take  enough  cognizance  of  the  renaissance  context  in 
which  Erasmus  wrote  (the  different  aesthetic  standards  from  those  favoured  today,  or  the 
different  expectations  of  what  would  be  termed  'entertaining').  Such  an  assertion  is  made 
by  G.  R.  Elton  who  writes  that  Erasmus'  reputation  rests  upon  "the  sententious  and 
unreadable  Adagia,  a  collection  of  common  sayings  with  commentaries  of  topical  interest, 
or  the  flat  and  tedious  piety  of  his  ubiquitous  Enchiridion...  "37.  Erasmus'  continuing  fame 
also  rests  upon  the  vast  amount  of  extant  letters  which  are  often  anything  but  "sententious 
and  unreadable".  Some  of  the  aspects  to  be  reappraised  perhaps  depend  upon  the  quality  of 
Erasmus'  intellectual  endeavours,  as  well  as  upon  the  highly  moralistic  vision  of  Christian 
faith  which  he  had  and  which  suffused  his  work.  In  his  analyses  of  society  and  Christian 
belief, 
[t]he  spirit  of  Erasmus  was...  of  the  type  which  moves  freely  only 
amidst  ideas  capable  of  easy  verification  and  clear  statement;  mostly 
of  a  concrete  order,  of  direct  human  interest,  of  definite  applicability 
to  life  and  action...  [We]  must  describe  him  as  conspicuously 
deficient  in  all  that  concerns  philosophical  speculation,  and  mental 
analysis  that  passes  below  the  surface  of  thought  or  morals.  38 
Erasmus  was  thoroughly  competent  in  terms  of  Christian  doctrine:  his  annotations  of  the 
Gospels  show  this.  But  his  philosophical  analysis  -  of  Christianity,  of  politics,  of  church 
corruption  -  was  imbued  not  with  complexity  but  with  a  plodding  "self-evident  working 
morality"39.  What  he  took  from  classical  sources  was  that  which  he  could  adapt  to  his 
definition  of  a  concrete,  applicable  code  of  morals,  based  upon  Christian  teaching. 
Arguably,  Erasmus'  spiritual  analyses  were  "never  very  profound"4°  and  while  his  satires 
85 were  certainly  witty  and  at  times  tinged  with  personal  anger  or  contempt,  they  tended  not  to 
show  critical  understanding  of  the  socio-political  context  of  the  times,  as  shall  now  be 
illustrated. 
Erasmus  and  political  realities 
In  the  turbulent  early  sixteenth  century,  Erasmus  was  faced  with  the  problem  of  reconciling 
the  state's  requirements  for  war  with  Christian  teaching.  Whatever  the  rights  and  wrongs 
(qua  morality)  of  the  many  instances  of  war  which  arose  during  the  Renaissance,  fighting 
was  an  actuality  which  was  not  going  to  end.  One  conflagration  might  cease,  but  another 
was  sure  to  follow,  borne  of  the  perceived  needs  of  rulers  for  defence  or  acquisition  of 
territories.  Many  humanists  like  Erasmus  and  Vives  wrote  on  the  inherent  problems  and 
sorrows  involved  in  warfare.  Humanists  might  demand  peace  but  it  was  unlikely  that  their 
demands  could  amount  to  anything  other  than  rhetoric.  Erasmus  did  not  like  the  overt 
nationalism  which  often  accompanied  bellicosity.  He  preferred  to  conceive  of  many  peoples 
living  in  a  state  of  Christian  homogeneity,  which  may  be  one  reason  for  his  espousal  of 
Latin  as  a  common  language  (though  it  does  not  explain  his  scorn  for  the  vernacular). 
However,  his  concept  of  social  hierarchy  and  of  politics  was  simplisitic,  particularly  his 
awareness  of  the  political  context  which  had  encouraged  warfare  in  response  to  the  political 
fragmentation  of  Europe  during  Medieval  and  Renaissance  times.  Consolidation  of  territory 
was  crucial.  National  boundaries  shifted,  territories  were  won,  lost  and  regained  and 
peoples  began  to  seek  national  identities.  Yet  nowhere  in  his  work  does  Erasmus  give  any 
real  insights  into  the  situations  which  actually  led  to  declarations  of  war. 
86 Erasmus'  conception  of  society  was  clearly  defined,  but  was  an  idealistic  delineation  which 
bore  only  superficial  similarities  to  reality.  His  hierarchical  notion  of  national  and  local 
socio-economic  structures  is  seen  in  works  such  as  the  Institutio  principis  Christiani  (the 
Education  of  a  Christian  Prince)  and  the  Querelapacis  (the  Complaint  of  Peace).  The 
Christian  prince  stood  at  the  head  of  the  nation,  placed  there  by  divine  right,  ready  always  to 
follow  the  will  of  God  in  protecting  his  subjects.  The  prince  was  to  be  intellectually, 
morally  and  ethically  superior  to  the  common  'mass'  whose  best  interests  he  would  have 
ever  in  mind.  In  his  descriptions  of  social  structure  Erasmus  often  writes  with  contempt  for 
ordinary  people.  He  regards  them  as  almost  bestial  and  certainly  more  prone  to  troublesome 
behaviour  -  indeed,  as  being  "unruly  by  nature"'  -  than  were  the  'learned'  and  the  wealthy. 
In  the  Institutio,  for  example,  Erasmus  states  that  a  prince  must  be  protected  from  the  outset 
"against  the  poison  of  what  the  common  people  think"42.  He  must  avoid  the  "degrading 
opinions  and  interests  of  the  common  folk"43.  Similarly,  in  the  Querelapacis,  Erasmus 
writes  that  the  "common  people"  are  "swayed  by  their  passions  like  a  stormy  sea"44. 
In  coping  with  his  naturally  unruly  commoners,  Erasmus'  prince  "does  not  need  the  artificial 
constraints  of  custom,  parliamentary  bodies,  or  written  constitutions"  because  "his  powers 
of  self-examination  and  his  understanding  of  the  true  meaning  of  Christ's  teachings  will 
unerringly  point  the  way  towards  the  well-being  of  his  flock.  "45  This  idealism  concerning 
the  nature  of  man  (in  terms  of  man's  ability  to  control  and  be  controlled)  was  obviously  not 
borne  out  in  reality.  Of  course,  the  idealism  was  partly  due  to  the  rhetorical  mode  Erasmus 
used:  he  meant  to  promote  a  scheme  in  his  Institutio  which  would,  theoretically,  produce  the 
ideal  prince.  But  he  did  believe,  as  did  many  humanists,  that  this  ideal  was  achievable,  that 
somehow  princes  were  naturally  'better'  than  others.  Evil  was  what  corrupted  them,  as  it  did 
everyone,  but  they  were  better  equipped  than  most  to  ward  it  off  and  act  for  the  good.  And 
because  of  their  position  as  the  heads  of  nations  the  benefits  accruing  from  their  rejection  of 
evil  ways  were  far  greater  than  the  saving  of  their  individual  souls.  Their  subjects  could 
87 benefit  from  a  peaceful  realm  and  learn  from  the  prince's  example  as  a  good  man.  Thus,  at 
the  core  of  Erasmus'  view  of  human  nature  was  the  Christian  message  of  repentance  of  sin 
and  renunciation  of  evil.  It  was  a  moralistic  concept,  if  an  unrealistic  one  and  it  was  typical 
of  Christian  humanists,  including  Vives. 
However,  war  militates  against  the  following  of  Christian  aspirations  to  perform  only  good. 
Erasmus  saw  discord  as  an  unavoidable  factor  in  society  due  to  man's  flawed  nature  and  to 
the  presence  of  evil  in  the  world.  Although  the  inevitable  outcome  of  discord  was  war, 
Erasmus  believed  that  the  problem  could  be  solved  by  the  actions  of  the  Christian  prince 
who  could,  by  his  very  example,  end  dissention.  This  view  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  another 
sixteenth  century  writer's  analysis:  Niccolo  Machiavelli  understood  far  more  about  the 
complexities  of  statecraft  when  he  wrote  that  a  prince  "who  wants  to  maintain  his  rule  is 
often  forced  not  to  be  good"'6.  He  may  have  to  adopt  cunning,  deception  and  guile  to 
overcome  threats  from  'enemies'.  In  The  Prince,  Machiavelli  also  analysed  the  requirements 
of  certain  types  of  power:  the  newly-won  principality  required  a  different  set  of  governing 
behaviours  and  policies  than  did  the  constitutional  principality,  or  that  governed  by  an 
hereditary  monarchy.  Perhaps  some  would  consider  Machiavelli's  standpoint  cynical,  but  it 
was  at  least  founded  on  analysis  of  contemporary  political  actualities  and  on  recognition  of 
the  potential  need  for  expediency.  Machiavelli's  prince,  like  Erasmus',  must  not  inspire 
hatred,  but  Machiavelli  counsels  that  it  is  better  for  a  ruler  to  be  feared  than  loved  if  he 
cannot  be  both.  47 
For  Erasmus,  given  an  hereditary  monarchy,  the  "main  hope  of  getting  a  good  prince  hangs 
on  his  education"48.  The  process  of  education  must  stress  the  moral  and  Christian  aspects  of 
learning  and  the  prince  had  to  be  taught  by  men  of  "integrity,  purity,  and  dignity"49. 
Erasmus  delineates  the  characters  of  good  and  bad  rulers  by  stating:  "A  tyrant  governs  by 
fear,  deceit,  and  evil  cunning;  a  king  through  wisdom,  integrity,  and  goodwill.  "50  Under 
88 benevolent  leadership  a  kingdom  will  be  peaceful  and  stable.  Erasmus  remarks:  "Let  it  be 
the  prince's  constant  principle  to  harm  nobody,  to  be  of  help  to  everybody...  and  either  to 
tolerate  such  faults  as  there  are  or  to  put  them  right  according  to  what  is  expedient  for  the 
common  good.  "51  Erasmus  feels  that  if  a  prince  is  benevolent  and  compassionate  the  people 
will  automatically  grant  him  love,  respect  and  loyalty.  Similarly,  if  the  prince  acts  with 
mercy  towards  'miscreants'  they  will  "turn  over  a  new  leaf"52.  If  the  prince's  entourage  are 
all  compassionate  and  courteous,  then  subjects  will  respect  the  government  as  a  whole.  This 
is  not  merely  optimistic  but  politically  naive.  Erasmus  does  not  place  war  amidst  the 
complex  relations  of  statecraft  and  national  identity  because  he  regards  the  prince  as  the 
personification  of  the  state  and  gives  a  simplistic  account  of  any  governing  body's  relations 
with  its  subjects. 
The  central  question  of  whether  a  Christian  might  wage  war  and  remain  a  Christian  was  not 
a  new  one.  There  was  ample  precedent  in  existing  literature  which  Erasmus  read  and  to 
which  he  referred,  especially  St.  Augustine  who  developed  an  argument  in  favour  of  the 
just'  war.  Erasmus  often  admitted  to  his  abhorrence  of  war  and  in  the  Institutio  writes  that 
the  "good  prince  will  never  start  a  war...  "53.  War  and  Christianity  are  also  explained  as 
incompatible  in  the  Querelapacis:  "Remove  peace  and  the  whole  community  of  Christian  life 
is  destroyed.  "54  It  is,  therefore,  obvious  to  Erasmus  that  the  Christian  prince  will  on  no 
account  go  to  war  and  will  endeavour  to  find  peaceful  alternatives  to  settle  disputes. 
However,  the  above  quotation  ("Let  it  be  the  Prince's  constant  principle...  ")  betrays  the  fact 
that  Erasmus  was  not  as  wholehearted  a  pacifist  as  he  is  generally  presented  as  being.  In  the 
case  of  uprisings  amongst  his  own  people  Erasmus  concedes  that  a  prince  may  "put  them 
right  according  to  what  is  expedient  for  the  common  good".  Erasmus  does  not  explain  what 
he  means  by  this  but  the  implication  is  that  force  may  be  the  most  expedient  method  if  all 
else  fails.  A  prince  may  "stifle...  uprising  with  the  least  possible  bloodshed.  "55  The  onus  is 
89 thus  placed  squarely  upon  the  people  to  'behave'  so  that  bloodshed  will  be  avoided.  But 
employing  euphemisms  for  force  (such  as  "stifle")  does  not  make  Erasmus  a  pacifist. 
Furthermore,  it  is  all  very  well  to  state  that  a  prince  should  induce  his  people  to  "observe  the 
law  by  rewards,  rather  than  be  coerced  by  punishment"56,  but  Erasmus  gives  no  concrete 
analysis  of  how  a  political  system  and  its  institutions  can  best  achieve  this.  The  veneer  of 
humane  instruction  covering  Erasmus'  remark  is  stripped  by  the  comment  which 
immediately  follows  it  in  the  Institutio:  that  servile,  "bestial"  men  ought  to  be  "tamed  by 
chains  and  the  lash"57. 
Moreover,  Erasmus  might  assert  that  the  good  prince  "will  never  start  a  war"  but  he  adds, 
"unless,  after  everything  else  has  been  tried,  it  cannot  by  any  means  be  avoided.  "511  This 
strategy,  Erasmus  argues,  would  mean  that  there  would  "hardly  ever"  be  war  and  that  even 
where  a  prince  must  fight  it  should  be  accomplished  "at  the  lowest  cost  in  Christian 
blood"59.  So,  while  Erasmus  writes  that  a  prince  should  consider  whether  "any  war  can 
really  be  called  just"60  he  implies  that  in  certain  circumstances  warfare  can  be  justified 
without  imperilling  the  Christian  soul.  Erasmus  does  not  explore  what  such  circumstances 
might  be,  other  than  to  say  that  they  arise  when  all  else  fails.  This,  as  Jose  A.  Fernandez 
points  out61,  is  "hopelessly  inadequate".  Erasmus'  ideas  on  war  add  up  to  a  "balance- 
sheet...  [which  I  is  not  a  brilliant  one"62.  To  Erasmus,  the 
just  war  could  be  nothing  but  a  myth  because  all  the  doctrinal 
assumptions  behind  it,  as  harsh  as  empirical  evidence  clearly 
demonstrated,  were  invalidated  by  the  reality  of  man's  behaviour. 
But  it  is  not  enough  to  point  out  the  obvious  evil  and  the  failure  of 
the  current  remedy.  A  new  formula  must  be  found  that  will  put  an 
end  to  the  endless  and  bloody  anarchy  so  antithetical  to  reason  and 
Christian  ethics  63 
Erasmus  does  not  seek  a  remedy,  asserting  that  warfare  would  only  disappear  when 
Christian  man  -  regardless  of  social  status  -  truly  realises  his  Christianity  and  behaves 
90 according  to  Christ's  messages  of  peace.  This  concept  is  found  in  Vives'  thoughts  on  war 
and  although  his  analyses  are  still  overly  optimistic  they  are  more  complex  than  Erasmus'. 
Nevertheless,  even  here  the  weakness  of  the  Christian  humanist  response  to  opposing  war 
is  seen.  Vives'  opposition  to  war  is 
to  be  understood  with  reference  to  man's  nature  and  the  reforming 
impulse  that  it  shall  receive  once  it  follows  the  road  pointed  out  by 
Christ.  God  has  made  it  possible  for  man  to  return  to  his  own  true 
state.  He  has  given  fallen  man  the  means,  in  the  form  of  His  son's 
teachings,  to  recover  the  concord  that  yields  a  safe  return  to  a  pure 
and  nature-ordained  social  state.  Let  man  first  know  himself  and 
thus  indeed  his  own  limitations,  the  frailty  of  his  own  self.  The 
seeds  of  all  discord  lie  in  his  overbearing  pride.  64 
This  is  still  inadequate,  not  to  say  ethnocentric  in  its  reliance  on  the  concept  that  the  western 
Christian  religious  ethic  is  superior  to  all  others.  But  in  appealing  to  such  a  concept, 
Erasmus  may  have  been  typical  of  a  prevalent  trend  amongst  Christian  intellectuals  in 
Renaissance  Europe. 
In  Erasmus'  Complaint  of  Peace  Spurned  and  Rejected  by  the  Whole  World  (Querelapacis 
eindiquegentiumejectaeprofligataeque),  he  seems  to  accept  that  a  just  war  can  exist.  In  this 
rather  confusing  statement  he  suggests:  "Hardly  any  peace  is  so  unjust  that  it  is  not 
preferable  to  a  war,  however  just  that  may  be.  116  5  He  pours  scorn  on  the  popes  and 
churchmen  who  wage  war  or  who  sanction  war  and  upon  Christian  nations  which  fight  each 
other.  "What  anomaly  is  this,  "  Erasmus  asks66,  "when  the  cross  fights  the  cross  and  Christ 
makes  war  on  Christ!  " 
Erasmus  argued  in  Querelapacis  that  while  war  is  not  always  'right',  it  is  often 
unavoidable.  "Clashes  between  Christians"  were  to  be  avoided  by  channelling  man's 
warlike  urges  into  conflict  with  "the  Turks"67.  This  was  an  argument  he  repeated  in  the 
epistle  to  John  Rinck,  Ultissima  consultatio  de  hello  Türcis  inferendo,  in  which  he  writes 
91 that  to  offer  no  resistance  to  the  Turkish  'menace'  is  to  deliver  "Christendom  and 
Christianity  into  the  hands  of  their  bestial  enemies"68.  He  continues  in  this  epistle:  "there  are 
those  who  judge  that  the  right  to  wage  war  is  absolutely  prohibited  by  Christians;  to  Inv 
understanding  this  is  too  absurd  to  deserve  refutation.  "69  His  previous  thoughts  on  this 
subject  have  been  misunderstood  with  the  result  that  some  "have  calumniously  (sic) 
attributed  [pacifist  ideas]  to  me  because  perchance  I  exceed  myself  in  praise  of  peace...  "70 
But,  as  has  been  demonstrated,  his  thoughts  in  defence  of  the  'just'  war  are  quite  plain. 
Thus  it  seems  that,  while  Erasmus  may  genuinely  have  detested  the  effects  of  war,  he  was 
not  truly  a  pacifist.  In  this  context  his  attitudes  to  the  Turks  gives  a  clue  to  his  attitudes  to 
other  non-Christian  peoples,  particularly  the  Jews.  Or,  as  he  puts  it:  those  same  Turks  "and 
all  the  real  barbarian  riff-raff  [who]  actually  demand  recognition  for  their  religion...  "71.  It 
shall  not  be  argued  that  in  these  attitudes  Erasmus  was  unique,  nor  that  he  was  especially 
virulent  in  his  tone.  His  age  abounded  with  beliefs  which  are  now  considered  antisemitic. 
Even  Vives,  a  second  generation  converso,  wrote  polemically  against  Judaism.  Erasmus 
was  simply  the  leading  figure  of  the  northern  Renaissance  to  espouse  such  attitudes,  as  will 
now  be  shown. 
Erasmus  and  his  concept  of  "the  whole  cesspool  of  Jewry"72 
Many  of  Erasmus'  comments  about  the  Jews  and  Judaism  are  scattered  throughout  his 
work,  particularly  in  his  Biblical  commentaries.  In  his  colloquies  he  writes  that  God  was 
displeased  with  the  Jews  because  they  "neglect  what  God  desires"  and  that  the  Jews  are  full 
of  "envy,  pride,  rapine,  hate,  and  fraud,  not  to  mention  other  vices...  "".  While  in  the 
92 Encomium  Moriae,  'Folly'  betrays  Erasmus'  bias  when  she  states  that  the  Jews  are  "by 
nature  the  most  obstinate  of  men"'4.  The  Querela  pacis  highlights  the  fighting  of  the  "last 
ten  years"  when  'Peace'  gives  voice  to  Erasmus'  view  that  "the  cruelty  of  the  fighting 
exceeds  that  of  the  Jews,  of  the  heathen,  and  of  wild  beasts"75. 
It  might  be  argued  that  the  accusation  of  antisemitism  is  a  false  one  because  Erasmus  was, 
in  his  attitudes,  merely  a  reflection  of  his  times.  It  might  also  be  argued  that  the  concept  of 
antisemitism  would  not  have  been  recognised  at  the  time.  As  has  been  described  in  Chapter 
1,  a  country  like  Spain  carried  out  intermittent  policies  of  institutionalised  persecution  and 
ultimately  complete  expulsion  or  enforced  conversion  of  Jews.  Conversion,  of  course,  did 
not  entirely  remove  persecution.  Ironically,  the  Rabbinic  response  to  conversion  (that  the 
con  verso  remained  Jewish,  lost  to  Judaism  only  after  many  generations)  was  paralleled  by 
the  Inquisition's  response.  That  is,  that  a  converso  was  still  Jewish  no  matter  how  far 
removed  from  the  last  practising  Jewish  ancestor. 
It  can  be  seen,  then,  that  in  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Inquisition  and  perhaps  in  the 
conceptions  held  by  many  people  throughout  Europe,  there  were  elements  of  racial 
argument  based  on  heredity.  The  fact  that  Jesus  was  Jewish  was  sidestepped  in  renaissance 
theology  while  all  other  conversos  were  trapped  in  the  Inquisition's  accusatory  biological 
determinism.  This  reflects  the  change  which  'antisemitism'  had  undergone  by  the  sixteenth 
century.  The  concept  had 
transcended  traditional  anti-Judaism  towards  a  growing 
identification  of  Jewishness  as  a  biological  fate  and  infection,  both 
physiologically  and  spiritually,  to  be  cut  out  of  society  rather  than 
incorporated  into  it.  This  form  of  antisemitism  may  have  had 
medieval  roots  but  it  also  lay  in  the  foundation  for  modern  racial 
hatred  of  Jews  which  would  also  demand  elimination  of  both 
perverted  Jewish  blood  as  well  as  retrograde  Jewish  ideas.  76 
93 Erasmus  is  usually  considered  to  be  a  tolerant  author  and  it  must  be  conceded  that  he  often 
argued  explicitly  for  toleration.  His  works  show  little  overt  antisemitism,  excepting  perhaps 
his  commentaries  on  the  New  Testament.  Few  humanists,  if  any,  made  a  case  for  the 
absolute  toleration  of  Judaism,  or  for  unbiased  treatment  of  Jews  as  the  equals  of  Christians. 
Hebrew  became  championed  during  the  Renaissance  as  being  imperative  for  Biblical 
exegesis  notably  by  Reuchlin  (whom  Erasmus  consulted  for  his  first  translation  of  the  New 
Testament).  Reuchlin  was  of  Jewish  descent,  but  as  a  Christian  was  committed  to  the 
conversion  of  Jews.  This  typifies  the  views  of  Christians  at  the  time.  Even  one  of  the  more 
tolerant  humanist  exponents  like  Reuchlin  did  not  advocate  the  co-existence  of  Jews  with 
Christians  or  accept  the  right  of  the  Jewish  people  to  accept  Judaism  as  a  religion  veridical 
for  themselves. 
In  his  Biblical  commentaries,  Erasmus  equates  Judaism  (founded  on  the  "Law  of  Moses") 
with  all  that  is  material,  as  opposed  to  Christianity  which  is,  he  claims,  based  on  the 
spiritual.  He  accepts  that  "the  ancient  worship  and  ritual  of  the  Jews  are  indeed  the  will  of 
God",  but  "not  the  kind  will,  the  benevolent  will,  the  whole  will.  God's  will  made 
concessions  to  the  stupidity  of  the  Jews.  "77  Erasmus  goes  on  to  say  that  if  Judaism  is  not 
silenced  then  the  message  of  the  Gospels  will  not  triumph;  the  Jewish  faith,  a  faith  of  "carnal 
rituals"78,  will  militate  against  the  voice  of  grace  which  is  heard  in  the  New  Testament.  (This 
does  not  demonstrate  much  faith  in  the  proclamatory  effect  of  Christianity,  or  in  God's 
redeeming  powers,  if  they  can  be  silenced  by  the  mere  existence  of  any  significant 
ideological  opponent.  )  Furthermore,  in  Erasmus'  thought,  Jews  reveal  their  continuing 
"stupidity"  by  adhering  to  the  tenets  which  God  originally  gave  them  -  unsubtle  strictures, 
which  might  regulate  the  Jews'  'stupid'  behaviour,  stricures  dependent  upon  punishment  to 
quell  their  "unruly"  natures.  Somehow  in  Erasmus'  theological  constructs,  though  he  never 
clarifies  this  aspect,  once  Christ  began  to  teach,  the  intellectual  capacity  of  'Christians'  came 
to  the  fore.  The  Christians'  Jewish  heritage  does  not  concern  him. 
94 Erasmus  becomes  vitriolic  on  the  subject  of  Mosaic  Law,  but  his  comments  reflect  the  view 
of  the  Jewish  faith  generally  held  by  the  European  Christian  intelligentsia  during  the 
Renaissance.  He  termed  Judaism  a  "superstition",  a  "perverted"  faith,  a  "primitive"  muddled 
"prejudice"79.  His  statements  on  Mosaic  Law  brought  criticism  from  the  theologians  of  Paris 
-  not  in  defence  of  Judaism  but  in  order  to  uphold  church  dogma.  The  theologians  termed 
Erasmus'  attacks  heretical,  "blaspheming  the  perhaps  superannuated  but  nevertheless  divine 
law"80.  In  the  face  of  this  eminent  opposition  Erasmus  backed  down.  He  replied  that  he  had 
not  actually  meant  criticism  of  Mosaic  Law  itself  but  of  Jewish  worship  "and  not  even  the 
whole  worship,  but  only  ritual  sacrifice",  ".  Yet  in  a  letter  to  Servatius  Roger,  Erasmus 
speaks  of  "Jewish  scruples"82  and  of  "cold  Judaic  rites"x;.  In  1523,  when  writing  to  Jean  de 
Carondelet,  he  comments  on  the  "disbelieving  Jews"  and  their  "stubborn  rejection  of  the 
grace  of  the  gospel'84.  In  the  same  year,  this  time  in  a  letter  to  Johann  von  Botzheim,  he 
writes  that  he  could  "love  even  a  Jew,  provided...  he  did  not  vomit  blasphemies  against 
Christ  in  my  hearing.  "85  There  is  ample  evidence,  therefore,  that  Erasmus  did  not  always 
limit  himself  to  'criticism'  of  "ritual  sacrifice"  when  referring  to  Judaism  and  that  he 
personalised  his  distaste  for  Jewish  belief. 
But  in  1517  when  Erasmus  had  been  'slandered'  by  someone  he  considered  to  be  a  lesser 
man  (Johann  Pfefferkorn)  his  anger  was  limitless.  In  his  tirades  against  Pfefferkorn  he 
resorted  to  antisemitic  statements  at  one  stage  calling  Pfefferkorn  a  "Jewish  scab"86.  A 
debate  between  Pfefferkorn  and  Reuchlin  had  become  heated.  It  concerned  Reuchlin's 
publication  of  DearteCabilistica  and  Erasmus  had  continually  stressed  his  neutrality  in  the 
affair  until  Pfefferkorn  called  him  a  "runaway  monk".  Erasmus  responded  by  defending 
Reuchlin's  right  to  publish  work  on  the  Cabbalah,  but  this  defence  carried  little  conviction 
since  when  Reuchlin  needed  support  to  defend  his  reputation  as  a  Hebrew  scholar,  Erasmus 
would  not  pass  judgement  on  who  was  right  in  the  argument,  Reuchlin  or  Pfefferkorn. 
What  Erasmus  did  was  defend  his  own  reputation  against  Pfefferkorn  by  means  of 
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"damned  Jew  and  now  a  most  damnable  Christian...  It  was  indeed  worth  his  while  to  be 
dipped  in  the  font:  as  a  Jew  in  disguise  he  could  throw  peace  among  Christians  into 
confusion.  "87  In  a  letter  to  Johannes  Caesarius  (1517)  Erasmus  repeats  almost  verbatim  a 
comment  made  in  a  letter  to  Jacopo  Banisio  (also  1517)  that  if  Pfefferkorn  "could  be  opened 
up,  you  would  find  in  his  bosom  not  one  Jew  but  a  thousand"",.  To  Banisio  he  stated  that 
he  wished  Pfefferkorn  were  "an  entire  Jew  -  better  still  if  the  removal  of  his  foreskin  had 
been  followed  by  the  loss  of  his  tongue  and  both  hands...  "119.  On  November  15th  1517, 
Erasmus  was  particularly  virulent  in  his  remark  to  Reuchlin  that  Pfefferkorn  "[t]his  half- 
Jew"  had  "done  more  harm  to  Christendom  than  the  whole  cesspool  of  Jewry...  "90.  These 
remarks  reveal  that  Erasmus  was  not  as  full  of  Christian  tolerance  or  rational  argument 
against  Mosaic  Law  as  he  would  have  the  Paris  theologians  believe. 
In  his  commentaries  on  the  New  Testament,  Erasmus  would  often  misrepresent  passages  of 
Scripture,  either  in  order  to  stress  the  moral  message  or  to  stress  the  inferiority  of  Judaism. 
One  example  will  suffice,  although  there  are  numerous  examples  from  which  to  choose: 
Erasmus  treatment  of  Matthew  12:  39,  which  should  read: 
But  [Christ]  answered  and  said  unto  them,  An  evil  and  adulterous 
generation  seeketh  after  a  sign;  and  there  shall  no  sign  be  given  to 
it,  but  the  sign  of  the  prophet  Jonas...  91 
Erasmus  paraphrases  this  as  follows: 
A  base  and  perverted  people,  boasting  that  their  father  is  God... 
although  they  more  resemble  those  who  foresook  God  to  worship 
the  Golden  Calf,  who  rose  up  against  Moses...  Their  father  is 
Beelzebub,  and  full  of  his  spirit,  they  rebel  against  the  Spirit  of 
God!  This  people  shall  have  no  heavenly  sign;  they  are  not  worthy 
of  it,  for  they  devote  themselves  utterly  to  the  earth,  but  there  shall 
come  a  sign  to  them  from  the  earth...  but  if  even  then  they  choose 
not  to  convert,  then  they  shall  perish.  ' 
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that  Jesus  told  the  scribes  and  Pharisees  who  asked  him  for  a  sign,  that  although  a  sign  is 
not  necessary  to  belief,  there  has  already  been  one  referring  to  the  resurrection  of  the 
Messiah:  Jonah's  sojourn  in  the  belly  of  the  whale.  In  the  paraphrase  Erasmus  sets  out  what 
he  saw  as  Biblical  evidence  against  Judaism,  but  this  does  not  make  the  "textual  violence"  93 
or  the  antisemitism  defensible. 
Erasmus  regarded  the  Jews  as  part  of  a  contemporary  threat  against  Christianity.  He  feared 
that  Hebrew  studies  might  encourage  a  Judaic  'revival'.  Yet  his  views  on  Judaism  and  the 
Jews  are  often  contradictory.  On  the  one  hand  he  can  display  a  patronizing  belief  that  the 
Jews  were  part  of  God's  plan  (with  respect  to  Judas'  betrayal  of  Jesus)  and  can  therefore  be 
partly  absolved  of  the  guilt  of  'murdering'  Christ;  on  the  other  hand  he  shows  a  distinct 
tendency  to  vilify  those  of  (supposed)  Jewish  descent  when  it  suits  him  to  do  so  (for 
instance,  Pfefferkorn,  Aleandro,  Zuniga).  He  also  rewrote  the  Biblical  message  in  his 
paraphrases  in  order  to  lend  an  anti-Jewish  slant  to  the  Scripture.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
Erasmus  was  a  calculating  antisemite;  he  was  a  product  of  his  age  and  represented  dominant 
social  and  religious/ideological  concepts  which  would  today  be  called  antisemitic.  He  was, 
as  Arthur  A.  Cohen  remarks  94,  as  "bloody-minded,  obtuse,  and  unyielding  as  his  age". 
Moreover  he  followed  a  tradition  amongst  Christian  writers  (for  example  St.  Augustine)  for 
deriding  the  Jews  and  their  religion. 
In  his  bilious  comments  on  Judaism,  Erasmus  was  no  different  in  many  ways  from  other 
authors  who  could  be  termed  antisemitic.  This  might  not  excuse  him,  however.  He  may  not 
have  participated  in  overtly  antisemitic  acts  against  Jews  but  he  promulgated  formulaic 
antisemitism,  utilised  the  word  'Jew'  as  an  insult  and  probably  would  not  have  defended  the 
rights  of  Jews  should  he  ever  have  been  called  upon  to  do  so  at  risk  to  his  own  security  or 
reputation.  And  in  his  repeated  attacks  on  Pfefferkorn  his  language  shows  him  to  have  a  real 
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the  clear  and  irrefutable  cowardice  of  Erasmus  -  genial,  charming, 
energetic,  passionate,  always  on  the  attack  when  he  is  not  on  the 
defense,  but  never,  ever,  courageous  -  not  courageous  towards  his 
erstwhile  friend  [Thomas  More]  whom  he  virtually  deserts  during 
More's  last  terrifying  years,  not  courageous  towards  Luther  whom 
he  initially  supports  and  then  repudiates,  nor  courageous  to  many 
and  generally  minor  critics  and  friends  to  whom  Erasmus  may  have 
once  been  generous  but  whom  he  chooses  at  other  times  to  attack 
or  to  leave  to  other  wolves.  95 
Erasmus'  sustained  contemptuousness  towards  Jews  in  his  work  and  in  his  letters  was 
couched  in  the  language  of  an  "exquisite  humanist"96  but  ultimately  he  represents  "one  more 
European-Christian  who  imagines  that  his  hatred  of  Jews,  Jewish  faith  and  practice,  Jewish 
history  and  institutions,  will  be  forgiven  because  God  no  longer  cares  for  the  Jews  nor 
hears  their  prayers.  "97  Although  Arthur  A.  Cohen's  words  are  harsh,  they  contain  more  than 
a  grain  of  truth. 
This  revisionism  of  Erasmus'  work  does  not  remove  a  central  reality:  Erasmus  was  a 
monolithic  figure  in  the  late  Renaissance.  He  was  a  successful  populariser  of  ideas  currently 
in  vogue  amongst  the  intelligentsia  and  he  could  display  a  wit  which  appealed  to  many  of  his 
readers.  Although  the  focus  of  this  study  will  now  shift  to  the  work  of  Vives,  Erasmus' 
thought  will  be  offered,  where  relevant,  in  comparison  with  that  of  Vives,  whose  early 
work  was  influenced  by  the  older  man.  With  Erasmus,  Vives  was  to  be  one  of  the  foremost 
contributors  in  Northern  Europe  in  the  field  of  education  and  psychology.  It  remains, 
therefore,  to  analyse  Vives'  thought  as  evinced  in  the  following  texts:  the  De  institutione 
feominae  Christianae,  De  tradendis  disciplinis  and  De  anima  et  vita.  Each  of  these  deals 
with  the  aspects  of  Vives'  work  which  are  of  most  interest  to  this  study:  the  education  and 
upbringing  of  women,  education  in  general  and  the  study  of  the  soul.  These  areas  will  be 
treated  of  in  Chapters  4,5  and  6  respectively. 
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Renaissance  idea  of  femininity 
The  great  achievements  of  art  and  intellect  that 
constitute  the.  Renaissance  did  not  prevent  that  age 
from  dissolving  into  the  fear  of  the  unknown  and 
persisting  in  the  violent  enforcement  of  orthodoxy. 
Indeed,  it  is  in  the  Renaissance  that  intolerance 
reached  its  height  in  inquisitorial  proceedings...  and 
that  fear  reached  its  nadir  in  the  witchcraft  terror,  most 
of  whose  victims  were  women.  If  no  other  indicator 
were  considered  at  all,  the  brutalization  of  the  female 
sex  by  the  inquisitorial  church  would  declare  that  the 
Renaissance  was  no  renaissance  for  women.  ' 
Against  a  background  which  was  "no  renaissance"  for  women,  few  renaissance  authors 
showed  much  interest  in  the  education  of  girls.  Luis  Vives,  however,  did  delineate  his 
concept  of  the  education  a  girl  should  have  in  his  works  De  institutione  foeminae  Christiane 
(The  Instruction  of  a  Christian  Woman)  and  De  ratione  stuudiipuerilis  (The  Plan  of  Studies 
for  Girls).  Both  were  published  in  1523.  Additionally,  he  writes  of  The  Learning  of  Women 
in  Chapter  3  of  his  De  officio  mariti  (The  Office  and  Ditties  of  a  Husband,  1528).  In  these 
texts  Vives  sets  out  the  type  of  education,  upbringing  and  curricular  studies  which  a  young 
woman  should  follow.  As  shall  be  seen  later  in  this  chapter  the  Instruction  of  a  Christian 
Woman  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Instruction)  offers  girls  a  limited  version  of  the 
education  offered  to  their  male  peers,  set  amidst  a  general  and  extremely  thorough  scheme  of 
training  in  conduct,  manners  and  mores  founded  upon  Christian  tenets. 
Underlying  Vives'  educational  prescriptions  for  women  were  several  assumptions  about 
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principal  was  that  women  needed  little,  if  any,  education  and  that  where  they  were  given 
some  formal  teaching  it  was  to  be  restrictive,  geared  to  the  domestic  existence  which 
(socially  elite)  women  would  normally  lead.  Renaissance  writers  generally  saw  no 
requirement  for  the  formal  education  of  women:  spinning,  sewing  and  household 
management  were  all  that  girls  needed  to  know,  though  basic  literature  might  be  advocated. 
While  humanist  authors  such  as  Erasmus  and  Vives  promoted  a  broad-based  education  for 
boys,  they  still  regarded  the  basis  of  a  girl's  education  as  domestic  and  character-forming. 
Girls  were  to  be  taught  nothing  which  might  compromise  their  modesty  or  purity  of 
thought.  Vives'  ideal  woman  was,  for  the  most  part,  the  renaissance  ideal:  chaste,  modest 
and  obedient  to  men. 
Nonetheless,  Vives'  Instruction  is  less  misogynistic  than  the  attitudes  held  by  most 
humanist  authors.  Perhaps  he  should  be  criticised  for  being  misogynistic  at  all  or  for  failing 
to  advocate  the  equality  of  women  with  men.  But  this  would  be  anachronistic.  With  the 
possible  exception  of  Agrippa  of  Nettesheim2  male  humanist  writers  did  not  accept 
arguments  for  sexual  equality.  They  followed  a  long  historical  tradition  of  regarding  women 
as  'naturally'  inferior  to  men.  This  tradition  was  assured  as  part  of  everyday  reality  and  was 
enshrined  in  the  Bible,  championed  by  the  Church  Fathers  and,  as  such,  had  religious, 
political  and  social  force  behind  it.  To  state  that  Vives,  or  Erasmus,  or  any  male  author  who 
worked  during  the  sixteenth  century  should  have  spoken  for  sexual  parity  is  to  argue  that 
they  should  have  done  something  completely  against  their  society's  standards. 
That  said,  the  weight  of  religious,  social  and  sexual  tradition  was  extremely  powerful.  It  is 
that  tradition  which  will  be  explored  first  in  order  to  go  some  way  towards  explaining  why  it 
was  that  writers  like  Vives,  who  were  otherwise  at  the  forefront  of  educational  development 
during  the  Renaissance,  found  it  impossible  to  think  in  any  other  way  than  that  which  we 
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programmes  for  the  education  of  women  and  demonstrate  that  some  women  of  patrician 
families  (such  as  Isotta  Nogarola  whose  case  will  be  discussed)  consciously  broke  the 
mould  by  studying  a  humanistic  curriculum  to  a  level  which  rivalled  the  best  educated  of 
their  male  counterparts.  That  they  usually  did  so  at  social  and  emotional  cost  underlines  how 
significant  was  their  achievement.  Their  example  also  highlights  how  curtailed  the  typical 
education  proposed  for  girls  was  in  comparison  to  the  range  of  subjects  which  might  have 
been  studied. 
Medieval  and  renaissance  images  of  women 
Misogyny  had  always  been  a  strong  current  in 
Western  civilization,  and  in  the  Renaissance 
the  misogynist  theme,  far  from  diminishing, 
flourished  with  the  intensity  that  otherwise 
characterized  the  age  3 
During  the  Renaissance  concepts  of  female  identity  were  linked  with  sexuality.  Women 
were  categorised,  overtly  or  implicitly,  in  the  roles  of  virgins,  mothers  or  whores  and  often 
those  roles  defined  their  social  and  familial  identities.  Women  were  expected  to  conform  to 
the  ideals  of  virginity  and  motherhood,  but  might  easily  be  condemned  as  whores  where 
their  behaviour  fell  short  of  men's  expectations  or  where  they  fell  victim  to  the  sexual 
advances  of  men.  Women  were  lauded  when  they  conformed  to  the  model  of  chastity, 
praised  when  they  became  'chaste'  mothers,  but  despised  and  feared  where  they  were 
perceived  to  have  displayed  overt  sexuality. 
The  renaissance  "denunciation  of  women"  was,  as  R.  Howard  Bloch  states, 
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Testament  and  to  ancient  Greece  and  extending  through  classical 
Hellenic,  Judaic,  and  Roman  traditions  all  the  way  to  the 
[Renaissance]... 
, 
it  dominates  ecclesiastical  writing,  letters, 
sermons,  theological  tracts,  and  discussions  and  compilations  of 
canon  law;  scientific  works,  as  part  of  biological,  gynecological,  and 
medical  knowledge;  folklore  and  philosophy 
The  idea  that  women  are  physically  and  mentally  inferior  to  men  was  normative  during  the 
Renaissance.  Men  looked  for  confirmation  of  this  'truth'  to  the  Old  Testament,  the  Church 
Fathers  and  -  in  terms  of  gathering  proof  of  female  physiological  weakness  -  to  the 
Hippocratic  corpus  and  to  Galen.  Belief  in  the  inherent  superiority  of  the  male  was 
pervasive  in  classical  times,  particularly  in  Greece.  This  belief  did  not  go  unchallenged,  for 
example  by  female  writers  such  as  Sappho,  Praxilla  and  Corinna.  Although  women  writers 
comprised  a  small  minority  when  compared  to  their  male  peers,  their  existence  testified  to 
the  fact  that  in  the  classical  world  "there  were  clever  and  sophisticated  women  who 
formulated  independent  views...  "5.  However,  there  are  no  "prominent"  philosophical  or 
mathematical  works  by  women  extant  from  the  classical  period6  although  there  were  some 
female  authorities  on  medical  practice7.  Thus,  in  classical  scientific  development,  the  role  of 
women  is  virtually  non-existent.  Women  were  largely  excluded  from  intellectual  and 
practical  subjects  outside  the  arts.  As  in  medieval  and  renaissance  times,  this  situation  arose 
because  the  prevailing  cultural  power  base  lay  in  men's  control. 
Male  biologists,  most  notably  Aristotle,  marshalled  current  knowledge  to  'demonstrate'  the 
passive,  weak  physiology  and  intellect  of  women.  Aristotle's  view  of  women  reflected 
biases  attendant  in  Greek  society.  In  his  work  he  asserts  that  the  female  sex  is  a  "natural 
deformity"  of  the  male".  His  theory  of  female  weakness  begins  with  his  description  of 
conception:  women  do  not  contribute  'seed'  to  reproduction  (as  do  men)  but  an 
'unconcocted'  residue  (the  menses)  which  nourishes  the  male  seed.  Women  are  therefore 
regarded  as  having  no  active  part  in  conception,  but  as  lending  nourishment  and  the 
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Aristotle  argues  provides  the  efficient  cause  and  form  -  the  life  force  -  to  the  foetus.  Some 
pre-Socratic  writers  such  as  Anaxagoras  and  Empedocles  did  advance  the  theory  that 
women  also  provide  'seed'  for  conception.  However,  Aristotle  rejects  this.  The  Hippocratic 
corpus  advances  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  both  male  and  female  'sperm'.  If  the 
'stronger'  sperm  are  overwhelmed  during  conception  by  "the  larger  quantity  of  the  weaker 
sperm"  a  female  foetus  results;  where  the  weaker  sperm  are  overwhelmed,  males  results.  So 
although  the  Hippocratic  author  of  "On  the  Seed"  accords  some  active  generative  capacity  to 
women  the  concept  that  females  arise  from  'weaker'  sperm  still  furnishes  the  idea  that 
women  are  physiologically  of  weaker'stock'. 
Aristotle's  analysis  of  the  difference  between  the  sexes  broadens  from  women's  role  in 
conception  and  pregnancy  to  promulgate  a  series  of  judgements  on  the  females  of  all  animal 
species.  He  regards  female  animals  as  less  courageous,  less  "spirited",  "softer,  more 
mischievous,...  more  impulsive,  and  more  considerate  in  rearing  the  young"  than  are 
males'  . 
The  disparity  between  male  power  and  (male-defined)  female  inadequacy  is  more 
marked  in  humans.  According  to  Aristotle,  man  has  the  "most  perfected  nature".  Thus 
woman  is  more  compassionate  than  man,  more  tearful,  and  again 
more  envious  and  more  querulous,  more  given  to  railing  and 
striking  out.  The  female  is  more  dispirited  than  the  male,  more 
despondent,  more  shameless  and  lying;  more  given  to  deceit, 
more  retentive  in  memory,  more  wakeful,  more  shrinking,  and  in 
general  more  difficult  to  raise  to  action  than  the  male,  and  she 
needs  less  nourishment.  The  male  is...  more  ready  to  help  and 
more  courageous  than  the  female...  '  1. 
Little  of  this,  if  any,  seems  based  on  systematic  observation.  Yet  many  of  Aristotle's 
contentions  about  the  biological,  physiological  and  psychological  differences  between  the 
sexes  were  accepted  uncritically  during  the  Medieval  and  Renaissance  periods. 
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assertions  in  Galen's  work.  Galen  disagreed  with  Aristotle  about  many  aspects  of  anatomy 
and  physiology  but  followed  his  view  of  women  being  less  perfect  than  men.  Galen  thought 
that  women,  being  "colder"  and  "moister"  than  men,  produce  "imperfect"  seed  during 
conception.  With  Aristotle,  he  was  perhaps  the  foremost  influence  on  medieval  and 
renaissance  authors  with  regard  to  medicine,  psychology  and  biology  who  tended  to  accept 
Aristotelian  and  Galenic  concepts  of  'the  female'  with  few  revisions.  Such  authors'  views 
were  reinforced  by  appeals  to  biblical  authorities.  Writers  often  cited  St.  Paul  in  defence  of 
their  misogynistic  statements.  Moreover,  they  held  to  the  position  delineated  in  the  first 
epistle  of  Peter  (3:  7): 
Likewise,  ye  wives,  be  in  subjection  to  your  husbands:  that,  if 
any  obey  not  the  word,  they  also  may  without  the  word  be  won 
by  the  conversation  of  the  wives; 
While  they  behold  your  chaste  conversation  coupled  with  fear. 
Whose  adorning  let  it  not  be  that  outward  adorning  of  plaiting  the 
hair,  and  of  wearing  of  gold,  or  of  putting  on  apparel; 
But  let  it  be  the  hidden  man  of  the  heart,  in  that  which  is  not 
corruptible,  even  the  ornament  of  a  meek  and  quiet  spirit,  which 
is  in  the  sight  of  God  of  great  price.  12 
Peter's  first  epistle  supports  the  concept  of  women  as  the  weaker  sex;  he  writes  of  men  as 
having  a  protective  duty  towards  their  wives  and  daughters,  insofar  as  the  women  obey 
religio-societal  rules  of  conduct:  silence,  chastity  and  virtue.  Men  owe  'their'  women  no 
courtesy  or  respect  as  human  beings.  The  sole  respect  given  to  them  is  that  which  they  earn 
by  being  models  of  biblical  femininity  and/or  motherhood.  Humanists,  like  medieval 
authors,  followed  this  attitude,  regarding  a  woman  as  an  ideal  wife  only  if  she  were  humble, 
plain,  unornamented,  quietly  devotional  and  obedient. 
104 In  Peter's  first  epistle  (3:  7),  he  states  that  husbands  should  give  "honour  unto  the  wife,  as 
unto  the  weaker  vessel...  ".  This  became  a  common  renaissance  term  for  women  and  from 
the  "weaker  vessel"  analogy  was  extrapolated  the  argument  that  women  had  weaker 
intellectual  powers  than  men.  This  argument  was  much  perpetuated  by  scholastic  and 
humanist  writers,  although  in  renaissance  neo-Platonism  female  beauty  was  at  least  regarded 
as  one  'saving  grace'  in  that  "the  beauty  of  the  female  body  is  said  to  reflect  the  beauty  of 
the  soul,  making  beauty  no  longer  an  occasio  peccuti  but  rather  a  step  on  the  ladder  to 
divine  love.  "";  This  is  of  little  comfort  to  those  women  who  do  not  conform  to  whatever 
male  image  of  female  'beauty'  is  currently  fashionable,  nor  does  it  do  much  to  enhance  the 
belief  that  women  are  more  than  faces  and  bodies  to  be  appraised  against  stereotypes  of 
attractiveness.  Furthermore,  the  image  of  the  beautiful  body  mirroring  the  beautiful  soul 
(and  thus  being  somehow  closer  to  God  by  dint  of  its  beauty)  was  not  to  be  found  in  the 
more  conservative  brands  of  humanist  and  scholastic  writing.  Female  beauty  tended  to  be 
associated  with  temptation  and  with  male  lust  rather  than  with  ascension  to  divine  love. 
Women  were  usually  regarded  by  men  as  sources  of  sexual  enticement,  even  of  solicitation. 
Just  as  the  classical  world  had  its  myth  of  Pandora,  the  Christian  world  had  its  myth  of  Eve. 
Pandora  was  created  by  Zeus  to  wreak  revenge  on  Prometheus  because  Prometheus  gave 
men  fire.  Pandora,  and  so  womankind  in  general,  was  seen  as  the  source  of  'evil',  illness 
and  toil.  Similarly,  medieval  and  renaissance  writers,  following  the  biblical  creation  story, 
saw  women  as  the  source  of  widespread  evil  in  the  world  and,  in  the  sense  that  Eve  was 
regarded  as  being  the  cause  of  the  expulsion  from  Eden,  the  source  of  toil.  In  addition, 
because  Genesis  has  as  one  part  of  the  creation  myth  the  description  of  Eve  being  formed 
from  Adam's  rib,  most  scholastic  and  humanist  authors  claimed  that  woman  was  a  'lesser' 
piece  of  work  than  was  man.  Eve  was  an  afterthought  not  made  in  God's  image  but  made 
from  Adam  to  be  his  companion  and  to  be  subservient  to  him.  Few  authors  repudiated  this, 
arguing  that  it  was  based  on  textual  evidence.  One  who  did  give  a  different  reading  was 
105 Martin  Luther  who  declares,  in  his  commentary  on  Genesis  (1:  27),  that  "woman  is  in  no 
way  a  botched  male,  but  rather  those  who  accuse  her  of  being  such  'are  themselves 
monsters...  'for  decrying  a  creature  made  by  God"  with  no  less  care  than  "  'he  might  have 
devoted  to  his  most  noble  work'.  "14 
Generations  of  men  shaped  the  biblical  text  to  fit  their  misogynist  bias.  There  are  actually 
two  passages  in  Genesis  relating  Eve's  creation:  verses  1:  27  and  2:  7.  It  is  in  2:  7  that  is 
found  the  story  of  Adam's  rib  being  used  to  fashion  Eve,  called  "woman"  because  she  was 
"taken  out  of  man"  (2:  23).  She  is  created  not  because  God  wished  to  create  her  for  his 
purpose(s),  but  merely  to  assuage  Adam's  loneliness.  However,  Genesis  1:  27  states:  "So 
God  created  man  in  his  own  image,  in  the  image  of  God  created  he  him;  male  and  female 
created  he  them.  "'  5  "Man"  would  seem  to  be  spoken  of  here  as  a  species/category,  not  as  a 
term  of  gender.  By  this  reading,  the  male  and  female  of  the  species  are  being  created  at  the 
same  time  and  with  the  same  status. 
Scholastic  (and  humanist)  writers  did  not  tend  to  follow  this  interpretation,  choosing  instead 
the  version  which  posits  woman  as  an  inferior  afterthought,  dependent  for  her  existence 
upon  Adam.  This  has  important  repercussions  for,  "in  the  misogynistic  thinking  of  the 
Middle  Ages  there  can  be  no  distinction  between  the  theological  and  the  sexual.  Woman  is  a 
limit  case  of  man,  and  as  in  Platonic  thought,  she  remains  bound  by  the  material,  by  flesh 
and  lust.  "16  Women's  sexuality  was  firmly  linked  to  Eve  and  to  her  temptation  by  the 
serpent.  Eve's  hubris  and  the  subsequent  fall  from  Eden  became  indivisible  from  the 
concept  of  woman's  uncontrollable  sexuality.  Eve's  disobedience  to  the  injunction  against 
eating  the  fruit  of  the  tree  of  knowledge,  her  weakness  in  the  face  of  temptation,  her 
'corruption'  of  Adam,  all  became  centred  on  her  sexual  'otherness'.  Men  regarded  women 
as  having  the  power  to  corrupt  them,  but  at  times  this  was  little  more  than  a  convenient 
excuse  either  for  their  licentiousness  or  for  fear  of  their  own  sexuality. 
106 Of  course,  if  Eve  was  subordinate  to  Adam  as  the  rib  story  implies,  it  followed  that  all 
women  were  subordinate  to  men  and  shared  Eve's  guilt.  They  were  guilty  by  association  of 
gender.  Resting  on  this  interpretation,  and  on  other  biblical  and  scholastic  authors,  the 
humanist  view  did  not  abandon  the  idea  of  woman  as  being  the  source  of  the  fall  and  of  the 
dissemination  of  sin  in  the  world.  They  might  abandon  other  elements  of  scholastic 
theology,  sophistry  and  pedagogy,  but  the  scholastic  concept  of  women  was  almost  wholly 
adopted  because  it  appealed  to  biblical  and  church  authority  for  its  credibility  and  professed 
veridicality.  To  reject  completely  this  image  would  be  to  invite  charges  of  heresy  and  to 
contradict  some  of  the  most  important  male  minds  in  the  Christian  tradition.  Some  of  these 
minds  and  the  anti-feminine  propaganda  which  they  produced  (no  doubt  in  good  conscience) 
will  now  be  discussed. 
Religious  and  secular  man's  concept  of  femininity 
Hence,  how  often  do  we,  from  beholding  a 
woman,  suffer  a  thousand  evils;  returning  home, 
and  entertaining  an  inordinate  desire,  and 
experiencing  anguish  for  many  days;  yet 
nevertheless  we  are  not  made  discreet,  but  when 
we  have  scarcely  cured  one  wound  we  again  fall 
into  the  same  mischief,  and  are  caught  by  the  same 
means;  and  for  the  sake  of  the  brief  pleasure  of  a 
glance,  we  sustain  a  kind  of  lengthened  and 
continual  torment...  17 
So  wrote  John  Chrysostom  in  an  apt  summary  of  the  common  reaction  to  women  from  the 
Church  Fathers.  Such  a  reaction  was  to  prevail  among  'devout'  men  for  centuries. 
Chrysostom  promotes  the  enduring  myth  that  the  male  sexual  urge  is  uncontrollable.  Men, 
he  says,  spend  long,  tortuous  days  fighting  the  lust  caused  by  the  mere  sight  of  a  woman. 
107 The  painful  'wound'  is  no  sooner  cured  than  the  affliction  strikes  again;  each  time  the 
devout  man  leaves  the  safety  of  his  home  or  cloister  he  sees  a  woman  who  inflames  his 
desire  once  more.  Men  have  to  wage  an  unceasing  battle  against  lust  and  so  against  sin. 
Rational  man  only  gives  way  to  sexual  appetite  because  women  tempt  him.  This  concept  of 
rational  man  verses  sensual  woman,  accepted  by  Chrysostom,  was  to  be  regarded  as  truth 
during  the  Medieval  and  Renaissance  eras. 
For  writers  like  John  Chrysostom  and  Tertullian,  women  were  thought  to  place  men's  souls 
in  danger.  This  danger  was  not  considered  to  arise  from  a  man's  lascivious  stares  at  a 
woman.  Rather,  women  are  attractive  to  men  and  are  a  'temptation'  because  of  their  beauty 
and/or  sexuality.  The  Old  and  New  Testaments  contained  all  the  female  stereotypes  (virgin, 
obedient  wife,  mother,  prostitute)  required  to  maintain  the  idea  of  women  either  as 
temptresses  or  as  property.  Following  St.  Paul,  the  Church  Fathers  compounded  these 
biblical  images  by  referring  to  women's  sexuality  and  its  corrupting  powers.  Tertullian 
called  woman  the  "devil's  gateway",  the  source  of  original  sin  and  thus  the  cause  of 
Christ's  death.  The  Church  Fathers  were  inordinately  preoccupied  with  women's  virginity  - 
in  many  passages  it  is  harped  on  to  the  exclusion  of  mention  of  male  virginity.  These  writers 
did  not  deal  with  the  reality  of  women's  mind's,  emotions  or  needs;  they  dealt  in  paradigms, 
particularly  those  which  were  biblical  and  which  pertained  to  female  sexual  and  marital 
status.  These  paradigms  play 
a  very  important  part  in  the  formulation  of  theological  ideas  about 
women.  [This  formulation]  is  closely  connected  with  the 
malediction  of  Eve,  as  the  wife's  subordination  emanates  from 
her  sin;  it  is  also  in  itself  a  divine  instruction  with  which  man 
may  not  tamper.  As  such,  it  remains  an  immovable  object  in  the 
way  of  change,  while  religion  maintains  its  authority.  18 
The  opposite  of  the  female  temptress  is  seen  in  the  glorification  of  the  virgin,  which  was  to 
be  of  growing  importance  as  the  influence  of  Christianity  spread,  affecting  secular  customs 
108 and  laws,  particularly  those  relating  to  property  and  marriage.  It  is  argued,  most  notably  by 
Michel  Foucault,  that  what  can  be  discerned  is  a  "domestication"  of  misogyny  which 
[w]ithin  this  context...  [would]  appear  to  stem  from  the  reduction 
of  a  once  broader  and  freer  model  of  sexuality  to  one  of  a 
"normality"  defined  by  nature,  a  "heterosexuality  of 
reproduction",  and  an  increased  burden  placed  upon  the  couple  as 
an  institution.  Misogyny  seen  as  domestic  annoyance  -  complaint 
against  petty  jealousies,  envy  of  neighbours,  nagging,  bragging, 
argument  and  contradiction,  risks  of  birth,  noises  of  the  nursery, 
and  disappointments  of  children  -  supports  such  a  claim.  19 
In  medieval  and  renaissance  literature  the  middle  road  between  the  virgin-whore  dichotomy 
became  the  figure  of  the  nagging  wife.  Men  were  caught  in  domesticity,  railed  at  by  a 
scolding  spouse  whose  main  purpose,  apart  from  heaping  misery  on  her  husband,  was  to 
bear  children  who  often  caused  trouble  for  their  fathers.  But  the  'domestic  annoyance' 
scenario,  while  partly  validated  by  popular  mythologizing,  neglects  the  reality  that  some 
men  and  women  did  love  each  other  and  that  not  all  reactions  to  marriage  fitted  the 
misogynistic  frame  of  reference.  Many  men  did  grieve  for  a  wife  or  mistress  who  died  and 
men,  as  well  as  women,  did  grieve  for  their  dead  children.  However,  economic  necessity  or 
social  convention  may  often  have  taken  the  upper  hand  in  marital  and  financial  affairs. 
Emotions  might  therefore  have  had  to  be  suppressed  in  the  face  of  attendant  actualities.  But 
what  is  at  issue  is  not  the  realities  concerning  individual  relationships;  rather,  the  issue  is 
one  of  how  women  were  stereotyped  within  normative  popularist  images  of  relationships. 
In  medieval  and  renaissance  literature,  in  both  vernacular  and  Latin,  women  were  generally 
portrayed  as  garrulous,  empty-headed,  vain,  deceitful  and  morally  corrupt  because  of  their 
rapacious  sexuality. 
That  women  possessed  all  these  faults  is  attested  to  by  Erasmus  in  his  Praise  of  Folly,  a 
work  which  was  extremely  popular  during  the  late  Renaissance,  as  has  been  stated  in  the 
preceding  chapter.  Apart  from  the  tacit  misogyny  in  the  personification  of  folly  as  a  woman, 
109 Erasmus  writes  that  it  was  Folly  who  suggested  to  Nature  that  man  should  have  a  woman  as 
a  companion: 
admittedly  a  stupid  and  foolish  sort  of  creature  but  amusing  and 
pleasant  company  all  the  same,  and  she  could  share  his  life,  and 
season  and  sweeten  his  harsh  nature  by  her  folly.  For  Plato's 
apparent  doubt  whether  to  place  woman  in  the  category  of  rational 
animal  or  brute  beast  is intended  to  point  out  the  remarkable  folly  of 
her  sex.  If  ever  a  woman  wanted  to  be  thought  wise  she  only 
succeeded  in  being  doubly  foolish...  The  defect  is  multiplied  when 
anyone  tries  to  lay  on  a  veneer  of  virtue  and  deflect  a  character  from 
its  natural  bent.  As  the  Greek  puts  it,  an  ape  is  always  an  ape  even 
if  clad  in  purple;  and  a  woman  is  always  a  woman,  that  is,  a  fool, 
whatever  mask  she  wears.  2° 
Even  allowing  for  the  satirical  and  humorous  intent  of  Erasmus'  words  the  characterisation 
of  the  innate  stupidity  of  women  is  harsh.  It  is  to  be  wondered  how  many  women  laughed 
at  his  descriptions  of  their  sex  because  they  genuinely  found  them  amusing  and  how  many 
laughed  because  it  was  expected.  Erasmus  reflects  assumptions  about  female  intelligence 
and  personality  which  were  widespread  during  the  Renaissance.  He  presents  a  picture  of 
men  tolerating  women's  idiocy:  "No  one  will  deny  the  truth  of  this  who  considers  the 
nonsense  a  man  talks  with  a  woman  and  the  silly  things  he  does  whenever  he  wants  to 
enjoy  the  pleasure  she  gives.  "2'  In  other  words,  men  have  to  endure  certain  conventional 
pleasantries  before  gaining  a  woman's  consent  to  the  intercourse  in  which  he  is  really 
interested.  Indeed,  it  might  be  asked,  given  male  distaste  for  anything  other  than  women's 
bodies,  why  would  men  consent  to  marry  the  creatures?  Erasmus  has  the  answer:  it  is  Folly 
which  makes  marriages  and  Folly  which  keeps  couples  together. 
Why,  not  many  marriages  would  ever  be  made  if  the  bridegroom 
made  prudent  enquiries  about  the  tricks  that  little  virgin  who 
now  seems  so  chaste  and  innocent  was  up  to  before  the 
wedding.  And  once  entered  on,  even  fewer  marriages  would  last 
unless  most  of  a  wife's  goings-on  escaped  notice  through  the 
indifference  or  stupidity  of  her  husband...  [Folly]  sees...  that 
peace  reigns  in  the  home  and  their  relationship  continues.  A 
husband  is  laughed  at,  called  a  cuckold...  when  he  kisses  away 
110 the  tears  of  his  unfaithful  wife,  but  how  much  happier  it  is  for 
him  to  be  thus  deceived  than  to  wear  himself  out  with 
unremitting  jealousy.  22 
So,  women  are  promiscuous  and  will  lie  about  their  virginity  to  trap  a  man  into  a  marriage 
he  would  not  otherwise  countenance.  Men,  on  the  other  hand,  are  either  beyond  reproach 
sexually,  or  are  expected  to  indulge  in  sexual  intercourse  as  often  as  they  require.  Erasmus 
makes  no  mention  in  this  passage  of  the  man  with  whom  the  wife  has  supposedly  been 
unfaithful. 
But,  his  eye  firmly  on  the  male  audience  of  the  Praise  of  Folly,  Erasmus  reserves  the 
cruelest  invective  for  elderly  women.  Young  women  who  are  beautiful  are  accused  of 
whorish  behaviour  and  of  using  their  beauty  to  trap  men.  Like  many  male  authors,  Erasmus 
will  allow  women  no  escape  from  the  prison  of  their  physical  appearance,  even  once  they 
are  no  longer  considered  to  be  sexually  attractive.  Folly  states  that  it  is  "fun" 
to  see  the  old  women  who...  look  like  corpses  that  seem  to  have 
risen  from  the  dead.  They  still  go  around  saying  "Life  is  good", 
still  on  heat,...  and  hiring  some  young  Phaon  by  paying  out 
large  sums  of  money.  They're  forever  smearing  their  faces  with 
make-up,  always  looking  in  the  mirror,  and  taking  tweezers  to 
their  pubic  hairs,  exposing  their  sagging  breasts  and  trying  to 
raise  failing  desire  with  their  quavery  whining  voices,  while  they 
drink,  dance  among  the  girls,  and  scribble  their  little  love-letters. 
All  this  raises  a  general  laugh.  23 
Apparently,  then,  older  women  who  still  feel  sexual  need  are  as  distasteful  to  the  Erasmian 
male  as  is  a  bitch  on  heat. 
Yet  Erasmus'  work  reflects  a  tradition  which  was  legitimated  by  the  church  as  much  as  by 
secular  institutions,  and  this  is  a  tradition  into  which  Vives'  (educational)  thought 
concerning  women  also  falls.  With  the  rise  of  European  Christianity,  women  in  the  West 
became  "entrapped  by  the  logic  of  a  cultural  ideal"  (that  is,  their  culpability  for  the  fall  from 
111 grace)  which,  once  internalised,  made  them  "always...  in  a  state  of  weakness,  lack,  guilt, 
inadequacy,  vulnerability.  "24  With  Marian  ideology  this  representation  of  women  was 
reinforced:  the  only  way  to  reduce  the  state  of  female  sinfulness  by  any  significant  margin 
was  for  a  woman  to  remain  a  virgin,  shut  away  from  men's  eyes.  By  citing  Mary  as  the 
immaculate  standard  of  femininity,  Christianity  attempted  the  impossible:  the  validation  of 
the  concept  that  childbirth  could  be  entirely  divorced  from  sexual  intercourse  and  thus  from 
sin.  In  practice  a  compromise  obviously  had  to  be  reached  if  all  souls  were  not  to  be 
damned.  Women  sinned  when  they  allowed  their  husbands  to  have  sex  with  them,  but 
provided  intercourse  was  curtailed  and  absolutely  linked  not  to  pleasure  but  to  the 
production  of  children,  sinfulness  could  be  lessened.  Alternatively,  a  woman  could  enter 
orders,  confine  herself  to  a  'cell'  in  the  family  home,  or,  once  widowed,  could  refuse  to 
remarry.  (These  options  will  be  considered  in  the  next  section  of  this  chapter.  ) 
The  Church  Fathers,  who  were  of  enormous  influence  on  medieval  and  renaissance 
authors,  argued  that  chastity  was  a  mental  as  well  as  a  physical  state.  They  considered  that 
the  thought  of  desiring  someone  was  as  sinful  as  the  act  of  coition  itself.  Origen  states  that 
"one  can  commit  adultery  only  in  the  heart"25,  but  the  Fathers  did  not  seem  concerned  with 
the  logical  outcome  of  this  argument:  that  if  the  thought  is  as  bad  as  deed,  what  is  to  prevent 
anyone  from  committing  the  'punishable'  act  believing  themselves  to  be  condemned 
anyway?  Cyprian  further  confuses  the  situation  by  blurring  the  distinction  between  desiring 
someone  and  being  desired.  To  him,  a  virgin  can,  by  her  presence,  incite  desire  in  a  man, 
but  cannot  thereafter  remain  a  virgin.  He  states,  addressing  all  virgins: 
if  you...  enkindle  the  fire  of  hope,  so  that,  without  perhaps 
losing  your  own  soul,  you  nevertheless  ruin  others...  who 
behold  you,  you  cannot  be  excused  on  the  ground  that  your 
mind  is  chaste  and  pure...  and  you  can  no  longer  be  numbered 
among  maidens  and  virgins  of  Christ...  26 
112 If  a  woman  neither  wants  not  encourages  the  lustful  attentions  of  a  man  -  indeed,  she  may 
not  even  be  aware  of  his  existence,  or  that  he  is  staring  at  her  -  she  is  still  deemed  to  have 
fallen  and  to  be  sexually  culpable.  In  Cyprian's  scheme,  women  cannot  ever  be  said  to  be 
virginal.  The  term  ceases  to  be  a  physical  description  of  a  woman  who  has  never  had 
penetrative  sexual  intercourse  and  becomes  a  description  of  a  state  of  mind  -  and  not  of  the 
woman's  mind,  but  the  minds  of  men  who  desire  her.  A  woman's  virginity  is  therefore  not 
her  own  possession;  it  belongs  to  any  man  she  passes  in  the  street,  or  who  sees  her  in 
church  or  in  her  parent's  home.  Cyprian  effectively  exonerates  men  from  the  sin  of  their 
lust  while  any  female  virgin,  any  woman  whatever  her  age,  is  guilty  because  she  exists. 
Such  logic  gave  rise  to  Tertullian's  argument  that  virginal  women  were  to  be  shut  away 
because  "every  public  exposure  of  an  honourable  virgin  is  Ito  her]  a  suffering  of  rape"27. 
And  it  may  be  asked  what  was  St.  Jerome  thinking  of  when  he  took  misogyny  so  far  as  to 
suggest  denying  female  virgins  the  right  to  see  their  own  bodies?  Jerome  writes  that  he 
"wholly"  disapproves  of  "baths  for  a  [female]  virgin  of  full  age"28. 
In  a  patriarchal  society  it  was  seen  to  be  imperative  that  a  young  bride  was  a  virgin  so  that 
no  questions  about  the  first  son's  legitimacy  could  lead  to  counter-claims  to  inheritance.  But 
the  Church  Fathers  were  not  promoting  views  which  could  be  said  to  have  inheritance  or 
financial  rights  as  their  chief  concern.  There  was  something  more  insidious  and  damaging 
at  work  and  that  was  a  belief  in  the  saving  of  men's  souls  at  the  expense  of  women's  while 
preserving  the  prevailing  socio-sexual  staters  quo.  The  Fathers  held  up  women's  virginity  to 
scrutiny  and  claimed  it  as  a  virtually  impossible  state  to  maintain,  while  terming  male 
virginity  celibacy  in  a  conquest  of  male  sexuality  which  was  tied  to  religious  ethics.  It  is 
unsurprising  that  with  such  biblical  and  church  authority,  medieval  and  renaissance  male 
authors  regarded  misogyny  as  not  just  normative  but  desirable.  It  can  be  imagined  just  what 
an  effect  was  created  upon  men  when  a  woman  was  unwilling  to  accept  a  male-defined 
feminine  role:  a  woman,  for  example,  who  did  not  accept  illiteracy  and  ignorance  as  all  she 
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The  case  of  'learned  women'  will  now  be  examined  before  looking  at  the  work  of  men  who 
believed  that  there  was  some  justification  for  educating  them. 
Resistance  through  intellect:  medieval  and  renaissance  women  of  learning 
Stupid  men,  fond  of  abusing 
All  women,  without  any  shame, 
Not  seeing  you're  the  ones  to  blame 
For  the  very  faults  that  you're  accusing. 
You  strive  to  conquer  her  resistance, 
Then  with  solemn  treachery 
Attribute  to  her  lechery 
What  was  only  done  through  your  persistence. 
No  female  reputation's  sure: 
The  most  cautious  woman  in  the  town 
Is  an  ingrate  if  she  turns  you  down; 
If  she  gives  in...  she's  a  whore.  29 
Few  learned  women  had  the  audacity  to  channel  their  anger  as  directly  as  did  the  Mexican 
nun  Juana  de  la  Cruz  in  this  recondillas.  To  be  sure,  most  women  were  concerned  simply 
with  living  and  working  and  if  they  were  angered  by  men's  attitudes  there  was  probably 
little  they  could  do.  For  a  tiny  minority  of  women  their  anger  could  be  expressed  through 
their  writing.  For  this  they  had  first  to  gain  some  education  and  few  men  regarded  this  as 
necessary  for  females. 
Women  were,  on  the  whole,  dispossessed  and  denied  much  means  of  intellectual  and  social 
advancement.  By  the  Renaissance,  there  were  some  women  who  did  have  recognizable 
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women"  0).  In  many  cases  widows  had  some  control  over  their  husband's  estate  if  the  eldest 
son  was  not  old  enough  to  administer  affairs.  Women  were  certainly  of  some  economic  and 
social  importance  to  patrician  society,  usually  it  must  be  said  in  terms  of  what  they  brought 
to  a  marriage,  by  which  a  woman's  family,  or  the  family  into  which  she  married,  could  have 
their  economic  or  social  status  enhanced.  The  only  financial  expectation  a  woman  could  have 
in  her  own  right  was  the  provision  of  a  dowry  if  her  family  had  the  means  to  furnish  one.  If, 
once  widowed,  a  woman  remarried,  her  husband's  family  could  return  her  dowry  to  her. 
Any  children  of  the  marriage  stayed  in  their  deceased father's  house.  Moreover,  married 
women  had  restricted  legal  rights  attendant  with  their  being  under  the  guardianship  of  their 
husbands.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  in  many  European  countries,  the  law 
generally  held  that  a  married  woman  could  not  draw  up  a  contract, 
take  a  loan,  or  take  any  person  to  court  on  civil  matters  without 
the  consent  of  her  husband,  not  only  because  the  husband 
managed  joint  property,  but  also  because  of  her  very  status  as  a 
woman.  As  Beaumanoir  wrote...  "The  dumb,  the  deaf,  the  insane 
and  the  female  cannot  draw  up  a  contract,  neither  alone  or  through 
a  representative,  since  they  are  subservient  to  the  authority  of 
others.  "31 
Women  had  no  legal  rights  to  share  in  the  government  of  society:  they  could  not  hold  public 
office  or  play  any  part  in  court  and  municipal  institutions.  Of  course,  this  situation  was 
underwritten  by  church  and  secular  authorities'  views  of  women  as  being  of  feeble 
intelligence  and  poor  judgement.  Little  had  changed  by  the  time  of  the  Renaissance. 
As  has  been  mentioned,  widowhood  could  give  a  measure  of  release  from  male  dominance 
or  financial  control.  One  other  means  of  escape,  perhaps  from  a  father's  constraints  or  from 
unwanted  marriage,  was  the  convent.  This  is  not  to  argue  that  no  woman  took  orders  for 
reasons  of  religious  vocation,  though  many  women  did  regard  conventual  life  as  a  type  of 
freedom  from  the  limits  imposed  upon  them  by  men.  It  also  offered,  if  they  chose,  the 
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women,  and  cloistered  women  were  disproportionately  literate:  it  was  a  commonplace  of 
advice  books  that  young  girls  should  not  be  taught  to  read  or  write  unless  they  were 
destined  to  be  nuns.  "  32  However,  this  situation  brought  its  own  difficulties  as  there  was 
much  suspicion  surrounding  women  who  decided  to  enter  holy  orders.  'Holy'  women, 
particularly  mystics,  might  be  granted  respect  for  their  devotions  but  in  wider  society  the 
situation  remained  such  that  girls  were  usually  expected  to  marry  and  leave  the  paternal 
home  for  a  husband's  house  rather  than  for  a  convent.  Thus,  where  a  woman  did  not 
choose  solitude  within  conventual  rules,  she  had  little  recourse  to  remaining  free  from  male 
interference  in  how  she  chose  to  live  her  life.  Any  woman  who  was  alone 
was  suspect.  An  unmarried  woman  was  considered  incapable  of 
living  alone  or  in  the  absence  of  masculine  protection  without 
falling  into  sin.  Even  if  she  were  a  recluse  and  lived  a  holy  life, 
even  if  she  retired  to  a  room  on  the  upper  floor  of  the  paternal 
house,  she  placed  the  family  honor  in  jeopardy  by  the  mere  fact  of 
her  celibacy  33 
In  any  case,  holy  orders  afforded  a  solution  only  for  women  of  high  social  standing  whose 
fathers  could  afford  to  pay  the  dowry  expected  by  the  convent  (although  many  convents  did 
accept  illegitimate  or  disabled  girls  without  dowries). 
Particularly  regarded  with  awe  were  those  women  who  had  mystic  visions,  for  example  St. 
Clare  of  Assissi,  St.  Catherine  (Benincasa),  Angela  of  Foligno,  Umiliana  de'Cerchi.  These 
women  gained  standing  in  the  eyes  of  the  church  and  of  society  by  dint  of  their  visions  and 
their  'outstanding'  holiness,  despite  the  fact  that  their  behavior  was  often  regarded  by  their 
families  as  bizarre  (before  the  girls'  entry  into  their  orders).  It  is  by  no  coincidence  that  all  of 
the  above  named  -  indeed  many  of  the  female  saints  of  the  Medieval  and  Renaissance 
periods  -  were  either  anorexic  or  bulimic.  It  is  not  without  foundation  to  suggest  that 
controlling  their  appetites  was  a  means  of  attempting  to  reclaim  their  identities,  their  selves, 
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ascetics  who  fasted,  but  female  ascetics'  behaviour  was  usually  more  extreme,  perhaps  even 
pathological:  it  can  be  termed  anorexia  or  bulimia  because  of  its  symptomology  and  due  to 
the  permanent,  wilful  self-imposed  state  of  starvation  which  could  result  in  death.  Starvation 
may  also  have  induced  altered  mental  conditions,  the  holy  visions  which  most  female  saints 
recounted.  They  also,  by  starving  themselves,  adhered  to  the  Christian  social  and  religious 
goal  of  purity3;.  These  women  purged  themselves  of  the  little  food  they  ate,  they  fasted, 
they  denied  their  physical  appetite.  And  appetite,  whether  'gluttony'  or  sexual  need,  was 
sinful.  Importantly,  for  women  who  had  these  visions,  church  representatives  often  believed 
them;  men  actually  listened  to  them  and  accepted  their  religious  authority  once  they  were 
convinced  that  the  nuns'  apparitions  were  'true'.  Mysticism  was  arguably  the  only  sphere  of 
influence  on  which  women  had  a  significant  effect  during  the  Middle  Ages  and  the 
Renaissance.  The  reality  of  women's  lack  of  impact  on  the  religious  and  intellectual  world  is 
heightened  by  the  knowledge  that  during  the  Renaissance  no  more  than  a  few  hundred 
women  were  regarded  as  holy  and  respected  as  such.  In  comparison,  some  60,000  were 
burned  as  witches.  Male  authority  preferred  to  regard  women  with  fear  and  suspicion,  to 
destroy  them  rather  than  to  grant  them  respect.  In  fact, 
[c]ondemned  witches  outnumbered  recognized  saints  and  near- 
saints  by  something  like  a  hundred  to  one.  If  the  Renaissance 
was  an  age  of  uniquely  feminine  sanctity,  it  was  much  more  so 
an  age  of  exceptional  brutality  to  women.  So  bright  burn  the  fires 
that  consumed  the  witches  of  Europe  that  they  cast  special  light 
on  the  condition  of  Renaissance  women.  35 
Whether  cloistered  women  engaged  purely  in  devotional  activity,  or  whether  they  used  the 
opportunities  afforded  for  education  and  study,  conventual  enclosure  allowed  a  woman  to 
refuse  her  "destiny"  as  a  "functionary  of  man  and  his  culture"  and  to  experience  some 
autonomy  of  self  "in  the  context  of  an  institution  recognised  as  valid  by  the  society"  in 
which  they  had  been  brought  up36.  Women  could,  moreover,  impose  solitude  upon 
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Nogarola  -  will  now  be  appraised.  It  will  be  seen  that  such  self-imposed  exile  within  the 
home  did  not,  in  Isotta's  case,  liberate  her  entirely  from  domination  and  disparagement  by 
men. 
Isotta  Nogarola:  the  case  against  the  "sweet  symbol  of  domestic  virtue" 
[Apart  from]  the  honeyed  words  of  a  few 
humanist  admirers  [learned  women]  encountered 
the  massed  opposition  of  the  male  intellectual 
community,  which  seemed  to  find  a  little  learning 
in  a  woman  proper  and  too  much  masculizing  and 
abhorrent.  These  women's  anxieties,  frustration, 
and  dissatisfaction  with  the  structure  of 
opportunity  available  to  women  intrude  on  their 
works  -  conspicuously,  in  the  cases  of  Nogarola 
and  [Laura]  Cereta.  They  set  a  high  standard  for 
female  academic  achievement  that  was  only  in  rare 
cases  equalled  before  the  modern  era  37 
Few  renaissance  women  became  celebrated  for  their  learning.  Amongst  those  who  did  were, 
apart  from  Isotta  Nogarola,  Laura  Cereta,  Cassandra  Fedele,  Alessandra  Scala  and  Olympia 
. 
Morata.  Margaret  King  has  written"'  that  while  twelve  female  humanists  can  be  named  and 
twenty  more  could  be  identified,  only  three  were  famous  during  their  lifetimes.  Some 
women  from  privileged  families  were  encouraged  to  learn,  generally  by  their  fathers  who 
usually  tutored  them:  many  girls  who  received  some  education,  however  attenuated,  did  not 
attend  schools,  but,  in  the  homes  of  the  wealthy,  the  tendency  was  also  for  boys  to  be 
tutored  privately.  For  the  most  part,  girls  were  not  considered  to  require  an  extended 
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beyond  minimum  literacy  were  often  believed  to  have  placed  themselves  against  the  male 
ideal  of  women  as  being,  in  Pompeo  Molmente's  words,  "sweet  symbols  of  domestic 
virtue"39. 
Women  belonging  to  financially  privileged  families  might  be  taught  basic  literacy  skills  but 
they  were  normally  expected  to  be  primarily  concerned  with  the  household,  its  tasks  and 
management;  they  were  the  overseers  of  its  efficient  running.  They  might  also  contribute 
craft-based  competencies  such  as  spinning,  weaving  and  needlework.  Thus,  much  of  the 
material  of  cultural  and  educational  transmission  which  was  contained  in  books  was 
inaccessible  to  women  because  they  could  not  read,  or  had  insufficient  reading  abilities  to 
understand  texts  (for  instance,  having  knowledge  of  vernacular  but  not  of  Latin). 
Furthermore,  they  may  have  been  members  of  a  social  class  which  did  not  give  them 
freedom  from  manual  work  and  trade  and,  as  such,  could  have  had  little  time  for  reading  for 
pleasure  or  education.  Additionally,  women  had  little  or  no  access  to  books  in  private 
collections,  or  in  monastery  or  university  libraries.  Indeed,  university  education  was  not 
available  to  women  who  were  disbarred  from  applying  to  a  university  supposing  they  had 
the  requisite  elementary  education  to  allow  them  to  do  so.  Any  basic  education  a  girl 
received  from  whatever  source  -  father,  tutor,  school  -  had  questionable  applicable  value 
with  the  result  that  girls  and  young  women  had  limited  incentives  to  learn  whereas  boys 
could  be  encouraged  to  study  for  entry  to  a  gild  or  university.  Despite  all  this,  some  women 
became  skilled  tradespeople:  goldsmiths,  spinners,  weavers,  wig  makers,  dyers,  milliners, 
amongst  others  listed  by  Boileau40.  Others  went  into  service  or  became  courtesans  or 
prostitutes.  Some  courtesans  became  relatively  well-educated  and  financially  successful:  two 
famous  female  renaissance  poets,  Gaspara  Stampa  and  Veronica  Franco,  were  courtesans. 
Meanwhile,  prostitutes  were  widely  thought  of  as  a'necessary  evil',  saving  'honest'  women 
from  the  unbridled  lust  of  men.  But  women  who  became  educated  to  a  level  comparable  to  a 
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rather  than  social  or  material.  Perhaps  they  wished  to  learn  because  they  enjoyed  learning 
and  the  knowledge  they  accrued  in  the  process;  perhaps  it  gave  them  a  sense  of  identity, 
rebelling  against  male  expectations  of  their  gender,  refusing  to  compromise  their  wish  to 
learn  by  giving  in  to  their  family's  intention  that  they  should  marry  and  bear  children. 
The  woman  who  became  (well)  educated  was  more  often  than  not  treated  with  suspicion, 
derision,  or  both.  A  sixteenth-century  Italian  doctor  wrote,  typifying  male  opinion,  that  it 
was  "a  miracle  if  a  woman  wishing  to  overcome  her  sex  and  in  giving  herself  to  learning  and 
languages,  does  not  stain  her  soul  with  vice  and  filthy  abominations.  ";  '  If  a  woman  chose  to 
learn  rather  than  be  satisfied  with  the  rudimentary  education  granted  her  by  male  opinion, 
she  challenged  male  control  over  her  and  ultimately  this  challenge  could  be  construed  as 
extending  to  the  father  who  may  have  educated  her.  If  she  could  think  for  herself  she  had  no 
need  of  a  man  telling  her  what  to  do  or  what  opinions  it  would  be  fitting  for  her  to  hold.  She 
might  be  less  likely  to  obey  a  man's  instructions  or  agree  with  his  assertions.  On  the  whole, 
the  explicit  assumption  amongst  those  who  considered  women's  education  at  all,  was  that  it 
placed  female  chastity,  virtue  and  spirituality  in  danger  if  that  education  exceeded  limited 
boundaries.  If,  like  Isotta  Nogarola,  a  woman  demonstrated  her  intelligence  by  becoming 
educated,  men  were  apt  to  state  that  she  was  some  sort  of  third  sex,  having  vanquished  her 
femininity  and  become  unwomanly.  Men  stereotyped  the  perfect  woman  as  being.  beautiful, 
decorous,  devout  and  silently  stupid.  Alongside  this  stereotyping,  they  infantilised  and 
overtly  attempted  to  control  women. 
Isotta  Nogarola  was  one  of  Margaret  King's  three  famous  renaissance  (humanist)  women. 
The  other  Nogarola  daughters,  Angela  and  Ginevra  were  also  highly  educated,  but  Isotta 
Evas  the  one  who  was  most  recognised  for  her  intellectual  achievement.  The  sisters  were 
tutored  by  Martino  Rizzoni  who  had  been  a  pupil  of  Guarino42.  Isotta  concentrated  on  her 
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amounted  to  internal  exile  within  her  own  home  in  Verona.  She  remained  self-confined  in 
what  Matteo  Bosso  called  her  "book-lined  cell"43,  a  term  which  has  obvious  religious 
overtones.  Isotta  remained  a  virgin,  something  which  was  praised  by  contemporaries  such 
as  Paolo  Maffei.  She  seemed  to  accept  the  'need',  the  societal  expectation  of  her,  to  remain 
chaste  and  to.  be  seen  to  be  spiritually  as  well  as  sexually  above  reproach  as  an  antidote  to 
what  might  be  levelled  against  her  as  a  learned  woman.  Isotta  chose  not  to  join  holy  orders 
but  to  create  her  own  cloister  in  the  family  house.  In  fact,  her  avowed  chastity  did  not  save 
her  from  slander  (as  shall  be  explained),  though  she  continued  her  'retreat'  even  to  the  extent 
of  renouncing  secular  humanism  in  favour  of  the  study  of  sacred  works. 
But  Isotta  was  at  best  patronised  (by  male  humanists),  at  worst  maligned  (by  Niccolö 
Barbo).  In  terms  of  the  former,  the  respected  humanist  author  Lauro  Quirini  wrote  to  Isotta 
at  the  request  of  her  brother.  Leonardo  Nogarola  asked  Quirini  for  guidance  for  his  sister 
regarding  a  plan  of  advanced  humanist  studies.  Accordingly,  Quirini  advises  Isotta  to  study 
Aristotle,  Boethius,  Cicero  and  Thomas  Aquinas.  He  tells  her  to  concentrate  on  the  subject 
areas  of  moral  and  natural  philosophy,  mathematics  and  metaphysics.  However,  he  states 
that  her  greatest  triumph,  that  for  which  she  deserves  "the  highest  praises",  is  that  in 
becoming  learned  she  has  "overcome"  her  "own  nature";  4.  Furthermore,  in  his  letter,  Quirini 
refers  to  Isotta  as  "venerable  virgin"45.  This  is  limiting  in  that  it  reinforces  the  common 
stereotype,  but  at  least  Quirini  does  advise  a  rigorous  course  of  study  for  Isotta. 
In  contrast,  Niccolö  Barbo's  vicious  attack  on  Isotta  went  far  beyond  the  application  of 
stereotypes.  In  1438  he  produced  an  anonymous  pamphlet  accusing  her  of  promiscuity  and 
incest.  He  writes  that 
before  [Isotta]  had  made  her  body  generally  available  for 
promiscuous  intercourse,  she  had  first  permitted,  and  indeed 
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none  other  than  her  brother,  so  that  by  this  tie  she  might  be  more 
tightly  bound  to  him.  Alas  for  God...  when  she,  who  sets 
herself  no  limit  to  this  filthy  lust,  dares  to  engage  so  deeply  in 
the  finest  literary  studies  46 
Barbo  portrays  Isotta  as  both  an  affront  to  society  and  to  God.  In  this  libel,  her  sexuality  is 
lied  about  and  said  to  be  depraved  in  an  effort  to  attack  her  because  her  intellectual  ability 
and  reputation  as  a  learned  woman  was  accepted.  To  her  accuser,  Isotta  offends  God  by  her 
supposed  wantonness  and  sin,  but  the  real  offence  is  against  the  man,  Barbo,  because  Isotta 
dares  to  be  an  intelligent  woman.  Actually,  it  would  seem  that  Isotta's  chastity  was  in  no 
doubt.  That  it  mattered  at  all  attests  to  the  difficulties  experienced  by  educated  women  in  the 
face  of  men  who  felt  threatened  by  both  their  intelligence  and  their  sexuality. 
Isotta  retired  from  the  world  in  order  to  spend  her  life  as  she  wished.  The  pursuit  of  her 
studies  had  become  increasingly  difficult  due  to  pressures  outwith  her  home  and  the  greater 
the  acclaim  for  her  learning,  the  more  the  detractors  circled.  Guarino  praised  her  to  Jacopo 
Foscari  but  would  not  answer  the  letters  she  wrote  directly  to  him.  To  have  a  personal  reply 
from  Guarino  would  have  meant  a  great  deal  to  Isotta.  In  writing  to  him  she  asks  Guarino 
not  to  hold  against  her  the  'fact'  that,  in  writing,  she  has  "transgressed  those  rules  of  silence 
especially  imposed  on  women"47.  She  would  write  to  him  again  when  he  failed  to  reply  to 
her  original  letter,  stating:  "'You  have  treated  me  wretchedly,  and  have  shown  as  little 
consideration  for  me  as  if  I  had  never  been  born'...  Even  if  I  am  most  deserving  of  this 
outrage,  it  is  unworthy  of  you  to  inflict  it.  What  have  I  done  to  be  thus  despised  by  you, 
revered  Guarino?  "48 
Guarino  did  eventually  reply,  but  in  his  letter  he  resorts  to  stereotypes:  he  stresses  to  Isotta 
the  need  for  "feminine"  emotions  to  counter  the  masculinizing  effects  of  study.  He  tells  her: 
your  conscience  itself  and  your  memory  of  good  deeds  should  make  you  joyful,  gay, 
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Guarino  appears  to  be  an  example  of  the  many  men  who,  in  Isotta's  words,  consider 
"learning  in  women  a  poison  and  a  public  pest.  "so 
Turning  to  Isotta's  work,  perhaps  the  most  enduring  example  is  the  disputation  between 
herself  and  Ludovico  Foscarini  (the  series  of  letters  collectively  titled  Of  the  Equal  or 
Unequal  Sin  of  Adam  and  Eve).  In  the  philosophic  dispute,  Isotta  argues  the  unfairness  of 
blaming  Eve  for  the  Fall  to  the  exclusion  of  any  regard  for  Adam's  part  in  the  drama. 
Ludovico  argues,  however,  that  Eve's  sin  was  greater  as  it  was  she  who  was  tempted  to  eat 
the  apple  from  the  tree  of  knowledge.  He  reasons  that  this  was  the  fitting  conclusion  to 
reach,  given  the  evidence:  God  gave  Eve  a  harsher  punishment  than  he  gave  Adam;  Eve,  in 
eating  the  apple,  believed  she  was  more  like  God;  Eve  was  the  cause  of  Adam's  sin.  In  his 
submissions  concerning  Eve's  guilt,  Foscarini  tends  to  rest  his  case  on  plain  assertion:  Eve 
is  inconstant  (being  a  woman)  and  inconstancy  is  a  sin.  Eve  had  to  take  the  blame  for 
Adam's  sin  because  she  causes  it.  Eve,  being  female,  is  naturally  inferior  to  Adam,  so  her 
action  in  defiance  of  God  "more  greatly  departed  from  the  mean"51  and  is  therefore  more 
sinful  than  Adam's  defiance.  Ludovico's  argument  is  pedantic  and  mostly  unoriginal,  nor 
does  it  show  particular  logical  rigour.  For  example,  concerning  Eve's  inferiority,  if  her 
inferiority  is  natural  (that  is,  tied  to  and  arising  from  her  gender,  )  it  is  God-given  and 
derived  from  his  purpose:  he  made  her  that  way.  Given  this,  Eve  cannot  help  being  inferior 
and  Ludovico  is  holding  her  accountable  for  God's  intent.  Nogarola  grasps  this  point  and 
uses  it  in  defence  of  Eve52.  She  supports  her  contentions  with  textual  evidence  from  Genesis 
reasoning,  with  some  quality,  that  although  Eve  was  misguided  in  eating  the  forbidden  fruit 
she  did  not  break  God's  commandment:  Adam  did,  because  it  was  he  who  was  explicitly 
ordered  not  to  do  so.  Isotta  writes  that  God  "esteemed  the  man  more  highly  than  the 
woman"53  and  accordingly  directed  his  demand  for  obedience  at  Adam.  Genesis  2:  17 
explicitly  states  that  God,  having  put  "the  man"  in  the  garden  of  Eden,  told  Adam  he  could 
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day  that  thou  eatest  thereof  thou  shalt  surely  die.  "54  At  this  stage,  Eve  had  not  been  created. 
She  will  hear  of  God's  directive  to  Adam  from  the  serpent  who  assures  her  that  should  she 
eat  from  this  tree  she  will  not  die  (Genesis  3:  4,5)  for  "God  doth  know  that  in  the  day  ye  eat 
thereof,  then  your  eyes  shall  be  opened,  and  ye  shall  be  as  gods,  knowing  good  and  evil.  "55 
The  metaphorical  aspects  of  the  creation  myth  are  not  a  factor  in  the  Nogarola-Foscarini 
debate,  but  this  notwithstanding,  it  can  be  seen  that  Ludovico  shapes  the  meaning  of  the  text 
to  suit  his  purposes,  something  which  Isotta  avoids. 
Isotta  also  uses  Ludovico's  arguments  of  feminine  inconstancy  and  lack  of  intellect  against 
him.  Nogarola  argues  that  if  Eve  was  unintelligent  then  she  could  not  really  defend  herself 
against  the  serpent's  sophistry;  Adam,  being  more  intelligent,  could.  Being  weak,  Eve  was 
inclined  to  indulge  in  pleasure  and  so  eats  the  fruit  (though  Genesis  3:  6  states  that  Eve  saw 
that  this  fruit  was  necessary  to  "make  one  wise").  If  this  is  so,  then  it  is  the  reason  why  she 
disobeyed  God,  not  because  she  desired  to  be  God-like.  Isotta  emphasises  that  Genesis 
does  not  actually  say  that  Eve  believed  herself  to  be  more  like  God  than  did  Adam.  But 
Isotta  clinches  the  argument  by  remarking  that  either  Adam  had  free  will  (in  which  case  he 
could  have  chosen  not  to  eat  the  forbidden  fruit  and  thus  Eve  could  not  be  held  responsible 
for  Adam's  disobedience),  or  he  did  not  (in  which  case  it  was  part  of  God's  plan  that  Adam 
ate  the  fruit  and  therefore  he  did  not  sin  at  all).  Ludovico  concedes  this,  though  he  concedes 
nothing  else  save  that  he  grants  that  Isotta  has  a  "brilliant  mind"56. 
Isotta's  example  demonstrates  what  renaissance  women  could  achieve  in  terms  of  education. 
It  also  shows  the  price  they  could  pay  and  highlights  the  rarity  of  that  achievement.  Isotta 
was  praised  less  for  her  learning  and  for  the  quality  of  her  intellect  (as  evidenced  in  the 
Foscarini  debate)  than  for  her  status  as  a  chaste  learned  woman.  Isotta  Nogarola  stands  as  a 
paradigm  of  humanist  learning,  regardless  of  gender,  but  the  attacks  on  her  sexual 
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woman  if  her  abilities  proved  equal  to  their  own. 
The  discussion  in  this  chapter  so  far  -  of  Isotta,  of  learned  women  and  of  prevailing  male 
opinions  about  them  -  has  been  offered  to  indicate  the  attitudes  which  governed  society  at 
the  time  Vives  wrote  his  educational  works  for  women.  It  has  to  be  granted  that  his  courses 
of  study  and  prescriptions  for  feminine  conduct  contain  much  which,  by  modern  standards, 
is  detrimental  to  claims  for  female  equality.  Vives  relies  upon  the  normative  socio-religious 
exemplarof  the  chaste,  deferential  woman  whose  place  is  in  her  father's/husband's  home. 
However,  in  its  consideration  of  Vives'  work  and  in  its  comparison  of  this  work  with  the 
suggestions  made  by  other  humanists  for  the  education  of  women,  the  remainder  of  this 
chapter  will  argue  that  Vives  was  less  misogynistic  than  many  of  his  precursors  or 
contemporaries.  But  it  shall  also  be  argued  that  his  course  of  education  for  women  was  still 
restrictive  and  in  no  way  matched  the  type  of  study  which  someone  like  Isotta  Nogarola 
appropriated  for  herself. 
The  education  of  a  'Christian'  woman 
[Vives']  restrictions  on  women's  writing  are,  once 
again,  a  function  of  [his]  purpose  in  providing  them 
with  any  instruction  at  all.  When  asked  what 
women  should  study  he  replied:  "I  have  tolde  you. 
The  study  of  wysedome:  the  whiche  dothe  enstruct 
their  maners...  and  teacheth  them  the  waye  of  good 
and  holy  lyfe.  As  for  eloquence  I  have  no  great 
care,  nor  a  woman  nedeth  it  nat:  but  she  nedeth 
goodnes  and  wysedom.  57 
In  her  essay  Some  Sad  Sentence:  Vives'  "Instruction  of  a  Christian  Woman"58,  Valerie 
Wayne  writes  critically  of  Vives'  educational  prescriptions  for  women.  She  states  that  the 
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education  offered  to  young  men  and  that  it  emphasises  stereotypical  feminine  virtues  above 
any  intellectual  abilities  which  a  woman  might  possess59.  Vives  adheres  to  the  traditional 
concept  of  femininity;  like  many  humanists  who  advocated  eloquence  as  a  central  aspect  of  a 
man's  education,  Vives'  woman  was  to  be  silent,  devout  and  virtuous.  Her  learning  was  to 
instruct  her  in  wisdom  and  Christian  duty  and  it  was  to  inculcate  in  her  those  graces  most 
highly  prized  by  her  male  peers. 
Vives  wrote  the  Instruction  in  1523,  dedicating  it  to  Catherine  of  Aragon.  It  was  the  first  of 
his  significant  educational  works  and  in  its  preface  he  mentions  the  neglect  of  women's 
'instruction'  by  male  writers.  Xenophon  and  Aristotle  give  "rules  of  housekeeping"60,  while 
Cyprian,  Jerome,  Ambrose  and  Augustine  "have  entreated  of  Maids  and  Widows,  but  in 
such  wise,  that  they  appear  rather  to  exhort  than  to  counsel  them  unto  some  kind  of  living" 
while  they  neglect  "to  instruct  and  teach  them"61.  Vives  complains  that  the  Church  Fathers 
confine  themselves  to  speaking  in  praise  of  (women's)  chastity  and  his  complaints  in 
general  might  lead  us  to  expect  that  he  will  spend  less  time  in  the  Instruction  on  telling 
women  how  to  live  virtuously  and  more  time  on  the  education  of  their  minds.  However,  in 
the  preface  he  sets  his  tone  broadly  in  line  with  current  thought:  a  woman  "hath  no  charge  to 
see  to,  but  her  honesty  and  chastity.  "62  He  proceeds  to  castigate  those  (men)  who  "go  about 
to  perish  that  one  treasure  of  women"63,  that  is,  her  virginity.  In  so  doing  Vives  regards 
men  not  just  as  the  despoilers  of  women  but  as  their  protectors:  women  are  helpless  and 
men  must  safeguard  all  women  by  seeing  to  it  that  they  (the  men)  do  nothing  sexually  to 
compromise  female  honour. 
Why,  then,  'instruct'  women  at  all  except  in  ways  to  protect  their  chastity?  Firstly,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  humanist  education  had  as  one  of  its  aims  the  formation  of  character:  a 
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that  a  woman  should  be  virtuous  as  her  virtue  was  the  protector  of  her  virginity  and 
reputation.  Vives  regarded  education  as  having  a  significant  role  in  intervention  to  enhance 
female  morality  and,  following  this,  female  sexual  purity.  It  might  be  thought  that  his 
educational  programme  was  no  better  in  terms  of  its  seeking  to  control  women  and  confine 
them  to  male-defined  domestic  and  sexual  functionalism  than  those  courses  of  learning 
delineated  for  women  by  other  humanists.  Given  what  has  been  written  so  far  in  this 
chapter  about  the  trenchant  and  retributive  misogyny  which  permeated  medieval  and 
renaissance  society,  it  may  be  contended  that  Vives  could  not  be  expected  to  adopt  a 
'feminist'  approach  to  the  education  of  women,  that  he  would  argue  for  their  education  only 
with  respect  to  what  he  (as  part  of  renaissance  culture)  would  have  defined  as  social  norms: 
Christian  morality,  male  superiority  and  female  subordination  in  domestic  and  sexual 
matters.  It  is  unsurprising  that  his  discussion  of  female  education  should  present  us  with  the 
model  of  renaissance  woman  as  specified  by  the  socio-economic  and  cultural  patriciate  to 
which  he  belonged:  voiceless,  subjugated,  weak  and  largely  without  productive  economic 
or  political  power.  Vives  saw  what  power  a  woman  has  as  being  over  her  children  and  her 
servants. 
And  yet,  although  he  spends  an  inordinate  amount  of  time  in  the  Instruction  outlining  ideals 
of  female  conduct,  Vives  does  give  details  about  what  subjects  girls  and  women  should  be 
taught.  The  Instruction  was  not  intended  simply  as  an  outline  of  studies;  it  was  meant  as  a 
comprehensive  guide  to  child-rearing  and  emphasises  moral  training  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  process.  Within  this  overall  scheme  Vives  accords  women  the  capacity  for  intellect 
rather  than  accepting  them  as  being  innately  ineducable.  For  him,  a  girl  could  be  taught  -a 
course  of  studies  similar  in  many  respects  to  that  which  a  boy  might  follow,  provided  her 
upbringing  inculcated  morality  and  Christian  ethics  while  reinforcing  what  was  expected  of 
her  given  her  gender.  Some  humanists,  for  instance  Leonardo  Bruni  and  Lodovico  Dolce, 
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authors.  However,  the  range  of  studies  they  advocate  is  very  restricted.  Dolce  concludes, 
perhaps  for  rhetorical  purposes,  that  women  are  as  intelligent  as  men,  but  he  presents  an 
account  of  women  as  being,  in  effect,  incapable  of  learning.  In  his  Dialogo  della  institution 
delle  donne,  Dolce  writes  that  "fear  and  shame"  are  the  "foundation  and  the  base  of  the 
whole  structure  of  [female]  virtue"64.  Women  might  have  intellects  because  they  are  human 
beings,  but  their  feeble  natures  render  this  intellect  as  good  as  useless.  Thus,  "Dolce's 
woman  has  virtue  or  value  only  as  the  property  of  man.  She  must  know  nothing  that  would 
allow  her  to  acquire  a  human  character  [of  her  own  1.116-5 
By  contrast,  Vives'  woman  will  be  allowed  to  acquire  knowledge  -  albeit  knowledge  which 
is  given  to  her  for  her  assimilation  by  a  man  who  permits  her  to  read  those  authors  who  will 
enlighten  her  and  reduce  her  ignorance,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  her  modesty  and  decency. 
Before  formal  education  begins,  Vives  expects  the  child's  mother  to  bring  her  tip  and  he  has 
a  great  deal  to  say  on  the  importance  of  the  girl's  relationship  with,  and  nurturing  by,  her 
mother.  Just  as  he  is  typical  of  a  variety  of  renaissance  attitudes  which  restrict  women's 
intellectual  and  sexual  individuality,  Vives  also  tends  to  write  about  women  -  particularly 
about  their  roles  as  mothers  -  in  a  romanticised  way.  He  begins  the  Instruction  by  citing 
Quintilian  in  support  of  the  contention  that  education  starts  at  birth,  and  advocates  that  the 
mother  breast  feed  her  baby,  writing  that  this  is  a  stage  which  is  vital  to  bonding.  By  breast 
feeding,  "the  love  shall  be  more  between  the  mother  and  the  daughter..  And  the  mother  may 
more  truly  reckon  her  daughter  as  her  own...  whom  she  hath  nourished  ... 
"f6  In  this  image 
of  motherhood,  part  common  sense,  part  idealism,  is  the  concept  that  the  child  is  gaining 
more  than  nourishment  and  love  at  the  breast.  Vives  declares  that  the  baby  gains  the 
"conditions  and  dispositions"67  of  its  mother  or  nurse-maid,  and  that  whatever  is  learned  at 
this  early  stage,  "in  rude  and  ignorant  age",  it  will  "ever  labour  to  counterfeit  and  follow"68. 
The  mother's  influence  is  to  continue  once  the  child  is  in  infancy.  Once  weaned,  Vives 
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rather  of  her  mother...  that  may  rule  and  measure  the  plays  and  pastimes  of  her  mind,  and 
set  them  to  honesty  and  virtue.  "WI  The  importance  of  play,  directed  by  the  mother,  is 
stressed.  The  child  is  to  be  encouraged  to  have  fun  but  the  pastimes  must  be  regulated  to 
insure  against  negative  influences.  Once  more,  honesty  and  virtue  are  at  the  core  of  the 
directive  and  are  central  to  the  desired  outcomes  of  the  early  training.  At  an  age  when  the 
infant  "cannot  yet  discern  good  from  bad,  they  should  be  taught  no  evil"70.  Obviously, 
concepts  of  'bad'  and  'evil'  are  normative  and  for  a  Christian  renaissance  woman  or  man 
evil  was  a  prevailing  reality  which  imperilled  the  soul,  a  threat  to  even  the  youngest  child. 
Moral  training  was  one  means  by  which  evil  might  be  countered.  That  Vives  should 
emphasise  this  for  girls,  as  he  did  for  boys,  is  not  unusual. 
However,  Vives  goes  further.  He  states  that  "all  mankind"  is  to  be  kept  away  from  her  [the 
infant]"  and  that  she  is  not  to  "learn  to  delight  among  men"7  t.  It  is  not  clear  from  the  English 
translation  of  the  Instruction  whether  "men"  is  used  to  denote  people  in  general  (that  is,  the 
recommendation  that  the  child  have  contact  only  with  her  family),  or  whether  it  denotes  men 
specifically.  Certainly  the  warning  that  the  young  girl  should  not  "learn  to  delight"  in  the 
company  of  men  implies  that  she  may  delight  in  the  company  of  women.  Vives  uses  the 
term  "learn"  and  gives  the  impression  that,  if  left  to  herself,  the  girl  will  naturally  incline 
towards  male  companionship  with  the  consequence  of  possible  sexual  attraction.  He 
embroiders  his  theme  by  reinforcing  common  renaissance  images  of  what  constitutes  a 
'modest'  woman,  counselling: 
Let  the  maid  learn  none  uncleanly  words,  or  wanton,  or  uncomely 
gesture  and  moving  of  the  body,  no  not  so  much  as  when  she  is 
yet  ignorant  what  she  doth,  and  innocent;  for  she  shall  do  the 
same,  when  she  is  grown  bigger  and  of  more  discretion,  and  it 
chanceth  unto  many,  that  what  thing  soever  they  have  been 
accustomed  in  before,  they  do  the  same  afterward  at  unawares  and 
unadvisedly?  ' 
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of  it  in  terms  of  its  behaviour,  along  with  what  is  acceptable  and  unacceptable  to  adults.  The 
girl  must  be  taught  how  to  fit  in  with  male  specifications  of  femininity. 
Vives  assumes  that  while  childhood  is  a  time  of  innocence,  it  is  potentially  a  time  of 
corruption  of  the  child  (by  adults  either  overtly  or  due  to  absence  of  direction).  Such 
corruption  has  devastating  results  for  children  who  will  have  learnt  the  'evil'  ways  of  adults 
before  they  can  discriminate  between  good  and  bad.  The  onus  is  therefore  upon  adults  to 
protect  children  from  the  bad  and  teach  them  right  from  wrong.  Vives  accepts  a  concept  of 
maturation  which  regards  it  as  being  difficult  to  reject  attitudes  and  behaviours  learned 
indiscriminately  when  young.  He  emphasises  the  control  and  training  of  a  young  child  for 
her  own  good,  for  her  protection,  adopting  a  philosophical  paternalism  which  he  does  not 
question.  And  he  assents  to  the  inculcation  of  the  child  into  prevailing  socio-religious 
mores,  thus  placing  huge  importance  on  a  girl's  chastity  and  upon  restriction  of  her  personal 
freedom,  even  upon  freedom  of  physical  movement  as  has  been  seen  from  his  advice  that  a 
girl  should  learn  no  "uncomely  gesture  and  moving  of  the  body".  But  who  decides  what  is 
"uncomely"?  Just  as  a  girl's  thoughts  were  supposed  to  be  imprisoned  by  the  silence 
imposed  as  'seemly'  upon  her,  so  her  movements  were  to  be  restrained.  In  effect,  each  girl, 
each  woman,  was  to  be  her  own  jailer  and  the  onus  is  upon  her  to  ensure  that  men  do  not 
find  her  provocative.  Thus  the  Church  Fathers'  thoughts  about  women's  culpability  for 
provoking  desire  in  men  is  still  of  influence  upon  a  'moderate'  misogynist  such  as  Vives. 
There  is  a  tension  in  the  Instruction  which  defines  women  as  being  corrupted  by  men,  but 
which  specifies  that  women  must  conform  to  notions  of  'comeliness'  coupled  with  sexual 
restraint,  indeed  sexual  negation. 
Vives  next  turns  his  attention  in  the  Instruction  to  learning.  He  "appoint[s]  no  time  to  begin" 
leaving  this  to  the  "discretion  of  the  fathers  and  mothers"73  but  states  that  once  the  girl  is  "of 
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her  soul,  and  the  keeping  and  ordering  of  an  house"74.  Undoubtedly  the  principal  social 
roles  assigned  to  women,  at  least  to  those  in  the  more  affluent  social  strata,  are  maternal  and 
domestic.  As  we  have  seen,  the  over-riding  reason  for  formal  marriage  arrangement  was  the 
"production,  preservation,  and  transmission  of  property"75  and  the  attempt  to  safeguard  the 
legitimacy  of  children  as  part  of  the  lineage  of  inheritance.  Vives  therefore  accepts  that 
women  have  importance  above  all  else  as  mothers  and  as  the  facilitators  of  a  well-run 
household,  though  he  does  attend  to  the  needs  of  girls  to  be  formally  educated  to  some 
extent. 
In  contrast,  an  example  of  the  low  expectations  in  respect  of  the  education  of  women  is 
found  in  a  passage  from  Leon  Battista  Alberti's  Ilibri  della  Famiglia.  The  passage  indicates 
the  levels  of  literacy  amongst  the  Alberti  women.  I  libri  della  Famiglia  describes  most 
aspects  of  the  daily  life  of  the  Alberti  family  in  fifteenth-century  Italy,  allowing  for  possible 
exaggeration  and  artistic  licence.  In  Book  3,  Economicu.  s,  Giannozzo  and  Lionardo 
discourse  upon  the  status  of  women  and  their  place  in  the  household.  Giannozzo  reminisces 
about  the  training  he  gave  his  young  wife  immediately  after  their  marriage.  He  took  her 
round  her  new  home  and  slowly  and  simply  explained  her  duties.  He  remarks  that  he  told 
her  he  wanted  none  of  his  "household  treasures"  or  "precious  things"  to  be  hidden  from 
her,  excepting  this  proviso: 
Only  my  books  and  records  and  those  of  my  ancestors  did  I 
determine  to  keep  well  sealed...  These  my  wife  not  only  could  not 
read,  she  could  not  even  la_y  hands  on  them...  I  also  ordered  her,  if 
she  ever  came  across  writing  of  mine,  to  give  it  over  to  my  keeping 
at  once.  To  take  away  any  taste  she  might  have  for  looking  at  my 
notes  or  prying  into  my  private  affairs,  I  often  used  to  express  my 
disapproval  of  bold  and  forward  females  who  try  to  hard  to  know 
about  things  outside  the  house...  76 
Alberti  does  not  explain  how  it  might  be  that  a  woman  who  could  not  read  would  gain 
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The  Alberti  woman,  furthermore,  is  not  just  to  be  denied  access  to  books,  but  to  verbal 
expression  and  to  learning  by  asking  "a  lot  of  questions".  As  Giannozzo  puts  it,  women 
who  ask  questions  gain  the  reputation  of  being  "irresponsible  featherbrain[sJ"  and,  besides, 
everyone  knows  that  talking  too  much  "has  ever  been  the  habit  and  sign  of  a  silly  fool"77 
especially  when  the  chatterer  is  female.  When  his  wife  is  "too  quick  to  answer"  a  question 
asked  of  her  by  Giannozzo  during  her  initial  training,  he  reprimands  her  and  is  pleased 
when  she  responds  by  lowering  her  eyes.  He  takes  this  as  a  sign  that  she  "would,  in  time, 
become  more...  careful  of  her  words,  more  mature,  more  deliberate.  After  a  little  while, 
with  humble  and  modest  slowness,  she  lifted  up  her  eyes  to  me  and  without  speaking, 
smiled.  "78  Alberti  presents  us  with  the  image  of  a  young  woman  who  is  being  house- 
trained,  much  as  a  dog  would  be.  She  will  be  praised  when  she  does  as  she  is  told  and 
humiliated  into  subjugation  when  she  displeases  her  handler.  She  is  to  undergo  her 
humiliations  with  good  temper  and  realise  that  she  deserves  to  be'put  down'  in  this  manner 
for  her  disobedience. 
By  contrast,  Vives  accords  women  intellectual  status  beyond  such  a  rudimentary  training 
programme.  He  admits  that  a  girl  should  be  taught  domestic  skills  but  he  states:  "let  her  both 
learn  her  book,  and  beside  that,  to  handle  wool  and  flax,  which  are  two  crafts  yet  left  of  that 
old  innocent  world,  both  profitable  and  keepers  of  temperance,  which  thing  specially  a 
woman  ought  to  have  in  price.  "79  Obviously  Vives  links  spinning  and  weaving  to  the  idyll 
of  (wo)man  before  the  fall,  a  common  evocation  in  renaissance  thought,  as  is  the  argument 
that  women  should  be  (emotionally)  temperate.  He  underlines  the  importance  of  girls 
learning  to  read  because  reading  is  a  discipline  which  will  help  them  to  order  and  control 
their  "somewhat  unstable"110  thoughts.  However,  he  advocates  that  a  girl  should  also  "learn 
cookery"  so  that 
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brethren,  while  she  is  a  maid:  and  for  her  husband  and  children, 
when  she  is  a  wife...  :  when  she  doth  not  lay  all  the  labour  upon 
the  servants,  but  herself  prepare  such  things  as  shall  be  more 
pleasant  unto  her  father,  mother,  brethren  and  husband,  and 
children...  Not  let  no  body  loathe  the  name  of  the  kitchen:  namely 
being  a  thing  very  necessary,  without  the  which  neither  sick  folks 
1  can  amend  nor  whole  folks  live.  " 
Vives  sees  the  domestic  role  as  being  part  of  family  life  rather  than  as  solely  being  carried 
out  by  women  in  deference  to  men.  Again,  it  is  perhaps  unfair  to  criticise  him  unduly  for  his 
suggestions  when  in  the  late  twentieth  century  the  burden  of  domestic  work  is  still 
disproportionately  carried  out  by  women.  Vives'  advice  on  the  education  of  girls  gives  them 
a  positive  capacity  in  the  family,  albeit  in  a  manner  which  patronises  them  when  it  praises 
their  domestic  skills.  This  aspect  of  the  Instruction  does  not  compare  unfavourably  with 
Alberti's  narrow  and  dehumanising  concept  of  how  women  should  be  treated  or  with,  for 
instance,  the  education  described  by  Erasmus  in  his  Institutioni  matrimonü  Christiani  in 
which  he  writes  that  a  woman  is  "not  only  her  husband's  political  subordinate  but  also  his 
natural  inferior.  "82 
Erasmus  asserts  that  a  woman  must  adjust  to  the  temperament  of  her  husband  and  tolerate 
mistreatment  advising:  "Remember  to  suffer  patiently  a  misfortune  that  you  brought  upon 
yourself.  If  it  is  not  your  fault,  tolerate  it  nonetheless,  for  this  pleases  the  Lord  for  reasons 
that  are  hidden  from  you.  "83  In  much  the  same  way  as  the  Alberti  women  have  to  suffer 
their  husbands'  chastisement  Erasmus'  code  of  conduct  for  women  warns  them  to  put  up 
with  their  husbands'  training  of  them  and  with  his  punishment  for  real  of  imagined  errors. 
Erasmus  goes  further:  if  the  woman  disobeys  her  husband  she  displeases  God  (who 
apparently  wishes  women  to  be  chastised  by  their  husbands).  His  suggestions  concerning  a 
girl's  education  allow  for  her  to  be  taught  Greek  and  Latin  letters  or,  where  she  is  destined 
for  manual  work,  she  may  be  taught  the  vernacular.  He  does  not  state  who  the  teacher  is  to 
be  or  what  proficiency  a  girl  should  display  in  her  studies.  In  matters  of  faith  and  morals  a 
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"extraordinary"  about  Erasmus'  educational  programme  for  girls  is 
the  assumption  that  underlies  it.  Despite  his...  claims  concerning 
the  spiritual  equality  of  women,  Erasmus  sees  that  their 
intelligence  is  inherently  defective.  In  fact,  he  likens  the  product 
of  a  woman's  mind,  if  not  shaped  by  masculine  instruction,  to  the 
menses.  Only  if  her  thought  are  "fertilized"  by  the  wit  of  her 
husband  can  she  bring  forth  sound  and  well-formed  "children": 
"for  just  as  in  generation  a  woman  does  not  produce  anything 
perfect  without  intercourse  with  a  healthy  man...  so  also  if  a 
husband  does  not  take  care  to  cultivate  his  wife's  spirit.  "84 
Vives  does  not  take  such  a  damning  view.  He  recognises  that  while  a  girl's,  or  for  that 
matter  a  boy's,  aptitude  for  learning  may  not  be  great,  "they  that  be  dull  are  not  to  be 
discouraged"85.  He  does  acknowledge  that  "learned  women  be  suspected  of  many:  as  who 
saith,  the  subtlety  of  learning  should  be  a  nourishment  for  the  maliciousness  of  their 
nature.  "s6 
Vives  perceives  education  as  having  a  beneficial  effect  on  a  person's  character,  whether 
male  or  female,  and  his  programme  of  studies  is  founded  on  the  humanist  archetype  of 
living  'well'.  For  both  boys  and  girls  this  will  entail  being  kept  from  licentious  literature  and 
from  immoral  habits.  Education  can  teach  the  "precepts  of  virtue"87  which  will  permit  the 
individual,  in  good  conscience,  to  turn  from  wickedness.  Thus,  Vives  gives  the  ancient 
world  as  an  example  of  the  benefits  of  learning  where  "we  shall  find  no  learned  woman  that 
ever  was  ill,  where  I  could  bring  forth  an  hundred  good"$s.  He  cites  Cassandra,  Paula  (the 
wife  of  Seneca),  Argentaria  Polla  ("wife  unto  the  poet  Lucan,  which  after  her  husband's 
death,  corrected  his  books,  and  it  is  said  that  she  helped  him  with  the  making..  "89)  and 
mentions  St.  Jerome's  praise  of  holy  women  (Laeta,  Marcella,  Fabiola  90).  From  his  own 
time  Vives  cites  Thomas  More's  daughters  and  the  "four  daughters  of  Queen  Isabel"9'  He 
concludes  that  "the  study  of  learning  is  such  a  thing  that  it  occupieth  one's  mind  wholly  and 
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doth  instruct  their  manners,  and  inform  their  living"  although  they  do  not  require,  in  his 
opinion,  to  study  eloquence,  for  they  "needeth  it  not"93.  That  it  not  to  say  that  all  eloquence 
displayed  by  a  woman  is  a  bad  thing;  Vives  states  that  Cornelia  and  Hortensia  were  praised 
by  Quintilian  for  their  eloquence.  But  this  is  a  classical  model  and  is  sufficiently  removed 
from  reality,  to  enable  Vives  to  compliment  female  eloquence  without  condoning  or 
encouraging  it  in  contemporary  women. 
Where  possible,  Vives  wishes  a  girl  to  be  taught  by  a  "well  learned  woman"  but  if  none  can 
be  found  then  a  man  of  impeccable  character  should  be  found94.  When  teaching  begins,  the 
girl  is  to  be  given  books  which  "may  teach  good  manners"  and 
when  she  shall  learn  to  write,  let  not  her  example  be  void  verses, 
nor  wanton  or  trifling  songs,  but  some  sad  [serious]  sentences 
prudent  and  chaste,  taken  out  of  holy  Scripture,  or  the  sayings  of 
philosophers,  which  by  often  writing  she  may  fasten  better  in  her 
memory.  95 
The  young  woman  is  to  then  learn  philosophy  which  can  "inform,  and  teach,  and  amend  the 
conditions"96.  Primarily,  the  outcome  of  a  girl's  education  is  to  be  the  formation  of  her 
virtuousness,  but  Vives  writes:  "in  learning,  as  I  [ap]point  none  end  to  the  man,  no  more  do 
I  the  woman  ['s  education]:  saving  it  is  meet  that  the  man  have  knowledge  of  many... 
things,  that  both  profit  himself  and  the  commonwealth.  "97  However,  it  is  all  very  well  for 
him  to  accord  women  the  possibility  of  continuous  learning,  but  women's  learning  has  little 
purpose  for  renaissance  society  and  Vives  knows  this.  He  therefore  states  that  a  woman 
should  "learn  for  herself  alone"98  and  for  her  children's  benefit. 
Vives  goes  on  to  detail  what  books  a  girl  might  read.  He  begins  by  cautioning  against 
romances  and  bawdry,  including  the  vernacular  translations  of  the  "unsavoury  conceits  of 
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men  wrote  unlearned,  and  set  all  upon  filth  and  viciousness°99.  Elsewhere,  in  De  officio 
nurriti,  he  states  that  lewd  excerpts  from  books,  especially  romances,  "do  hurt  both  man 
and  woman"  1110.  He  continues: 
woman,  even  as  man,  is  a  reasonable  creature  and  hath  a  flexible 
wit  both  to  good  and  evil...  And  although  there  be  some  evil  and 
lewd  women,  yet  that  doth  no  more  prove  the  malice  of  their 
nature  than  of  men,  and  therefore  the  more  ridiculous  and  foolish 
they  are  that  have  invied  [inveighed]  against  the  whole  [sex]...  10, 
Vives,  then,  argues  against  misogyny  which  damns  all  females  while  calling  for  a  measure 
of  fairness  in  attitudes  towards  women. 
The  Instruction  advises  a  young  woman  to  read  classical  authors,  including:  Anacreon, 
Homer,  Hesiod,  Cicero,  Seneca  and  Plato.  She  should  also  study  the  Gospels,  the  Acts, 
the  Epistles,  the  Old  Testament,  and  the  following  Church  Fathers:  St.  Jerome,  Cyprian, 
Augustine,  Ambrose,  Hilary  and  Gregory1°2.  In  De  ratione  studii  puerilis,  Vives 
recommends  that  girls  read  authors  who  "cultivate  right  language  and  living"'Ö3  which,  as 
has  been  shown  in  Chapter  2,  was  a  central  purpose  of  all  humanist  education  and 
philosophy.  The  Deratione  mentions  Cicero  and  Seneca  but  adds  the  works  of  Plutarch, 
Prudentius,  Lucan,  Sidonius,  and  advocates  the  reading  of  Erasmus'  Institution  of  a 
Christian  Prince,  Enchiridion  and  Paraphrases,  together  with  More's  Utopia10-3.  The 
historians  Justinus,  Florus  and  Valerius  Maximus  should  also  be  consulted.  All  these 
authors  are  to  be  read  once  proficiency  in  reading  and  language  has  been  acquired. 
The  Instruction  deals  with  all  aspects  of  a  girl's  upbringing,  treating  of  education  in  the 
context  of  a  child's  wider  development.  The  De  ratione  concentrates  on  education  alone. 
Vives  first  outlines  how  language  should  be  taught,  beginning  with  pronunciation.  The  child 
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sounds  and  syllables"105.  She  will  be  taught  to  distinguish  vowels  from  consonants  and  will 
learn  both  Latin  and  Greek  alphabets,  progressing  through  ordered  curricular  stages.  Next 
she  will  be  taught  to  read  in  a  similarly  systematic  method,  forming  letters  initially  "not  so 
much  with  a  view  to  elegant  as  to  swift  writing,  so  that  she  may  write  down...  anything  the 
tutor  may  dictate.  "10o  Moreover,  the  pupil  must  "exercise  her  memory  daily"107.  Vives  was  a 
firm  believer  in  the  benefits  of  "sharpening"  the  "wit"  by  memorizing  interesting  passages. 
Rules  of  grammar  should  be  thoroughly  learned,  as  should  unfamiliar  words  to  increase  the 
child's  vocabulary.  Latin  ought  to  be  taught  in  a  conversational  way  and  the  tutor  should 
write  dialogues  for  the  girl,  concentrating  on  the  familiar  at  first.  This  was  a  method 
favoured  by  Vives  for  teaching  Latin,  believing  it  to  follow  the  way  in  which  children  learn 
their  mother  tongue. 
Yet,  like  many  humanists,  Vives  could  not  remove  himself  from  a  paradox:  he  portrays 
knowledge  as  being  beneficial  for  men  and  women  but  the  Bible  has  Eve  gaining  knowledge 
by  being  deceived  into  going  against  the  command  of  God.  This  paradox  might  explain 
many  humanists'  unwillingness  to  advocate  women's  education.  It  is  to  Vives'  credit  that  he 
asks  in  De  officio  "shall  a  woman...  be  excluded  from  the  knowledge  of  all  that  is  good, 
and  the  more  ignorant  she  is  be  counted  better?  "  1011  He  argues  that  it  is  better  for  everyone  to 
have  knowledge  and  that  "children  should  be  brought  up  among  those  that  be  best  learned 
and  have  best  experience"'  09.  Furthermore,  in  the  Office  and  Duties  of  a  Husband,  he 
writes  that  women  who  are  "learned  are  most  desirous  of  honesty,  nor  can  I  remember  that 
ever  I  saw  any  woman  of  learning  or  of  knowledge,  dishonest"  10.  Vives  thus  advocates  the 
education  of  women  even  if  he  does  so  by  asserting  that  ignorance  is  the  facilitator  of  deceit 
and  dishonesty. 
Vives  is  quite  clear  in  his  educational  thought  that  (paraphrasing  Socrates)  "the  woman's  wit 
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lacks  the  "counsel  and  strength"  to  make  full  use  of  her  intellect.  These  attributes  have  to  be 
lent  to  her  by  the  man  who  undertakes  to  educate  her.  Vives  does  accentuate  (in  De  officio) 
the  place  of  philosophy  in  a  woman's  education,  but  "logic,...  the  rule  of  governance  of  the 
commonwealth,  and  the  art  mathematical"'  12  wives  are  to  leave  to  their  husbands.  He  did 
not  envision  women  as  taking  their  learning  into  the  world,  expecting  their  actual  horizons 
to  be  hardly  further  than  the  thresholds  of  their  homes.  He  does  not  confine  women  entirely 
to  their  houses  but  he  regards  the  world  as  a  dangerous  place,  both  physically  and 
emotionally,  for  them.  In  Chapter  XIV  (Of  Loving)  in  the  Instruction,  he  speaks  of  love  as 
being  deceiving  and  harmful,  for  there  "is  no  deed  so  ungracious,  so  cruel,  so  outrageous  or 
strange  that  we  will  not  do  to  obey  love",  13.  As  this  affliction  strikes  men  as  well  as  women, 
learning  does  not  seem  to  be  sufficient  protection  from  it.  Vives  contends  that  women  have 
to  be  defended  against  men  who  will  lie  to  them  in  order  to  exploit  them.  He  warns  that  a 
man  will  say 
he  shall  die  for  thee,  ...  and  that  he  dieth  even  straightaway. 
Believest  thou  that?  A  fool;  let  him  show  thee  how  many  have 
died  for  love,  among  so  many  thousands  as  have  been  lovers. 
Love  doth  pain  sometimes,  but  it  never  slayeth.  '  14 
Particularly  in  his  early  writing,  Vives  has  in  mind  a  concept  of  women  as  foolish  and 
innocent,  duped  by  their  own  passions  as  much  as  by  the  men  who  would  have  them 
consent  to  sex.  This  stereotype  has  a  hint  of  reality  -  people  are  sometimes  fooled  into 
believing  they  are  loved  -  but  then,  as  now,  it  infantilises  women. 
To  some  extent  Vives  did  allow  women  to  extend  their  mental  horizons.  As  Valerie  Wayne 
comments,  the  "rigid  life"  which  Vives  defines  for  women  "was  not  the  worst  alternative 
for  them:  it  was  one  of  the  best  available.  "'  15  Conversely,  Constance  Jordan  argues  that  the 
Instruction  is  "draconian"'  16,  which  it  might  seem  to  a  modern  reader.  But  is  it  really  any 
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Barbaro,  or  any  of  the  other  humanists  whom  Jordan  criticises?  Taking  those  of  Vives' 
works  which  deal  specifically  with  women's  education  it  is  arguable  that  he  was  more 
disposed  than  most  renaissance  men  to  the  proposal  that  women  might  be  "learned". 
Moreover,  a  significant  element  in  Jordan's  critique  of  Vives'  apparently  restrictive 
educational  programmes  centres  upon  his  denial  of  women's  capacity  to  govern  a  state. 
Vives  certainly  denies  women  a  public  governmental  role,  but  he  actually  had  great  respect 
for  Catherine  of  Aragon  (as  was  discussed  in  Chapter  1).  During  the  Renaissance  few 
women,  apart  from  the  aristocracy,  had  any  public  role  in  society;  fewer  still  had  a  part  in 
politics  or  statesmanship.  Jordan  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  of  Vives'  attitudes  towards 
Catherine  as  a  "learned"  woman. 
Further  to  this,  Jordan  cites  Elyot's  Defence  of  Good  Women'  17,  written  in  1532,  as  a 
refutation  of  Vives'  Instruction  in  that  Elyot  "argues  the  feminist  point  that  a  woman  is 
capable  of  governing"  8.  However,  Jordan  here  uses  the  term  'feminist'  in  an  anachronistic 
manner:  Elyot  could  not  argue  a  feminist  point  of  view  because,  as  used  in  this  instance,  the 
term  is  a  twentieth  century  imposition  of  ideas  which  accord  (or  seem  to  accord)  with 
concepts  compatible  with  twentieth  century  feminism.  Elyot's  work  is  undedicated  but  it 
was  probably  intended  for  Queen  Catherine.  Securing  patronage,  or  flattering  a  dedicatee, 
would  therefore  be  a  more  likely  explanation  of  Elyot's  arguments  for  female  rulership.  His 
acceptance  of  female  leadership  was  effected  through  his  praise  of  Zenobia  which  was  a 
frequent  humanist  topos  when  discussing  'strong'  women.  It  was  used  by  Vives  in  the 
Instruction'  19  to  show  admiration  of  educated  women,  whereas  Elyot  has  Zenobia  as  one  of 
the  characters  appearing  towards  the  end  of  the  Defence'20.  It  is  very  likely  that  Elyot's 
educational  work,  the  Boke  Named  the  Gouvenour,  was  influenced  by  Vives,  but  Jordan 
does  not  mention  this,  and  prefers  Elyot's  defence  of  a  mythical  female  ruler  to  Vives' 
actual  defence  of  Catherine  during  her  contestation  of  divorce. 
139 There  is  no  denying  that  Vives  did  not  regard  women  as  having  absolute  parity  with  men, 
nor  that  he  ascribed  to  women  narrow,  domestic  roles.  Yet  he  did  see  them  as  having  equal 
intellectual  capacities  in  his  De  ofcio  rnuriti  and  he  considered  the  most  able  women  to  be 
capable  of  a  relatively  high  degree  of  literacy  and  philosophical  knowledge.  The  overruling 
concern,  it  must  be  admitted,  was  a  woman's  silent  obedience,  her  religious  outlook,  her 
devotion  to  motherhood.  Vives  did  not  imagine  the  'typical'  woman  as  being  capable  of 
equalling  the  breadth  of  study  which  a  man  might  undertake;  he  did  not  argue  for  the 
standard  of  educational  and  intellectual  achievement  reached  by  Isotta  Nogarola.  He  did  not 
consider  such  excellence  to  be  necessary  for  females. 
How  far  short  his  educational  schemes  for  women  fell  in  comparison  to  his  projected  plan 
of  studies  for  boys  can  be  observed  when  Vives'  more  complex  pedagogical  work  is 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  But  by  setting  his  thought  on  women's  education  in  the 
context  of  prevailing  societal  misogyny  it  might  be  conceded  that  he  was  less  severe  in  his 
attitudes  to  women  than  were  the  majority  of  his  contemporaries.  For  all  this,  Vives  had  as 
the  main  purpose  of  women's  education  the  enhancement  of  their  "demureness,  chastity 
[and]  sadness,  because  these  things  be  required  more  perfect  in  a  woman  than  a  man.  "  121 
Virtue  and  chastity  were,  even  with  Luis  Vives,  to  be  displayed  silently,  at  the  cost  of  a 
woman's  identity. 
140 Chapter  5:  Vives'  curriculum  and  the  psychology  of  learning 
... 
I  have  always  held  that  we  must  render  the  ancients 
our  warmest  thanks,  for  not  withholding  from  us...  the 
results  of  their  study...  Moreover  it  is  far  more 
profitable  to  learning  to  form  critical  judgment  on  the 
writings  of  the  great  authors  than  to  merely  acquiesce 
in  their  authority,  and  to  receive  everything  on  trust 
from  others,  provided  that  in  forming  judgments  we 
are  all  far  removed  from  those  pests  of  criticism  and 
assertion  of  one's  views  -  viz.  envy,  bitterness,  over- 
haste,  impudence  and  scurrilous  wit...  It  is  therefore 
clear  that,  if  we  can  only  apply  our  minds  sufficiently, 
we  can  judge  better  over  the  whole  round  of  life  and 
nature  than  could...  any  of  the  ancients...  Is  it,  then,  to 
be  forbidden  to  us  to  at  least  investigate,  and  to  form 
our  own  opinions?  Especially  as  Seneca  wisely 
declares:  "those  who  have  been  active  intellectually 
before  us,  are  not  our  masters  but  our  leaders.  "  Truth 
stands  open  to  all.  It  is  not  as  yet  taken  possession  of. 
Much  of  Truth  has  been  left  for  future  generations  to 
discover., 
Vives  wrote  these  words  in  his  Dedisciplinis(1531).  He  structured  this  work  in  two  parts: 
the  first  discusses  the  causes  of  the  "corruption"  of  the  arts,  the  second  deals  specifically 
with  education  and  is  titled  De  tradendis  disciplinis.  In  the  above  excerpt  the  essence  of 
Vives'  educational  humanism  can  be  discerned:  critical  study  of  classical  wisdom  (beyond 
imitatio)  coupled  with  contemporary  investigation  to  enable  the  formation  of  balanced 
judgements.  All  this  was  to  be  undertaken  with  a  view  to  discovering  further  'truths'  by 
extending  knowledge  about  life  and  the  natural  world.  Vives  also  set  great  store  in  the 
transformative  capacity  of  education,  and  as  we  have  seen  this  was  a  typically  humanist 
aim.  He  believed  that  one  outcome  of  learning  should  be  the  enhancement  of  virtue. 
141 Moreover,  in  company  with  many  humanists,  he  rejected  scholastic  methodology  and 
conceived  of  a  curriculum  which  would  widen  the  study  of  the  arts  and  sciences.  As  with 
Erasmus,  he  placed  God  at  the  centre  of  his  philosophy  and  pedagogy.  In  education,  as 
with  everything,  Vives  had  emulation  of  Christ  as  fundamental  to  the  process  of  gaining 
salvation.  Thus,  learning  is  the  thing  "by  means  of  which  we  separate  ourselves  from  the 
way  of  life  and  customs  of  animals  and  are  restored  to  humanity  and  raised  towards  God 
himself...  "'-  Vives  did  not  simply  state  that  education  lends  man  a  sophistication  which 
harbours  a  pretence  of  humanity,  but  argued  that  what  makes  people  truly  human  is  the 
presence  of  God  in  them  through  their  acceptance  of  His  word  and  in  their  recognition  of 
their  place  in  His  world.  Vives  regarded  learning  as  being  fundamental  to  this  awareness, 
writing:  "we  are  not  men  because  of  our  bodies...  but  in  consequence  of  the  likeness  of  our 
mind  to  God  and  the  angels...  by  the  possession  of  reason  we  become  most  like  to,  and 
most  united  with,  that  divine  Nature,  which  rules  everything.  ";  In  some  respects,  then, 
Vives'  thought  epitomises  the  Christian-humanist  synthesis.  He  viewed  education  as 
imparting  a  culture  which  had  been  'handed  down'  from  ancient  authorities,  but  which  was 
founded  on  God's  gift  of  knowledge.  Therefore  to  have  a  cultured  mind  was  to  please  God 
and  fulfil  the  intellectual  potential  granted  by  him  to  men.  Vives  thus  saw  education  and  the 
transmission  of  culture  in  quasi-religious  terms. 
It  was  explained  in  the  previous  chapter  that,  as  far  as  educating  girls  was  concerned,  Vives 
looked  upon  education  as  a  possible  means  to  shape  the  female  character.  This  emphasis  on 
character  formation  would  also  be  a  prominent,  if  less  overtly  stated,  factor  in  his 
educational  programme  for  boys.  However,  as  will  be  demonstrated,  the  substance  of  the 
education  delineated  in  De  tradendis  disciplinis  was  much  wider  and  more  complex  than  that 
which  Vives  set  out  for  girls.  Following  the  humanist  concept  that  education  should  be 
utilitarian  in  that  it  should  produce  'virtuous'  men,  he  believed  that  education  had  to 
inculcate  more  than  sterile  philosophy  and  facts  -a  'good'  education  must  teach  conduct  and 
142 behavioural  self-regulation,  though  this  last  was  less  an  intentional  aim  than  it  was  a  taken- 
for-granted  assumption.  These  outcomes  were  to  be  facilitated  by  the  teaching  of  wisdom, 
but  for  Vives  they  would  also  be  fostered  by  critical  thinking  which  was  to  be  encouraged, 
in  part,  by  the  conducting  of  investigative  research.  He  counselled  that  "[thej  teacher  will 
not  expound  by  means  of  narrative...  but  seek  to  investigate  causes,  whence  things  are 
derived,  how  they  exist,  develop,  continue,  act,  and  discharge  their  own  functions...  "4  He 
particularly  related  this  to  the  teaching  of  the  sciences  but  applied  this  method  to  varying 
degrees  in  many  subject  areas  in  his  curriculum,  and  where  direct  investigation  was 
inappropriate,  he  advocated  critical  inquiry.  It  has  been  argued  that  in  his  emphasis  on 
pragmatic  observation  Vives  can  be  counted  as  a  forerunner  of  Gassendi,  Telesio  and 
Bacon.  " 
This  is  not  to  imply  that  Vives'  pedagogic  theory  gave  rise  to  a  revolutionary  system  of 
schooling  in  any  European  country  or  state.  Initially,  much  of  what  he  advocated  was  not 
practiced  in  its  entirity,  but  Vives  influenced  other  authors  who  proposed  a  psychologically 
oriented  educational  programme  (most  notably  Jan  Amos  Komensky).  In  the  subsequent 
sections  of  this  chapter  Vives'  most  comprehensive  statement  on  education  (De  tradendis 
disciplinis)  will  be  examined  together  with  the  educational  thought  of  other  renaissance 
authors,  where  appropriate.  Again,  the  most  illustrious  of  these  authors,  and  the  one  to 
whom  most  reference  will  be  made,  is  Erasmus.  Aspects  of  his  educational  works  (De 
rationestudii  and  De  pueris  statim  ac  liberaliter  instituendis)  will  be  offered  in  comparison 
with  Vives'  educational  theory  and  curriculum  as  they  were  an  important  influence  on  the 
ideas  of  the  younger  man. 
In  De  tradendis  disciplinis  Vives  has  a  humanist  goal:  to  prepare  the  child  and  the  young 
man  to  be  a  social,  civil  entity  by  means  of  the  stadia  humanitatis.  It  will  become  clear  that, 
above  all  else  except  the  Christian  purpose,  Vives'  education  was  designed  to  be  a  practical 
143 one:  "[t]his,  then  is  the  fruit  of  all  studies",  he  wrote,  "that  "[hlaving  ourselves  acquired  the 
arts  of  scholarship,  we  should  seek  to  apply  them  to  the  arts  of  life,  and  employ  them  for 
the  public  good...  "''  Study  should  not  be  an  end  in  itself,  but  must  have  a  useful  aim 
otherwise  it  becomes  an  "inane  sort  of  contemplation'17.  This  chapter  will  concentrate,  then, 
on  Detradendis  in  order  to  show  how  Vives  shaped  his  plan  of  study  and  to  illustrate  that 
this  plan  incorporated  the  main  elements  of  Christian  humanism  (enhancement  of  virtue, 
practicality  of  knowledge,  reliance  on  Classical  study,  )  while  attempting  to  formulate  a 
coherent  pedagogical  scheme  which  would  enable  teaching  to  take  place  in  a  systematic 
manner.  Rather  than  being  a  manual  of  conduct  for  princes  and  courtiers  (compare,  for 
example,  Castiglione's  Il  Cortegiano  or  Erasmus'  Education  of  a  Christian  Prince),  De 
tradendis  was  intended  for  all  young  men  provided  they  were  of  a  social  class  which  could 
afford  to  educate  its  children.  In  addition,  Vives'  educational  work  is  oriented  to  the 
practicalities  of  teaching  and  to  detailing  a  curriculum.  It  is  significant  that  it  contains  not 
just  essential  precepts  of  humanism  but  that  it  is  based  on  his  theories  of  'psychology'  as 
described  in  De  anima  et  vita  (to  which  Vives  refers  explicitly  in  De  tradendis8).  In  both  his 
educational  and  psychological  treatises  he  felt  that  systematic  observation  and  investigation 
should  play  important  roles:  sensate  knowledge  was  fundamental  to  cognition,  and 
reasoned  inquiry  was  fundamental  to  study.  The  concept  of  d  priori  knowledge  was  to  be 
rejected.  Vives'  study  of  cognition  encouraged  him  to  structure  his  curriculum  in  a  way 
which,  he  believed,  would  make  most  sense  to  students  and  which  would  present 
knowledge  in  a  hierarchy  graduated  in  difficulty  to  suit  pupils'  maturational  (cognitive) 
abilities.  Vives'  thoughts  on  psychology  are  diffused  throughout  De  tradendis  and  his 
examination  of  cognition,  together  with  his  refutation  of  a  priori  knowledge,  meant  that  he 
was  "logically  driven  to  realise  that...  his  only  recourse  was  the  appeal  to  experience.  "9 
Experience,  supported  by  study  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  was  the  means  by  which  useful 
knowledge  and  reliable  information  were  to  be  gained.  Vives  conceived  of  a  course  of 
144 liberal  studies  where  students  would  'test'  knowledge  in  the  light  of  their  experiences  and  11 
observations.  As  will  now  be  established,  this  was  an  ambitious  project  which  was  too 
eclectic  to  be  wholly  practicable.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  look  at  De  tradendis  in 
detail  and  will  be  largely  expository.  This  should  give  sufficient  information  about  Vives' 
pedagogy  in  preparation  for  subsequent  discussion  of  his  work  on  psychology  and  its 
relation  to  his  educational  theory. 
Luis  Vives  "On  education" 
[Classical  authors]  were  men  as  we  are,  and  were  liable  to 
be  deceived  and  to  err.  They  were  the  first  discoverers  of 
what  were  only...  rough...  shapeless  blocks  which  they 
passed  on  to  their  posterity  to  be  purified  and  put  into 
shape.  Seeing  that  they  had  such...  charity  towards  us, 
would  they  not  be  themselves  unwilling  to  pledge  us  not 
to  use  our  own  intellects  in  seeking  to  pass  beyond  their 
gifts...  For  they  judged  it  to  be  of  the  very  essence  of  the 
human  race,  that...  it  should  progress  in  the  arts, 
disciplines,  virtue  and  goodness.  We  think  ourselves  men 
or  even  less,  while  we  regard  them  as  more  than  men...  - 
not  but  what  they  excelled  in  many  and  great 
achievements.  So  we  also  might  no  less  excel,  in  the  eyes 
of  our  posterity,  if  we  were  to  strive  sufficiently 
earnestly,  or  we  might  achieve  still  more,  since  we  have 
the  advantage  of  what  they  discovered  in  knowledge  as 
our  basis,  and  can  make  addition  to  it  of  what  out 
judgement  finds  out.  For  it  is  a...  false  similitude...  that 
we  are,  compared  to  the  ancients,  as  dwarfs  upon  the 
shoulders  of  giants.  It  is  not  so...  [W]e  are  all  of  one 
stature,  save  that  we  are  lifted  up  somewhat  higher  by 
their  means,  provided  that  there  be  found  in  us  the  same 
studiousness..  and  love  of  truth,  as  was  in  them.  If  these 
conditions  be  lacking,  then  we  are  not  dwarfs,  nor  set  on 
the  shoulders  of  giants,  but  men  of  competent  stature, 
grovelling  on  the  earth.  1° 
145 Although  Vives  wrote  this  in  Declisciplinis  in  one  of  the  books  explaining  the  causes  of  the 
"corruption"  of  the  arts,  it  encapsulates  his  attitude  towards  classical  authority  as  it  affects 
educational  studies.  It  has  been  stated  that  his  educational  plan  was  humanistic  and  reliant 
upon  the  reading  of  classical  texts,  but  this  classicism  was  qualified.  Ancient  Greek  and 
Roman  writers  were  not  to  be  accorded  unmitigated  acceptance  or  praise;  they  were  to  be 
regarded  as  human  and  prone  to  imperfection.  Reading  had  to  be  tempered  by  judicious 
criticism,  particularly  when  the  author  in  question  was  Aristotle.  Vives'  mistrust  arose  from 
his  position  that  certain  knowledge  was  not  to  be  discovered  as  Aristotle  postulated.  The 
closest  that  could  be  got  to  certain  knowledge  was  information  gained  through  reason 
relying  on  sensate  experience.  Philosophy,  especially  Aristotelian  philosophy,  did  not  lead 
to  absolute  certainty  but  was,  in  Vives'  words,  "entirely  founded  on  opinion,  conjecture  and 
verisimilitude"".  In  Vives'  mind,  education  could  not  lead  to  the  discovery  of  absolute  truth 
or  to  the  collection  of  a  body  of  completely  verifiable  and  quantifiable  facts.  Everything, 
including  classical  authority,  was  open  to  reasoned  interpretation  and  to  challenge,  though 
for  Vives  this  should  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  "that  nothing  is  known"  as  Francisco 
Sanches  put  it.  Sanches  was  familiar  with  De  disciplinis,  but  he  took  the  'uncertainty 
principle'  much  further  than  Vives  who  would  call  knowledge  "true,  according  as  it  lies  near 
or  is  like  the  truth"'2.  However,  Vives  cannot  escape  the  problem  that  if  knowledge  based 
on  sensate  experience  is  not  certain  even  when  rationalised,  how  can  anyone  prove  there  to 
be  'truth'  existing  as  a  reality  outwith  their  mind? 
What  is  striking  about  Vives'  education  is  not  just  that  it  is  based  on  his  theories  of 
psychology,  but  that  it  is  to  be  based  on  enquiry,  observation  and  critique  at  a  time  when 
education  was  still  largely  scholastic  in  character.  He  wrote: 
I  shall  show  that  the  old  writers  were  mistaken,  not  through  the 
limitations  of  the  human  intellect...  but  by  their  own  fault. 
Therefore  I  have  produced  my  reasons  fron  nature,  not  out  of 
146 divine  oracles...  Moreover  it  is  far  more  profitable  to  learning  to 
form  a  critical  judgment  on  the  writings  of  the  great  authors  than  to 
merely  acquiesce  in  their  authority...  Nature  is  not  yet  so  effete 
and  exhausted  as  to  be  unable  to  bring  forth,  in  our  times,  results 
comparable  to  those  of  earlier  ages...  Further,  what  was  the 
method  of  Aristotle  himself?  Did  he  not  dare  to  pluck  up  by  the 
root  the  received  opinion  of  his  predecessors?  Is  it,  then,  to  be 
forbidden  to  us  to  at  least  investigate  and  to  form  our  own 
opinions?  " 
Vives  was  not  advocating  the  renunciation  of  all  classical  knowledge,  but  he  objected  to  the 
stultification  which  arose  from  obeisance  to  classical  authority  at  the  expense  of 
contemporary  advance  and  enquiry.  We  must,  he  said,  "partly  learn  what  and  accept  what 
has  been  handed  down  to  us,  and  partly  think  it  out  for  ourselves  and  learn  by  practising  L- 
it.  "  14  He  acknowledges  that  classical  discoveries  had  opened  "the  entrance  to  the 
comprehension  of  the  different  branches  of  knowledge"'  5;  building  on  this,  modern  scholars 
must  investigate  and  form  their  own  opinions  as  they  learn.  Accordingly,  God  has  given 
man  a  great  gift,  Vives  writes  in  De  trudendis:  a  mind  and  the  power  of  enquiry,  "with 
which  power  he  can  behold  not  only  the  present,  but  also  cast  his  gaze  over  the  past  and  the 
future"'  16.  The  mind  permits  man  "to  examine  all  things,  to  collect,  to  compare,  and  to  roam 
through  the  universe  of  nature  as  if  it  were  his  own  possession"".  Vives  thus  delineates 
what  were,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned,  the  three  chief  mental  operations:  simple 
apprehension,  composition  and  division,  and  exploration.  His  theory  of  education  takes 
cognisance  of  these  functions,  particularly  with  regard  to  natural  science. 
Before  detailing  the  studies  which  Vives  considered  necessary  to  a  'liberal'  education,  he 
writes  in  Detradendis  about  the  development  of  society  and  the  evolution  of  language.  He 
states  that  man  formed  family  and  social  groups  in  the  first  place  for  the  mutual  benefit  of 
individuals.  Eventually,  once  villages  had  grown  and  towns  had  been  established,  forms  of 
government  were  created  and  put  into  place;  laws  came  to  be  passed  in  order  to  give 
guidance  in  normative  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  The  beginnings  of  society  arose  when 
147 the  needs  associated  with  self-preservation,  then  "daily  business",  brought  people  together. 
Thereafter,  "speech  bound  them  to  move  as  closely  as  possible  amongst  one  another...  By 
help  of  speech,  their  minds...  began  to  reveal  themselves...  ""'  This  took  place  initially 
through  the  use  of  single  words,  then  phrases  which  became  more  complex  to  include 
different  modes  of  speech  created  "as  they  were  appropriate  for  use"'  9.  Vives  concludes  that 
speech  facilitates  mental  development,  the  growth  of  reasoning  skills,  and  that  it  is  "from 
reason  that  all  practical  wisdom  spring  s"'0. 
Moreover,  he  notes  that  the 
educative  value  of  a  language  is  in  proportion  to  its  apt  suitability 
for  supplying  names  to  things.  Its  eloquence  consists  in  its  variety 
and  abundance  of  words...  It  should  have  the  capacity  to  explain 
most  aptly  what  [peoplel  think.  By  its  means  much  power  of 
judgment  should  be  developed.  ' 
From  accumulated  knowledge  ("wisdom")  grew  a  body  of  learning  which  was  organised 
into  subject  areas  as  formal  education  developed.  This  learning  also  had  its  use  in  practical 
aspects  of  socio-political  fields  (ethics,  economics,  politics),  but  Vives  warns  that  "all  arts 
and  all  learning,  without  religion,  are  childish  play"".  Eagerness  for  knowledge  must  be 
channeled  into  structured  enquiry  and  this  must  have  an  aim,  although 
the  human  mind...  is  not  able  to  attain  to  the  conception  of  that 
ultimate  end,  unless  it  has  been  enlightened  by  the  end  itself... 
Therefore,  there  was  need  of  God,  not  only  to  teach  us  how  to 
come  to  Him,  but  also  to  lead  us  by  the  hand,  since  we  are  weak, 
and  constantly  liable  to  fall.  This  is  the  function  of  religion,  which 
we  receive  from  God  himself..:  3 
Knowledge  cannot  be  an  end  in  itself  -  God  and  salvation  are  the  ultimate  goals  and  wisdom 
is  one  step  towards  gaining  the  virtue  which  might  enable  a  person  to  lead  a  moral  life.  What 
constitutes  knowledge  is  in  itself  problematic  to  Vives  and  he  writes  that  he  will  call 
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which  we  receive  when  the  senses  are  properly  brought  to  observe 
things  in  a  methodical  way  to  which  clear  reason  leads  us  on, 
reason  so  closely  connected  with  the  nature  of  our  mind  that  there  is 
no  one  who  does  not  accept  its  lead;  or  our  reasoning  is  'probable', 
when  it  is  based  on  our  own  experiences  or  those  of  others,  and  is 
confirmed  by  a  judgment,  resting  upon  probable  conjecture.  24 
It  can  be  seen  that  Vives  has  linked  the  gaining  of  knowledge  to  his  work  on  psychology: 
knowledge  is  primarily  derived  from  sensate  experiences,  and  this  type  of  experience  can  be 
harnessed  and  have  order  imposed  on  it  by  observing  natural  phenomena  in  a  methodical 
way.  In  such  structuring  can  be  discerned  the  directive  influence  of  reason  -  the  ability  to 
sort,  categorise  and  analyse  sensate  experience  into  knowledge  firmly  held,  though  never 
absolutely  certain,  or  into  conjectural  knowledge  (what  Vives  terms  "probable"  knowledge). 
Importantly,  the  ordering  of  the  experiences  begins,  for  Vives,  with  structured  observation 
of  phenomena,  followed  by  reasoned  reflection  on  the  data  gathered  through  the 
observation.  In  De  anima  et  vita  he  is  concerned  to  explicate  cognitive  functioning  (as  far  as 
he  is  able)  and  he  utilises  his  observations  on  psychological  operations  in  De  trudenclis 
firstly  to  underpin  his  explanation  of  the  differences  between  certain  and  probable 
knowledge,  and  secondly  to  support  his  argument  for  a  structured  curriculum. 
Erasmus  also  dealt  with  cognition  in  his  De  ratione  studii,  but  in  a  far  more  cursory  manner. 
He  begins  by  making  clear  that  thought  and  expression  are  the  "materials"  of  instruction. 
Knowledge  may  be  subdivided  into  knowledge  of  truths  and  knowledge  of  words.  Ideas 
"are  only  intelligible  to  us  by  means  of  the  words  which  describe  them"25.  Hence,  Erasmus 
reasoned,  if  knowledge  of  language  is  "defective",  truths  cannot  be  properly  comprehended. 
(Erasmus  seems  to  have  arrived  at  a  renaissance  version  of  a  linguistic  deficit  model,  where 
use  of  restricted  language  forms  implies  restricted  cognitive  abilities.  )  Erasmus  did  not  trust 
sensate  experience  and  wrote  in  De  pueris  statim  ac  liberaliter  instituendis  that  children  are 
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does  not  discuss  sensate  experience  as  it  relates  to  psychology  or  education,  but  sensualism 
as  it  relates  to  theology.  He  labels  sensual  experience  as  'bad',  believing  it  to  derive  from 
the  episode  in  Eden  and  fearing  that  left  unbridled  it  would  endanger  souls.  Thus,  children 
should  be  trained  to  be  rational  so  that  their  sensual  appetites  could  be  controlled.  In 
contrast,  Vives  studied  'psychology'  in  a  more  'scientific'  way  and  saw  the  'findings'  as 
applicable  to  the  process  of  education.  He  categorises  two  'special'  intellectual  functions 
which  he  deems  vital  to  learning:  the  powers  of  judgement  and  observation.  He  explains  the 
differences  between  them:  judgement  pertains  to  a  person's  actions  whereas,  in  the 
observation  and  analysis  of'man',  the  intellect  regards  in  him 
not  merely...  a  single  relation,  but  it  [the  intellect]  investigates 
man's  mind  and  body  and  those  things  which  happen  to  both  these 
in  their  permanent  states,  and  in  their  vicissitudes  at  various  stages. 
Thus  the  mind  passes  to  consider  human  inventions,  which  open 
up  a  wide  field  for  observation.  Thence  it  goes  on  to  study  spiritual 
things,  and  eventually  is  led  to...  God.  27 
All  things  are  therefore  linked;  for  Vives  education  is  not  an  isolate  and  cognition  is 
imperative  not  just  to  learning  but  is  obviously  fundamental  to  all  aspects  of  life. 
Furthermore,  he  perceives  autognomic  knowledge  to  be  inextricably  bound  to  social, 
scientific  and  theological  knowledge. 
What,  then,  distinguishes  knowledge  from  an  art?  In  teaching,  Vives  is  concerned  with  the 
arts  (scientific  or  humanities)  and  with  communicating  the  ordered  collective  information 
which  is  contained  in  them.  He  argues  that  this  is  most  effectively  done  where  there  is  a 
hierarchy  of  difficulty,  a  system  of  work,  and  a  set  of  goals  to  be  reached.  This  is  what 
constitutes  an  art:  knowledge  arranged  by  rules  which  guide  the  attainment  of  a 
"predetermined  end".  Vives  puts  it  this  way: 
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aims  everything..  Further  it  occupies  itself  with  the  material  with 
regard  to  which  the  end  arises;  and  it  does  not  occupy  itself  with 
that  material  otherwise  than  by  teaching  those  precepts  which, 
being  practised,  lead  to  the  end  of  an  art.  28 
Therefore,  any  art  is  a  systematised  relevant  body  of  knowledge  which  can  be  taught. 
However,  teaching  any  subject  belonging  to  a  discipline  supposes  a  purpose  or  reward.  If  a 
subject  is  perceived  as  useless  or  without  value  then  only  compulsion  of  some  kind  would 
make  someone  study  it.  Vives  regards  'value'  in  less  exact  terms  than  this,  but  does  link  it 
to  the  humanist  ideal  of  personal  transformation  towards  the  'good'  and  to  social  utility. 
Knowledge  which  has  no  practical  function  is  to  be  avoided  as  are  some  subjects 
(palmestry,  pyromancy,  necromancy,  astrology,  which  are  "invented  of  the  devyll"29). 
Learning  has  to  be  "of  use  to  us",  Vives  repeats,  since  "we  do  not  learn  arts  and  sciences  for 
their  own  sakes,  but  for  our  good"30.  A  person  can  decide  what  subjects  are  efficacious  or 
harmful  by  judging  rationally  what  "things  are  helpful  and  what  harmful  to  the  development 
and  illumination  of  the  mind  ".  3  1 
The  humanist  concept  of  right  living  is  emphasised  almost  ad  nauseam  in  De  tradendis. 
Vives  tends  to  join  it  to  the  idea  of  goodness  being  guided  by  sound  judgement  and  by 
learning.  Thus  the  moral  imperative  is  generally  uppermost  in  his  pedagogy;  learning  equips 
a  person  intellectually  and  morally  and,  when  conducted  properly,  ought  to  facilitate  the 
"wise  leading  of  the  whole  life": 
Practical  wisdom  is  increased  by  experience,  which  is  supported 
by  the  memory,  for  knowledge  of  many  and  great  things  would  be 
less  useful,  if  there  were  not  something  which  preserved  them  and 
produced  them  before  the  mind  for  use,  just  at  the  time  of  need  32 
Again,  Vives  leads  from  a  typically  humanist  concern  (right  living  through  gaining  of  0  t) 
wisdom)  to  discussion  of  psychological  components  in  epistemological  and  educational 
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if  experience  is  invaluable  to  gaining  wisdom  it  can  only  be  so  if  a  person  remembers  the 
experience.  People  cannot  progress  or  become  wiser  if  they  constantly  forget  what  they 
have  experienced  and  learned.  Vives  realises  that  without  memory  cognitive  functioning  is 
impaired  and  he  expands  on  this  to  consider  the  educational  repercussions  in  De  tradendi.  s 
(Book  111,  Chapter  111)  when  he  writes  of  the  importance  of  exercising  a  child's  memory  to 
encourage  the  ability  to  learn.  According  to  Vives,  memory  consists  of  comprehension  and 
retention  of  what  is  comprehended.  Both  faculties  are  helped  by  the  structured  arrangement 
of  facts  in  teaching  and  by  certain  techniques  (such  as  reading  aloud,  making  written  notes, 
and  mnemonics).  Moreover,  he  agrees  with  Quintilian  that  a  child's  mind  will  reject 
knowledge  if  too  much  is  presented  too  quickly33  . 
Learning  should  proceed  gradually  from 
what  is  simple  to  what  is  more  difficult.  Vives  advises:  "In  the  first  beginnings,  let  the 
teacher  often  ask  questions,  and  let  him  often  supply  the  reasons  for  what  he  has  got  in 
answer.  For  great  is  the  help  to  memory  if  reasons  are  associated  with  the  matter  taught.  "34 
Having  generally  dealt  with  cognition,  the  categorisation  of  knowledge  into  recognised 
subject  areas,  and  with  some  of  the  purposes  of  learning,  Vives  turns  to  pedagogy  and  to 
his  methodology  and  curriculum. 
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It  is  beyond  dispute  that  a  man  not  instructed  through 
reason  in  philosophy  and  sound  learning  is  a  creature 
lower  than  a  brute,  seeing  that  there  is  no  beast  more 
wild  or  more  harmful  than  a  man  who  is  driven...  by 
ambition,  or  desire,  anger  or  envy,  or  lawless 
temper...  Nature,  in  giving  you  a  son  presents  you, 
let  me  say,  with  a  rude,  unformed  creature,  which  it  is 
your  part  to  fashion  so  that  it  may  become  indeed  a 
man.  If  this  fashioning  be  neglected  you  have  but  an 
animal  still:  if  it  be  contrived  earnestly  and  wisely, 
you  have,  I  had  almost  said,  what  may  prove  a  being 
not  far  from  God  35 
But  how  was  Erasmus'  "rude  unformed  creature",  less  a  child  than  an  animal,  referred  to  as 
"it",  to  be  "fashioned"  into  this  God-like  adult?  Predominantly  by  humanist  methods  and 
studies,  that  much  has  already  been  stated.  However,  in  terms  of  the  specifics,  Luis  Vives 
explains  at  length  in  De  traclendis  disciplinis  how  a  child  is  to  be  taught,  from  early 
education  to  higher  education.  He  believed  that  children  were  naturally  disposed  to  be 
'good'  or'bad',  but  that  a  wayward  nature  could  be  tamed  if  it  was  caught  early  enough.  He 
felt  that  learning  could  not  take  place  without  self-discipline  and,  as  with  Erasmus,  the 
aspect  of  education  as  'shaping'  a  child's  behaviour  as  well  as  its  intellect  was  evident  in  his 
educational  theory.  But  a  child  must  also  progress  from  the  rudiments  of  literacy  and 
numeracy  to  proficiency  in  the  complexities  of  a  range  of  arts  and  sciences.  De  tradendis 
informs  the  renaissance  teacher  how  to  accomplish  this  in  a  structure  pedagogical  scheme. 
For  Erasmus  and  Vives  men  are  "fashioned"  and  reason  is  what  raises  them  from  the  bestial: 
this  was  a  humanist  'given'.  The  point  was  to  define  exactly  what  the  shaping  process 
required.  Erasmus  states  in  De  pueris  that  no  age  is  too  early  to  begin  learning  and  that  a 
child  may  be  "trained  in  conduct"  from  birth36.  Most  renaissance  writers  concerned  with 
'conduct'  did  not,  however,  describe  an  educational  process.  For  example,  in  Ilcortegiano, 
Castiglione  describes  what  attributes  a  courtier  should  have  without  specifying  how  an 
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sprezzatura,  performing  with  excellence:  "in  everie  thing  (he)  shall  have  good  grace"  7.  In 
comparison,  Thomas  Elyot  does  describe  a  curriculum  for  boys  in  his  Boke  named  the 
Governour  (1531),  but  what  is  lacking  from  this  is  psychological  background  informing  the 
pedagogy. 
In  Detradendis  Vives  gives  his  thoughts  on  choice  of  books  for  the  child's  education, 
believing  it  prudent  to  choose  a  few  "set"  texts  for  use  in  schools.  Books  judged  as  harmful 
are  to  be  rejected38,  and  sophistry  is  to  be  avoided.  He  emphasises  that  "right  reading"  of 
"heathen"  works  does  no  harm  because  "they  contain  the  knowledge  of  antiquity  and  of  all 
human  memory,  of  so  many  words  and  deeds...  by  which  practical  wisdom  is  cultivated 
and  helped"39.  But  if  what  a  classical  author  says  raises  doubts  about  Christian  faith,  then 
this  aspect  of  their  work  is  to  be  condemned  by  the  teacher.  (The  same  applies  if  an  author 
praises'vices'  such  as  pride,  vanity  or  lust.  )  If  a  book  is  on  the  whole  commendable,  but 
contains  certain  'harmful'  passages,  Vives  has  no  compunction  about  excising  these  parts. 
In  defence  of  expurgation,  he  cites  Ambrose's  adaptation  of  Cicero's  De  offrciis  "into  a 
form  more  consistent  with  our  faith"30,  and  sees  nothing  wrong  with  such  moral  and 
religious  prophylaxis.  Like  Erasmus,  Vives  held  that  a  child's  soul  was  in  peril  from 
'corrupt'  or  bad  training,  and  part  of  the  corrupting  force  might  be  found  in  the  books  a 
child  read. 
As  regards  the  teaching  of  reading,  children  were  first  to  learn  the  rudiments  of  Latin.  For 
this  Vives  recommends  the  following  authors:  Donatus,  Perotti,  Nebrija,  Melanchthon,  and 
Manutius.  Most  humanists  were  not  concerned  that  a  child  be  able  to  read  and  write 
proficiently  in  vernacular,  though  Vives  differed  as,  incidentally,  did  Castiglione  who 
advocates  the  use  of  Tuscan  citing  the  brilliance  of  style  to  be  found  in  the  work  of  Petrarca 
and  Boccaccio31.  Elyot's  Boke  named  the  Governour  upholds  the  use  of  vernacular  in 
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was  vehement  about  the  subject:  while  the  vernacular  might  be  a  child's  first  language  it  is 
"barbarous  and  unformed"32,  and  Latin  should  be  taught  as  soon  as  possible.  To  this  end  he 
recommends  the  use  of  Latin  grammars  by  Diomedes  and  Perotti,  and  states  that  Latin 
should  be  studied  concurrently  with  Greek  (he  mentions  use  of  the  Greek  grammars  by 
Theodore  Gaza  and  Constantine  Lascaris43). 
On  the  process  of  teaching  Latin  (indeed  any  language),  Erasmus  and  Vives  agreed  that  "it  is 
not  by  learning  rules  that  we  acquire  the  power  of  speaking  a  language,  but  by  daily 
intercourse  with  those  accustomed  to  express  themselves  with  exactness...  "44  Vives  writes 
that  Latin  is  to  be  taught  to  pupils  between  the  ages  of  seven  and  fifteen,  but  did  not 
consider  pupils  at  this  stage  of  intellectual  development  to  be  suited  to  learning  "branches  of 
scientific  knowledge"45.  Greek  may  be  taught  once  the  pupil  understands  the  foundations  of 
Latin  which  should  be  "learned  and  learned  exactly,  and  not  in  a  corrupted  form"46.  Neither 
Vives  nor  Erasmus  had  patience  with  teachers  who  wasted  time  trying  to  hammer  rules  of 
grammar  and  syntax  into  children's  heads.  Rote  learning  certainly  had  an  important  place  in 
the  pedagogies  of  both  men,  but  within  the  context  of  more  active  learning.  The  process  of 
teaching  had  to  be  structured  and  knowledge  taught  in  such  a  way  that  success  is  facilitated 
for  students,  and  elements  would  have  to  be  formally  taught.  For  instance,  in  teaching 
syntax,  Vives  advises  use  of  Linacre's  De  emendata  structura,  and  "the  little  book  on  the 
eight  parts  of  speech  which...  was  composed  by  Lily,  and  revised  by  Erasmus"47. 
Once  a  child  learns  the  rudiments  of  syntax  he  should  complete  simple  translations  from  his 
first  language  into  Latin,  and  vice  versa.  Passages  should  gradually  be  lengthened  as  the 
child's  proficiency  grows48.  For  general  reading,  Vives  suggests  that  younger  pupils  begin 
with  simpler  Latin  texts  like  Cato's  Distichs  (a  common  humanist  choice),  the  letters  of 
Pliny  Caecilius,  and  Calentius  -  all  of  which  are  "uncommonly  entertaining"49.  Pupils  might 
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eventually  go  on  to  more  challenging  texts  by  Terence,  Seneca,  Virgil  (Aeneid  ),  Horace, 
Prudentius,  Ovid,  and  the  histories  of  Livy,  Valerius  Maximus  and  Tacitus51.  Moreover, 
Vives  stresses  the  importance  of  pupils'  private  reading,  and  recommends  for  this  purpose 
authors  such  as  Valla,  Linacre,  Nebrija,  Bude  and  Boccaccio  (the  mythological  poetry)-52. 
Erasmus'  selection  of  authors  for  pupils  displays  some  similarities  to  Vives',  but  Erasmus' 
choice  explicitly  highlights  style  rather  than  content.  He  advocates  prose  works  by  Lucian, 
Demosthenes,  Herodotus,  poetry  by  Aristophanes,  Homer,  Euripides  and  Menander,  and 
plays  by  Terence.  He  mentions  too  the  standard  humanist  referents:  Vergil,  Horace,  Cicero 
and  Sallust  commenting  that  these  authors  will  provide  a  "working  knowledge  of  Latin  and 
Greek"53. 
Vives  wrote  a  textbook  for  use  in  the  teaching  of  Latin:  the  Linguae  Latinae  exercitatio 
(published  in  1538)  which  presented  vocabulary  and  Latin  structure  in  short  dialogues 
between  characters  in  everyday  situations.  The  dialogues  begin  simply,  and  graduate  to 
more  involved  discussions  about  life,  learning  and  morality.  Small  children  are  depicted 
learning  their  alphabet,  while  in  later  conversations  young  men  travel  from  Paris  to 
Boulogne.  Vives  adopts  a  conversational  style  and  builds  information  into  the  dialogues 
which  he  thinks  might  be  interesting  to  pupils.  For  example:  men  of  antiquity 
were  accustomed  to  write  with  styles.  Styles  were  followed  by 
reeds,  especially  Nile  reeds...  Formerly  the  ancient  Latins  wrote 
on  parchment  which  was  called  palimpsist,  because  the  writing 
could  be  wiped  out  again,  written  on  both  sides.  [These]  were 
called  Opistographi54. 
This  might  not  seem  particularly  exciting  now,  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  renaissance 
children  were  not  expected  to  enjoy  their  studies.  Learning  was  usually  an  arid,  repetitious 
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breath  of  fresh  air  to  some  children.  The  Linguae  L  itinue  exercitutio  certainly  became  a 
popular  textbook:  fifty  editions  were  printed  in  the  sixteenth  century  alone$5,  and  it  remained 
in  use  in  schools  in  the  next  century  (for  instance,  being  required  reading  at  Westminster 
School  in  1621,  and  Hertford  Grammar  School  in  1614s6).  Whatever  their  popularity,  the 
dialogues  underscore  Vives'  conviction  about  the  centrality  of  Latin  to  life  and  study.  He 
states: 
Very  great  are  the  uses  of  Latin  both  for  speaking  and  thinking  rightly. 
For  that  language  is  as  it  were  the  treasure-house  of  all  erudition,  since 
men  of  great  and  outstanding  minds  have  written  on  every  branch  of 
knowledge  in  Latin  speech.  Nor  can  anyone  attain  to  knowledge  of 
those  subjects  except  by  first  learning  Latin.  '? 
Vives  also  stresses  his  belief  in  the  importance  of  language  in  Detradendis  when  he  writes 
that  speech  is  the  index  of  the  mind  and  that  it  flows  from  the  "rational  soul"58  (that  is,  the 
intellect);  through  speech  the  mind  is  revealed. 
Like  Erasmus,  Vives  saw  value  in  learning  languages  simultaneously,  arguing  that 
reciprocal  understanding  and  improved  erudition  could  arise  from  knowledge  of  source 
languages59.  He  gives  the  example  of  Latin  as  being  the  language  from  which  Spanish, 
Italian  and  French  are  derived;  the  mutual  benefits  of  studying  Latin  and  the  associated 
vernacular  languages  were  thus  obvious  to  him60.  He  goes  into  detail  with  regard  to  the 
method  and  content  of  teaching  Latin.  Single  sounds  are  to  be  taught  first  (vowels),  then 
combined  sounds  (vowels  plus  consonants),  then  syllables.  Next  the  letters  of  the  alphabet 
are  to  be  learned  and  the  teacher  is  to  show  how  the  letters  combine  to  form  words6'. 
Thereafter,  "by  analogy  of  meanings"6'  the  child  is  to  be  taught  proper  and  common  nouns, 
substantive  adjectives,  verbs,  participles,  pronouns,  and,  from  this,  more  complicated 
grammar  (declensions,  and  so  forth).  Once  basic  grammar  is  mastered  each  pupil  is  to  be 
157 given  a  "little  Latin  book...  in  free,  conversational  style,  pleasant,  easy"  and  brief".  Pupils 
should  then  he  taught  prosody  and  exposition.  Older  students  will  learn  philology  ("i.  e. 
some  knowledge  of  the  circumstances,  times,  places,  history,  fables,  proverbs,  sentences, 
apothegms...  "  4).  But  Vives  insists  that  grammatical  and  linguistic  knowledge  is  to  be 
learned  "without  being  wearily  troublesome,  for  while  it  is  injurious  to  neglect  rules,  so  it 
also  injures  to  cling  to,  and  to  be  dependent  on,  them  too  much"".  He  extended  this 
pragmatic  approach  to  the  teaching  of  written  style.  Vives  did  not  advocate  slavish  initatio  at 
the  expense  of  individual  expression,  though  he  would  not  accept  unruly  individualism  to 
the  detriment  of  accepted  standards  of  elegance,  form  and  eloquence. 
Psychological  functioning  and  education 
In  formulating  his  educational  theory,  Vives  did  not  ignore  the  child's  disposition  and 
aptitudes.  He  was  adamant  that  study  of  different  subjects  required  "distinct  type[s]  of 
mental  ability  for  their)  successful  pursuance.  It  is  possible,  however,  to  obtain  a  judgment 
as  to  which  studies  a  particular  person  would  wisely  refrain  from  undertaking"66.  Once  into 
the  intermediate  stage  of  education,  when  the  child  is  on  the  "verge"  of  youth,  the  student's 
psychological  dispositions  become  ever  more  important67.  In  discussing  this  in  De 
iradenifis,  Vives  refers  to  his  work  De  anima  et  vita  and  explains  that 
[n]atural  powers  of  the  mind  are:  sharpness  in  observing,  capacity 
for  comprehending,  power  in  comparing  and  judging.  Nothing 
physical  is  more  similar  to  understanding  than  the  eye;  the  one  is 
the  light  of  the  mind,  the  other  of  the  body.  In  the  eye  is  the  power 
of  seeing  all  those  things  which  are  diem  in  colour,  and  that  is  called 
sharpness.  There  are  sonic  who  have  very  great  power  in 
discerning  separate  scattered  things,  but  cannot  grasp  many  things 
together,  or  if  they  do  grasp  them  for  a  short  moment,  yet  do  not 
158 retain  them.  But  often  those  who  see,  who  grasp  and  retain  images 
of  things,  cannot  bring  things  into  relation  with  one  another;  nor 
can  they  judge  what  the  quality  of  a  thing  is  by  comparison  of  it 
with  others.  just  so  it  is  with  the  natural  abilities  of  the  mind.  For 
some  minds  are  acute  and  see  separate  things  clearly,  but  cannot 
grasp  them  nor  retain  them  when  they  are  connected;  their 
comprehension  is  narrow,  or  their  memory  is  short  and  fleeting. 
Others  grasp,  but  do  not  reflect  on  those  things  which  are  intuited, 
so  as  to  judge  and  determine  their  nature  and  properties.,  " 
Vives'  recognition  of  such  intellectual  differences  and  his  attempt  to  take  cognisance  of  them 
in  his  educational  programme  may  be  said  to  constitute  a  tentative  step  towards  a 
'psychology  of  learning'.  There  is  little  comparable  with  it  in  contemporary  or  preceding 
renaissance  pedagogical  texts.  Erasmus  briefly  mentions  (in  De  ptteris)  that  a  child's 
temperament  and  talent  are  "innate"  and  a  "primitive  endosvmentbut  his  remarks  are 
superficial  and  have  no  specific  basis  in  a  theory  of  cognition.  He  states  in  the  same  work 
that  teachers  must  recognise  the  individuality  of  the  pupil  so  that  a  child  is  not  forced  to 
study  a  subject  "against  their  instinct"70.  Similarly,  Philipp  Melanchthon  (1497-1560) 
advocated  that  children  be  grouped  according  to  ability  when  learning  history  and  Latin". 
His  suggestion  is  not  based  on  observation  of  psychological  activity,  though  it  could  well 
have  been  based  on  direct  observation  of  pupils'  learning. 
Vives  may  have  been  fatalistic  in  assigning  different  cognitive  abilities  to  different 
individuals,  but  he  was  at  least  attempting  to  place  pedagogy  on  the  footing  of  psychological 
analysis.  In  effect,  he  affirmed  that  cognitive  processes  affect  the  content  and  method  of 
education  as  well  as  the  progress  of  the  pupil.  He  stresses  the  importance  of  recognising  this 
with  respect  to  deciding  how  material  to  be  learned  can  most  effectively  be  presented.  As 
such  his  work  is  a  move  towards  planned  teaching  activity  which  takes  account  of  possible 
differences  in  individual  cognition  in  an  attempt  to  reduce  mismatch  between  cognitive 
ability  and  learning  procedures. 
159 Vives  categorises  some  of  the  cognitive  differences  that  he  has  noted  in  students.  Some 
'minds'  pour  over  work  and  become  engrossed  in  a  task,  while  others  find  concentration 
difficult.  The  former  will  tend  to  "look  deeply  into  things",  but  the  latter  will  tend  to  "stop  at 
the  most  obvious"72.  Some  students  may  find  the  beginnings  of  study  straightforward  but 
become  perplexed  and  easily  discouraged  when  subjects  become  more  advanced.  Other 
students  will  revel  in  the  challenge  of  increasing  difficulty.  Thus  some 
accept  as  joined  those  things  which  they  see  together:  some 
analyse  things  into  their  separate  parts  by  a  close  examination, 
which  is  called  subtlety.  There  are  some  who  at  the  right  moment, 
by  their  concentration,  strike  at  the  root  of  things,  hasten  on 
through  many  fields  of  knowledge  and  do  not  stop  to  rest;  others 
linger...  " 
Vives  regards  this  as  dependent  upon  what  types  of  innate  qualities  and  cognitive  abilities 
their  minds  have.  However,  though  some  students  have  mercurial  intellects,  and  others  are 
more  deliberative,  both  might  still  arrive  at  the  intended  learning  outcome  but  the  time  they 
take  to  do  so  will  probably  differ.  So,  Vives  advises  that  where  a  pupil  does  not  seem  to 
have  great  intellectual  aptitude  parents  and  teachers  should  not  despair:  the  child's 
intellectual  development  might  simply  take  longer  to  fulfil  its  potential  than  other 
children's74.  But  he  cautions  that  if  a  child  is  not  destined  to  be  a  scholar  it  is  pointless  to 
force  him  to  try  to  be  one. 
Vives  stipulates  that,  whatever  their  abilities,  all  children's  progress  should  be  monitored 
constantly  by  the  teacher,  and  every  two  to  three  months  teachers  should  review  their 
pupils'  progress  and  alter  courses  of  study  to  better  suit  children's  needs75.  Teachers  must 
tailor  any  programme  of  studies  to  the  learner's  aptitudes.  For  instance,  if  a  child  has  what 
Vives  calls  a  "narrow"  mental  capacity,  he  should  not  be  overwhelmed  with  material  to 
learn.  Furthermore,  teachers  should  bear  in  mind  that,  temperamentally,  a  pupil  could  be 
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Implicit  throughout  what  Vives  says  regarding  education  is  a  call  for  the  improvement  of  the 
way  in  which  subjects  were  presented  to  pupils,  in  order  to  make  education  more  effective. 
In  teaching  the  arts,  for  example,  "the  most  effectual  order  must  be  followed,  so  that  hearers 
may  easily  learn  and  easily  retain.  The  material  being  rightly  arranged  they  are  led  naturally, 
and  since  they  see  that  what  follows  grows  as  it  were  out  of  what  precedes,  they  receive  all 
as  being  quite  certain.  ""  In  any  discipline,  the  topics  which  are  most  suited  to  the  pupil's 
capacities  should  be  taught  first.  Vives  shows  awareness  of  the  importance  of  presenting 
teaching  material  in  a  logically  structured  series  that  goes  beyond  a  general  grading  of 
teaching  what  is'easy'  before  what  is  'difficult'.  How  children  learn  (assimilate  and  retain 
knowledge/information)  is  dependent  on  the  order  and  structure  of  the  presentation  of  the 
material  to  be  learned.  Vives'  educational  writing  implies  a  professionalisation  of  the  role  of 
the  teacher.  He  begins  to  address  pedagogy  from  the  stance  of  psychology  and  expects 
teachers  to  do  likewise,  and  he  promotes  procedures  (such  as  continuous  assessment)  for 
use  by  teachers  as  specific  tools  to  be  used  by  the  professional  in  determining  how  best  to 
carry  out  the  task  of  educating  children. 
The  degree  to  which  Vives  founds  his  pedagogical  ideas  on  concepts  of  psychology  is 
striking,  especially  in  comparison  with  other  renaissance  works.  Again,  Erasmus  is  the 
most  important  parallel.  In  De  ratione  he  mentions  the  role  of  the  order  of  presentation  as  it 
affects  memory,  but  he  does  so  in  passing.  He  writes  that  memory  depends  on  "thorough 
understanding  of  the  subject,  logical  ordering  of  the  contents,  repetition  to  ourselves"78.  In 
the  De  pueris,  many  of  Erasmus'  comments  concentrate  on  arguments  as  to  why  one 
should  educate  a  child  rather  than  dealing  with  how  to  go  about  it.  When  he  does  write 
about  pedagogical  practice  he  tends,  as  do  most  humanist  educators  before  Vives,  to  give 
most  attention  to  which  books  should  be  used  and  which  subjects  taught.  As  has  been  stated 
161 earlier  in  this  chapter,  Erasmus  and  Vives  concur  on  the  point  that  children  should  not  be 
forced  to  study  against  their  "instincts".  They  also  agree  that  the  imitative  abilities  of  very 
young  children  can  be  used  in  teaching  language  (learning  which  depends  not  only  on 
memory  but  on  imitation'`'),  while  at  this  stage  children  "delight"  in  activity80.  Erasmus 
suggests  that  a  teacher  should  use  "attractive"  teaching  methods  and  should  "in  a  sense 
become  a  boy  again  that  he  may  draw  his  pupil  to  himself""'.  The  teacher  must  on  no 
account  expect  the  child  to  be  a  "diminutive  adult"82.  However,  these  are  cursory  references 
to  maturation  and  Erasmus  does  not  attempt  to  go  further  in  associating  maturation  and 
cognition  with  teaching  practice.  The  comparison  with  Erasmus  reinforces  the  extent  to 
which  Vives  was  innovative. 
Higher  studies:  expressions  of  practical  wisdom  in  the 
curriculum  for  youth 
For  many  students  of  pre-Cartesian  thought,  the 
words  'scholasticism'  and  'Aristotelianism'  must 
have  evoked  visions  of  a  sterile,  derivative,  and 
monolithic  system  obsessed  with  logic-chopping  and 
leading  its  abstracted  victims  on  a  bookish  hunt  for 
the  irrelevant.  Erasmus,  Rabelais,  and  other  humanist 
critics  immortalized  the  depression,  enervation,  and 
terror  that  they  suffered  in  interminable  bouts  of 
indoctrination  into  subject-matter  that  they  found 
impoverished  and  insipid...  To  confirm  such  sour 
memories  we  have  more  than  enough  evidence  of 
bad,  dull,  doctrinaire  performance  in  early  modern 
classrooms.  Allowing  for  a  natural  urge  in  students  of 
any  period  to  resist  the  formal  requirements  of 
systems  to  which  they  are  introduced,  one 
nonetheless  hears  an  insistent  note  in  the  chorus  of 
complaint  about  the  lifelessness  of  the  late  scholastic 
curriculum...  For  those  who  despised  scholasticism 
as  a  labyrinth  of  dreary  trivialities,  the  contrast  with 
humanist  engagement  in  moral  and  political  debate 
lowered  the  reputation  of  schools  all  the  more,  even 
though  humanism  left  its  own  miasma  of  mind- 
numbing  pedantry.  83 
162 In  Vives'  curriculum  for  youth  (which  he  classified  as  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and 
twenty-five)  he  may  not  have  quite  escaped  the  "mind-numbing  pedantry"  to  which 
humanism  often  fell  foul.  He  produced  a  range  of  subjects  for  study  which  was  wide- 
reaching  and  intended  for  young  men  to  continue  to  learn  during  the  course  of  their  lives.  As 
was  stated  in  the  earlier  discussion  of  humanist  pedagogy  in  Chapter  2,  many  humanists 
were  preoccupied  with  reform  of  university  curricula  and  in  trying  to  move  away  from 
scholastic  logic  and  disputation.  In  Detruclencli.  v,  Vives  was  careful  to  outline  a  course  of 
study  (at  pre-university  and  university  level,  and  beyond)  which  would  bypass 
scholasticism  and  present  material  which  was  less  "impoverished  and  insipid"  than  had  been 
the  norm.  Vives'  concern  to  advance  from  the  type  of  learning  shaped  by  scholasticism  was 
noted  in  his  early  work  In  pseuclot  ialecticos.  In  this  text  he  suggests  the  importance  of  the 
early  stages  of  education,  for  if  a  pupil  "goes  astray  at  the  beginning  of  [hiss  education  it  is 
inevitable  that  the  more  he  progresses,  the  farther  he  will  stray"x'.  He  did  not  consider  that 
scholasticism  was  a  sound  basis  on  which  to  build  the  educational  method  or  content,  being 
of  the  opinion  that  it  was  based  on  a  "sophistic  discipline"  which  was  nothing  more  than  a 
"system  of  verbal  quibbling  dependent  on  the  distorted  meaning  of  words"115.  He  believed 
that  the  scholastics  concentrated  on  logic  as  an  end  in  itself,  whereas  he  regarded  it  as  a  skill 
to  be  used  across  the  educational  disciplines.  He  writes: 
It  should  be  clear...  that  if  logic  has  been  invented  to  be  used  by 
the  other  disciplines,  then  this  logic  which  (the  scholastics) 
teach,  which  cannot  be  put  to  use  by  the  other  disciplines,  must 
be  no  logic  at  all86. 
This  is  indicative  of  Vives'  acceptance  of  the  idea  that  eduction  should  provide  useful 
knowledge  and  skills.  However,  in  arguing  for  a  move  from  scholasticism,  Vives  did  not 
simply  advocate  a  return  to  classicism,  along  humanist  lines.  Vives  offered  many  subject 
areas  including  philosophy,  history  and  natural  sciences,  attempting  to  present  them  in  a 
way  which  demanded  more  of  teachers  than  repetition  of  "dreary  trivialities"  and  which  tried 
163 to  engage  students  in  a  more  active  fashion  than  rote-learning  and  iinitatio  allowed. 
As  has  been  seen,  Vives'  curriculum  for  early  education  concentrates  on  language 
acquisition  and  basic  linguistic  proficiency.  In  his  section  on  higher  studies,  he  reiterates  the 
importance  of  languages,  which  are  "the  gates  of  all  sciences  and  arts"A7.  From  Book  IV 
onwards  Detradendis  deals  with  the  arts  and  sciences  which  he  believes  are  necessary  to  the 
education  of  a  young  man.  Although  hostile  to  scholasticism,  Vives  does  not  deny  the 
usefulness  of  logic  as  a  means  of  investigation.  It  was  to  be  studied,  with  languages,  once 
the  pupil  was  past  the  elementary  stage.  Students  were  to  learn  to  employ  "critical 
dialectic""",  or  logical  proof  (although  Vives  warns  against  the  exemplar  of  Aristotle's  Prior 
Anal  'tics  because  much  of  it  is  obscure  and  unnecessary89).  Teachers  are  to  set  pupils 
disputational  tasks  commensurate  with  their  abilities,  but  practice  in  logic  "should  not  arouse 
a  desire  for  competition...  It  would  be  wiser  for  the  teacher  to  conduct  his  pupils'  studies  by 
means  of  questions  rather  than  by  wordy  arguments,  for  at  this  stage  the  pupils  have  not 
usually  sufficient  material  knowledge  about  which  to  argue.  "`9°  Once  more  Vives' 
educational  prescriptions  are  marked  by  practical  advice  and  by  his  recognition  of  pupils' 
maturational  levels.  Particularly  he  advises  use  of  Socratic  questioning  as  being  "very  useful 
not  only  for  induction  but  also  for  sharpening  wits"91.  Rules  of  logic  are  to  be  applied  to 
other  branches  of  knowledge  with  the  aim  of  rejecting  what  is  inconsistent  (as  measured 
against  a  given  premise). 
Thereafter  the  teacher  should  introduce  students  to  knowledge  of  nature.  Again,  Vives 
emphasises  the  need  for  a  hierarchy  of  complexity:  initially  study  of  natural  philosophy  is 
more  straightforward  than  study  of  "an  abstract  subject  dealing  with  the  experiences  of 
life"92.  This  is  because  knowledge  of  nature  can  be  acquired  with  the"natural  senses" 
whereas  abstract  intellectual  study  requires  "knowledge  in  many  subjects  of  life, 
experience",  and  it  necessitates  having  "a  good  memory"93.  Study  of  nature  can  allow  for 
164 more  direct  contact  between  subject  and  student;  pupils  can  observe  and  experiment  using 
their  senses  to  collect  data  from  which  they  can  abstract  findings  about  the  natural  world. 
Characteristically,  Vives  uses  his  theories  of  psychology  in  making  these  suggestions,  as 
when  he  cautions: 
What  we  know  of  nature  has  been  gained  partly  through  the 
senses,  partly  through  imagination,  though  reason  has  been  at 
hand  as  a  guide  to  the  senses;  on  this  account  we  have  gained 
knowledge  in  few  subjects  and  in  those  sparingly,  because  of 
those  shadows  which  envelope  and  oppress  the  human  mind.  For 
the  same  reason  what  knowledge  we  have  gained  can  only  be 
reckoned  as  probable  and  not  assumed  as  absolutely  true.  `" 
Thus,  the  first  precept  of  nature  study  which  should  be  understood  by  students  (contr(I 
Aristotle  and  Pliny)  is  that  certain  knowledge  of  nature  cannot  be  gained.  However,  enquiry 
should  yield  knowledge  suited  to  the  "necessities  of  life",  to  physical  and  mental  benefit,  or 
to  the  "increase  of  reverence"95.  Curiosity  alone  is  not  enough. 
Students  are  to  begin  their  enquiries  into  natural  philosophy  with  "those  things"  which  are 
"evident  to  the  senses.  For  senses  open  up  the  way  to  all  knowledge"96.  While  students  are 
to  be  given  some  general  exposition  by  the  teacher  on  aspects  of  nature  such  as  the  heavens 
and  the  elements,  Vives  comments  that  in  such  studies  "there  is  no  disputation  necessary; 
there  is  nothing  needed  but  the  silent  contemplation  of  Nature"97.  A  rudimentary  form  of 
empirical  study  is  advocated,  and  while  he  recommends  texts  on  natural  philosophy  (Strabo, 
Ptolemy,  Dioscorides,  Theophratus,  Pliny,  Purbach,  )  he  intends  the  reading  to  be 
underpinned  by  personal  observation  of  nature".  In  his  "insistence  on  a  direct  confrontation 
between  mind  and  nature",  Vives  is  "implying  a  new  standard  of  'truth'  emerging  in  new 
applied  sciences...  serving  utilitarian  ends"99. 
165 Disputation  and  first  philosophy 
Vives  defined  "first"  philosophy  as  "an  examination  of  the  connexions  of  things,  and  of  all 
the  functions  which  arise  from  the  very  essence  of  anything"10°.  Students  should  study 
Aristotle's  Metaphysics  (though  he  warns  against  its  obscurity)  and  De  audito  physico,  and 
Boethius'  Method  of  definition  and  division10'.  Study  of  philosophy  will  allow  students  to 
rise  above  sensate  knowledge  to  analysis  of  "causes"  and  "first  principles"  102.  Vives  states 
again  that  study  of  philosophy  rests  upon  sensate  knowledge  and  perception  and  that,  from 
this,  students  can  become  more  analytical  and  attempt  to  gain  some  insight  as  to  the  essences 
of  things  (though  certain  knowledge  of  essences  is impossible)  in  an  effort  to  learn  about  the 
"inner  system  of  nature"103.  In  trying  to  move  beyond  recognition  of  an  object's  appearance, 
and  in  order  to  discover  more  of  the  "inner  system",  students  are  to  be  taught  to  collect 
evidence  in  support  of  arguments  about  what  constitutes  'knowledge'  or  'truth'.  This  moves 
Vives  into  the  area  of  dialectic  and  his  preferred  textbook  for  study  of  this  subject  is 
Rudolph  Agricola's  Dialectica.  Students  must  practise  arguing  a  case  and  the  teacher  must 
assess  their  skills. 
Dialectic  leads  Vives  into  discussion  of  the  study  of  rhetoric  and  it  is  clear  from  De  tradendis 
that  his  course  of  higher  study  is  firmly  oriented  towards  humanist  ideals  in  its  core 
subjects:  classical  languages,  dialectic  and  rhetoric.  Humanist  ideals  are  also  evident  in 
many  of  the  statements  in  Detradendis  regarding  the  functions  of  learning.  For  instance, 
with  rhetoric  Vives  argues  that  the  function 
is  not  directed  to  any  empty  use  of  words;  that  they  be  accounted 
beautiful  and  splendid  kinds  of  speech;  that  they  may  be  elegant 
and  connected  by  a  pleasant  style  of  composition:  but  that  we 
should  not  speak  impurely  and  inaccurately  and...  we  should 
speak  so  that  it  may  be  made  clear  that  this  most  powerful  of  arts 
is  a  part  of  practical  wisdom.  104 
166 The  purpose  of  rhetoric  is  to  convince,  teach,  and  arouse  listeners  by  the  use  of  words  "and 
the  conceptions  in  them"  105.  Vives  writes  that  students,  while  preparing  an  oration,  should 
consider  their  own  personalities  and  those  of  the  audience  in  order  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  the  oration.  They  also  need  to  consider  the  purpose  of  the  speech  in  order  to 
choose  rhetorical  techniques  to  produce  the  requisite  effects. 
In  De  ratione  studii,  oratory  is  the  subject  to  which  Erasmus  devotes  most  attention.  He 
retains  a  strict  conception  of  what  comprises  'formal  oratory':  for  example,  students  are  to 
practise  "a  declamation  in  praise  of  Socrates,  or  a  denunciation  of  Caesar")  06.  A  student  is  to 
be 
led  to  consider  the  various  methods  by  which  he  may  adorn  his 
treatment  of  the  argument,  such  as  simile  and  contrast,  parallel 
cases,  moral  reflection,  adages,  anecdotes,  parables,  and  so  on; 
and  he  should  have  some  guidance  in  choice  of  figure  and 
metaphor...  In  regard  to  the  logical  ordering  of  argument  as  a 
whole,  the  student  should  be  taught  to  attend  to  the  niceties  of 
exposition  -  the  exordium,  the  transition,  the  peroration;  for  each 
of  these  has  its  own  peculiar  excellence,  and  each,  moreover, 
admits  of  merit  not  only  of  precision  but  also  of  elegance.  '07 
The  central  texts  for  both  Erasmus  and  Vives  are  Cicero's  De  oratore  and  Quintilian's 
Institutio  oratorio.  Vives  widens  this  area  of  study  to  include  a  general  account  to  be  given 
by  the  teacher  of  a  theory  of  linguistics,  explaining  "in  what  manner  languages  arose, 
developed  and  decayed;  how  the  power,  nature,  riches,  elegance,  dignity,  beauty,  and  other 
special  virtues  for  discourse  of  each  language  should  be  estimated"  10". 
167 Mathematics,  the  sciences  and  history 
Vives  next  turns  his  attention  to  the  mathematical  arts  which  he  calls  "silent"  and 
contemplative,  concerned  with  "quantity  and  number"  and  which  are  "theoretical  and 
practical"109.  Arithmetic  and  geometry  are  the  "simplest"  of  the  mathematical  arts  and  give 
rise  to  astronomy,  optics,  perspective,  and  music.  However,  Vives  states  that  students  with 
poor  memories  are  not  suited  to  study  mathematics  (which  requires  remembering  series  and 
proofs).  Most  students,  though,  will  learn  arithmetic  which  "not  only  tests  the 
understanding,  but  also  sharpens  it  and  makes  it  keener.  No  part  of  life  can  be  devoid  of  the 
use  of  numbers"  10.  Vives  recommends  using  James  Faber's  work  on  theory  and  practice  of 
arithmetic"',  as  he  does  Cuthbert  Tunstall's  work"'. 
Geometry  is  to  be  taught  after  arithmetic,  utilising  Euclid  and  Thomas  Bradwardine.  At  a 
more  advanced  level,  astronomy  is  suggested  because  it 
concerns  itself  with  the  number,  magnitude  and  motion  of  the 
heavens  and  constellations,  in  all  their  aspects,  singly  and  in 
combination.  The  study  of  astronomy  should  not  be  applied  to  the 
divination  of  the  future  or  to  that  of  hidden  things.  For  this  kind  of 
application  draws  human  minds  with  consummate  vanity,  and 
gradually  lures  them  to  impiety.  '  13 
Vives  goes  on  to  say  that  astronomy  should  enable  the  description  and  determination  of  time 
and  of  seasons,  as  well  as  determining  position  and  working  out  distance.  This  is,  he  points 
out,  "absolutely  necessary  to  the  general  theory  of  navigation""' 
Vives  intends  his  curriculum  of  the  mathematical  arts  to  be  studied  in  later  youth  (up  to  the 
age  of  twenty-five).  It  is  at  this  stage  of  'higher'  education  that  Vives  thinks  it  important  for 
students  to  begin  the  study  of  man's  soul.  The  teacher  should  present  the  following  authors 
168 for  study:  Aristotle  (Deanima),  Alexander,  Themistus,  Plato,  and  Plotinus.  Study  of  the 
soul  exercises 
a  most  helpful  influence  on  all  kinds  of  knowledge,  because  our 
knowledge  is  determined  by  the  intelligence  and  grasp  of  our  minds, 
not  by  the  things  themselves.  The  treatment  of  the  development  of 
knowledge  within  our  souls  will  proceed  parallel  with  the  order  of 
nature  itself;  first  the  discussion  should  be  of  life...,  in  general,  then 
of  vegetation,  sensation,  the  feelings  and  the  intellect,  which  may  be 
said  to  consist  of  diverse  functions,  e.  g.  intelligence,  memory, 
reason  and  judgment.  115 
Vives  envisages  students  as  learning  about  the  soul,  having  dealt  with  physiology,  so  that 
the  intellectual  process  might  be  researched  and  man  understood  as  part  of  the  natural  world. 
Some  students  -  particularly  those  wishing  to  become  doctors  -  may  want  to  study  natural 
history  to  try  to  grasp  "the  idea  of  causation  in  nature",  by  which  is  meant  "changes  which 
are  more  clearly  visible  to  the  senses"'  16.  Reading  should  consist  of  Aristotle's  eight  books 
of  physics,  Cicero's  De  natura  deorum,  Plutarch's  De  placitis  philosophicum,  Galen,  and 
Albertus  Magnus  (though  Vives  includes  this  last  with  reservations  for  "he  ventures  to 
assert  some  very  dangerous  views"'  17).  To  begin  with,  the  teacher  is  to  supervise  students' 
reading  of  these  texts  and  should  select  excerpts  from  them  in  order  to  "put  together  for  his 
pupils  a  work  supplying  the  foundations  of  Nature  study  with  such  clearness  and  brevity  of 
method  as  to  enable  them  to  clearly  comprehend...  "118  Vives  remarks  that  natural 
philosophy  is  important  for  those  who  intend  to  study  medicine:  from  "nature-knowledge" 
arise  the  subjects  of  "dietetics"  and  "Medicine  proper"  119.  He  regards  medicine  and  dietetics 
as  related  fields: 
When  we  have  acquired  a  knowledge  of  the  powers  and  natures  of 
things,  and  compared  together  other  living  beings,  especially 
(comparing  them)  with  the  nature  and  constitution  of  the  human 
body,  we  see  what  is  stronger  than  the  interior  of  the  human  body 
can  bear,  as  well  as  what  is  too  small  and  weak  to  strengthen  the 
169 body,  and  to  sustain  it;  what  substance  brings  to  the  body  that  tone 
or  quality  which  is  alien  or  inimical  to  it,  and,  if  it  is  taken  into  the 
body,  leads  to  its  great  affliction,  or  pains  and  sufferings  of  the  most 
grievous  kind.  We  see,  on  the  other  hand,  what  is  congruent...  to 
the  life  of  the  body,  to  its  senses,  mind,  intellect,  i.  e.  what  will 
preserve  it...  and  confirm  it  in  strength...  (W)hat  is  suitable  to... 
man,  in  common,  must  be  considered.  Then,  the  individual  man 
must  be  studied  in  particular  aspects  and  relations,  e.  g.  as  to  age, 
place,  time,  activity.  manners  and  habits.  Similar  observation  is 
necessary  with  regard  to  the  foods  which  satisfy  his  needs.  '2° 
Briefly,  mention  should  be  made  of  Vives'  ideas  on  the  study  of  history  and  related 
disciplines.  Older  students  are  to  read  historical  works  to  learn  about  the  course  of  history, 
and  Vives  suggests:  Antonius  Sabellicus,  Thucydides,  Xenophon,  Livy  ("a  very 
painstaking  author"),  Polybius  and  Tacitus121 
. 
The  Bible  should  be  read  as  an  historical 
work,  specifically  Exodus,  Numbers,  Joshua,  Chronicles,  Kings  and  the  Apocrypha. 
Although  historical  study  ought  to  begin  while  one  is  a  student,  Vives  regards  it  as  a  lifelong 
pursuit.  He  thought  it  important  to  study  not  just  classical  history  but  church  history 
(Eusebius,  Bede,  Isidore),  the  history  of  Europe  since  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  the 
lives  of  the  saints.  For  this  purpose  he  names  modern  writers  (Trithemius,  Bruni,  Valla'22) 
including  those  whose  work  is  in  vernacular  (Valera,  Froissart,  Monstrelet,  Philip  de 
Comines'23). 
"Interwoven"  with  the  teaching  of  history  are  to  be  the  "precepts  of  training  for  both  public 
and  private  life",  that  is,  moral  philosophy'24.  At  this  advanced  level,  moral  philosophy 
supports  reason  in  opposition  to  the  emotions;  for  this  purpose,  the 
whole  man  must  be  understood,  from  within  and  without.  Within 
the  mind  are  the  intellect  and  emotions.  We  must  know  by  what 
things  the  emotions  are  aroused  and  developed,  by  what  things  on 
the  other  hand  they  are  restrained,  calmed,  removed.  This  enables 
a  man  "to  know  himself"...  125 
Vives  proceeds  to  elucidate  how  "the  passions  of  the  mind  should  be  subordinated  to  the 
170 authority  and  judgment  of  Reason"  126  . 
This  might  be  said  to  be  the  culmination  of  his 
curriculum  which  began  at  the  earliest  stages  of  language  learning. 
Conclusion 
What  is  contained  in  De  tradendis  disciplinis  is  a  more  comprehensive  scheme  of  studies 
than  given  by  Vives'  renaissance  contemporaries  or  predecessors.  Criticism  can  be  levelled 
at  the  very  comprehensiveness  of  his  educational  programme,  but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  until  the  eighteenth  century  it  was  assumed  that  an  educated  man  could  become 
reasonably  competent  in  a  wide  range  of  disciplines.  In  addition,  having  now  looked  at  his 
course  of  studies  for  boys  and  young  men,  it  can  be  seen  how  limited  was  his  educational 
plan  for  girls  and  women. 
It  has  been  argued  that  in  many  ways  De  tradendis  is  more  advanced  than  similar  works  by 
humanist  authors:  in  its  scope,  its  frequent  references  to  pedagogical  technique  and  the 
teacher's  role  as  it  relates  to  each  subject  area,  and  in  the  application  of  Vives'  knowledge  of 
psychology  to  the  process  of  learning.  However,  at  heart,  De  tradendis  is  firmly  humanistic 
and  rests  upon  the  belief  in  a  utilitarian  education  which  can  tame  the  emotions  by  the 
development  of  rationality.  Vives  writes  that  having  acquired  knowledge  men  must  "turn  it 
to  usefulness,  and  employ  it  for  the  common  good"  27.  Moreover,  he  stresses  practical 
wisdom,  stating  that  it  arises  from  judgement  and  experience.  He  explains:  "Experience  is 
either  personal  knowledge  gained  by  our  action,  or  the  knowledge  acquired  by  what  we 
have  seen,  read,  heard  of,  in  others.  Where  either  of  these  sources  is  lacking  a  man  cannot 
be  practically  wise.  "  128 
171 Apart  from  the  psychological  aspects  of  his  work,  a  noteworthy  aspect  of  Vives'  pedagogy 
is  his  insistence  on  the  use  of  experience  and  experiment  to  support  the  conclusions  of 
reason  and  study.  His  rejection  of  äpriori  knowledge  is  part  of  a  general  humanist  criticism 
of  Aristotle  and  of  medieval  dialectic.  But  incorporated  in  Vives'  curriculum  is  some  active 
involvement  by  pupils  in  learning,  and  the  advocacy  of  an  early  form  of  empirical  research 
which  is  a  precursor  to  scientific  experiment.  In  this  aspect  of  his  method  there  is  clearly 
argument  for  the  use  of 
utilitarian,  experimental  tasks...  The  emphasis  is...  explicitly  on  the 
authority  of  reason  as  formed  by  contact  with  nature,  not  on  the 
verbal  authority  of  the  ancients;  words  are  now  to  be  considered 
subordinate  to  the  'things'  of  experience.  Vives  heralds  a  whole 
revolution  in  educational  thinking,  where  reason,  working  on  the 
stuff  of  experience,  becomes  the  court  of  ultimate  appeal  rather  than 
a  reason  ('judgment')  which  is  confined  to  the  assimilation, 
harmonization  and  deployment  of  past  authorities'29. 
Having  said  that,  it  is  in  the  field  of  psychology,  and  the  application  of  his  psychological 
theory  to  education,  that  Vives'  work  was  at  its  most  original,  and  his  investigation  into  the 
soul  will  be  the  focus  of  the  next  chapter. 
De  anima  et  vita  was  to  have  some  influence,  directly  and  indirectly,  on  a  number  of 
authors.  This  influence  will  be  analysed  in  chapters  seven  and  eight,  with  reference  to  the 
work  of  Pierre  Gassendi,  Rene  Descartes  and  John  Locke.  Vives'  text  provides  an 
interesting  indicative  stage  in  the  development  of  scientific  method  in  terms  of  its  advocacy 
of  empirical  observation.  It  is  perhaps  overstated  to  term  Vives  the  "father  of  modern 
psychology"  as  Foster  Watson  did130,  but  De  anima  et  vita  was  in  advance  of  contemporary 
discussions  of  the  intellect  and  may  provide  one  link  between  the  development  of  modern 
understanding  of  psychology  (particularly  educational  psychology)  and  the  concepts  of 
mind  as  evinced  by  Aristotle,  the  Church  Fathers  and  Galen. 
172 Chapter  6:  Soul  as  mind:  Vives  and  psychological  function 
The  history  of  discourse  on  the  human  character  may 
be  summarized  under  two  great  headings:  "Nature" 
and  "Spirit".  Beneath  the  former  we  find  naturalism, 
stoicism,  materialism,  and,  ultimately,  scientific 
determinism  and  logical  positivism.  Below  the  latter 
are  the  near  opposites  of  these:  spiritualism,  idealism, 
transcendentalism,  psycho-logical  indeterminism,  and 
Romanticism.  Every  century  or  so  the  terms  change 
but  the  essential  positions  remain  stubbornly  constant. 
In  the  Hellenistic  period,  the  controversy  was  over  the 
reality  of  Platonic  Ideas.  Among  the  scholastics,  this 
controversy  surfaced  in  the  form  of  the  Nominalist- 
Realist  antagonism.  In  the  individualistic  climate  of 
the  Renaissance,  it  becomes  a  battle  between  neo- 
Platonists  and  Aristotelians.  In  the  twentieth  century, 
the  labels  are  "Behaviourism"  and  "Mentalism";  in  the 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth,  "Empiricism"  and 
"Idealism". 
So  much  for  labels,  then.  But  if  the  terms  of  the  debate  have  remained  "stubbornly 
constant"  what  were  those  terms  from  the  Hellenistic  age  to  the  Renaissance?  Specifically, 
what  aspects  were  there  to  the  study  of  `psychology'  and  how  did  they  develop  in  the  work 
of  certain  influential  authors  (such  as  Plato  and  Aristotle,  Augustine  and  Aquinas)  and 
which  of  these  aspects  were  retained  and  developed  by  Luis  Vives? 
When  Vives  wrote  De  anima  et  vita  (in  1538)  the  `soul'  was  still  regarded  as  the  province  of 
philosophy.  At  least  this  was  the  view  propounded  in  most  philosophical  rhetoric.  The 
reality  was  that  other  disciplines  into  which  study  of  the  soul  would  eventually  fall  were 
173 imprecise.  Medicine  was  rooted  in  folkloric  remedy;  physiology  was  inexact.  Medical 
practice  rested  upon  Hippocratic  texts,  Galen's  work,  and  on  a  variety  of  local  traditions. 
The  study  of  the  soul  was  rarely  treated  as  coming  within  the  province  of  medicine.  Such 
study  was  more  the  field  of  the  philosopher  and  theologian  than  of  the  doctor.  There 
remained  the  legacy  of  the  Aristotelian  commonplace  that  it  was  the  'duty'  of  the  "physical 
philosopher  to  reflect  on  first  principles  of  disease  and  health"2.  Aristotle  explains  that  "most 
inquirers  into  nature,  and  those  doctors  who  pursue  their  craft  with  scientific  interest,  are 
alike.  For  the  former  at  the  end  of  their  inquiries  reach  a  discussion  of  medicine,  while  the 
latter  begin  their  investigations  into  medicine  with  an  inquiry  into  nature.  "3 
In  the  sixteenth  century  a  shift  becomes  discernible  from  the  classical  view  that  philosophy 
was  the  means  to  cure  the  soul's  ills.  Gradually,  study  of  the  soul  came  to  be  seen  as  being 
within  the  scope  of  biology/physiology,  and  ultimately  of  a  definable  medico-scientific  field 
(`psychology').  As  with  all  progressions  the  shift  was  not  strictly  linear;  elements  of  what 
might  be  termed  'psychology'  can  be  found  in  classical  authors,  in  the  Church  Fathers,  in 
Galen  and  Avicenna.  Even  use  of  the  term  psychology  itself  is  fraught  with  difficulty.  In  this 
thesis  the  term  is  used  in  relation  to  Vives'  analysis  of  the  soul  in  De  «niina  et  vita,  although 
he  did  not  use  the  term  himself.  It  is  used  to  denote  his  theory  of  the  soul  because  the  focus 
of  his  work  is  the  study  of  the  intellectual  and  emotional  manifestations  of  the  operations  of 
the  soul.  Arguably,  it  is  apt  to  regard  such  a  study  as  one  of  psychological  function  and  thus 
of  psychology.  The  earliest  use  of  the  term  may  date  to  Philipp  Melanchthon  who  used  the 
word  psychology,  circa  1530,  as  the  title  of  a  series  of  academic  letters'.  Melanchthon  is  also 
to  be  noted  for  his  underpinning  of  pedagogy  with  psychological  theory.  Indeed,  as  Eckhard 
Kessler  points  out,  "Melanchthon's  psychology  differs  greatly  from  the  usual  commentaries 
on  the  soul  and  resembles  instead  the  treatise  De  anima  et  vita  of  Juan  Luis  Vives  with  which 
it  was  published  several  times.  "5  However  Kessler,  writing  with  Katherine  Parke,  argues 
that  the  earliest  example  of  the  term  psychology  (psychol(gia)  dates  to  1575  and  its  use  by 
174 Joannes  Frei  bius'.  This  debate  notwithstanding,  what  is  relevant  for  this  study  is  the  shift 
towards  psychology  (defined  as  the  study  of  the  intellectual  and  emotional  manifestations  of 
the  'soul')  as  empirical  study  of  nman,  and  as  the  underpinning  of  pedagogy. 
To  put  Vives'  work  in  context  there  will  follow  a  discussion  of  various  treatments  of  the 
study  of  the  soul,  from  Hellenistic  times  through  the  Medieval  era  and  the  writing  of  the 
Church  Fathers.  Thereafter,  Deuninzael  vita  will  be  considered  and,  as  with  Deli-uclenclis 
cli.  sciplinis  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  method  will  be  largely  expository.  This  will  allow 
for  explanation  of  Vives'  concept  of  psychology,  firstly  to  detail  the  contents  and  elements 
of  empiricism,  secondly  to  illustrate  in  what  ways  his  psychology  may  be  said  to  have  led 
him  to  develop  his  pedagogy  in  the  way  that  he  did  (see  Chapter  5).  Finally,  it  will  permit 
continued  analysis  of  the  study  of  psychology  as  evinced  by  Gassendi,  Descartes  and 
Locke  (all  of  whom  were  influenced,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  Vives). 
The  concept  of  soul  pre-Aristotle 
(Before  Homer]  the  Greeks  in  all  probability  had 
a  word  for  the  free  soul  that  was  gradually 
replaced  by  the  Iife  soul,  identified  by  the  p.  oche 
or  "breath",  and  that  at  the  same  time  started  to 
lose  its  purely  physical  function.  In  Homer  we 
meet  this  process  at  a  halfway  stage.  Psyche  has 
already  absorbed  the  role  of  the  free  soul  as  the 
soul  of  the  dead,  but  it  has  not  lost  all  of  its 
original  function  as  breath.  It  was  to  be  some 
centuries  before  psyche  developed  completely  into 
a  unitary  soul.  " 
175 Jan  Bremmer  comments9  that  in  Homer  the  term  `psyche'  has  no  psychological 
connotations.  Around  the  eighth  century  B.  C.  Homer,  like  Hesiod,  conceived  of  the  soul 
as  residing  in  the  body  but  did  not  invest  the  concept  with  the  psychological  implications 
which  it  had  in  Aristotle's  De  anima.  Bremmer  explains  (following  Ernst  Arbman)  that 
Homer  distinguishes  between  `free'  soul  equating  with  the  term  psyche  (which  represents 
individual  personality)  and  a  `body'  soul  equating  to  the  terms  thvmos,  noun  and  menos 
(which  endows  the  body  with  life)'0.  The  psyche  is  mentioned  in  Homer  when  a  person  is 
undergoing  crisis.  In  this  respect  psyche  is  identified  as  part  of  the  person:  when  a  person 
faints  (for  example,  through  pain)  psyche  leaves  the  body,  then  re-enters  once 
consciousness  is  restored.  At  death,  the  psyche  leaves  the  body  and  goes  to  Hades. 
However,  the  term  as  used  by  Homer  does  not  fully  equate  with  the  concept  of  'life 
breath'.  What  can  be  said  is  that  Homer  describes  where  the  psyche  leaves  the  body 
forever  thus  resulting  in  the  death  of  the  body'  ý. 
It  seems  to  have  been  the  free  soul,  in  the  form  of  Psyche  ,  which  was  identified  by  early 
Greeks  as  the  soul  of  the  dead.  Again,  this  had  no  psychological  connotations;  psyche  was 
merely  distinguished  from  menus,  noes  and  thymos.  It  was  this  free  soul  which  was 
capable  of  afterlife.  A  concomitant  belief  was  that  the  psyche  was  represented  as  an  eidolon 
which  looked  like  the  living  person.  The  free  soul  was  accepted  as  being  capable  of  leaving 
the  body  during  life  ('bilocation'),  events  which  "reportedly  took  place  in  antiquity".  For 
example,  it  was  said  of  Pythagoras  that  "he  was  seen  in  Croton  and  Metapontum  at  the 
same  hour  on  the  same  day,  a  feat  later  imitated  by  Apolonius  of  Tyana  who  was  seen  in 
Smyrna  and  Ephesos  on  the  same  day""2.  Stories  of  bilocation  demonstrate  belief  in  the 
possibility  of  a  free  soul  appearing  in  the  from  of  an  eidolon. 
However  the  situation  is  not  as  clearly  defined  as  the  discussion  so  far  has  made  it  seem. 
In  the  fifth  century  B.  C.,  according  to  Plato,  Socrates  writes  about  the  epistemological 
176 aspects  surrounding  the  soul.  By  this  time  the  soul  was  being  regarded  as  the  site  of 
intellect  although  it  was  a  somewhat  protean  concept:  `soul'  continued  to  encapsulate  more 
aspects  of  functioning  than  the  intellectual.  In  classical  times  `soul'  was  regarded  as 
Aquinas  would  later  regard  it  -  as  the  "root  principle"  of  life13.  Intellectual  functioning 
would  be  an  increasingly  important  aspect  of  `soul',  particularly  as  it  would  affect  the 
changing  nature  of  psychological  study.  (For  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  where  `soul'  is 
used  to  refer  specifically  to  intellect,  this  will  be  made  explicit.  ) 
As  to  the  spiritual  aspects  of  soul,  Socrates'  conception  of  it  was  a  sophisticated  version  of 
Orphism  which  taught  that  the  soul  predates  the  body  but  becomes  imprisoned  in  it  through 
sin.  Death  liberates  the  soul  so  that  it  might  return  to  the  Gods'-.  In  Socrates'  descriptions 
the  soul  is  an  ethereal  essence.  Thus,  "the  whole  point  of  life  turns  out  to  be  the  soul's 
readiness  for  its  own  liberation,  its  own  next  incarnation.  ""5  The  epistemological  aspects  of 
Socrates'  discussion  of  soul  are  advanced  when  he  denies  the  epistemological  validity  of 
sensate  knowledge.  In  so  doing  he  appeals  to  the  Protagorean  approximation  of 
epistemological  authority:  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things.  This  is,  as  Daniel  N.  Robinson 
argues,  "an  early  form  of  the  so-called  incorrigibility  thesis,  according  to  which  each 
percipient  enjoys  unimpeachable  epistemic  authority  as  regards  his  own  experiences"16.  If 
sensate  knowledge  is  veridical  only  to  the  individual  percipient,  it  follows  that  sensate 
knowledge  cannot  be  said  to  be  generally  veridical.  Therefore,  Socrates'  position  is  that 
perceived  reality  is  an  illusion.  The  realm  of  `truth'  is  the  province  of  the  soul  and  this 
realm  is  beyond  sensate  experience.  But  there  is  a  proviso  to  this:  what  universal  truth  is 
able  to  be  known  at  all  must  be  `known'  by  the  soul.  Socrates  concludes  that  philosophical 
wisdom  is  the  "proper  aim  of  the  soul""7.  Robinson  effectively  summarises  Plato's  account 
of  Socrates'  argument  in  the  Thaetetits,  to  which  he  refers.  However,  it  is  notoriously 
difficult  to  ascertain  in  the  Platonic  dialogues  what  thought  belongs  to  Socrates  and  what  to 
177 Plato.  (Consequently,  in  the  ensuing  discussion  of  the  Thuetetus,  the  reference  shall  be  to 
Plato/Socrates.  ) 
In  the  Thaetetus,  Plato  has  Socrates  seemingly  reach  the  following  conclusion  in  response 
to  Thaetetus'  assertion  that  "knowledge  is  simply  perception"'  11:  "my  perception  is  true  for 
me  -  because  it  is  always  a  perception  of  that  being  which  is  peculiarly  mine;  and  I  am 
judge,  as  Protagoras  said,  of  things  that  are,  that  they  are,  for  me;  and  of  things  that  are 
not,  that  they  are  not.  "'  9  The  T/2aetetus  is  primarily  a  treatise  on  the  nature  of  knowledge, 
although  even  Plato/Socrates  cannot  give  an  answer  to  the  question  "What  is  knowledge?  " 
In  the  dialogue  we  learn  what  Plato/Socrates  thinks  knowledge  is  not  (perception,  `true' 
judgement,  true  judgement  with  the  "addition  of  an  account"20).  There  is  little  mention  of 
the  soul  in  this:  what  is  stated  is  that  the  soul  gains  knowledge  through  learning  and  study. 
This  link  between  the  soul  and  the  act  of  knowing  is  hardly  developed,  nor  is  an  explicit 
argument  evolved  for  the  soul  being  the  seat  of,  or  agent  of,  cognition.  The  nearest  that 
Plato/Socrates  comes  to  this  is  to  state  that  knowledge  should  not  be  sought  in  sense 
perception  "but  in  whatever  we  call  that  activity  of  the  soul  when  it  is  busy  by  itself  about 
the  things  which  are"-'.  The  soul  is  also  quite  clearly  cited  as  the  receiver  of  sense 
perception. 
In  Plato's  work  there  is  a  definite,  if  rudimentary,  connection  between  the  soul,  acts  of 
cognition,  and  perception  as  the  means  by  which  knowledge  is  received.  Plato/Socrates 
uses  the  metaphor  of  wax  to  explain  the  differences  in  perception  and  learning  capacity 
between  individuals: 
... 
I  want  you  to  suppose,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  that  we 
have  in  our  souls  a  block  of  wax,  larger  in  one  person,  smaller  in 
another,  and  of  purer  wax  in  one  case,  dirtier  in  another...  We 
make  impressions  upon  this  of  everything  we  have  seen  or  heard 
or  thought...  ;  we  hold  the  wax  under  our  perceptions  and 
thoughts  and  take  a  stamp  from  them,  in  the  way  in  which  we 
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wax  we  remember  and  know  so  long  as  the  image  remains  in  the 
wax;  whatever  is  obliterated  or  cannot  be  impressed,  we  forget 
and  do  not  know.  " 
Plato  uses  the  extended  metaphor  of  wax  as  an  approximation  of  how  the  soul  receives 
sense  impressions.  As  will  be  demonstrated  in  this  and  subsequent  chapters,  the  wax 
metaphor  was  one  which  was  to  remain  in  use  in  the  age  of  Locke  having  been  used 
hitherto  as  the  most  common  approximation  of  how  sensate  impressions  are  retained  by  the 
intellect/soul.  Plato,  in  developing  the  metaphor,  has  Socrates  speak  at  times  as  if  this  soul 
`wax'  is  a  reality.  Wax  is  not  the  only  referent  used  in  the  Thaetetus  to  convey  how 
perception  leads  to  learning  but  there  is  no  attempt  as  yet  at  a  physiological  or 
psychological  explanation  of  perception  and  cognition,  nor  of  what  part  the  soul  (intellect) 
plays  in  the  biological  processes  attendant  in  cognition.  The  discussion  of  the  soul, 
knowledge  and  perception  in  the  Thaetetus  largely  centres  on  semantics:  explanation  of  the 
unknown  (the  soul  and  its  functions)  is  derived  from  comparison  of  it  to  the  known  (the 
soul  to  wax,  cognates  to  birds  in  an  aviary23).  The  Thaetetus  is,  in  the  first  instance,  a 
philosophical  discussion  of  epistemology;  any  discussion  of  the  soul  is  therefore  conducted 
in  philosophical  terms  and  is  secondary  to  the  epistemological  purpose. 
Plato  also  mentions  the  soul  in  the  Phaedo,  Republic,  Timaeus  and  Phaedrus.  In  the 
Phaedo,  soul  is  discussed  as  both  life  force  and  cognitive  source  though  the  discussion 
remains  vague:  soul  is  a  quasi-substance  which  is  not  a  property  of  body.  Plato  has 
Socrates  refer  to  the  human  soul 
sometimes  as  a  counter-person,  sometimes  as  an  intellectual 
principle,  sometimes  as  a  life-bringer  or  life-principle,  and 
perhaps  in  one  passage  even  as  a  formal  property  (with 
intermediate  status?  )  entailing  life.  But  a  fifth  view  remains  to  be 
distinguished.  This  has  much  in  common  with  the  view  of  soul 
as  a  counter-person,  but  is  couched  in  more  material  terms.  On 
this  view  the  soul  is  something  like...  a  ghost,  which  can 
179 influence  and  be  influenced  by  the  bodily,  and  is  the  body's 
exact  non-material  replica.  24 
So,  for  Plato,  the  soul  is  still  spoken  of  as  an  eidolon,  even  amidst  dialogues  which  refer 
to  it  as  having  cognitive  function.  Moreover,  in  the  Republic,  Plato  broadens  the  functions 
of  the  soul  to  include  moral  propensities  -  the  "congenital  evil"  of  the  soul  can  militate 
against  it  being  `just'.  The  result  is  a  person  displaying  "injustice,  licentiousness, 
cowardice,  and  ignorance"25.  For  Plato,  the  "vicious"  soul 
is  the  soul  at  its  most  limited  and  unrecognizable;  but  any  soul 
still  attached  to  a  body...  is  to  that  degree  "tainted,  "  in  at  least  the 
minimal  sense  that  the  cares  and  distractions  of  the  bodily 
generally  divert  its  attention  to  some  degree  from  those  activities 
which  are  claimed  to  be  the  natural  ones  of  soul  in  its  pure  state. 
In  book  five  [of  the  Gorgias]  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  pure 
being,  absolute  non-being,  and  an  intermediate  state,  the  objects 
of  "knowledge",  "ignorance",  and  "opinion"  respectively...  The 
object  of  "opinion"  is  stated  to  be  the  world  known  to  us  by 
sense-perception;  it  is  a  world  of  fluid  and  shifting  existence, 
with  only  a  fleeting  hold  on  reality,  a  world  opined  rather  than 
known...  26 
Thus,  Plato's  concept  of  the  soul  contained  many  elements  and  the  disparate  aspects  of  his 
work  are  spread  over  many  works  rather  than  contained  in  a  sustained  dialogue  on  the 
nature  of  the  soul.  Such  a  sustained  treatment  comes  with  Aristotle's  De  anima,  though  the 
following  works  also  have  relevance  to  Aristotle's  concept  of  soul:  De  sense,  De  soinnis 
and  De  memoria.  Aristotle's  work  was  to  exert  powerful  influence  upon  subsequent 
analyses  of  the  soul  and  its  functions  from  the  classical  period  through  medieval  and 
renaissance  texts. 
180 Aristotle:  what  the  soul  is 
The  scope  of  de  anima  is  much  broader  than 
either  contemporary  philosophy  of  mind  or 
contemporary  philosophical  psychology.  It  is  a 
metaphysical  inquiry  into  the  ontology  of  psuche 
and  noes;  it.  is  philosophical  psychology,  a 
general  analysis  of  the  activities  of  psyche;  it  is 
philosophical  bio-psychology,  an  investigation 
of  the  teleologically  organized  functions  that  are 
common  to  living  bodies.  It  has  sometimes  been 
classified  with  metaphysics  in  a  group  of  works 
on  natural  philosophy,  and  sometimes  more 
narrowly  with  the  physical  and  biological 
treatises.  '' 
Amelie  Oksenberg  Rorty's  summation  of  Aristotle's  concerns  in  De  anima  aptly  conveys 
the  difficulties  inherent  in  attempting  to  define  Aristotle's  psychology.  Even  to  use 
`psychology'  in  its  broadest  definition  -  the  study  of  mind  -  is  not  straightforward.  The 
connotations  surrounding  the  concept  of  mind  in  the  twentieth  century  are  very  different 
from  those  which  Aristotle  would  have  understood.  Indeed,  after  Descartes,  the  concept  of 
mind  altered  in  ways  which  took  it  beyond  the  understanding  of  renaissance  thinkers  reliant 
upon  Aristotelianism  and  Galenism.  Today  we  site  mind  (intellect)  in  the  brain,  to  the 
extent  that  we  cannot  separate  the  two:  intellect  is,  by  some  process,  a  product  of  brain 
function.  The  brain  is  understood  to  be  what  enables  us  to  reason  and  intellectualise.  If  we 
think  of  `soul'  nowadays  it  is  in  an  ephemeral  way,  linked  to  the  religious  and  the  afterlife. 
However,  just  as  today  we  equate  mind  with  brain,  Aristotle  (and  renaissance  and 
scholastic  thinkers)  equated  mind  with  a  soul  (psyche)  which  resided  in  the  body. 
181 For  Aristotle,  soul  has  three  functions:  nutritive,  sensitive  and  cognitive.  (This  discussion 
will  concentrate  on  the  cognitive  function  as  described  by  Aristotle,  but  in  so  doing  will 
also  deal  with  sense  perception.  )  We  have  seen  that  the  mind-soul  equation  was  not  always 
a  common  concept  in  classical  Greek  thought.  Much  as  our  idea  of  the  mind-brain 
relationship  developed  so  did  that  with  which  Aristotle  was  familiar:  that  the  soul  is 
"substance  qua  form  of  a  natural  body  which  has  life  potentially.  Substance  is  actuality. 
The  soul,  therefore  will  be  the  actuality  of  a  body  of  this  kind"28.  Let  us  turn  first  to 
Aristotle's  general  conception  of  soul  before  dealing  with  his  view  of  its  functions  and  the 
part  it  plays  in  cognition. 
Aristotle  wrote  (in  Departihusanimalium): 
[Of]  things  constituted  by  nature  some  are  ungenerated, 
imperishable,  and  eternal,  while  others  are  subject  to  generation 
and  decay.  The  former  are  excellent  beyond  compare  and  divine, 
but  less  accessible  to  knowledge...  Both  departments,  however, 
have  their  special  charm.  the  scanty  conceptions  to  which  we  can 
attain  of  celestial  things  give  us,  from  their  excellence,  more 
pleasure  than  all  our  knowledge  of  the  world  in  which  we  live. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  certitude  and  completeness  our  knowledge 
of  terrestrial  things  has  the  advantage...  Absence  of  haphazard 
and  conduciveness  of  everything  to  an  end  are  to  be  found  in 
Nature's  works...  29 
Herein  lies  the  paradox  of  Aristotle's  study  of  the  soul:  the  incorporeal  aspects  of  the  `soul' 
belong  with  the  "ungenerated,  imperishable,  and  eternal"  things  of  which  we  can  have 
scant  knowledge30.  Yet  `soul'  (psyche),  which  Aristotle  states  is  the  "first  principle  of 
animal  life"  1,  is  always  in  living  matter  (which  is  perishable).  He  seems  to  argue  that 
knowledge  of  the  terrestrial  can  be  achieved  with  some  certitude,  while  knowledge  of  the 
imperishable  and  eternal  must  remain  incomplete.  This  does  not  prevent  him  from 
embarking  on  an  enquiry  into  the  soul  in  which  he  will  speak  of  activities  which  are 
common  to  the  soul  and  body,  and  others  which  are  proper  to  the  soul  alone.  He  will  tend 
182 to  equate  `soul'  with  consciousness  and  the  body  with  that  which  is  not  conscious32.  He 
will  seek  to  separate  aspects  of  bodily  function  from  those  of  the  soul,  as  will  Vives. 
Underpinning  Aristotle's  theory  is  an  a  priori  belief  in  the  soul's  existence:  mental 
phenomena  are  experienced  in  the  body  and  may  ultimately  be  inseparable  from  corporeal 
function.  But  this  challenges  belief  in  an  incorporeal  cognitive  agent.  If  such  an  agent  (that 
is,  psyche)  is  the  accepted  starting  point  of  a  discussion  of  cognition,  a  mind-matter 
dichotomy  will  be  apparent. 
Mind-body  dualism  has  consequences  even  for  the  form  of  Aristotle's  discussion:  his 
enquiries  into  the  soul  are  conducted  in  philosophical  terms  (as  with  Plato).  Aristotle 
ascribes  the  study  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  to  the  scope  of  the  natural  philosopher.  The  fact 
that  Aristotle's  method  of  inquiry  is  philosophical  has  specific  effects  upon  his  conclusions 
as  to  the  nature  and  function  of  the  soul.  Amelie  Oksenberg  Rorty  assesses  the  situation  in 
this  way: 
By  Aristotle's  lights,  a  scientific  explanation  of  natural 
phenomena  focuses  on  their  invariable  and  universal  features... 
Philosophical  ethics  analyses  the  teleology  and  the  structure  of 
well-formed  action  (praxis).  But  since  its  subject  matter  is 
contingent  and  particular,  it  can  at  best  provide  qualified 
generalizations  about  `what  is  true  for  the  most  part'.  33 
Thus,  the  biological  functions  as  explained  in  De  anima  are  not  dealt  with  in  the  same  way 
as  are  the  psychological  manifestations  of  the  soul.  Taking  empirical  methodology  for 
granted,  the  modern  perception  of  Aristotle's  philosophical  method  of  inquiry  may  well  be 
that  it  is inappropriate  for  enquiry  into  an  area  such  as  psychology.  For  Aristotle  there  was 
no  such  perceived  problem. 
Aristotle's  explicit  task  is  to  ascertain  the  ontological  status  of  the  soul  and  thereafter  to 
delineate  "all"  the  attributes  of  it34.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Aristotle  considered  it  possible  to 
183 enquire  into  the  "essence"  of  psyche.  This  is  a  contention  which  Vives  will  reject.  Aristotle 
conceded  that  there  is  no  common  procedure  for  determining  the  essence  of  things,  but  sets 
the  remit  of  the  enquiry  as  follows: 
1.  to  "determine  in  which  parts  of  the  genera  the  soul  is  and  what  it  is;  I  mean  whether  it 
is  a  particular  thing  and  substance  or  quality  or  quantity...  "35; 
2.  to  determine  whether  the  soul  exists  in  "potentiality"  or  in  "actuality",  "for  this  makes 
no  small  difference"36; 
3.  to  enquire  whether  the  soul  is  divisible  or  indivisible  "and  whether  every  soul  is  of 
like  kind  or  not;  and  if  not  of  like  kind,  whether  differing  species  or  genus"  7; 
4.  to  enquire  as  to  whether  the  human  soul  differs  in  definition  from  animals'  souls38 
Once  we  are  able  to  give  an  account  of  all  or  most  of  the  soul's  attributes  as  they  appear  to 
an  observer,  "then  we  shall  be  able  to  speak  best  about  the  essence"39.  Here,  then,  is  a  hint 
of  empiricism:  the  only  way  describe  the  essence  of  soul  is  to  study  its  observable 
manifestations. 
Briefly,  the  answers  Aristotle  gives  to  these  areas  of  enquiry  are: 
l.  "The  soul  must,  then,  be  substance  qua  form  of  a  natural  body  which  has  life 
potentially.  Substance  is  actuality.  The  soul,  therefore,  will  be  actuality  of  a  body  of 
this  kind"40; 
2.  `°...  the  soul  is  actuality  as  knowledge  is...  "41  The  soul  is  the  "first  actuality"  of  a 
natural  body  which  "has  life  potentially"42  and  which  "has  organs";  3; 
3.  "the  soul  or  certain  parts  of  it,  if  it  is indivisible,  cannot  be  separated  from  the 
body"44; 
4.  the  soul  is  what  is  necessary  for  a  body  to  be  what  it  is  (i.  e.  what  makes  a  man  a  man, 
a  dog  a  dog,  etc.  )45 
184 Aristotle  discusses  five  faculties  of  the  soul  in  detail  in  Deanima:  the  nutritive,  sensory, 
intellectual,  motive  and  desiderative.  Apart  from  these  faculties  he  details  the  functions  and 
divides  them  into  three  categories:  nutritive,  sensory  and  cognitive.  Man  has  all  three 
functions;  animals  have  the  nutritive  and  sensitive  functions;  plants  have  only  the  nutritive 
function.  If  a  thing  has  a  soul,  it  lives  (hence,  for  Aristotle,  plants  have  a  nutritive  soul 
concerned  with  nourishment,  growth  and  reproduction).  Aristotle's  definition  of  exhibiting 
life  is  where  a  thing  displays  intellect  or  perception,  or  rest  in  respect  of  place,  or 
movement  involved  in  nutrition,  or  decay  and  growth-''.  While  animals  and  plants  both  live 
and  are  ensouled  in  some  way,  animals  differ  from  plants  in  that  they  have  sense 
perception.  But  as  regards  cognition,  Aristotle  thinks  that  "the  intellect  and  the  potentiality 
for  contemplation"  seem  to  belong  to  "a  different  kind  of  soul"  from  that  which  gives  rise 
to  nutritive  and  sensitive  functions.  It  is  this  "intellectual"  soul  "alone  (which]  can  exist 
separately"  (that  is,  immaterially,  without  the  body)47.  His  argument  on  this  becomes 
unclear,  however,  with  his  statement  that  the  "soul  does  not  exist  without  a  body  and  yet  is 
not  itself  a  kind  of  body"48.  In  this  instance  Aristotle  appears  to  be  referring  to  the  nutritive 
and  sensitive  parts  of  the  soul  -  he  has  just  admitted  that  intellect  `seems'  to  be  a  different 
type  of  soul.  In  other  words,  he  is  not  sure. 
Sensation,  sense  perception  and  cognition 
Aristotle  distinguishes  two  factors  in  sensation:  body  (soma)  and  soul  (psyche).  Sensation 
is  "felt  by  the  soul  through  the  medium  of  the  body"49.  This  `fact'  is  "obvious"  to  Aristotle 
on  "theoretical  grounds"  and  also  "apart  from  theory"-10  (so  despite  hints  at  empirical 
observation,  theory  has  primacy).  He  does  not  speak  of  sense  perception  (aisthesis)  in  a 
185 manner  exactly  congruent  with  the  modern  concept  of  `sensation'.  Aristotle  means  aisthesis 
to  refer  to  "any  capacity  possessed  by  living  animals  for  obtaining  information  concerning 
the  outside  world"51.  The  ten  chapters  in  Deanima  dealing  with  sensation  are  perhaps  the 
most  clearly  delineated  aspect  of  this  work.  However,  only  those  areas  of  his  work  on 
sensation  which  have  direct  relevance  to  cognition  or  acquisition  of  knowledge  will  be 
discussed.  It  must  be  stressed  that,  for  Aristotle,  the  study  of  soul  (mind)  did  not  have 
primarily  epistemological  concerns. 
Aristotle  comments  that  the  faculty  of  sense  perception  does  not  exist  "by  way  of  activity 
but  by  way  of  potentiality  only"52.  Perception  is  of  particulars,  in  contrast  with  knowledge 
which  is  of  universals.  Universals,  he  writes,  "are  somehow  in  the  soul  itself'''.  This 
seems  not  to  be  an  argument  for  innate  knowledge  but  rather  a  suggestion  that  the  ability  to 
gain  knowledge  is  a  property  of  the  (intellectual)  soul.  Perception  also  requires  an  object 
which  may  be  perceived  whereas  we  can  think  whenever  we  wish,  argues  Aristotle 
(though  he  does  not  deal  with  the  postulate  that  this  still  requires  an  object  of  thought).  In 
animals,  perception  occurs  via  the  senses.  Sense  is  "that  which  can  receive  perceptible 
forms  without  their  matter,  as  wax  receives  the  imprint  of  the  ring  without  the  iron  or 
gold...  "54  All  animals  perceive,  but  few  think  or  understand. 
If  all  information  comes  via  sense  perception,  cognition  must  be  dependent  on  sensate 
experience.  Aristotle  differentiates  between  perceiving  and  understanding,  and  between 
perceiving  and  thinking.  Thought  includes  imagination  and  supposal55.  He  further 
distinguishes  in  this  way:  perception  is  potentiality  and  perceptions  are  "always  true,  while 
imaginings  are  for  the  most  part  false"56.  Similarly,  knowledge  and  intellect  are  "always 
correct"57.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Aristotle  regards  sense  perception  to  be  always  true  - 
consequently,  because  knowledge  rests  upon  it,  knowledge  is  also  veridical.  Belief, 
however,  can  be  false.  Yet,  he  claims  that  imagination  "will  be  a  movement  taking  place  as 
186 a  result  of  actual  sense-perception""'  and  even  though  imagination  results  from  sense 
perception,  imaginings  are  rarely  tnie. 
While  the  faculty  of  sense  perception  is  dependent  on  the  body.  Aristotle  argues  that  the 
intellect  is  distinct  from  the  body;  it  exists  "potentially"59.  The  part  of  the  soul  called 
"intellect"  (the  faculty  of  thinking  and  supposing)  "is  actually  none  of  existing  things 
before  it  thinks"60.  Aristotle  is here  speaking  of  intellect  as  pure  potentiality,  actualised  only 
when  thinking  takes  place.  This  surely  leads  to  the  problem  of  suggesting  that  something 
(thought)  can  be  created  out  of  nothing  (potential,  but  not  actual,  intellect)?  Aristotle 
attempts  to  clarify:  the  intellect  is  "in  a  way  potentially  the  objects  of  thought,  although  it  is 
actually  nothing  before  it  thinks;  potentially  in  the  same  way  as  there  is  writing  on  a  tablet 
on  which  nothing  actually  written  exists"61.  This  is  a  somewhat  problematic  analogy;  the 
writing  on  a  tablet  does  not  exist  potentially  in  the  tablet.  The  words  are  formed  and  have 
actuality  first  in  the  mind  of  the  writer  who  inscribes  the  tablet.  This  still  does  not  explain 
how  the  words  are  thought  by  the  writer's  intellect  (especially  if  it  only  potentially  exists). 
The  explanation  of  cognition  becomes  more  confused  when  Aristotle  writes:  "Actual 
knowledge  is  identical  with  its  object;  but  potential  knowledge  is  prior  in  time  in  the 
individual  but  not  prior  even  in  time  in  general"62.  There  are  three  problems  here.  Firstly, 
the  separation  between  `general'  time  and  time  as  it  progresses  in  an  individual.  This  is  not 
a  clear  distinction.  Secondly,  how  can  actual  knowledge  be  identical  with  its  object  (i.  e.  of 
perception)?  This  may  be  simply  a  semantic  confusion  surrounding  Aristotle's  use  of  the 
term  'identical'.  Obviously,  knowledge  cannot  be  corporeal  as  is  the  perceptible  object.  So 
what  does  Aristotle  mean  by  `identical'?  Thirdly,  by  this  argument,  knowledge  is  existent 
potentially  as  a  body  of  knowledge  formed  but  not  actual  in  the  mind.  If  knowledge  is 
identical  with  an  actual  perceptible  object,  how  can  it  also  exist  potentially  in  the  mind? 
Moreover,  if  this  potential  knowledge  is  not  prior  to  time  in  general  but  is  prior  in  time  in 
187 the  individual,  does  the  mind  exist  outwith  time  in  general?  Aristotle  then  states  that  "all 
things  that  come  to  be  are  derived  from  that  which  is  so  actually"63.  This  would  seem  to 
contradict  his  potentiality  theory  of  knowledge. 
Memory  and  recollection 
Before  giving  a  summation  of  Aristotle's  theory  of  the  soul,  his  discussion  of  memory  will 
be  addressed.  Aristotle  deals  with  this  subject  in  the  Parva  naturalia  asking  to  what  part  of 
the  soul  memory  and  recollection  belong.  He  makes  a  distinction  between  the  two  faculties: 
people  who  have  "good  memories  are  not  the  same  as  those  who  are  good  at  recollecting... 
[G]enerally  speaking  the  slow-witted  have  better  memories,  but  the  quick-witted  and  those 
who  learn  easily  are  better  at  recollecting.  "64  On  memory,  Aristotle  says  that  it  is 
impossible  to  remember  the  future  (this  is  `expecting')  nor  can  you  remember  the  present 
(this  is  perception).  Because  Aristotle  believes  that  memory  cannot  exist  without  a  mental 
picture,  he  reasons  that  it  must  belong  "incidentally  to  the  thinking  faculty"  but  in  itself  "to 
the  first  sense  perception"65.  Memory  is  the  term  for  the  part  of  the  soul  "to  which 
imagination  refers"  because  "all  things  which  are  mental  pictures  are  in  themselves  subjects 
of  memory,  and  those  which  cannot  exist  apart  from  imagination  are  only  incidentally 
subjects  of  memory"66.  Again,  when  describing  how  memories  are  retained.  Aristotle 
resorts  to  the  wax  image:  movement,  produced  in  the  soul  by  an  affection,  is  made  by  an 
impression  "just  as  when  men  seal  with  signet  rings"67  . 
For  this  reason,  "the  very  young 
and  the  old  have  poor  memories;  they  are  in  a  state  of  flux,  the  young  because  of  their 
growth,  the  old  because  of  their  decay"68.  As  a  result  there  is  nothing  `static'  on  which  to 
impress  the  memory. 
188 Recollection  is  "neither  the  recovery  nor  the  acquisition  of  memory"69,  though  this  process 
of  recollecting  "implies  memory,  and  is  followed  by  memory"'°  Recollection  is  the  name 
given  to  the  act  whereby  we  'recover'  knowledge  or  sensation  which  we  have  had  before. 
We  collect  one  piece  of  a  former  impulse,  then  another  linked  piece,  then  another.  (A 
rudimentary  example  of  association  which  Vives  expands  on.  ) 
Aristotle's  philosophy  of  mind:  a  summation 
Aristotle's  theory  of  soul  is  built  upon  a  biology  which  is  hardly  acceptable  today.  The 
physiological  and  scientific  assumptions  which  underpin  his  work  on  the  soul  appear  to 
have  little  relevance  to  the  modern  reader.  Ultimately,  as  Myles  Burnyeat  remarks: 
"Aristotle's  philosophy  of  mind  is  no  longer  credible  because  Aristotelian  physics  is  no 
longer  credible,  and  the  fact  of  that  physics  being  incredible  has  quite  a  lot  to  do  with  there 
being  such  a  thing  as  the  mind-body  problem  as  we  face  it  today.  "7'  Some  appreciation  can 
be  gained  of  how  difficult  Aristotle's  task  was  in  attempting  to  explain  the  functions  of  the 
soul  if  it  is  considered  that  with  modern  understanding  of  physics,  biology  and  medicine, 
we  still  cannot  satisfactorily  resolve  philosophical  problems  inherent  in  the  mind-body 
complexity. 
Many  of  the  problems  spoken  of  concerning  Aristotle's  conjecture  on  the  nature  of  psyche 
stem  from  what  would  today  be  termed  his  ignorance  of  physiology  coupled  with  his  use 
of  a  method  which  is  an  inappropriate  means  of  exploring  processes  of  perception  and 
cognition.  However,  such  criticism  is  from  a  post-Cartesian  standpoint.  Consequently,  as 
regards  ongoing  questions  about  dualism, 
189 Aristotle  has  for  us  a  deeply  alien  conception  of  the  physical.  If 
we  want  to  get  away  from  Cartesian  dualism,  we  cannot  do  it  by 
travelling  backwards  to  Aristotle,  because  although  Aristotle  has 
a  non-Cartesian  conception  of  soul,  we  are  stuck  with  a  more  or 
less  Cartesian  conception  of  the  physical.  To  be  truly 
Aristotelian,  we  would  have  to  stop  believing  that  the  emergence 
of  life  or  mind  requires  explanation  72 
Of  course,  Vives,  pre-Descartes,  would  not  be  troubled  by  an  inconsistency  (dualism) 
which  seems  obvious  post-Descartes.  By  Vives'  era  the  emergence  of  life  and  intellect  was 
explained  by  belief  in  God  and  a  literal  interpretation  of  Genesis.  Man's  mind  reflected 
God's  mind;  it  was  a  fraction  of  his  perfection  and  the  wax  metaphor  remained  a 
commonplace.  But  during  the  Renaissance  there  was  dissatisfaction  with  the  Aristotelian 
explanation  of  the  soul.  While  Vives  would  cling  to  remnants  of  Aristotle's  theories,  as  he 
would  cling  to  Galen's  physiology,  he  was  attempting  an  explanation  not  of  what  the  soul 
was  in  its  essence,  but  of  observable  functioning.  But  in  Europe,  between  Aristotle  and 
Vives,  the  soul  was  appropriated  by  the  Christian  church.  A  short  discussion  of  the 
concept  of  soul  in  Augustine  and  Aquinas  will  now  be  given,  as  Vives  was  influenced  as 
much  by  the  thought  of  the  Church  Fathers  as  by  Hellenistic  philosophers. 
Augustine  and  Aquinas  on  the  nature  of  the  soul 
For  Augustine,  the  mind  is  the  preeminent  part  of  the  soul.  The  animarationalisis  part  of 
the  mind  and  the  will;  the  anima  irrationalis  is  the  seat  of  the  faculties  of  sense  perception, 
appetite  and  memory.  (The  latter  is  common  to  all  animals;  the  former  is  found  only  in 
men.  )  He  also  refers  to  the  existence  of  a  `vegetable'  soul  which  is  termed  `non-sentient' 
life.  The  concept  of  soul  in  Augustine's  work  is  of  an  "immaterial,  dynamic,  unextended 
190 and  indivisible  substance"73.  He  sees  soul  in  terms  of  `life  breath'  and  distinguishes 
between  the  vegetative,  sensitive  and  intellectual  soul.  According  to  Augustine's  reasoning, 
if  a  person  is  alive,  then  that  person  is  aware  that  they  have  a  soul.  It  is  therefore  the  case 
that  "though  we  do  not  perceive  soul  by  means  of  any  of  the  senses,  we  are  nonetheless 
empirically  aware  that  we  have  a  soul  because  we  are  conscious  of  the  fact  that  we  are 
percipient  beings...  "74  However,  while  this  might  be  an  argument  for  belief  in  the 
existence  of  soul,  it  is  far  from  an  empirical  justification  for  its  existence,  nor  does  it 
explain  why  human  beings  are  capable  of  ratiocination.  It  is  a  rudimentary  argument  for 
individual  existence,  of  the  Cartesian  cogito  ergo  sum  variety,  but  it  is  not  an  analysis  of 
intellectual  functioning. 
Augustine  argues  that  being  (esse),  together  with  living  (invere)  and  thinking  (intelligere), 
is  one  of  three  levels.  (Intelligence  is  superior  to  the  others.  )  But  we  do  not  perceive  our 
being  or  our  knowing  with 
any  bodily  sense,  as  we  perceive  things  outside:  colors  by 
seeing,  sounds  by  hearing,  odors  by  smelling,  flavors  by 
tasting,  hard  things  and  soft  by  touching.  Rather  we  treat 
images  of  these  sensible  things  -  images  very  similar  to  them, 
but  no  longer  bodily  -  by  thought,  retain  them  by  memory,  and 
by  their  means  are  solicited  to  desire  them.  But  my  being,  my 
knowing...  is  most  certain  to  nie,  not  with  any  images  or 
visions  of  a  deceitfid  imagination,  but  certain  and  free  frone  the 
deceptions  of  our  imagination.  75 
Augustine  asserts,  in  a  circular  argument,  that  these  `interior  realities'  are  self-evident  and 
verifiable  as  true  in  themselves  by  dint  of  their  self-evidence.  That  is,  to  be  sure  of  existing 
one  must  exist.  But  this  is  not  a  reliable  argument;  simply  because  something  appears  to  be 
self-evident  there  is  no  logical  extrapolation  which  proves  it  to  be  `true'.  Furthermore,  the 
point  that  being  is  known  with  certainty  is  assertion  and  tells  us  nothing  about  cognitive 
processes  involved  in  us  being  able  to  deduce  rationally  that  we  exist,  and  that  we  think. 
191 As  has  been  said,  Augustine  divided  the  soul  into  rational  and  irrational  parts.  The 
irrational  soul  can  be  disturbed  by  emotion  and  desire  (that  is,  by  affections).  Augustine 
emphasises  that  it  is  the  function  of  the  rational  soul  to  control  the  irrational  aspects  of  its 
being.  The  soul  is  "fitted  to  the  task  of  controlling  the  body"  and  in  its  power  is  "the 
direction  of  all  the  limbs"  thus  "affecting  all  bodily  motion  s"'6.  He  further  divides  the  soul 
into  functions  which  have  different  levels  of  activity:  the  lowest  function  is  found  in 
vegetative  life  (power  of  growth  and  self  nourishment/preservation).  Above  this  is  the 
function  which  contains  powers  of  sensory  perception,  movement,  awareness, 
concentration,  avoidance,  dreaming,  judgement,  sexual  instinct  and  memory.  Above  this  is 
the  rational  level  which  comprises  five  activities:  discursive  reason,  ethical  activity,  the 
level  of  `perfection'  (success  over  a  moral  struggle),  and  two  activities  of  the  `pure' 
intellect  (aspiration  and  achievement)77.  The  individual  is  expected  to  proceed  through  each 
of  these  five  stages  to  the  higher  most  superior  part  of  the  soul:  "that  by  means  of  which 
we  reason,  comprehend,  understand...  is  not  the  entire  soul  (universa  anima),  but  some 
part  of  it.  "78  Only  in  this  part  of  the  rational  soul  can  there  be  acquaintance  (agnito)  with 
God,  and  in  the  human  mind  is found  to  be  an  `image'  of  God  79. 
Augustine  grants  that  when  a  living  body  moves  there  is  "no  way  revealed  to  our  eyes  by 
which  to  see  the  soul  (animus),  a  thing  which  the  eyes  cannot  see;  but  we  perceive  that 
there  is  something  within  that  mass,...  and  that  is  life  and  soul  (anima).  "80  The  mind's 
ability  to  think  is  taken  as  evidence  of  the  soul's  incorporeality.  Body  and  soul  exist  in 
symbiosis  with  the  soul  being 
spread  throughout  the  entire  body  which  it  animates,  not  through 
any  local  extension,  but  by  a  kind  of  vital  tension;  for  it  is 
simultaneously  entirely  present  throughout  all  its  parts,  and  is 
not  smaller  in  the  smaller  parts  or  larger  in  the  larger  ones,  but  is 
in  one  place  more  tense  and  in  another  more  slack,  and  is  totally 
present,  both  in  all  and  in  the  individual  parts.  81 
192 In  discussing  the  soul  Augustine  develops  a  theory  of  sense  perception  which  is 
physiologically  oriented,  but  he  argues  that  sense  perception  is  primarily  a  psychological 
process.  As  with  Aristotle,  Augustine  considers  the  senses  to  be  the  mechanism  whereby 
percepts  are  received.  He  explains  that  perception  is  an  active  process  by  which  the  soul  is 
"moved"  during  the  act  of  perception.  Moreover  the  soul  is  "aware  of  its  motions,  or 
activities...  when  it  perceives"82.  Thus  "perception  is  something  directly  undergone  by  the 
body  of  which  the  soul  is  aware"83.  In  order  that  percept  images  are  retained,  the  memory 
operates  instantly  on  perception,  and  memory  impressions  are  stored  for  subsequent  recall. 
Augustine  writes  (in  De  Genesi  ad  litteram): 
For  when  something  is  seen  by  the  eyes,  an  image  of  it  is 
immediately  (continuo)  formed  in  the  mind  (.  Spiritus)... 
Therefore,  although  we  first  see  an  object  which  we  had  not 
previously  seen,  and  from  that  moment  its  image,  by  means  of 
which  we  can  recollect  it  when  it  is  not  there,  begins  to  be  in  our 
mind  (spiritus),  it  is  not  the  object  which  produces  that  same 
image  of  it  in  the  mind,  but  the  mind  itself  which  produces  in 
itself  with  singular  rapidity...  as  soon  as  [the  object]  has  been 
seen  with  the  eyes,  its  image  is  formed  in  the  percipient's  mind 
before  an  instant  of  time  has  elapsed.  84 
Remembering  is  not  grouped  strictly  with  the  memory;  rather  it  is  classed  by  Augustine  as 
a  type  of  imagining.  The  will  directs 
our  senses  to  external  objects,  which  we  then  perceive;  in  like 
manner,  the  will  directs  the  mind  towards  the  memory's  contents, 
and  recollection  occurs.  The  form  (species)  actualised  in 
recollection  and  the  memory-image  appear  to  us  as  one:  their 
distinction  is  purely  conceptual. 
This  description  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  recollection  is 
perceiving  memory-images:  in  other  words,  that  it  is  primarily 
concerned  with  actualizing  memory-traces.  85 
It  can  be  seen  that  Augustine's  account  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  is  not  based  upon 
empirical  observations  but  on  philosophical  argument.  His  account  of  the  soul  is 
193 principally  a  spiritual  one  encapsulating  his  belief  that  the  two  principal  subjects  of  inquiry 
in  philosophy  are  God  and  the  S0111.86 
Turning  now  to  Aquinas,  the  predominance  of  philosophical  enquiry  is  evident  once  again. 
A  sustained  discussion  of  soul  is  found  in  the  Summa  Theologiae  (questions  75-83)  but 
Aquinas'  discourse  on  the  nature  of  the  soul  and  its  functions  is  philosophical,  examining 
what  pertains  to  the  essence  of  the  soul,  its  power  of  acting,  and  its  activities  in  general. 
Aquinas  states  that  the  soul  is  not  corporeal,  at  once  "non-material  yet  immattered"117.  He 
gives  a  line  of  reasoning  "by  which  it  becomes  plain  that  the  soul  is  not  corporeal": 
[It]  is  obvious  that  not  every  principle  of  vital  activity  is  a  soul. 
Otherwise  the  eye  would  be  a  soul,  since  it  is  a  principle  of  sight; 
and  so  with  the  other  organs  of  the  soul.  What  we  call  the  soul  is 
the  root  principle  of  life.  Now  though  something  corporeal  can 
be  some  sort  of  principle  of  life,  as  the  heart  is  for  animals, 
nevertheless  a  body  cannot  be  the  root  principle  of  life.  For  it  is 
obvious  that  to  be  the  principle  of  life,  or  that  which  is  alive, 
does  not  belong  to  any  bodily  thing  from  the  mere  fact  of  its 
being  a  body;  otherwise  every  bodily  thing  would  be  alive  or  a 
life-source...  Therefore  a  soul,  as  the  primary  principle  of  life,  is 
not  a  body  but  that  which  actuates  a  body.  88 
The  act  of  understanding,  "which  is  called  the  soul  of  man,  must  of  necessity  be  some  kind 
of  incorporeal  and  subsistent  principle"89. 
According  to  Aquinas,  understanding  is  a  power  of  the  soul.  Human  understanding  is  "in  a 
state  of  potentiality  in  relation  to  what  it  can  understand,  and  is  initially  like  a  blank  page  on 
which  nothing  can  he  written"  (Aquinas  cites  Aristotle  on  this  point).  That  this  is  so  is 
"obvious  from  the  fact  that  initially  we  are  solely  able  to  understand  and  afterwards  we 
come  actually  to  understand"90.  Distinguishing  the  potentiality  of  what  he  terms  the 
'intellectual'  soul  from  the  objects  of  sense  which  "exist  apart  from  the  mind"91,  he  writes 
that  an  intellectual  soul 
194 is  indeed  actually  non-material,  but  is  in  a  state  of  potentiality  as 
regards  grasping  the  natures  of  things.  Images,  on  the  contrary, 
actually  are  likenesses  of  certain  things  grasped,  but  are  only 
potentially  non-material.  Nothing  can  stop  the  same  soul  from 
having,  because  of  its  actual  non-materiality,  a  power  to  de- 
materialize  things  by  abstracting  them  from  the  conditions  of  material 
individuality  -  which  power  we  call  the  abstractive  intellect  -  while  at 
the  same  time,  because  its  being  potentiality  to  such  concepts,  it  has 
another  power,  receptive  of  them...  92 
The  same  criticisms  of  the  potentiality  theory  applied  earlier  in  this  chapter  to  Aristotle 
apply  to  the  argument  as  given  by  Aquinas.  Moreover,  in  giving  this  argument  Aquinas 
does  not  fully  explain  why  or  how  he  distinguishes  between  the  two  forms  of 
understanding  (potential  understanding,  defined  as  the  ability  to  understand,  and  actual 
understanding). 
Aquinas  ranks  the  powers  of  the  soul  in  a  "threefold  order".  The  intellectual  power  has 
ascendancy  over  the  sense  powers,  which  in  turn  have  ascendancy  over  the  nutritive 
powers.  There  is  also  an  ordering  of  the  sense  powers:  sight,  hearing  and  smell  are 
arranged  hierarchical  iy93.  The  soul  has  five  specific  powers:  vegetative,  sensitive, 
appetitive,  locomotive  and  intellective.  Additionally,  he  describes  the  five  senses  and 
postulates  the  existence  of  internal  senses  (the  'common'  sense,  fantasy/imagination, 
instinct  and  memory)94. 
However,  the  body  is  necessary  to  enable  the  intellect  to  function.  Objects  presented  to  the 
intellect  come  through  the  senses  and  sensation  is  a  corporeal  function.  According  to 
Aquinas,  sensation  occurs  because  a  physical  organ  undergoes  change  when  affected  by  a 
percept  (for  instance,  colour  "affects  the  pupil  of  the  eye"95  -  in  other  words  if  the 
perceptible  object  is  blue,  the  pupil  of  the  eye  takes  on  the  blueness  without  actually 
becoming  blue).  He  lists  sensation  as  a  power  of  the  body-soul  `composite',  as  an  act  of 
the  soul  exercised  through  a  corporeal  organ,  and  explains  that  sensation  and  nourishment 
195 "are  said  to  be  of  the  soul  not  as  the  subject  of  the  powers,  but  as  their  source"96.  Thus  it  is 
"because  of  the  soul  that  the  composite  can  carry  out  these  activities"`  7.  The  operation  of 
sense  "requires  a  spiritual  change,  by  which  an  intention  of  a  sensible  form  comes  to  exist 
in  a  sense  organ"93'K  A  change  is  spiritual  when  "the  form  causing  the  change  is  received  in 
the  thing  being  changed  according  to  a  spiritual  mode  of  being"99.  What  Aquinas  seems  to 
mean  is  that  the  sense  organ  receives  a  spiritual  impression  of  the  percept.  But  his  thought 
lacks  clarity  here. 
One  other  factor  which  Aquinas  deals  with  must  be  mentioned:  that  of  memory.  This  is 
defined  by  him  as  "the  conservation  of  thoughts  not  actually  being  attended  to"  100.  He 
notes  that  it  is  "essential  to  memory  to  be  a...  place  of  conservation  for  thoughts"t01.  The 
concept  of  memory  as  "memory  of  past  things  has  its  application  in  the  intellectual  order  in 
that  the  understanding  knows  that  it  has  previously  understood  something"  although  the 
understanding  cannot  grasp  the  past  "in  its  here-and-now  character"  10=.  Generally,  Aquinas 
distinguishes  between  the  power  of  retention  and  the  power  of  preservation.  The 
imagination  ('fantasy')  is  what  retains  and  perceives  forms.  The  estimative  power 
apprehends  forms  not  received  through  the  senses,  and  the  memory  stores  these  forms. 
It  can  be  seen  from  these  descriptions  of  Augustine's  and  Aquinas'  concepts  of  soul  that 
both  men  rely  on  Aristotle's  De  anima  for  their  idea  of  the  essence  and  nature  of  soul.  But 
as  has  been  stated,  their  analyses  of  the  intellect  are  philosophical  and  heavily  influenced  by 
their  religious  belief.  Religion  also  affected  Luis  Vives'  concept  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  but,  as  shall  now  be  explained,  his  remit  was  not  to  study  the  soul's  essence;  rather,  it 
was  to  study  the  observable  functions  and  aptitudes  which  could  be  said  to  stem  from  the 
soul's  functioning. 
196 Vives'  De  anima  et  vita 
The  exceptional  importance  of  Vives'  treatise  Ike 
Anima  et  Vita  lies  in  the  paradoxical  fact  that  its 
content  has  little  to  do  with  the  title  of  the  book. 
De  Anima  does  not  say  much  about  the  soul 
itself,  the  nature  of  which  it  professes  to  ignore: 
"It  is  not  important  for  us  to  know  what  the  soul 
is,  but  it  is  essential  to  know  which  are  its 
operations.  "  We  are  even  unable  to  know  the 
operations  themselves  "and  to  define  them  in  an 
absolute  way";  Vives'  real  concern  is  to 
investigate  "how  these  operations  are  conducive 
to  the  reform  of  our  morals.  "103 
It  is  not  strictly  correct  to  state,  as  Carlos  Norena  does  here,  that  the  content  of  Vives'  De 
anima  et  vita  has  "little  to  do  with  the  title  of  the  book".  The  comments  from  De  uninia  to 
which  Norena  directly  refers  are  taken  from  Book  1,  Chapter  12  (hereafter  1.12)  and  the 
contents  of  Chapter  12  alone,  far  less  the  entire  treatise,  are  not  as  simply  summarised  as 
Norefia  suggests.  Vives'  concern  with  the  reform  of  morals  does  not  dictate  the  content  of 
Deanina  which  is  an  account  of  the  soul's  actions  and  activities  (as  far  as  can  be  deduced 
from  observing  external  functioning  of  the  organism).  His  underlying  concern,  it  is  true,  is 
with  self-knowledge  because  if  men  have  self-knowledge  they  can  govern  their  actions. 
Moreover,  his  comment  (in  Deanima  1.12)  that  we  cannot  declare  what  the  soul  is  "directly" 
because  the  soul's  essence  is  not  placed  before  our  sight,  is  a  direct  rebuttal  of  Aristotle's 
premise  in  his  Deaninia  that  the  essence  of  the  soul  can  be  described  and  understood1°4.  (In 
this  contention  Vives  had  been  somewhat  pre-empted  by  Gregor  Reisch,  who  stated  in  his 
work  Margarita  philosophica  that  "spiritual"  substances  "including  the  soul...  cannot  be 
perceived  by  the  senses"1°5.  )  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  Vives  ignores  the  nature  of 
the  soul,  as  Norena  argues:  Vives  writes  that  the  soul  must  be  observed  in  its  corporeal 
197 functions  as  the  soul  itself  does  not  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  our  senses1°  . 
He  therefore 
sets  the  parameters  of  his  investigation  (part  introspection,  part  rudimentary  empiricism,  part 
reliance  upon  classical  authority)  and  cautions  that  it  is  easy  to  infer  what  the  soul  is  not  and 
from  there  declare  what  the  soul  is  107.  He  argues  that  it  is  futile  to  ask  what  the  soul  is  in  its 
essence  but  proceeds  in  Deanimuetvita  to  discuss  its  observable  functions,  the  part  played 
in  cognition  by  the  senses,  and  how  the  emotions  ('passions')  might  affect  the  soul/intellect. 
The  introduction  to  De  anima  et  vita  outlines  the  topic.  Vives  writes  that  rational  human  life 
is  preeminent  among  all  life  forms  and  that  rationality  lies  between  the  spiritual  and  the 
corporeal108.  In  man,  the  "faculties  of  the  senses"  are  "subordinate  to  the  mind"109.  His 
description  of  the  basic  functions  of  the  soul  have  a  distinctly  Aristotelian  ring.  He  speaks  of 
the  nutritive  and  generative  faculties  and  delineates  two  instruments  of  the  nutritive  soul 
(heat  and  humidity)'  10.  Heat,  which  is  life's  "vital  principle""'  preserves  the  soul  in  the 
body  while  corporeal  functions  (such  as  hunger  and  thirst)  result  from  the  nutritive  by- 
product  of  heat.  The  generative  faculty  is  universal  to  all  living  things"'.  Vives  follows 
Aristotle's  argument  that  plants  have  a  vegetative  soul,  animals  have  both  vegetative  and 
sensitive  souls  (and  also  a  form  of  interior  consciousness).  Humans  have,  in  addition, 
cognitive  abilities  beyond  sensitive  information. 
Vives  argues  that  the  soul  is  "clearly"  an  "active  principle"  essential  for  life  in  a  body  which 
is  capable  of  living'  13.  But  De  unilau  et  vita  is  given  over  to  dealing  with  the  senses, 
rationality  and  emotion  as  they  are  directed  by  the  soul  or  as  they  permit  information  to  be 
processed  by  it.  Before  Vives  looks  at  intellectual  and  emotional  functioning,  he  must 
explain  sensate  functioning  as  far  as  he  is  able.  Animals  are  aware  of  the  world  because  of 
their  senses.  Plants  are  capable  of  sensate  life  as  are  animals,  but  plants  lack  consciousness, 
sight,  hearing,  touch,  taste  and  smell'  s4.  Plant  life  is  sensitive  in  that  it  grows,  feeds  and 
reproduces,  but  in  this  case  the  sensitive  and  nutritive  aspects  of  life  appear  to  be  largely 
198 similar  in  Vives'  explanation.  However,  from  what  he  goes  on  to  say,  sensate  life  is  a  class 
of'being  in  the  present'.  Vives  delineates  three  classes  of  consciousness: 
1.  that  which  only  'knows'  in  the  present  (sensation); 
2.  that  which  understands  that  which  is  'missing'; 
3.  that  which  understands  mixed  and  combined  things'  15. 
This  describes  a  hierarchy  of  consciousness  -  the  lowest  being  a  form  of  sensate  awareness 
of  existence  which  is  not  cognitive  (which  seems  paradoxical  to  say  the  least). 
Next  Vives  turns  his  attention  to  the  five  senses.  He  distinguishes  between  inner 
consciousness  (operations  of  the  soul)  and  the  outer  senses  (the  passive  receivers  of  sensate 
information).  In  Book  I  he  devotes  time  to  explaining  what  is  known  from  observation 
about  each  of  the  senses.  He  begins  with  sight.  The  exterior  organs  of  sight  are  the  eyes'  16, 
and,  while  Vives  does  not  name  the  optic  nerves,  he  states  that  the  "interior  organ"  of  sight 
"are  (sic)  two  nerves  which  arrive  to  (the  eyes)  from  the  brain""'.  It  is  not  clear  whether  he 
means  that  one  nerve  Does  to  each  eye,  or  that  two  nerves  go  to  each  eye.  From  dissection 
of  ape's  eyes,  Galen  described  two  nerves  involved  in  vision.  He  named  the  optic  nerve  and 
although  he  described  the  oculomotor  nerve  he  did  not  name  it"  ",,.  It  may  be  that  Vives  is 
referring  only  to  the  optic  nerve.  Vives  also  states  that  the  eyes  work  as  mirrors  do:  both  are 
concave  in  structure  and  receive  an  image,  although  the  image  reflected  in  the  eye  is  far 
smaller  than  that  reflected  in  a  mirror.  His  physiological  description  is  rudimentary  and  lacks 
first-hand  knowledge  of  the  internal  structure  of  the  eye.  Moreover,  he  does  not  give  as 
detailed  an  account  of  the  eye  as  can  be  found  in  Galen.  When  Vives  discusses  sight  he 
must  do  so  by  comparison  (eye  with  mirror).  In  contrast,  Galen  bases  his  discussion  on 
observation,  utilising  dissection,  and  postulates  "two  alternative  pathways  of  the  image  to 
the  optic  nerve:  one  by  pneuma  via  the  lens  and  the  retinal  fibers,  the  other  by  light  rays 
199 directly  and  rectilinearly  through  the  lens  and  the  vitreous  (humour)",  1''.  Vives  writes,  on 
vision,  that  it  is  a  "thing  of  wonder"  that  "something"  may  arrive  from  an  object  to  the  eyes 
with  such  speed  that  the  image  arrives  at  the  eyes  "in  an  instant":  at  the  moment  of 
perception  of  the  image,  the  light  illuminating  the  object  travels  "great  distances""20. 
In  describing  hearing,  Vives  comments  that  sound  production  is  "difficult  to  explain"'?  '. 
The  exterior  organ  of  hearing  is,  of  course,  the  ear;  internally,  two  nerves  run  from  the  ear 
to  the  brain.  If  two  "bodies"  are  struck  together,  the  impact  produces  sound  by  "pushing" 
the  air  which  carries  the  sound  as  far  as  the  ear.  His  best  explanation  for  hearing  is  that 
awareness  of  sound  is  effected  by  the  air  which  is  pushed  into  the  ear,  confined  there,  and 
while  it  seeks  a  way  out  sound  is  produced  much  in  the  way  air  reverberating  in  a  trumpet 
produces  a  note'".  Vives  here  attempts  an  explanation  of  why  we  hear  by  referring  to  an 
empirical  comparison,  as  he  also  does  when  discussing  touch.  (He  comments  that  if 
something  is  put  on  the  skin,  the  skin  experiences  sensation  via  the  sense  of  touch'23. 
Hence,  touch  must  be  disseminated  in  all  the  nerves  of  the  body,  particularly  those  of  the 
flesh.  ) 
Direct  observation  is  further  apparent  when  Vives  speaks  of  the  faculties  of  taste  and  smell 
(1.7/8).  The  "sensory  organ  of  taste"  is  a  "nerve  which  extends  from  the  tongue,  to  which 
taste  arrives  conveyed  in  the  saliva",  (rather  like  touch  being  conveyed  through  the 
fingers)'24.  There  is  a  need  for  saliva  in  order  to  taste  properly;  Vives  notes  that  a  dry  mouth 
affects  the  taste  of  food,  as  when  someone  has  a  fever.  Smell  and  taste  have  an  affinity  with 
each  other;  if  something  tastes  good,  it  smells  good,  if  it  tastes  bad  it  smells  bad'25. 
Generally,  Vives  does  not  go  into  physiological  detail  about  sensory  perception  because  he 
does  not  have  the  medical  background  or  the  direct  experience  of  dissection  to  enable  him  to 
do  so.  But  he  does  discuss  the  organs  of  perception  by  comparison  with  the  known  and 
200 observable,  and  he  uses  experience  as  a  direct  referent.  He  assigns  a  medium  to  each 
sensory  perception:  light  to  vision,  air  to  audition,  flesh  to  touch,  saliva  to  taste.  Norma 
writes  that  "typical"  of  Vives'  "careless  style  was  the  omission  of  the  medium  to  be  allocated 
to  the  olfactory  sense""''i.  Norefia  is  here  referring  to  Deuninui  1.9.  However,  in  this  chapter 
Vives  argues  that  smell  is  a  "force"  of  dense  air,  and  that  odour  resides  in  the  phenomenon 
of  evaporation.  He  explicitly  states  that  "smell  is  aerial"  27.  Furthermore,  he  devotes  an 
entire  chapter  to  each  of  the  senses  including  the  olfactory'28. 
On  how  sensate  impressions  are  received  by  the  soul  Vives  comments  that  they  are 
specifically  dealt  with  by  the  faculties  of  imagination  and  memory.  He  writes  that  images 
which  are  "impressed"  upon  the  senses  are  received  by  the  imagination  which  retains  them, 
though  memory  also  serves  for  image  retention'29.  There  is  a  third  faculty  termed  "fantasy" 
('  fanlaviu")  and  Vives  says  that  there  are  many  who  confuse  imagination  with  fantasy,  using 
both  names  vaguely  or  implying  that  both  have  the  same  function.  (As  we  have  seen  earlier, 
Aquinas  joins  imagination  with  fantasy.  )  Vives  argues  that  they  have  distinct  functions  and 
categorises  them  as  two  of  four  faculties  of  soul  (together  with  estimation  and  memory). 
Fantasy  is  "prodigious"  and  "forms,  reforms,  combines,  unites  and  disassociates"'!  °  all  that 
comes  to  it  via  the  will.  It  links  ideas  which  are  distinct,  and  if  it  is  not  adequately  controlled 
by  reason  it  disturbs  the  soul  as  a  storm  disturbs  the  sea"'.  The  faculty  of  estimation 
provides  an  individual  with  the  ability  to  make  judgements  from  "sensible  impressions"  132 
and  permits  determination  of  what  is  beneficial  as  opposed  to  harmful  (compare  this  to 
Aquinas'  view  of  the  estimative  power,  above,  page  196). 
201 Book  11:  treatise  of  the  soul  and  life 
Vives  moves  on  to  intellectual  operations,  having  demonstrated  -  as  far  as  possible  -  how 
information  about  the  world  is  perceived.  In  Book  11  he  deals  extensively  with  the  faculties 
of  the  rational  soul:  "They  are  the  mind  or  intelligence,  the  will  and  the  memory"  '.  ;.  He 
then  categorises  the  functions  of  the  mind  as  simple  intelligence,  reflection,  retention, 
comparison,  reasoning,  criticism  and  attention.  Vives  treats  of  these  systematically  in  Book 
11,  Chapters  1-11,  beginning  with  simple  intelligence.  Before  he  does  so,  however,  he  again 
warns  about  the  difficulties  of  investigating  the  soul.  He  writes  that  it  is  "very  arduous  and 
very  difficult...  to  investigate  the  operations  of  these  faculties"  of  the  soul,  given  that  they 
are,  metaphorically,  "submerged  in  darkness"134 
. 
He  considers  the  three  faculties  and  their 
associated  functions,  and  alludes  to  the  complexities  of  studying  them  when  he  wonders 
what  is  the  origin  and  cause  of  "their  development,  their  growth,  their  decrease,  and  their 
decline"135.  He  states  that  "God  gave  us  these  faculties...  for  our  use  (in  order)  to  acquire 
knowledge"'36  -  knowledge  of,  amongst  other  things,  the  faculties  of  the  soul.  But  in  trying 
to  gain  understanding  of  the  operations  of  the  soul  Vives  remarks  that  "we  are,  one  and  the 
same,  simple  labourers"  who  "utilize"  the  faculties  given  by  God"7.  Vives  thus  emphasizes 
the  limits  placed  on  us  in  the  attempt  to  study  the  operations  of  the  soul. 
His  treatment  of  simple  intelligence  is  not  altogether  clear,  but  he  categorises  it  as  the  faculty 
which  first  receives  images/concepts  offered  to  the  mind138.  What  he  seems  to  argue  is  that 
'simple'  intelligence  is  not  so  called  because  it  facilitates  comprehension  of  simple  things, 
but  because  it  is  the  first  stage  whereby  images  or  ideas  are  stored  for  processing.  His 
discussion  of  this  becomes  conflated  with  further  explanation  of  the  part  played  in 
understanding  by  imagination  and  fantasy  once  ideas  or  images  are  present  to  the  simple 
intelligence139.  If  a  "simple 
,  uncombined"  object  is  present  to  the  senses  the  imagination 
202 receives  the  image,  as  has  been  explained.  If  the  object  is  not  immediately  present  to  the 
senses,  that  is,  it  is  absent  but  has  at  some  time  come  under  the  "domain"  of  the  senses  and 
been  "impressed"  on  the  memory,  fantasy  forms  a  "figure",  taking  it  from  memory'40.  If  the 
"figure"  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  external  senses  (that  is,  if  it  is  a  purely  abstract 
percept)  it  is  the  intellect  which  infers  it  through  reason. 
Once  images  and  ideas  are  processed  by  the  simple  intelligence,  they  must  be  retained  by 
some  faculty,  otherwise  cognition  would  be  impossible.  It  seems  self-evident  to  say  that  the 
memory  is  the  function  which  does  this.  Vives  writes  that  memory  is  to  the  intellect  what  a 
canvas  is  to  a  painter,  and  this  is  his  preferred  metaphor  when  describing  the  process  of 
memory  '41.  He  also  states  that  the  memory  has  two  functions  analogous  to  those  of  the 
hand:  to  grasp  and  to  retains  +'.  The  memory  grasps  percepts  stored  in  the  intellect  and 
retains  them  for  future  retrieval.  In  attempting  to  describe  how  it  is  able  to  do  this,  Vives 
does  not  use  the  wax  analogy  directly,  but  uses  terms  such  as  "stamped"  and  "impressed" 
when  referring  to  the  memory  process.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  he  writes  of 
problems  with  memory  and  of  the  different  facilities  for  remembering  amongst 
individuals'43:  for  example,  if  something  is  stamped  into  fluid  the  image  is  not  retained 
because  the  material  is  not  dry.  Vives  compares  the  memory  to  an  observable  effect  -a  solid 
object  has  to  be  imprinted  into  a  malleable  substance  which  is  firm  enough  to  retain  the 
image  of  the  object.  To  Vives,  the  memory  must  work  in  a  similar  way.  This  leads  him  to 
discuss  the  effect  the  humours  have  on  memory144:  young  people  have  better  memories  than 
the  old  because  of  their  bodily  and  cranial  heat  and  humidity.  The  old  can  make  up  for  this 
lack  of  retention,  however,  because  they  have  accumulated  wisdom  and  experience'45 
Vives  expands  on  this:  not  everyone  has  equal  capacity  for  memory  and  obviously  this  is 
something  which  he  could  have  affirmed  by  observation  (though  explaining  why  it  is  so  is  a 
different  matter).  He  states  that  some  people  retain  information  readily  and  remember  with 
203 ease;  others  remember  best  what  is  unusual14h.  Those  who  have  "slower  wits"  have  a  more 
"tenacious"  memory,  but  the  quick-witted  tend  to  find  retrieving  memories  easy'.  47.  If  the 
memory  is  not  exercised  it  "dulls""",  growing  slower  "each  day"149,  and  becoming 
increasingly  "weak"  due  to  "idleness  and  stillness"'  SQ.  Vives  outlines  four  ways  in  which 
the  memory  is  negated: 
1.  when  an  image  "printed"  on  the  memory  is  erased  before  it  is  complete; 
2.  when  the  memory-image  is interrupted  and  partially  destroyed; 
3.  when  the  memory-image  is  retained  but  "conceals"  itself  from  the  individual's  inquiry; 
4.  when  the  memory-image  is  obscured  similarly  as  a  physical  object  is  obscured  by 
darkness.  (Vives  comments  that  this  type  of  memory  loss  usually  occurs  for 
physiological  reasons  such  as  illness  or  emotional  excitement.  )''' 
What  Vives  has  to  say  about  memory  can  be  seen  to  have  implications  for  the  learning 
process  and  for  partial  explanation  of  different  capacities  for  learning  and  retention  of 
information.  As  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  5,  he  notes  in  De  tradendis  disciplinis  the 
importance  of  the  main  faculties  of  cognition  (which  he  comments  on  in  De  anima  - 
retention,  judgement,  comparison,  memory,  )  as  they  affect  learning. 
In  De  anima,  Vives  also  discusses  the  association  of  ideas  in  the  memory,  and  uses 
introspection  and  observation  to  do  so.  He  reflects  that  whenever  he  is  in  Brussels  and  sees 
a  house 
which  is  not  far  from  the  royal  palace,  I  remember  Idiaquez, 
whose  house  it  was,  and  in  which  we  [engaged]  in  [stimulating] 
conversation...  Whenever  it  comes  to  me  to  recall  the  memory  of 
Idiaquez  I  do  not  think  of  that  house;  the  reason  is  because  in  my 
mind  his  memory  is  more  noteworthy  than  that  of  his  house.  '  52 
It  is  the  emotional  connotations  surrounding  "Idiaquez"  (friend,  liking,  enjoyment)  which 
are  uppermost  in  Vives'  mind  and  it  is  these  connotations  which  he  remembers  when  he 
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connotations).  But  when  Vives  is  presented  with  the  house  in  reality,  it  only  has  meaning 
for  him  because  Idiaquez  lived  there.  Seeing  the  house  triggers  memories  of  the  more 
important  thing  (his  friend),  though  he  notes  that  the  process  is  not  the  same  in  reverse. 
Similarly,  he  writes  that  when  he  was  a  child  in  Valencia  he  was  ill  and  confined  to  bed 
because  of  a  fever.  At  the  time,  he  ate  some  cherries  and  many  years  later  whenever  he  eats 
cherries  he  remembers  the  fever  and  how  ill  he  felt  then153. 
According  to  Vives,  the  faculties  of  the  mind  are  arranged  to  serve  reason''.  He  envisages  a 
system  where  the  senses  serve  the  imagination,  which  in  turn  serves  the  fantasy  which 
permits  'extension'  of,  and  reflection  upon,  thought.  Reflection  then  serves  the  memory 
which  has  reason  as  its  ultimateend155.  Knowledge  therefore  originates  with  information 
taken  in  by  the  senses'-51'.  The  senses  deal  with  objects  in  present  time  (that  is,  things 
immediately  present  to  them);  imagination  deals  with  percepts  no  longer  present  to  the 
senses;  the  faculty  of  reflection  scrutinises  the  resources  (contents)  of  the  mind  and  reflects 
upon  them157.  Vives  states  that  there  is  no  ratiocinative  function  in  the  power  of  reflection, 
which  is  a  "quiet",  reflexive,  action;  SH  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  mull  over  what  has  been 
collected  by  reason. 
Reason,  in  tandem  with  volition,  controls  appetitiveness.  As  Carlos  Norefla  highlights,  in 
Deanima  Vives  "clearly  distinguished  between...  speculative  reason,  the  end  of  which  is  the 
True,  and...  practical  reason  oriented  towards  the  Good.  "S"  But,  in  humanist  fashion, 
Vives  also  emphasises  the  power  of  reason  to  control  emotional  appetites.  Moreover,  he 
decides  that  part  of  the  function  of  the  will  is  the  facilitation  of  the  ability  to  choose  between 
good  and  bad  and  it  allows  judgement  of  what  is  potentially  harmful  or  beneficial.  In 
animals  this  function  is  permitted  via  the  sensual  appetite,  but  in  humans  the  will  is  what 
directs  us  to  seek  the  good  and  avoid  the  bad160.  Vives  cites  two  acts  of  the  will: 
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its  hands  that  lie  "good  works"  and  bad,  "virtue  or  vice",  "praise  or  blame",  "prize  or 
penalty"  I  fi=. 
Physiologically,  the  body  reaches  its  peak  then  deteriorates  with  advancing  age'63.  Youth  is 
a  state  of  organic  "perfection"  and  also  a  state  of  equilibrium  between  qualities  of  heat  and 
humidity,  therefore  youth  is  a  state  of  vigour  and  health'64.  At  death,  the  soul  leaves  the 
body  but  is  immortal  and  survives  as  a  type  of  altered  consciousness,  -5.  The  crux  of  Vives' 
argument  for  the  soul's  immortality  is  that  if  the  soul  is  not  immortal  then  what  is  the  point 
of  a  good  person  being  good?  '66  There  must  be  compensation  after  life  for  the  virtuous167. 
This  use  of  a  priori  reasoning  is  curiously  juxtaposed  with  an  implicit  argument  for  the 
empirical  methods  of  what  Vives  calls  the  "man  of  science"1611:  by  "intensely  examining"  and 
applying  the  "strength  of  his  intelligence"  to  all  aspects  of  the  natural  world  (plants,  animals, 
men,  elements,  stars,  skies)  the  man  of  science  will  be  able  to  gain  knowledge  of  his 
creator'69.  Thus  by  observing  natural  phenomena  the  scientist/philosopher  will  have  to 
postulate  a  creator  of  the  world.  Vives  accepts  the  value  of  observation  and  examining  of 
natural  phenomena  as  a  means  to  discover  the  existence  of  things,  yet  he  links  this  to  a  priori 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  Articles  of  faith,  he 
suggests,  can  be  inferred  through  science.  170  Vives  lived  during  a  period  of  transition  when 
empirical  methodology  was  hardly  formulated  and  argument  a  posteriori  was  far  from  being 
taken  for  granted. 
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Vives  writes  that  study  of  the  effects  which  the  passions  (emotions)  have  on  the  soul  is 
difficult  because  of  the  diversity  of  the  range  of  emotions.  Just  as  the  waves  in  the  sea  have 
many  sizes  in  response  to  the  wind  depending  on  whether  it  is  a  "gentle  breeze",  a  "fresh", 
strong  wind,  or  a  "ferocious  storm"171.  In  other  words,  the  soul  can  be  disturbed 
depending  on  the  strength  of  the  emotions.  He  goes  on  to  discuss  a  variety  of  emotional 
responses  in  the  chapters  which  make  up  Book  Ill.  Amongst  them  are  anger,  love,  desire, 
veneration/respect,  sympathy,  joy,  envy,  sadness  and  pride.  Again,  Vives  ranks  these  in  a 
specific  order  -  for  example,  he  classifies  love  as  the  source  of  the  following  feelings: 
favour,  respect,  compassion;  under  happiness  comes  delight,  under  desire  comes  hope, 
under  sadness  comes  grief  and  sorrow.  In  contrast,  Vives  names  pride  as  being  a  mixture  of 
emotions  (happiness,  desire  and  confidence).  It  is  an  emotion  "born  of  arrogance""71. 
"Love"  is  a  movement  of  the  will/desire  and  manifests  itself  in  the  individual  who  feels 
happy.  Vives  argues  that  being  in  love  affects  our  perceptions,  for  instance  the  loved  one 
looks  more  perfect,  sunrises  look  more  "luminous"  and  everything  looks  better173.  Love  is 
therefore  a  prime  example  of  an  emotion  which  affects  our  ability  to  be  rational  and  to 
perceive  actualities.  He  believes  that  we  tend  to  love  people  who  have  similar  natures  to 
ourselves  and  that  we  feel  love  towards  people  who  love  us  in  return174.  He  warns  that  lust 
can  be  confused  with  "true  love"  17'. 
According  to  Vives,  desire  is  an  appetite  for  the  good  which  allows  us  to  provide  for  our 
wellbeing  (that  is,  when  we  desire  what  is  good  for  us)'76.  However,  some  desires,  such 
as  avarice,  are  unwelcome  and  may  be  harmful.  Each  desire  has  a  specific  object:  ambition 
is  linked  to  honours,  avarice  to  money,  gluttony  to  food  and  drink177.  The  imagination 
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Desire  is  thus  a  form  of  love  but  Vives  regards  it  as  a  kind  of  "false"  love179.  He  goes  on  to 
discuss  various  characteristics  of  love:  true  love  is  not  selfish  and  originates  in  sincerity  and 
the  wish  for  communication  between  people'80.  Vives  repeatedly  warns  against  lustfulness 
which  leads  to  flattery  and  praises181  and  cites  the  love  of  a  mother  for  her  child  as  one  of 
the  strongest,  purest  forms  of  love  -  she  will  love  her  child  even  where  "others  loathe  it"  182. 
Vives  then  turns  to  discuss  anger  and  sadness  as  the  emotional  opposites  of  love  and 
happiness.  All  rage  is  born  of  anger,  but  he  describes  rage  and  anger  as  having  distinct 
causes:  rage  is  directed  at  the  specific,  anger  at  something  in  general  (although  both  have 
similar  effects)'83.  Anger  is  a  specific  movement  of  the  soul,  a  disturbance,  whereas 
irascibility  is  a  temperament,  a  natural  disposition  194.  Vives  thinks  that  an  individual  may 
have  a  tendency  to  become  angry  but  still  requires  an  object  for  that  anger.  Dislike,  envy, 
jealousy,  indignation  and  cruelty  follow  from  a  propensity  for  anger  and  rage,  and  the 
relationship  which  one  emotion  has  with  others  is  a  complex  one. 
With  regard  to  sadness,  Vives  asserts  that  it  is  a  "shrinking"  of  the  soul  and  is  an  emotion 
which  is  "totally  contrary"  to  happiness'85.  It  generally  has  a  specific  cause  (Vives  gives  the 
example  of  a  mother's  grief  at  the  "death  of  her  only  child"I86.  )  The  most  obvious 
manifestation  of  sadness  is  crying.  A  tear  is  a  humour,  he  states,  produced  by  the 
physiological  effects  caused  by  the  emotional  disturbance  of  sadness187,  although  he  notes 
that  it  is  not  only  those  who  are  sad  who  have  the  propensity  for  tears:  so  also  do  those  of  a 
"gentle"  disposition,  children,  women,  the  sick  and  the  drunk188. 
In  his  discussion  of  emotion,  then,  it  is  clear  that  Vives  writes  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
judicious  observer.  Although  there  is  consistent  reference  to  the  physiological  effects  of 
emotion  (for  instance,  that  sadness  causes  the  production  of  black  bile'89,  that  tears  are 
208 produced  as  a  by-product  of  excessive  humidity  in  the  brain,  90,  that  the  principal  effect  of 
fear  is  to  "contract  the  heart"  191),  his  explanations  of  how  emotion  affects  a  person  are 
readily  observable  in  ourselves  and  in  others.  Granted,  his  distaste  for  the  sexual  and 
condemnation  of  the  sinful  arise  from  a  perspective  concomitant  with  the  prevailing  religious 
climate  in  sixteenth  century  Europe.  His  morals  colour  his  depiction  of  emotions  such  as 
shame  which  results  particularly  in  those  who  surrender  to  sexual  pleasure.  Thus  fantasy 
"excites  sinful  movements  of  desire"  192.  But  feeling  ashamed  depends  on  believing  that  the 
act  committed  is  wrong  or  sinful  and  shame  tends  to  be  greater  "in  the  presence  of  those 
who  command  respect  from  us"  193. 
Conclusion 
Throughout  De  anima  et  vita  there  is  a  mixture  of  old  and  new  methodology  (though 
empirical  methods  were  not,  strictly  speaking,  new:  elements  are  found  in  Aristotle's 
biology  and  in  the  methods  of  Roger  Bacon,  for  example).  However,  Vives  uses 
introspection  and  observation  consistently  in  this  treatise.  He  does  not  establish  a  method 
which  is  recognizably  'scientific'  in  any  modern  sense  of  the  word,  but  he  does  state 
unequivocally  that  his  examination  of  the  soul  will  be  based  on  what  can  be  observed  of  its 
functions.  Psychological  and  emotional  effects  are  subsequently  discussed  in  relation  to 
observable  phenomena  and  this  is  the  basis  on  which  Vives  builds  his  analyses.  He  can  be 
explicit  in  this  technique  of  observation,  and  works  from  the  premise  that  speculation  about 
the  unseen  has  to  arise  from  observation  of  actual  effects.  This  is  a  hypothesis  which  is 
implemented  in  a  consistent  manner  throughout  De  unirau  et  vita,  even  if  the  conclusions 
surrounding  various  aspects  of  Vives'  inquiry  now  seem  doubtful  or  absurd. 
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reliance  on  and  explicit  references  to  observation,  and  for  the  scope  of  its  study. 
Furthermore,  as  has  been  argued  in  the  previous  chapter,  his  conclusions  regarding  memory 
and  perception  were  utilised  in  his  educational  theories.  This  allowed  Vives  to  construct  a 
pedagogy  which  took  account  of  the  mind  of  the  learner  as  well  as  dealing  with  the 
formation  of  the  pupil's  character.  Had  this  never  been  done  pupils  would  have  continued  to 
be  regarded  as  empty  vessels  to  be  stuffed  with  the  contents  of  lessons  regardless  of  their 
individual  capacities  and  abilities.  With  respect  to  Vives'  work,  this  conclusion  must  not  be 
overstated;  his  application  of  psychology  to  education  may  seem  tenuous  today.  However, 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  the  psychology  of  learning  was  not  self-evident  to 
educators  before  or  during  the  Renaissance,  and  the  development  of  an  educational 
programme  integrating  psychology  as  one  of  the  crucial  components  was  to  be  far  in  the 
future. 
Despite  Vives'  retention  of  Aristotle's  general  categories  of  soul,  his  analysis  is  more 
complex  and  lengthy  than  was  Aristotle's.  Vives  was  critical  of  the  scholastic  adherence  to 
Aristotelianism  and  one  overall  aim  in  De  unirau  et  vita  is  to  divorce  his  study  from  both 
scholasticism  and  Aristotelianism.  In  this  he  was  only  partially  successful.  His  conception 
of  the  functions  of  the  soul  has  many  similarities  to  Aristotle's  conception.  But  his  means  of 
analysis  differs;  his  empiricism  might  be  sketchy  but  he  attempts  to  apply  it  to  the  study  in 
ways  that  Aristotle  did  not.  Moreover,  unlike  Plato,  Vives'  concern  in  his  De  unirau  is  not 
epistemological  but  psychological,  and  his  method  is  very  different  to  that  employed  by 
Augustine  and  Aquinas.  Aquinas'  method  followed  the  typical  scholastic  philosophical 
model:  argument  for  a  contention  preceded  by  argument  against  the  same  contention,  all  set 
out  in  a  series  of  disputed  questions.  Vives'  treatise  is  certainly  removed  from  this  formula. 
And,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  makes  particular  moral  judgements  and  allows  his  religious 
beliefs  to  lead  him  into  a  priori  arguments  for  the  existence  of  the  soul,  De  anima  et  vita  is 
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aspects  of  the  study  of  the  soul,  while  not  neglected  in  Vives'  work,  are  not  on  the  whole 
the  main  focus  of  the  analysis. 
Certain  of  Vives'  ideas  (particularly  the  pedagogical  and  psychological)  would  seem  to 
have  been  similar  to  those  produced  by  a  number  of  authors  in  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
century  Europe  (for  instance  Comenius,  Sturm  and  Huarte).  The  influence  of  Vives'  work 
will  be  studied  in  the  next  chapter  which  concentrates  upon  the  general  influence  of  Vives' 
thought  on  Gassendi  and  the  specific  similarities  which  De  uninot  et  vita  bears  to  Descartes' 
Les  Passions  de  !  'Acne.  (It  is  of  particular  interest  to  this  analysis  to  examine  the  differing 
methodologies  used  by  Descartes  and  Vives.  )  Finally,  in  the  concluding  chapter,  aspects  of 
Vives'  pedagogy  and  psychology  which  can  be  said  to  be  forerunners  of  certain  of  John 
Locke's  ideas  will  be  examined. 
211 Chapter  7:  The  Empirical  and  the  Rational  -  the  opposing 
methodologies  of  Gassendi  and  Descartes 
Gassendi  was.  one  of  the  significant  influences  on  the 
development  of  science  and  the  mechanical 
philosophy  in  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century...  [Gassendi'sj  "baptism"  of  Epicurus 
permitted  atomism  to  be  considered  a  viable 
philosophy  of  nature,  even  in  an  era  characterized  by  a 
morbid  fear  of  atheism.  Boyle's  writings  on 
corpuscularianism  and  Newton's  early  notebook  on 
natural  philosophy  reveal  the  imprint  of  Gassendi's 
revival  of  Epicurean  atomism...  Gassendi's  mitigated 
skepticism  and  nominalist  ontology  became 
characteristic  of  English  science  as  represented  in  the 
works  of  Boyle  and  Newton.  John  Locke  took  up 
Gassendi's  views  and  elaborated  them  in  his  Essay 
Concerning  Human  Understanding,  which  is  marked 
by  many  of  Gassendi's  arguments  and,  in  places, 
even  his  language.  ' 
The  development  of  any  line  of  thought  is  marked  by  a  matrix  of  influences  of  authors  upon 
other  authors.  During  the  period  under  study  (the  Renaissance  and  the  seventeenth  century) 
it  was  normal  for  authors  to  `borrow'  from  predecessors  without  acknowledging  the  source. 
In  consequence  it  tends  to  be  very  difficult  to  specify  direct  influences  upon  particular 
authors  unless  they  explicitly  mention  a  writer  whose  work  is  known  to  them.  Pierre 
Gassendi  (1592-1655)  and  Rene  Descartes  (1596-1650),  the  subjects  of  this  chapter, 
mention  Luis  Vives  and  in  discussing  Vives'  influence  upon  them  reference  will  be  made  to 
two  texts  in  particular:  Gassendi's  lnstittttioL  giert  and  Descartes'  Les  Passions  de  1'Anme. 
What  can  also  be  discerned  in  the  study  of  certain  texts,  though  with  less  certainty  than  in 
cases  where  attribution  is  evident,  is  where  various  elements  of  an  author's  thought  echo  the 
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but  it  may  be  said  that  the  evolution  of  a  body  of  thought  is  discernible.  What  is  striking 
about  the  era  which  marks  the  development  of  scientific  method  is  "the  longevity  of  the 
humanist  vision  of  the  course  of  science.  Although  the  humanist  picture  was  sharpened, 
enriched,  and  qualified,  the  original  outlines  were  still  visible  four  hundred  years  later.  "2  It 
is  as  part  of  this  tradition  that  Vives'  work  will  be  discussed. 
As  has  been  stated  in  the  previous  chapter,  Vives'  method  of  analysis  in  De  anima  et  vita 
used  observation  as  a  key  component  of  the  study.  However,  he  had  little  recourse  to 
anything  resembling  what  would  now  be  termed  `scientific'  or  empirical  methodology. 
Indeed,  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  metaphysics  was  still 
widely  held  to  be  a  legitimate  member  of  the  sciences,  if  not  the 
most  basic  science.  It  was...  a  science  of  pre-suppositions,  or 
of  "first  principles",  but  not  of  unconscious  first  principles. 
The  aim  of  metaphysics  was  to  argue  for,  at  least  explicitly  to 
portray,  fundamental  or  basic  principles  and  concepts.  Whether 
defined  by  its  subject  matter  (typically  "being"  considered  in 
general)  or,  as  came  increasingly  to  be  the  case  in  the  modern 
period,  by  its  method  (a  priori  intellection),  metaphysics 
constituted  a  distinct  intellectual  enterprise.  - 
But  metaphysics  was  not  an  enterprise  which  Vives  applied  to  his  investigations  of  the  soul, 
as  has  been  seen.  `Scientific'  method  post-Newton  would  build  upon  a  mathematical  tool 
(calculus)  and  upon  the  establishment  of  models  for  experimental  procedures.  The 
importance  of  mathematics  to  the  development  of  science  is  displayed  in  the  present  day 
when,  as  John  D.  Barrow  highlights,  mathematics  is  held  to  be 
the  most  sophisticated  language  we  know  of  which  possesses  a 
built-in  logic  and  a  way  of  deducing  its  own  limitations.  It  is  a 
recipe  for  writing  down  analytic  truths,  or  tautologies,  and 
science  aims  to  show  these  to  be  equivalent  to  various  natural 
events  which  on  the  face  of  it  appear  to  be  non-analytic,  or  non- 
tautological  truths.  All  our  precise  current  knowledge  about 
Nature  is  at  root  mathematical,  but  we  cannot  be  sure  whether 
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fact  that  mathematical  properties  are  the  only  ones  which  we 
have  been  able  to  find  out  systematically 
So,  defining  the  `true'  nature  of  the  world  is  as  much  a  problem  today  as  it  was  for  Vives, 
only  the  method  of  enquiry  has  changed. 
Gassendi  was  one  seventeenth  century  philosopher  whose  work  involves  a  shift  from 
purely  philosophical  reasoning  towards  advocacy  of  empiricism.  Like  Vives,  he  sought  to 
reconcile  his  observations  of  the  natural  world  with  his  religious  beliefs.  Gassendi  would 
not  allow  the  materialist  leanings  of  his  philosophy  to  lead  to  questioning  of  Christian  faith. 
Matters  of  faith  were  not  to  be  treated  as  matters  concerning  the  natural  world;  matters  of 
faith  "belonged  to  a  different  order  of  knowledge  based  on  different  principles  and  required 
a  different  methodology"'  from  that  which  could  be  used  to  investigate  natural  phenomena. 
As  with  Vives,  this  juxtaposition  between  observation  of  natural  philosophy  and  adherence 
to  religious  tenets  lead  to  tensions  in  Gassendi's  work.  Problems  of  philosophical  coherence 
result,  and  there  is  a  mismatch  between  old  forms  of  thinking  (a  priori  philosophising  and 
religious  dogma)  and  `new'  (empiricism). 
Gassendi's  purported  method  ran  counter  to  Descartes',  whose  Les  Passions  de  l'Ame 
remains  philosophical  in  character.  Descartes'  treatise  on  the  passions  will  be  discussed  in 
the  second  part  of  this  chapter.  For  the  time  being  the  focus  will  be  on  Pierre  Gassendi  and 
the  rejection  of  Aristotelianism  which,  in  his  mind  at  least,  permitted  him  the  licence  to  adopt 
a  method  of  inquiry  into  natural  philosophy  different  from  that  used  by  Aristotle.  In  so 
doing  the  influence  of  Vives  will  be  explained  and  attention  will  be  drawn  to  points  of 
similarity  between  Gassendi's  lnstittttio  Logicu  and  Vives'  De  anima  et  vita  . 
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Pierre  Gassendi  was  born  in  1592  in  Provence.  He  enrolled  in  1609  at  the  University  of 
Aix,  and  studied  philosophy.  He  was  appointed  Professor  of  Rhetoric  at  Digne,  and  was 
ordained  a  priest  in  16161'.  Gassendi's  thought  is  notable  for  its  rehabilitation  of  atomism,  a 
doctrine  famously  espoused  by  Epicurus  and  rejected  by  the  majority  of  medieval  and 
renaissance  philosophers,  Vives  included.  When  Gassendi  deals  with  perception  and 
epistemology  he  presents  no  new  observations  and  analyses,  but  he  was  fascinated  by 
Epicurus'  theories  (publishing  his  De  vita  et  rnoribus  Epicuri  in  1647)  and  was  drawn  to 
contemporary  atomists  such  as  Isaac  Beekman  whom  he  called  "le  meilleur  philosophe  que 
jage  encore  rencontre"'.  Gassendi  was  further  influenced  by  Sextus  Empiricus  and 
Lucretius,  and  was  broadly  in  agreement  with  the  Socratic  argument  that  knowledge  is 
probable"  -  that  is,  the  only  certain  knowledge  that  an  individual  has  is  that  (s)he  knows 
nothing.  Gassendi  was  therefore  mindful  that  in  natural  philosophy  what  was  being  sought 
was  probable  knowledge. 
It  is  Gassendi's  epistemology  which  is  of  interest  to  this  study  and  with  regard  to  this  area 
of  his  work  he  may  be  defined  as  adopting  a  stance  which  is  both  anti-Aristotelian  and 
sceptical.  His  criticism  of  Aristotle  and  scholasticism  was  influenced  by  Vives, 
Gianfrancesco  Pico  della  Mirandola,  Pierre  Charron  and  Pierre  de  la  Ramee  (known  as 
Ramus,  and  who  had  also  been  influenced  by  Vives).  Gassendi  wrote:  "When  I  read  Vives 
and  my  own  Charron  my  spirits  rose...  I  saw  there  was  nothing  wrong  in  suspecting  that 
the  Aristotelians  were  not  always  correct...  "  IIt  maybe  that  Vives'  criticism 
of  the  Aristotelian  system  of  knowledge  opened  the  eyes  of 
many  later  thinkers  to  the  possibility  that  Aristotle's  scientific 
vision  was  incorrect  in  many  areas  and  that  new  advances  in 
knowledge  were  continually  being  made.  To  argue  that  Aristotle 
215 was  infallible  in  all  of  his  writings  was  to  deny  the  possibility  of 
scientific  progress  and  the  evidence  of  history.  This  belief  in 
progress...  was  characteristic  of  Vives'  conception  of 
philosophy...  10 
Gassendi's  critique  of  scholasticism  is  very  similar  to  that  outlined  in  Vives'  early  work  In 
pseudodialeciicos,  and  is  typical  of  the  sort  of  criticism  which  was  found  in  renaissance 
arguments  against  scholastic  method.  Gassendi  contended  that  scholastic  methods  were 
theatrical,  resting  on  spurious  dialectic,  that  the  philosophy  was  useless  and  the  teachers 
arrogant  fools.  The  scholastics  neglected  genuine  sources  of  classical  wisdom  and 
Aristotelians  had  perverted  philosophy  into  useless  disputation  designed  to  produce 
disputants  not  philosophers".  On  scholastics  Vives  had  written:  "[t]hey  certainly  have  not 
even  a  passing  acquaintance  with  Aristotle,  in  natural  or  moral  philosophy  or  even  in 
dialectic,  which  they  shamelessly  profess  to  teach,  although  they  themselves  have  never 
understood  it.  "''  Time  spent  on  the  futile  dialectic  taught  by  the  scholastics  is  wasted,  Vives 
argued.  Teachers  and  students  who  learn  scholastic  dialectic  are  "quite  unsuited  to  business, 
to  serve  on  embassies,  administer  public  or  private  affairs,  or  deal  with  popular  opinion; 
they  are  of  no  more  use  in  affairs  of  this  kind  than  men  of  straw"13.  Scholastic  logicians,  in 
short,  use  "stupid"  methods  and  Vives  asks:  "...  am  I  to  believe  that  a  person's  wit  can  be 
sharpened  by  something  that  is false...  foolish,  frivolous  and  unsound?  "14  Gassendi  was  to 
be  particularly  scathing  about  the  schoolmasters  who  peddled  their  perverse  brand  of 
Aristotelianism  saying:  In  a  word,  they  examine  nothing  in  this  world.  When  they  enter 
their  Schools  they  enter  into  another  nature  which  has  nothing  in  common  with  this  nature 
outside.  "'-',  Similarly,  Vives  wrote  of  Scholastic  professors  at  the  University  of  Paris: 
When  these  people  leave  the  nest  of  their  schools  to  mix  with 
normal  and  prudent  folk-,  they  act  so  stupidly...  You  should  see 
the  expressions  on  their  faces  when  they  are  confronted  with 
reality.  They  just  behave  as  if  they  were  coming  from  a  different 
world,  to  such  an  extent  they  ignore  real  life  and  common 
sense.  '' 
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in  empirical  study  of  natural  effects.  Yet,  as  Barry  Brundell  comments,  it  was  as  a 
"Renaissance  philosopher  rather  than  as  a  specialist  in  the  experimental  approach  to  nature 
that  Gassendi  confronted  Aristotelianism"".  In  this  confrontation  Gassendi  appealed  to  the 
work  of  Vives  and  Charron,  and  paired  these  authors'  work  with  regard  to  their  respective 
emphases.  Brundell  explains  that  "by  coupling  Vives  and  Charron,  Gassendi  indicated  the 
stress  that  he  placed  on  ethics  as  the  supreme  part  of  philosophy"  while  renaissance 
admiration  for  classical  authors  "had  led  Vives,  Charron  and  now  Gassendi  onto 
contentious  ground  as  they  advocated  pagan  morality  in  a  Christian  world.  ""' 
Furthermore,  by  linking  Vives  and  Charron,  Gassendi  was  indicating  their  influence  on  him 
with  regard  to  scepticism.  Charron  was  much  more  direct  in  his  scepticism  than  was  Vives 
who  would  have  denied  the  sceptical  elements  in  his  work.  But  Vives,  in  rejecting 
Aristotelianism  and  in  holding  that  knowledge  was  in  the  first  instance  sensate,  was  partly 
responsible  for  opening  the  way  for  the  sceptical  thought  of  Gassendi.  Vives  also 
emphasised  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge  in  De  disciplinis  and  argued  that 
"philosophy  is  entirely  founded  on  opinion,  conjecture  and  verisimilitude""9.  Ultimately,  as 
Brundell  points  out,  Gassendi's  scepticism  was  rather  less  a  wholehearted  mind-set  and 
more  "a  limited  weapon  taken  tip  for  a  specific  purpose,  namely  his  polemic  against 
Aristotelianism"20.  For  Vives  the  only  sure  source  of  knowledge  was  reasoning  based  upon 
sensate  information.  The  importance  of  this  lies  in  the  assumption  by  empiricists  that  all 
sources  of  knowledge  are  sensory.  The  natural  sciences  have  largely  been  pursued  through 
empirical  methodologies,  so  empiricism  was  necessary  for  modern  science  to  develop  as  it 
did21. 
The  basis  of  Gassendi's  epistemology  is  that  essence,  or  the  inner  nature  of  objects,  cannot 
be  known.  All  that  can  be  known  is  the  sensible  appearance  of  objects  and  sensate 
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concerning  sensation  and  `psychology'  into  a  'method'  of  logic  (the  In.  ctitutio  Logica).  He 
defined  logic  as  the  "art  of  correct  thinking"22,  `thinking'  being  an  "inner  conversation"  the 
mind  has  with  itself''  and  he  postulates  that  four  elements  are  involved  in  `correct'  thinking: 
imagining  correctly,  proposing  correctly,  inferring  correctly,  and  ordering  correctly'-.  But 
Gassendi  never  defines  what  he  means  by  the  term  "correctly"  and  this  is  a  significant 
drawback  to  his  argument.  Gassendi  accords  a  paramount  place  in  the  logical  process  to  the 
faculty  of  imagination.  He  writes  that  it  is  vital  "in  the  first  place  to  imagine  an  individual 
object  correctly,  that  is,  by  means  of  the  object  hovering  as  it  were  before  the  mind"25.  This 
is  the  first  element  in  thinking.  Again,  the  obvious  criticism  is  to  ask  "what  is  correct  ?"  An 
individual  may  believe  that  (s)he  has  imagined  an  object  precisely  and  therefore  correctly, 
but  her/his  account  of  the  object  may  lack  certain  details  which  the  account  of  another 
individual  includes.  If  by  "correctly"  Gassendi  means  "precisely",  different  observers  may 
give  different  versions  of  what  a  concrete  object  looks  like  (in  which  case  the  referent  is  the 
appearance  of  the  object),  or  even  what  the  object  is.  Thus,  if  by  "correctly"  he  means 
"truthfully"  then  the  referent  ceases  to  be  the  concrete  object  itself  and  becomes  the  subject's 
version  of  the  object  which  will  be  true  for  her/him  (but  perhaps  not  true  for  another 
observer).  The  situation  becomes  even  more  confused  when  the  object  of  imagining  is 
abstract.  How  will  any  definition  of  Gassendi's  term  "correctly"  apply  to  a  belief,  an  idea  or 
an  assertion? 
"Imagining"  is,  however,  only  the  first  stage  in  the  process.  Gassendi  continues  by 
stressing  the  importance  of  forming  propositions,  that  is,  stating  what  something  is  or  is  not 
by  "predicating  or  attributing  to  each  thing  what  corresponds  to  it"26.  Then,  when  given  two 
propositions,  it  is  crucial  to  "infer  something  legitimately  and  truely  (SjC)27  and  thereafter  it 
is  "useful"  to  form  notions  (in  other  words,  to  arrange  propositions  and  inferences  in  a 
"fitting  order")28.  Now,  the  four  elements  are  based  upon  some  extremely  imprecise 
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context  and  subject  dependent  and  it  is  difficult  to  ascribe  definitive  meaning  to  them.  It  is 
boing  to  be  difficult,  then,  to  build  a  method  of  logic  which  will  be  applicable  across  a  range 
of  instances  and  situations,  with  a  variety  of  individuals  implementing  it  and  which  will 
provide  -  regardless  of  context  -a  means  to  certitude.  This  attempt  at  a  method  of  logic 
seems  opposed  to  Gassendi's  avowal  of  scepticism,  but  Gassendi's  scepticism  is  exhibited 
in  a  weak  form.  Certain  knowledge  of  essences  is  impossible;  however,  there  can  be 
knowledge  of  appearances.  His  method  of  logic  is  an  attempt  (albeit  a  flawed  one)  to 
provide  a  set  of  formal  rules  for  doing  just  this,  and  for  giving  people  a  framework  for 
ordered  thinking  based  on  sensate  appearance  of  the  world.  However,  it  is  a  possibility  that 
"logic  alone  cannot  reveal  to  us  the  existence  of  new  types  of  entity",  in  that  it  has  "little  use 
for  experiment  or  observation.  "29  This  was  a  possibility  which  Gassendi  did  not  accept. 
On  "simple  imagination" 
Gassendi  states  that  "[w]e  use  the  expression  simple  imagination...  [because]  we  imagine  a 
thing  purely  and  simply  in  and  by  itself,  without  making  of  it  any  judgment...  "  0.  That  is, 
the  imagination  in  the  first  instance  produces  an  image  which  does  not  lead  to  the  production 
of  a  proposition  or  a  sentence.  Simple  imagination  encapsulates  the  "whole  description"  of  a 
perceptible  thing.  This  image  is  "thrust"  before  the  mind  and  is  popularly  termed  "idea", 
"form",  "concept",  "preconception",  "anticipation"  and  "phantasm"31.  (Gassendi  states  that 
he  will  use  the  term  "idea"  because  it  is  a  "commonplace"32.  )  Gassendi's  view  of  simple 
imagination  is  broadly  in  accordance  with  Vives'  concept  of  the  simple  intelligence  which, 
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receives  images  from  the  senses  in  the  mind. 
Further  similarity  arises  when  Gassendi  writes  that  the  idea  which  is  the  product  of  simple 
imagination  is  inseparable  from  the  imagination  itself;?.  Vives  writes  that  the  image  of  an 
object  immediately  present  to  the  senses  is  received  by  the  imagination,  while  he  conflates 
imagination  and  simple  intelligence;  '.  Gassendi  argues  that  every  idea  which  is  in  the  mind 
"takes  its  origin  from  the  senses"3i  and  expands  on  this: 
Here  is  the  point  of  the  well-known  saying  `there  is  nothing  in 
the  understanding  which  was  not  first  in  the  sense',  and  the 
dictum  that  the  understanding  or  the  mind  is  a  blank  tablet... 
Indeed,  those  who  claim  that  ideas  have  been  imprinted  in  the 
mind  by  nature  and  not  acquired  through  the  senses  are  very  far 
from  proving  what  they  say.  'h 
Gassendi  explains  that  ideas  either  come  through  the  senses  or  are  formed  from  (prior) 
ideas  which  have  come  through  the  senses.  This  was  an  argument  which  Vives  also  cave, 
stating  that  "[v]e  enter  into  knowledge  though  the  gates  of  the  senses"37,  making  it  plain 
that  he  believes  that  all  knowledge  derives  from  sensate  experience.  In  the  De  prima 
philosophic  Vives  gives  this  comparison: 
Like  those  who  live  in  a  basement,  with  only  one  little  window 
to  the  outside,  do  not  see  except  through  that  window,  thus  we 
see  nothing  except  through  our  senses.  Nevertheless...  with  our 
mind  we  infer  the  existence  of  something  beyond  our  senses,  but 
only  as  much  as  our  senses  permit  us  to  do.  Our  mind  rises  upon 
the  senses,  but  is  based  upon  [them]...  The  senses  point  the 
way,  nor  is  there  any  other.  The  mind  infers  the  existence  of 
something,  but  it  does  not  see  it.  38 
Gassendi  is  also  in  agreement  with  Vives  that  ideas  which  pass  through  the  senses  are 
"impressed"  upon  the  mind39.  Such  ideas  are  always  singular  and  the  mind  forms  general 
ideas  from  singular  ones40.  Ideas  are  gained  "either  from  personal  experience  or  from 
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, gained  through  one's  own  senses  is  "more  perfect";  '.  This  is  because  things  which  "enter 
through  the  ears  stimulate  the  mind  in  less  lively  a  way  than  what  our  reliable  eyes  have 
seen"-".  It  is  noticeable  that  this  assertion  is  not  based  on  observation  although  Gassendi 
uses  observable  phenomena  to  illustrate  that  the  eyes  can  be  deceived:  for  example,  "a  stick 
which  is  actually  straight  appears  crooked  if  it  is  placed  half  in  and  half  out  of  water"-+-;.  He 
argues  that  observation  should  be  made  to  discern  whether  the  appearance  of  a  thing 
"corresponds  to  the  reality"45. 
Gassendi  then  argues  that  "temperament,  disposition,  custom,  and  preconceived  opinion" 
can  alI  affect  our  perception-16.  But  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  temperament  and  emotion  on 
cognition  he  does  not  give  as  detailed  an  account  as  does  Vives  in  De  anima  et  vita. 
Gassendi  uses  temperament  as  a  warning  to  be  judicious.  Consequently,  he  writes  that 
when  it  is  a  matter  of  holding  a  true  idea  of  something,  it  is 
necessary  to  pay  particular  attention  lest  any  deception  arise 
from  these  or  similar  considerations;  and  care  must  be  taken  that 
all  prejudice,  whether  it  stems  from  temperament  or  some  other 
source,  be  eradicated  and  the  mind  be  free  and  neutral  in 
examining  and  determining  what  idea  it  will  hold  to  be  true.  47 
Unlike  Vives,  Gassendi's  objective  is  not  to  examine  cognition  as  part  of  a  treatise  on 
psychological  functions.  He  is  interested  in  sensation  and  perception  as  they  affect 
epistemology  and  the  preparation  of  a  logical  `method'.  Ultimately,  for  Gassendi,  the  "more 
complete  a  person's  ideas  and  the  more  the  things  of  which  he  has  ideas,  the  more  he  excels 
in  knowledge"  ".  The  method  was  supposed  to  facilitate  such  acquisition  of  knowledge  by 
sharpening  the  individual's  ability  to  reason. 
Concerning  logical  method,  Gassendi  explains  that  it  "is  nothing  other  than  a  progression  of 
thoughts  organised  or  arranged  in  a  determined  pattern"49.  His  method  rests  upon  the 
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"matter  which  can  be  resolved  by  the  understanding  alone",  upon  the  faculty  of  reason5°. 
The  method  starts  with  the  "resolution",  that  is,  discerning  the  goal  which  is  to  be  attained 
before  indicating  the  "stages  which  must  be  reached  for  the  end  result  to  be  secured"51. 
According  to  Gassendi,  each  subject  (arts,  sciences  or  practical  crafts)  has  a  structure  which 
may  be  worked  through,  and  the  process  can  be  divided  into  stages.  For  instance, 
in  researching  the  natural  world...  wherever  possible  we  call 
upon  anatomy  and  chemistry  and  the  other  sciences  to  enable  us 
as  far  as  possible  to  analyse  bodies  and  break  them  down  into 
their  structural  units  in  an  attempt  to  understand  the  precise 
nature  of  their  composition  and  to  determine  by  extrapolation 
whether  the  composition  of  other  bodies  can  be  accounted  for  in 
the  same  or  in  a  different  way.  52 
This  has  application  for  teaching  methods  as  Gassendi,  like  Vives,  realised.  Gassendi 
mentions  that  the  "method  of  instruction  ought  to  be  such  that  the  subject  matter  is 
presented  in  the  clearest  possible  way"53.  Moreover,  the  instructor  "ought  to  present  the 
material  in  such  a  way  that  the  pupil  gains  understanding  of  it"s  4  . 
As  has  been  explained  in 
Chapter  5  of  this  thesis,  these  aspects  are  present  in  Vives'  pedagogy.  And  when  Gassendi 
states  that  in  teaching  "care"  must  be  taken  "to  start  from  what  is  better  known  and  more 
fundamental  to  the  understanding  of  what  is  to  follow"55,  he  is  giving  an  axiom  with  which 
Vives  was  entirely  familiar. 
222 Descartes  and  the  passions  of  the  soul 
Descartes  initiated  the  modern  interpretation  of  the 
soul  in  the  Meditations,  as  is  generally  conceded.  Of 
all  the  Cartesian  doctrines,  his  account  of  the  soul  has 
received  least  examination.  One  reason  for  this 
neglect  is  that  the  major  changes  he  effected  have 
become  taken  for  granted,  even  by  his  critics. 
According  to  the  dominant  pre-modern  tradition  of 
Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle  and  the  medievals,  the  soul 
is  responsible  for  two  functions...  life  or  motion,  and 
awareness,  discerning,  or  thinking...  With  Descartes 
the  soul  performs  one  function  only.  It  is  exclusively 
a  `thinking  thing',  a  mind,  or  a  `consciousness'... 
After  Descartes  it  is  hard  to  name  a  thinker  of  the  first 
rank,  of  whatever  metaphysical  or  anti-metaphysical 
posture,  who  has  sought  to  restore  to  the  soul...  its 
original  `organic'  meaning  as  responsible  for  life  and 
motion  and  `wordly'  activity.  56 
Descartes'  treatise  Les  Passions  de  l'Aine  (The  Passions  of  the  Soul)  perhaps  does  not 
epitomise  the  singular  conception  of  soul  here  mentioned  by  Richard  Kennington  as  much 
as  does  the  Meditations  on  First  Philosophy.  Despite  Kennington's  remarks  about  the 
rejection  of  the  `organic'  meaning  of  soul,  Descartes  does  speak  in  Les  Passions  of  the  soul 
as  a  life-giving  or  animating  force  as  well  as  enumerating  the  passions  and  describing  how 
they  affect  the  soul.  Of  course,  what  he  has  to  say  in  this  work  must  be  placed  in  the  context 
of  his  general  argument  for  the  separation  of  mind  (as  a  purely  intellectual  function)  from 
body.  Yet  Les  Passions  de  l'Ante  has  a  decidedly  renaissance  tone,  and  much  of  its  content 
has  its  parallel  in  Vives'  De  anima  et  vita  (to  which  Descartes  refers  in  Les  Passions  57). 
Descartes'  concept  of  the  soul  as  the  thinking  part  of  the  organism  was  opposed  to  earlier 
"two-function"  theories  espoused  not  only  by  classical  and  medieval  commentators  but  by 
many  renaissance  authors,  amongst  them  Luis  Vives.  The  manner  of  Descartes' 
223 investigations  into  the  soul  in  Les  Passions  de  I'Anre  and  in  the  Meditations  (which  will 
both  he  discussed  below)  is  philosophical  and  is  more  akin  to  that  found  in  the  scholastic 
analysis  of  Aquinas  than  that  used  in  Vives'  De  anima.  In  contrast  with  Vives,  Descartes' 
method  is  speculative  `first  philosophy'. 
In  the  Discourse  on  Method  Descartes  affirmed  his  belief  that  the  soul  is  immortal-58.  Once 
the  body  `fails'  the  soul  leaves  it.  As  has  been  said,  the  functions  of  the  soul  are  addressed 
in  his  Les  Passions  de  l'Anie  in  which  he  begins  by  stating  that  the  task  of  describing  these 
passions  should  not  be  difficult  "since  everyone  feels  passions  in  himself  and  so  has  no 
need  to  look  elsewhere  for  observations  to  establish  their  nature"-,  9.  The  expectation  is, 
then,  that  Descartes  will  use  an  introspective  method,  rather  than  a  strictly  empirical  one 
relying  on  observation  of  effects.  Before  beginning  his  explanation  of  the  passions  he 
argues  the  need  to  sort  out  the  differences  between  the  functions  of  the  soul  and  those  of  the 
body.  He  again  states  that  this  will  not  be  difficult  if 
we  bear  in  mind  that  anything  we  experience  as  being  in  us,  and 
which  we  see  can  also  exist  in  wholly  inanimate  bodies,  must  be 
attributed  only  to  our  body.  On  the  other  hand,  anything  in  us 
which  we  cannot  conceive  in  any  way  as  capable  of  belonging  to 
a  body  must  be  attributed  to  our  soul  60 
Using  this  `method'  it  follows  for  Descartes  that,  because  we  have  no  conception  of  a  body 
being  able  to  think  for  itself,  "we  have  reason  to  believe  that  every  kind  of  thought  present  in 
us  belongs  to  the  soul"o'. 
According  to  Descartes,  the  soul  directly  functions  "most  particularly"  in  the  mid-brain  in  the 
pineal  gland,  `:!,  but  it  "radiates  through  the  rest  of  the  body  by  means  of  animal  spirits,  the 
nerves,  and  even  the  blood...  "63.  Passions  are  caused  by  the  "spirits  contained  in  the 
cavities  of  the  brain  making  their  way  to  the  nerves  which  serve  to  expand  or  constrict  the 
224 orifices  of  the  heart...  "64.  He  writes  that  the  main  effect  of  the  passions  is  to  "dispose  the 
soul  to  want  things  for  which  they  prepare  the  body.  Thus  the  feeling  of  fear  moves  the  soul 
to  want  to  flee...  "h".  However,  the  soul  does  not  have  full  control  over  the  passions.  It  can 
more  readily  control  lesser  emotions,  but  finds  it  harder  to  contain  the  "more  violent  ones",  ý". 
Passions  can  be  caused  by  an  action  of  the  soul  or  a  temperament  of  the  body,  but  they  can 
also  be  "excited  by  objects  which  stimulate  the  senses"67.  This  last  is  the  most  common 
cause  of  the  "arousal"  of  the  passions.  Descartes  claims  that  it  is  of  interest,  in  enumerating 
the  passions,  to  conduct  an  "orderly  examination"  of  the  ways  in  which  the  senses  can  be 
stimulated  by  their  objects68.  Descartes  lists  the  passions  in  Part  It  of  Les  Passions  de  !  'Ante, 
but  during  this  enumeration  speaks  very  generally  of  the  causes  of  the  passions;  elsewhere 
he  writes  in  more  detail  about  sensation  and  perception  and  about  how  the  senses  are 
stimulated.  This  problematic  aspect  of  his  work  will  be  dealt  with  after  detailing  his 
categorisation  of  the  passions  as  he  understands  them. 
Descartes'  Number  and  Order  of  the  passions 
Descartes  describes  the  following  emotions  in  Les  Passions  de  I'Ame:  wonder  (and  its 
subsidiaries  such  as  esteem  and  contempt),  love  and  hatred,  desire,  hope,  irresolution, 
remorse,  joy  and  sadness,  envy,  anger,  pride  and  shame,  and  disgust69.  He  places  wonder 
as  the  `first'  of  the  passions  because  we  express  surprise  and  wonder  at  what  is  new  to  us 
before  we  ascertain  whether  that  thing  is  beneficial  or  harmful.  Wonder  is  linked  with 
esteem  and  contempt  depending  on  whether  we  value  the  object  of  wonder  or  think  it  to  be 
"insignificant"70.  If  we  think  something  is  beneficial  to  us  we  love  it;  if  we  perceive  it  to  be 
225 harmful  "this  arouses  hatred  in  us"71.  Descartes  asserts  that  this  consideration  of  good  and 
evil  is  the  origin  of  the  passions,  except  those  which  can  he  produced  without  perception  of 
whether  the  object  of  them  is  `good'  or  'bad'  (for  example,  passions  such  as  veneration  and 
scorn,  esteem  and  contempt,  generosity  and  pride).  In  discussing  the  passions  arising  from 
consideration  of  good  and  evil  Descartes  begins  with  desire. 
He  writes  that  desire  "always  concerns  the  future",  and  that  it  is  an  "agitation  of  the  soul"72. 
In  comparison,  Vives  states  that  the  passions  in  general  agitate  the  soul  as  waves  are  agitated 
by  the  wind73.  What  Descartes  says  about  desire  is  generally  in  keeping  with  Vives'  opinion 
that  desire  is  an  `appetite'  for  the  good  which  allows  us  to  cater  for  our  well-being. 
Descartes  puts  it  this  way:  we  are 
prompted  to  desire  the  acquisition  of  a  good  or  the  avoidance  of 
an  evil  simply  if  we  think  it  possible  to  acquire  the  good  or 
avoid  the  evil.  But  when  we  go  beyond  this  and  consider 
whether  there  is  much  hope  of  our  getting  what  we  desire,  then 
whatever  points  to  the  former  excites  hope  in  us,  and  whatever 
points  to  the  latter  excites  anxiety.  74 
Descartes'  contentions  here  may  be  said  to  be  verifiable  from  personal  experience,  although 
he  does  not  mention  at  this  stage  that  he  is  using  experience  as  a  referent.  Good  and  evil,  he 
continues,  can  also  lead  to  feelings  of  pride  and  shame.  For  instance,  an  `evil'  done  to  us  by 
others  can  stir  tip  anger  in  its  if  we  are  the  target;  where  someone  else  is  the  target  we  feel 
indignation.  Moreover,  when  Descartes  comments  that  a  "good  or  evil  which  is  in  us" 
produces  "pride  or  shame  respectively,  when  it  is  related  to  the  opinion  which  others  have 
of  it"75,  he  echoes  Vives'  comment  that  shame  is  "greater  in  the  presence  of  those  who 
inspire  respect  in  us"76.  However,  Descartes  does  not  go  much  further  in  naming  the 
passions  than  to  distinguish  what  emotions  the  words  describe.  He  does  not  really  explain 
them  with  respect  to  psychological  function. 
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joy  and  sadness)".  All  the  others  are  composed  of  a  mixture  of  these.  He  describes  the 
attributes  of  each,  taking  wonder  as  the  first  of  them.  Wonder  is  a  "sudden  surprise  of  the 
soul  which  brings  it  to  consider...  the  objects  that  seem  to  it  unusual  and  extraordinary"78. 
(It  is  a  characteristic  of  Les  Passions  de  PAme  that  Descartes  writes  about  the  soul  as  if  it 
were  separate  from  the  person.  Consequently  the  person  does  not  express  "sudden 
surprise",  the  soul  does.  )  Wonder  is  marked  by  two  physiological  occurrences:  firstly,  an 
"impression  in  the  brain,  which  represents  the  object  as  something  unusual";  secondly,  a 
"movement  of  the  spirits"  in  the  brain79.  Wonder  does  not  provoke  changes  "in  the  heart  or 
in  the  blood"  as  do  the  other  passions80,  but  the  ability  to  wonder  makes  us  learn  and  retain 
the  things  we  learn  in  the  memory.  But  if  we  wonder  about  things  which  merit  "little  or  no 
consideration"  this  might  inhibit  the  use  of  reason"'.  Therefore 
although  it  is  good  to  be  born  with  some  inclination  to  wonder, 
since  it  makes  us  disposed  to  acquire  scientific  knowledge,  yet 
after  acquiring  such  knowledge  we  must  attempt  to  free  ourselves 
from  this  inclination  as  much  as  possible.  For  we  may  easily 
make  good  its  absence  through  that  special  state  of  reflection  and 
attention  which  our  will  can  always  impose  upon  our 
understanding  when  we  judge  the  matter  before  us  to  be  worth 
serious  consideration.  But  there  is  no  remedy  for  excessive 
wonder  except  to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  many  things...  82 
Descartes  warns  that  excessive  wonder  can  become  habitual  and  that  efforts  should  be  made 
to  correct  it"-.  As  with  desire,  all  passions  can  become  excessive  if  not  controlled.  Descartes 
declares  that  the  "exercise  of  virtue  is  a  supreme  remedy  against  the  passions"$;  and  that  it  is 
certain  that,  provided  our  soul  always  has  the  means  of  happiness 
within  itself,  all  the  troubles  coming  from  elsewhere  are  powerless 
to  harm  it.  Stich  troubles  will  serve  rather  to  increase  its  joy;  for 
seeing  it  can  be  harmed  by  them,  it  becomes  aware  of  its 
perfection.  And  in  order  that  our  soul  should  have  the  means  of 
happiness,  it  needs  only  to  pursue  virtue  diligently.  If  anyone 
lives  in  such  a  way  that  his  conscience  cannot  reproach  him  for 
ever  failing  to  do  something  he  judges  to  be  the  best...,  lie  will 
receive  from  this  a  satisfaction  which  has  such  power  to  make  him 
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sufficient  power  to  disturb  the  tranquility  of  his  soulx'. 
Thus,  to  Descartes,  it  is  virtue  rather  than  reason  which  is  the  means  to  govern  the  passions. 
Descartes  next  turns  his  attentions  to  love  and  hatred.  Love  is  "an  emotion  of  the  soul 
caused  by  a  movement  of  the  spirits,  which  impels  the  soul  to  join  itself  willingly  to  objects 
that  appear  to  be  agreeable  to  it""".  Vives  writes  similarly  in  De  anima  K'  when  he  contends 
that  resemblance  is  a  cause  of  love:  our  souls,  he  says,  have  a  tendency  to  be  disposed 
towards  beauty"  and  in  some  people  there  exists  an  "admirable  conformity  of  spirit"  which 
creates  sympathy  between  them".  Descartes  argues  that  hatred  is  also  caused  by  animal 
spirits  impelling  the  soul  to  separate  itself  from  harmful  objects"". 
As  was  seen  with  Vives'  warnings  against  lust,  Descartes  too  makes  the  distinction  between 
"concupiscent"  and  "benevolent"  love''".  The  latter  makes  us  "wish  for  the  well-being  of 
what  we  love",  the  former  prompts  us  to  desire  the  object  of  our  love92.  Descartes  argues 
that  his  distinction  refers  only  to  the  effects  of  love  not  to  its  "essence"  and  contends  that 
seemingly  different  passions  can  be  said  to  "partake  of"  (that  is,  stem  from)  love`.  This 
may  be  said  because  there  are  different  objects  of  love. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  passions  which  an  ambitious  man  has 
for  glory,  a  miser  for  money,  a  drunkard  for  wine,  a  brutish  man 
for  a  woman  he  wishes  to  violate,  an  honourable  man  for  his 
friend  or  mistress,  and  a  good  father  for  his  children.  Although 
very  different  from  one  another,  these  passions  are  similar  in  so 
far  as  they  all  partake  of  love.  But  the  men  in  the  first  four 
examples  have  love  only  for  the  possession  of  objects 
themselves...  Whereas  the  love  of  a  good  father  for  his  children 
is  so  pure  that  he  desires  to  have  nothing  from  them...  He  regards 
them,  rather,  as  other  parts  of  himself,  and  seeks  their  good  as  he 
does  their  own,  or  even  more  assiduously.  9 
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strongest  form  of  love"-,  loving  her  child  even  if  everyone  else  "loathes"  it'",.  Furthermore, 
while  Descartes  links  ambition,  miserliness  and  drunkenness  to  love  of  specific  objects, 
Vives  links  similar'vices'  (avarice,  ambition  and  gluttony)  to  desire,  which  he  states  is  a 
"false"  love97. 
Descartes  now  attends  to  joy  and  sadness.  Joy  is  a  "pleasant  emotion"?  s  while  sadness  is  an 
"unpleasant  listlessness  which  affects  the  soul  when  it  suffers  discomfort""".  People  can 
feel  sad  or  joyful  for  no  apparent  reason100.  Descartes  notes  that  laughter  can  be  caused 
"without  any  joy",  for  instance  because  of  indignation,  aversion,  or  any  emotion  which 
"may  suddenly  make  the  lungs  swell  up"  so  causing  the  "external  action  of  laughter"101. 
Descartes  mentions  that  regarding  this  matter 
Vives  writes  that  when  he  had  gone  without  eating  for  a  long 
time,  the  first  pieces  of  food  that  he  put  in  his  mouth  caused  him 
to  laugh.  This  could  result  from  the  fact  that  his  lungs,  emptied  of 
blood  by  the  lack  of  nourishment,  were  rapidly  swollen  by  the 
first  juice  which  passed  from  his  stomach  to  his  heart,  and  which 
the  mere  imagination  of  eating  could  direct  there  even  before  the 
arrival  of  the  juice  of  the  food  he  was  eating.  1°2 
Descartes  does  not  name  the  text  frone  which  this  example  comes,  but  it  is  in  fact  from  Dc 
anima  et  vita,  the  example  coming  from  Book  Three,  Chapter  Ten.  (Given  this,  and  given 
the  similarities  in  the  contents  of  Les  Passions  and  De  anima,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
Descartes  had  read  De  anima  in  its  entirity.  )  Vives  states  that  at  the  "first  or  second 
mouthful"  eaten  "after  a  prolonged  fast"  he  was  "unable  to  contain"  his  laughter'°3, 
explaining  that  this  is  because  the  food  expanded  his  diaphragm  and  restricted  its 
movement.  He  also  comments  that  there  is  laughter  which  is  not  'true'  and  this  originates  in 
sadness  or  indignation'04.  Descartes  similarly  remarks  that  "we  are  never  so  ready  to  laugh 
229 as  when  we  are  sad"105  while  the  section  in  which  he  paraphrases  Vives  is  titled  "What 
causes  laughter  in  the  case  of  indignation""",. 
Having  thus  appraised  Descartes'  account  of  the  major  passions,  his  thought  concerning 
sensation  and  perception  will  now  he  addressed,  as  he  maintains  that  these  are  functions  of 
the  soul.  The  following  section  will  refer  to  Descartes'  Discourse  rin  Method  and  Principles 
of  Philosophy. 
Descartes  on  sense  perception  and  affirmation  of  truth 
As  has  been  mentioned,  Descartes'  method  for  analysing  the  functions  of  the  soul  is  not 
principally  based  on  observation.  His  method  is  epistemological,  as  he  explains  in  the 
Meditations;  the  soul  has  to  be  known  through  intellectualising.  Descartes  ponders  on  the 
"attributes  of  soul"  to  "see  if  there  are  any  of  these"  in  him  if  he  has  no  physical  body'07.  He 
concludes  that  eating,  walking,  and  sensing  would  be  "impossible  without  the  body"  but 
that  the  one  attribute  of  the  soul  which  would  be  possible  would  be  thinking'08.  Thought  is 
the  only  attribute  which  "cannot  be  detached  from  me.  I  am,  I  exist  :  This  is  certain,  but  for 
how  long?  For  as  long  as  I  think...  "109.  For  Descartes,  his  being  is  entirely  bound  up  with 
his  ability  to  think  and  he  states  that  he  is  "therefore,  precisely  speaking,  only  a  thing  which 
thinks,  that  is  to  say  a  mind,  understanding,  or  reason...  "'  10.  He  continues: 
I  am  not  this  assemblage  of  limbs  called  the  human  body;  I  am  not 
a  thin  and  penetrating  air  spread  through  all  these  members;  I  am 
not  a  wind,  a  breath  of  air,  a  vapour,  or  anything  at  all  that  I  can 
invent  or  imagine,  since  I  have  supposed  that  all  those  things  were 
nothing,  and  yet,  without  changing  this  supposition,  I  find  that  I 
am  nevertheless  certain  that  I  am  something.  ' 
230 Thus  the  essence  of  a  person  is  purely  intellectual,  the  human  body  is  merely  a  machine. 
This  is  the  heart  of  dualism  and  in  looking  at  the  problems  associated  with  this,  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  Descartes'  conception  of  sense  perception  will  be  unavoidable. 
There  are  two  especially  perturbing  aspects  of  the  mind-body  theory,  as  John  Cottingham 
indicates.  The  first  of  these  he  labels 
the  'non-corporeality  dogma':  by  insisting  on  the  essential  non- 
corporeality  of  the  mind,  Cartesian  dualism  is  committed  to  a 
thesis  which  modern  advances  in  neurophysiology  have  made  less 
and  less  plausible.  The  claim,  made  by  Descartes,  that  an  act  of 
thinking  or  doubting  'does  not  require  any  place  or  depend  on  any 
material  thing'  (e.  g.  requires  no  brain)  seems...  to  be  a  non- 
starter.  '  12 
The  second  aspect  concerns  the  epistemological  consequences  of  dualism,  as  will  be 
explained  in  due  course.  With  respect  to  the  issue  of  non-corporeality  Descartes'  claim  that 
thinking  requires  no  material  dependence  is  contradictory  to  his  insistence  that  the  soul, 
which  is  the  seat  not  just  of  the  passions  but  of  cognitive  function,  has  the  pineal  Oland  as 
the  centre  of  its  functions.  In  Part  Four  of  his  Principles  of  Philosophy  he  makes  a 
statement  that  the  human  soul  has  "its  principal  seat  in  the  brain"'  ".  In  Meditation  4  he 
writes  that  the  mind  is  a  thinking  thing,  not  extended  in  length,  breadth,  depth,  and  not 
participating  "in  anything  that  pertains  to  the  body"'  1-1.  Now,  Descartes  could  conceive  of 
the  soul/mind  as  a  type  of  unquantifiable  'spirit'  suffused  through  the  body,  having  its  locus 
in  the  pineal  gland,  and  just  about  maintain  his  argument  for  mind-body  separatism.  But  if 
he  insists  on  the  statement  that  the  mind  does  not  participate  in  anything  pertaining  to  the 
body  then  a  clearer  definition  of  'participate'  is  required,  because  his  explanations  of  the 
soul's  activity  in  Les  Passions  de  l'Ame  can  be  interpreted  as  implying  participation  in 
pineal  gland  activity.  Descartes  was  not  unaware  of  this  seeming  contradiction.  In  his  later 
thought  he  attempts  to  reach  a  middle  position  to  account  for  what  might  be  seen  as 
231 inconsistency  in  his  theory  of  intellect.  He  seems  to  give  a  description  of  mind-body 
dualism  as  a  potential  rather  than  an  actual  state.  As  shall  be  explained  later  in  this  section, 
his  explanations  do  not  wholly  remove  the  confusions  surrounding  this  aspect  of  his  work. 
Some  of  these  confusions  will  now  be  examined. 
In  the  Conversation  with  Burman  (the  interview  Descartes  gave  to  Frans  Burman  at 
Egmond-Binnen)  Descartes  is  reported  as  saying: 
When  external  objects  act  upon  my  senses,  they  print  on  them  an 
idea...  And  when  the  mind  attends  to  these  images  imprinted  on 
the  (pineal]  gland...  in  this  way  it  is  said  to  have  sense-perception 
(sentire) 
. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  images  on  the  gland  are 
imprinted  in  the  mind  itself,  which  fashions  and  shapes  them  in 
the  brain  in  the  absence  of  external  objects,  then  we  have 
imagination.  The  difference  between  sense-perception  and 
imagination  is  really  just  this,  that  in  sense-perception  the  images 
are  imprinted  on  the  brain  by  external  objects  which  are  actually 
present,  while  in  the  case  of  imagination  the  images  are  imprinted 
by  the  mind  without  any  external  objects,  and  with  the  windows 
shut,  as  it  were.  '  15 
Descartes  is  here  taking  a  traditional  'imprinting'  theory  of  sense  perception,  as  did  Vives, 
although  in  Descartes'  case  it  is  unclear  how  the  incorporeal  mind  can  imprint  images  on  the 
imagination,  which  is  also  incorporeal.  This  insistence  on  physiological  activity  as  integral 
to  sense  perception  does  not  sit  well  with  Descartes'  postulation  of  the  mind  as  pure 
(incorporeal)  intellect  able  to  function  without  reliance  upon  physical  activity.  This 
confusion  is  increased  by  his  persistence  in  holding  to  the  'imprinting'  theory  elsewhere  in 
his  work,  for  instance  in  the  Rules  for  Direction  of  the  Mind.  In  this  he  writes: 
First  in  so  far  as  our  external  senses  are  all  part  of  the  body, 
sense-perception,  strictly  speaking,  is  merely  passive,  even 
though  our  application  of  the  senses  to  objects  involves  action 
viz,  local  motion;  sense-perception  occurs  in  the  same  way  in 
which  wax  takes  on  the  impression  from  a  seal.  It  should  not  he 
thought  that  I  have  a  mere  analogy  in  mind  here:  we  must  think 
232 of  the  external  shape  of  the  sentient  body  as  being  really  changed 
by'the  object  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the  shape  of  the  surface 
of  the  wax  is  altered  by  the  seal.  '  h 
Descartes  has  a  problem  here:  he  is  insisting  upon  the  actuality  of  the  imprinting  model 
rather  than  using  it  as  a  metaphor.  He  thus  has  the  membranes  of  the  sense  organs  actually 
physically  altered  by  the  percept  itself.  He  goes  on  by  explaining  that  the  figure  received  by 
the  external  sense  organ  is  conveyed  to  another  part  of  the  body  known  as  the  "common 
sense"'  17.  As  has  been  said,  Vives  also  deals  with  the  common  sense  as  regards  perception, 
conceiving  of  it  as  a  combination  of  imagination  and  fantasy'  18.  The  common  sense 
according  to  Descartes  "functions  like  a  seal,  fashioning  the  phantasy  or  imagination,  as  if 
in  wax,  the  same  figures  or  ideas  which  come,  pure  and  without  body,  from  the  external 
senses"'"'.  But  if  these  figures  come  "without  body"  how  can  they  be  impressed  in 
something,  far  less  something  which  is  itself  incorporeal? 
The  second  problematic  aspect  associated  with  Descartes'  dualism  is  defined  by  John 
Cottingham  as 
the'mental  or  physical?  '  dilemma.  By  insisting  that  all  attributes 
be  regarded  either  as  modes  of  thought  or  as  modes  of  extension, 
Cartesian  dualism  seems  to  lumber  itself  with  an  impossible 
choice  when  it  comes  to  complex  psycho-physical  phenomena 
like  sensations.  (Descartes')  attempts  to  deal  with  the  dilemma 
lead  him  to  the  bizarre  position  that...  having  a  sensation  is  a  kind 
of  thinking...  '20 
It  has  been  argued  that  for  Vives  and  for  Gassendi  sense  perception  is  the  primary  means  by 
which  knowledge  is  gathered;  it  is  the  starting  point  in  the  epistemological  process.  Both 
Vives  and  Gassendi  could  adopt  this  concept  unproblematically  because  they  did  not 
envision  such  an  absolute  dichotomy  between  mind  and  body  as  did  Descartes.  Neither 
posited  the  theory  of  stripping  away  all  physical  attributes  and  asking  "what  is  left?  " 
Because  Descartes  argues  that  it  is  mind  and  not  body  which  makes  a  person  a  person,  and 
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explaining  how  we  become  aware  of  the  information  that  constitutes  a  body  of  knowledge. 
How  do  we  learn?  How  do  we  gather  percepts  which  lead  to  thoughts  and  ideas? 
In  Meditations  I  Descartes  writes  that  everything  he  has  learned  and  holds  to  be  true  he 
learned  through  the  senses,  though  the  senses  can  at  times  be  false'^'.  The  senses  can 
deceive  us  "concerning  things  which  are  barely  perceptible  or  at  a  great  distance''?.  Even 
seemingly  indubitable  sensate  information  ("that  I  am  here,  sitting  by  the  fire,  wearing  a 
dressing  gown"''')  may  be  a  dream.  And  yet,  in  the  Discourse  on  Method  he  insists  that 
"light,  sounds,  smells,  tastes,  heat  and  all  the  other  qualities  of  external  objects  can  imprint 
different  ideas  in  the  brain  by  means  of  the  senses"''-'.  Here  is  a  clear  definition  of  sense 
perception.  Descartes  describes  percepts  being  transposed  into  ideas  in  the  brain  via  the 
external  sense  organs.  Moreover,  in  Part  Four  of  the  Principles  of  Philosophy  he  argues 
that  sensory  awareness  "comes  about  by  means  of  nerves,  which  stretch  like  threads  from 
the  brain  to  all  the  limbs"  125.  It  is  the  "movements"  set  tip  in  the  brain  by  the  nerves  which 
result  in  sensation.  For  both  sensation  and  sense  perception  generally  Descartes  appears  to 
give  physiological  explanations  which  contradict  a  strict  mind-body  dichotomy. 
However,  in  partial  answer  to  such  an  accusation,  Descartes  reviewed  his  theory  to  try  to 
clarify  the  matter.  In  the  Conversation  with  Burman  he  characterises  mind  as  a  thinking 
`thing':  that  is,  "there  is  in  addition  to  the  thinking  a  substance  which  does  the  thinking"  26. 
He  speaks  of  mind  and  body  respectively  as  "thinking  substance"  and  "extended 
substance""27.  He  apparently  regards  mind  as  a  "substance"  distinct  from  "body", 
classifying  the  two  substances  (mental  and  corporeal)  as  being  not  just  distinct  but  "actually 
incompatible"  28.  None  of  this  fully  explains  what  characteristics  a  thinking  "substance" 
might  have;  it  is  being  depicted  as  an  incorporeal  entity.  It  may  be,  as  John  Cottingham 
suggests'29,  that  Descartes'  distinction  is  a  conceptual  rather  than  a  `real'  one.  However,  this 
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exercise  which  does  not  aim  at  describing  how  intellectual  processes  function  in  actuality.  It 
is  not  clear  that  this  is  what  he  intends.  Nor  does  this  point  help  elucidate  what  form  of 
"substance"  thinking  substance  is,  what  this  incorporeal  entity  might  actually  be. 
Descartes  typically  identifies  "substance"  as  substrate,  adopting  the  traditional  view  of 
substance  as  what  underlies  the  attributes  of  any  thing.  In  the  Second  Replies  he  interprets 
substance  as  the  term  which  "applies  to  every  thing  in  which  whatever  we  perceive  is 
immediately  located,  as  in  a  subject;  or  every  thing  by  means  of  which  whatever  we  perceive 
exists"130.  Thus  our  perceptions  are  first  located  in  the  percepts  inhering  in  substance. 
Thought/ideas  are  based  on  perception  so  `thought'  could  be  said  to  derive  from  what  is 
perceptible  in  substance.  Descartes  writes: 
When  external  objects  act  on  my  senses,  they  print  on  them  an 
idea,  or  rather  a  figure,  of  themselves;  and  when  the  mind  attends 
to  these  images  imprinted  on  the  (pineal  J  gland  in  this  way  it  is 
said  to  perceive.  When...  the  images  on  the  gland  are  not 
imprinted  by  external  objects  but  by  the  mind  itself,  which 
fashions  and  shapes  them  in  the  brain  in  the  absence  of  external 
objects,  then  we  have  inuagination.  13' 
This  explains  how  the  mind  acts  upon  percepts  which  are  transferred  to  it  via  the  pineal 
gland.  But  the  mind  still  acts  upon  these  imprints  and,  furthermore,  it  can  itself  imprint  on 
the  pineal  gland.  The  mind  and  body  are  therefore  posited  as  acting  together  through  the 
intermediary  of  the  pineal  gland,  but  Descartes  does  not  make  plain  how  this  occurs  if  the 
two  "substances"  (mental  and  corporeal)  are  "actually  incompatible".  Furthermore,  he  refers 
to  one  operation  of  the  `soul'  which  does  take  place  independently  of  the  body,  what  he 
calls  "pure  understanding  "'3?.  Cottingham  observes  that  these  aspects  of  Descartes'  theory 
"must  be  among  the  most  bizarre  psycho-physical  transactions  in  Descartes'  philosophical 
psychology"  133. 
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from  the  body,  but  does  not  actually  do  so:  human  beings  are  a  "compound  of  these  two 
separable  but  not  separated  components"  134.  Moreover,  there  is  no  observable  means  to 
prove  the  potential  for  intellect  to  exist  separately.  The  confusions  which  attend  Descartes' 
delineation  of  mind  and  body  emerge  from  his  need  to  align  his  philosophical  thought  with 
his  physics"'.  He  has  to  maintain  concepts  of  mind  and  body  which  do  not  "disrupt  the 
argument  of  most  importance  to  the  foundations  of  [his]  physics,  the  claim  that  our  idea  of 
body,  properly  considered,  is  the  idea  of  a  thing  all  of  whose  properties  are  geometrical, 
which  is  capable  of  existing  apart  from  the  mind.  "136 
This  proviso  notwithstanding,  Descartes'  explanations  also  prove  problematic  in  another 
respect.  Because  of  his  (confused)  dualistic  position,  any  claim  that  sensate  percepts 
(leading  to  cognition,  awareness,  understanding,  )  arise  from  corporeality  is  troublesome. 
Descartes  endeavours  to  get  round  this  by  asserting  that  perception  is  thinking.  In  the  second 
Meditation  he  has  this  to  say: 
I  am  the  same  being  who  senses,  that  is  to  say  who  apprehends 
and  knows  things,  as  by  the  sense-organs,  since,  in  truth,  I  see 
light,  hear  noise  and  feel  heat.  But  it  will  be  said  that  these 
appearances  are  false  and  that  I  am  dreaming.  Let  it  be  so;  all  the 
same,  at  least,  it  is  very  certain  that  it  seems  to  me  that  I  see  light, 
hear  a  noise  and  feel  heat;  and  this  is  properly  what  in  me  is  called 
perceiving  and  this,  taken  in  its  precise  sense,  is  nothing  other  than 
thinking.  '37 
In  the  Principles  of  Philosophy  Part  One  (The  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge)  Descartes' 
concept  of  sensation  as  `thought'  is  again  evident.  He  writes  that  knowledge  of  our  mind  is 
"prior  to"  and  "more  certain  than  the  knowledge  of  our  body""38.  Therefore  it  is  possible  for 
its  to  be  sure  we  exist  because  we  are  thinking.  He  then  asserts  that  "[we]  possess  only  two 
modes  of  thinking:  the  perception  of  the  intellect  and  the  operation  of  the  will"139.  These  are 
general  categories;  under  intellectual  perception  comes  not  just  imagination  and  `pure 
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assertion,  denial  and  doubt"'-i0. 
So,  for  Descartes,  feeling,  sensation  and  imagination  are  all  modes  of  thinking.  By  this 
argument  sensation  is  not  primarily  a  physiological  occurrence  even  though  we  have  seen 
that  elsewhere  he  explains  sensation  in  physiological  terms.  By  "thought"  he  "understand[s] 
everything  which  we  are  aware  of  as  happening  within  us,  in  so  far  as  we  have  awareness 
of  it.  Hence,  thinking  is  to  be  identified  here  not  merely  with  understanding,  willing  and 
imagining,  but  also  with  sensory  awareness.  ""4'  However,  as  Zeno  Vendler  points  out,  in 
doing  this  Descartes 
persistently  confuses  sensations  of  a  certain  kind  with  the  idea  of 
such  sensations:  pain  with  the  idea  of  pain,  the  experiences  of  light, 
of  sound,  with  the  ideas  of  light,  of  sound,  etc.  This  confusion 
leads  to  the  empiricist  attempt  to  construe  all  ideas  or  most  ideas, 
out  of  sensory  elements  -a  tendency  against  which  Descartes 
himself  fulminates  in  his  replies  to  Hobbes'  objections...  and 
elsewhere.  '42 
Descartes  never  clears  up  this  confusion.  If  someone  sprains  her/his  ankle  (s)he  is  aware  of 
the  pain  in  the  sense  of  feeling  the  pain  in  the  site  of  the  injury.  The  pain  may  be  so  severe 
that  (s)he  reasons  that  the  ankle  cannot  merely  be  sprained  and  judges  that  it  is  probably 
broken.  If  the  pain  was  a  mode  of  thought  then  diverting  her/his  attention  and  causing 
her/him  to  think  of  something  else  would  stop  the  pain  (that  is,  if  it  is  granted  that  someone 
cannot  think  of  two  thoughts  simultaneously).  It  is  a  cognitive  phenomenon  that  awareness 
of  pain  can  lessen  temporarily  if  the  individual  is  sufficiently  diverted  but  once  attention  to 
the  diversion  has  lapsed  the  pain  is  felt  once  more  at  the  site  of  the  physical  problem.  And  if 
the  pain  is  very  severe,  this  diversion  tends  not  to  happen.  Moreover,  if  pain  was  a  mode  of 
thought,  and  if  thinking  requires  volition,  the  individual  would  have  had  to  have  willed  the 
pain  to  exist  if  it  was  to  be  experienced  at  all.  It  would  not  be  contingent  upon  physical 
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and  then  have  placed  it  in  a  particular  location  (her/his  ankle).  Finally,  after  the  broken  ankle 
has  healed,  (s)he  may  think  about  the  pain  caused  by  the  break  and  remember  the  severity  of 
it,  and  (s)he  may  describe  what  the  pain  was  like  to  others,  but  in  so  doing  (s)he  will  not 
feel  the  pain  in  her  ankle. 
Descartes'  case  on  sensation  as  it  relates  to  knowledge  and  thought  is  further  confused 
when  he  discusses  errors  in  perception143  -  or  rather,  errors  in  judgement.  He  states  that 
error  is  only  a  factor  when  we  make  judgements  about  what  we  perceive:  "...  it  is  easy  for  us 
to  extend  our  will  beyond  what  we  clearly  perceive;  and  when  we  do  this  it  is  no  wonder 
that  we  may  happen  to  go  wrong.  ""44  Again,  this  argument  seems  to  divide  sensory 
perception  from  thinking:  we  perceive  via  the  external  senses  and  then  think  about  what  we 
have  perceived  (that  is,  we  judge  it).  But  this  is  a  distinction  which  Descartes  repeatedly 
denies.  However,  this  apparent  separation  between  sensing  and  the  faculties  of  thought  is 
reinforced  in  the  Principles  of  Philosophy  when  Descartes  writes  that  "we  will  never 
mistake  the  false  for  the  true  provided  we  give  our  assent  only  to  what  we  clearly  and 
distinctly  perceive"  14-,.  Thus,  perceptions  which  are  "clear"  and  "distinct"  are  veridical  if  we 
do  not  misuse  our  judgement  (our  power  of  reason)  when  we  apply  it  to  our  perceptions. 
Descartes  goes  on  to  argue  that  we  can  clearly  perceive  sensations  if  we  "take  great  care  in 
our  judgements  concerning  them  to  include  no  more  than  what  is  strictly  contained  in  our 
perception.  "  146  This  is  a  "difficult  rule  to  observe",  he  warns,  because  "all  of  us,  from  our 
early  childhood  judged  that  all  the  objects  of  our  sense-perception  are  things  existing  outside 
our  minds  and  closely  resembling  our  sensations...  "  47  We  therefore  take  these  judgements 
to  be  indisputable  when  they  may  not  be.  Yet,  following  Descartes'  arguments,  we  must 
bring  intellection  and  judgement  to  bear  on  what  we  perceive:  he  comments  that  "there  is 
nothing  whose  true  nature  we  perceive  by  the  senses  alone"1411.  This  is  nothing  short  of  a 
double  bind:  sensate  information  is  not  enough  to  allow  us  to  discern  the  "true  nature"  of 
238 things  therefore  we  have  to  use  reason.  But  our  judgement  is  the  cause  of  error  so  how  can 
we  ever  know  with  certainty  that  our  judgement  is  sound? 
Furthermore,  Descartes  has  made  the  task  more  difficult  by  contending  that  our  judgement  is 
extremely  prone  to  error  because  of  our  preconceived  opinions  about  the  nature  of  things, 
formed  in  childhood.  He  attempts  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  how  we  affirm  the  existence 
of  material  things  in  Part  Two  of  the  Principles  (?  f  Philosophy  14",  and  it  might  be  hoped  that 
the  attendant  confusions  will  be  resolved  allowing  us  to  confirm  the  existence  of  actual 
physical  objects  which  we  perceive.  Descartes'  argument  runs  as  follows: 
1.  sensations  "come  to  us  from  something  that  is  distinct  from  our  mind""50; 
2.  as  a  "result  of  sensory  stimulation  we  have  a  clear  and  distinct  perception"  of  "some 
kind  of  matter"  "which  is  extended  in  length,  breadth  and  depth...  '"-'; 
3.  we  have  a  "clear  understanding  of  this  matter  as  something  which  is  quite  different 
from  God  and  from  ourselves  or  our  mind",  and  we  "appear  to  see  clearly  that  the  idea 
of  it  comes  from  things  located  outside  ourselves...  "152; 
4.  the"  unavoidable  conclusion",  then,  is  that  there  exists  "something  extended  in  length, 
breadth  and  depth  and  possessing  all  the  properties  which  we  clearly  perceive  to  belong 
to  an  extended  thing.  And  it  is  this  extended  thing  that  we  call  `body'  or  `matter'.  ""53 
But  this  does  not  solve  the  problem  of  how  we  judge  our  perceptions  of  physical  objects  to 
be  truthful,  and  this  has  obvious  epistemological  consequences.  In  his  argument,  Descartes 
is  judging,  by  way  of  logic,  that  external  objects  exist.  However,  he  has  already  told  us  that 
errors  occur  at  the  level  of  judgement.  He  cannot  judge  any  conclusion  of  his  to  be 
"unavoidable";  he  still  does  not  know  with  certainty  that  material  things  exist  outwith  the 
mind.  Even  if  he  chooses  to  believe  that  they  do,  his  argument  leaves  him  little  or  no 
means  of  asserting  the  truthfulness  of  how  these  objects  appear  to  him,  let  alone  of 
describing  their  "true  nature". 
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It  can  be  seen  that,  in  comparison  with  problems  associated  with  the  work  of  Vives  and 
Gassendi,  a  different  set  of  problems  arises  with  Descartes'  views  on  cognitive  processes. 
His  epistemology  is  not  linked  to  psychology  and  his  approach  is  that  of  a  philosopher, 
rather  than  of  someone  who  wishes  to  apply  his  theories  of  cognition  to  a  practical  process 
(like  teaching).  In  this  chapter  it  has  been  argued  that  the  confusions  arising  from  Descartes' 
work  on  cognition  stem  from  his  separation  of  mind  and  body  but,  as  has  been  shown, 
there  are  various  areas  of  similarity  between  his  theories  on  the  passions  and  Vives'  theories 
as  set  out  in  De  aninia  et  vita  in  spite  of  the  differing  methodologies.  However,  Descartes' 
conclusions  are  shaped  inevitably  by  the  logic  of  his  argument,  and  this  logic  arises  from 
the  initial  premise  that  there  can  be  separation  of  mind-body  function.  Overall,  he  adopts  a 
rationalist  approach  as  opposed  to  the  more  empirical  elements  found  in  the  work  of  Vives 
and  Gassendi.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  problems  to  be  found  in  Descartes'  work  on 
perception,  he  provides 
a  paradigm  of  what  it  is  to  argue  metaphysically  in  the  early  modern 
period.  He  argues  for  a  version  of  the  "nature  of  reality"  in  an  a 
priori  manner,  on  the  basis  of  an  account  of  the  knowing  subject 
and  with  the  aim  of  achieving  absolute  certainty.  He  claims  to  have 
penetrated  to  the  essences  of  things  and  to  have  provided  a  basic 
taxonomy  of  being.  His  metaphysics  provides  a  general  account  of 
the  created  world:  It  includes  everything  that  exists,  considered 
generally,  within  its  subject  matter.  '  S4 
Descartes'  influence  upon  generations  of  thinkers  was  immense.  The  influence  of  Vives  and 
Gassendi  is  less  immediately  recognisable.  Pierre  Gassendi's  theory  (based  on  the  theories 
of  Sextus  Empiricus  and  Pierre  Charron),  that  while  matter  exists  in  actuality  it  is  impossible 
to  know  its  nature  (essence),  appears  in  the  work  of  John  Locke.  (Locke  mentions 
Gassendi's  name  once  in  the  third  letter  to  Stilllingfleetl55.  )  Although  Locke 
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only  from  the  testimony  of  Leibniz  ("Nouveaux  Essais",  hk.  1,  ch 
I)  that  he  owed  to  Gassendi  the  theory  of  mind  as  tabula  rasa  and 
the  suggestion  that  matter  might  he  able  to  think  -  two  notions 
which  struck  at  the  foundation  of  Cartesian  orthodoxy.  '  51, 
One  of  Locke's  general  aims  in  his  work  was  to  attempt  to  develop  in  a  "coherent, 
systematic  and  rational  way  what  he  took  to  be  the  fundamental  tenets  of  the  corpuscularian 
philosophy"  7.  The  works  which  will  be  of  interest  to  this  study  are  those  which  deal  with 
sense  perception,  knowledge  and  learning:  the  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding, 
and  Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Edaucation.  As  well  as  being  influenced  by  Gassendi, 
Locke  was  influenced  by  Descartes,  though  he  argued  against  the  Cartesian  distinction 
between  apriori  `necessary'  knowledge  and  held  that  there  were  no  innate  ideas.  Various 
aspects  of  Locke's  theories  on  both  sense  perception  and  education  had  also  been  espoused 
earlier  by  Luis  Vives.  In  discussing  Locke's  work  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  this 
research,  similarities  with  Vives'  theories  will  be  highlighted.  It  will  be  argued  that  there  is 
a  discernible  continuum  in  areas  of  epistemology,  psychology  and  education  from  the  time 
of  renaissance  humanism  to  the  Enlightenment. 
241 Chapter  8:  Locke,  education  and  human  understanding 
The  great  work  of  a  Governour  is  to  fashion  the 
Carriage,  and  forni  the  Mind;  to  settle  in  his  Pupil  good 
Habits,  and  the  Principles  of  Vertue  and  Wisdom;  to 
give  him  by  little  and  little  a  view  of  Mankind;  and  work 
him  into  a  love  and  imitation  of  what  is  Excellent  and 
Praise-worthy;  and  in  the  Prosecution  of  it  to  give  him 
Vigour,  Activity  and  Industry.  The  Studies  which  he 
sets  him  upon,  are  but  as  it  were  the  Exercises  of  his 
Faculties,  and  Imployment  of  his  Time,  to  keep  him 
from...  Idleness,  and  to  give  him  some  little  taste  of 
what  his  own  industry  must  perfect.  For  who  expects, 
that  under  a  Tutor  a  young  Gentleman  should  be  an 
accomplished  Critick,  Orator,  or  Logician?  Go  to  the 
bottom  of  Metaphysicks,  Natural  Philosophy  or 
Mathematicks?  Or  be  a  Master  in  History  or 
Chronology?  Though  something  of  each  of  these  is  to 
be  taught  to  him:  But  it  is  only  to  open  the  Door,  that  he 
may  look  in,  and  as  it  were  begin  an  Acquaintance,  but 
not  to  dwell  there...  But  of  good 
Breeding,  Knowledge 
of  the  World,  Vertue,  Industry,  and  a  love  of 
Reputation,  he  cannot  have  too  much... 
This  chapter  will  be  concerned  with  two  aspects  of  John  Locke's  work:  his  theory  of 
education  and  his  enquiry  into  human  understanding.  Two  texts  will  be  central  to  the  study: 
Sorte  Thoughts  Concerning  Education  (1693)  and  the  Essay  Concerning  Human 
Understanding  (1689).  Comparison  will  be  made  between  aspects  of  Locke's  and  Vives' 
pedagogy  and  epistemology  (with  specific  reference  to  De  anima  et  vita).  At  heart,  Locke's 
system  of  education  retains  the  humanist  aim  of  shaping  character,  and  emphasises  good 
`breeding',  virtue  and  learning.  It  is  an  education'for  a  gentleman  and  Locke  often  suggests 
educational  outcomes  which  are  similar  to  those  found  in  renaissance  texts,  for  instance 
Castiglione's  11  Cortegiano.  Castiglione  writes: 
242 I  will  have  this  our  Courtier  theretofore  to  bee  a  gentleman  borne 
of  good  house.  For  it  is  a  great  deale  less  dispraise  for  him  that 
is  not  borne  a  gentleman  to  faile  in  the  actes  of  vertue,  than  for  a 
gentleman.  If  he  swerve  from  the  steps  of  his  ancestors,  hee 
staineth  the  name  of  his  familie.  2 
And  as  Locke  would  not  have  a  gentleman  "go  to  the  bottom"  of  physics,  natural 
philosophy  or  mathematics,  nor  be  an  accomplished  orator,  Castiglione  argues  that  while  a 
gentleman  should  be  proficient  in  writing  and  speaking  he  should  not  fall  into  the  trap  of 
exhibiting  "an  over  great  desire  to  show  much  knowledge";. 
Locke  agrees  with  this  view.  The  gentleman  must  have  enough  learning  to  enable  him  to 
display  knowledge  on  a  range  of  subjects,  but  a  tutor's  main  purpose  in  education  should  be 
to  train  the  young  man  for  the  sort  of  life  he  will  lead.  Thus,  just  as  a  gentleman  must  wear 
the  correct  clothes  and  have  correct  deportment,  so  Locke  would  have  him  display  enough 
erudition  on  a  few  well  chosen  topics  to  be  entertaining  without  being  too  serious  or  overly 
intellectual.  He  admits  that  learning  is  the  least  of  the  endowments  to  be  engendered: 
Reading,  and  Writing,  and  Learning,  I  allow  to  be  necessary, 
but  yet  not  the  chief  Business.  I  imagine  you  would  think  him  a 
very  foolish  Fellow,  that  should  not  value  a  Vertuous,  or  a  Wise 
Man,  infinitely  before  a  great  Scholar.  Not  but  that  I  think 
Learning  a  great  help  to  both  in  well  dispos'd  Minds;  but  yet  it 
must  be  confess'd  also,  that  in  others  not  so  dispos'd,  it  helps 
them  only  to  be  the  more  foolish,  or  worse  Men 
This  seems  a  retrograde  step  from  the  curriculum  suggested  by  Vives  (or  indeed  of  other 
educators  such  as  Comenius  and  Sturm).  As  was  argued  in  Chapter  5,  one  of  Vives' 
curricular  aims  was  the  inculcation  of  virtue  and  wisdom,  but  he  moved  away  from  the 
traditional  renaissance  aim  of  producing  a  courtier  or  gentleman.  In  theory,  his  curriculum 
was  generally  applicable;  in  practice,  education  was  a  provision  for  the  elite  unless  the 
education  was  aimed  at  gild  entry.  Whereas  Vives'  De  tradendis  disciplini.  s  is  not  a 
handbook  of  conduct  and  primarily  deals  with  the  content  and  method  of  teaching,  Locke's 
243 Thoughts  Concerning  Education  is  largely  given  over  to  discussion  of  a  child's  upbringing 
and  the  forming  of  `good'  habits.  Discussion  of  learning  merits  fifty-nine  pages  as  opposed 
to  the  one  hundred  and  thirty-nine  pages  spent  on  upbringing  and  conduct.  Locke  is  clear 
from  the  outset  about  the  main  task  of  the  tutor:  it  is  to  "fashion  the  Carriage,  and  form  the 
mind;  to  settle  in  his  pupil  good  Habits,  and  Principles  of  Vertue  and  Wisdom...;  and  work 
him  into  a  love  and  imitation  of  what  is  Excellent  and  Praise-worthy...  "-5.  The  fashioning  of 
habits  takes  precedence  over  the  forming  of  the  mind  in  Locke's  work,  and  this  may  be 
partly  due  to  the  intended  audience  for  Some  Thoughts.  It  is  not,  after  all,  aimed  at 
professional  teachers. 
It  has  been  implied  in  this  study  that  Vives'  pedagogy  was  in  advance  of  contemporary 
trends.  Much  of  what  he  wrote  predated  what  John  Locke  would  advise  on  education. 
Certain  elements  of  Locke's  theory  of  education  revert  to  an  earlier,  more  courtly,  tradition. 
He  does  underpin  some  of  what  he  has  to  say  on  education  with  his  thoughts  on 
psychology,  but  not  to  an  extent  comparable  with  Vives.  In  the  ensuing  discussion  of  Some 
Thoughts  Concerning  Education  areas  in  which  Vives  was  a  precursor  will  be 
demonstrated,  though  Locke's  text  will  principally  be  dealt  with  in  its  own  right  as 
background  to  the  discussion  of  his  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding.  The  Essay 
will  be  dealt  with  thereafter,  and  it  is  here  that  similarities  between  Vives'  theory  of 
psychology  and  Locke's  become  apparent.  In  so  doing  it  is  not  the  intention  to  deny  that 
Locke's  work  was  of  immense  importance,  nor  to  suggest  that  Vives'  writing  was  a  direct 
influence  upon  Locke's  theory  of  psychology.  Rather  the  intent  is  to  understand  how 
Locke's  work  fits  into  and  follows  European  traditions  of  epistemology  and  pedagogy.  It 
will  be  argued  that  his  work  promulgates  this  tradition  rather  than  advances  it. 
244 Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Education 
The  great  mistake  I  have  observed  in  People's 
breeding  of  their  Children  has  been,  that  this  has  not 
been  taken  care  enough  in  its  due  Season;  That  the 
Mind  has  not  been  made  obedient  to  Discipline,  and 
pliant  to  Reason,  when  first  it  was  most  tender,  most 
easy  to  be  bowed.  Parents,  being  wisely  ordain'd  by 
Nature  to  love  their  Children,  are  very  apt,  if  Reason 
watch  not  that  natural  Affection  very  warily...  to  let  it 
run  into  Fondness.  They  love  their  little  ones,  and 
'tis  their  Duty:  But  they  often,  with  them,  cherish 
their  Faults  too...  But  to  a  fond  Parent,  that  would 
not  have  his  Child  corrected  for  a  perverse  Trick,  but 
excused  it,  saying,  it  was  a  small  Matter;  Solon  very 
well  replied,  Ay,  but  Custom  is  a  great  one.  h 
As  has  been  stated,  in  certain  ways,  Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Education  returns  to  the 
type  of  handbooks  of  conduct  exemplified  by  Erasmus'  Education  of  a  Christian  Prince  and 
Castiglione's  Book  of  the  Courtier.  In  Locke's  work  it  is  no  longer  the  prince  or  courtier 
who  is  to  be  fashioned,  it  is  the  young  gentleman.  His  treatise  emphasises  the  importance 
of  inculcating  proper  habits  into  a  child  in  what  is  at  heart  a  discourse  on  diet,  environment 
and  general  upbringing.  Locke  advises  on  diet  and  exercise  because  the  child's  body  must 
be  strengthened  "so  that  it  may  be  able  to  obey  and  execute  the  Orders  of  the  Mind'7.  lt  will 
be  the  task  of  parents  and  tutors  to  "set  the  [child's]  Mind  right"  and  thereby  form  a 
"rational  Creature"".  It  can  be  seen  that,  for  educational  writers  like  Locke,  conduct  and 
habit  were  considered  to  be  as  important  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  as  they  were 
during  the  Renaissance. 
245 It  was  Locke's  purpose,  then,  to  describe  ways  for  fashioning  the  character  as  much  as  for 
educating  the  mind.  In  his  Conduct  of  the  Uncierstanclin,  g  he  comments  that  the  "business  of 
education"  is  not  "to  make  [pupils]  perfect  in  any  one  of  the  sciences,  but  so  to  open  and 
dispose  their  minds  as  may  best  make  them  capable  of  any,  when  they  shall  apply 
themselves  to  it".  Hence,  during  Locke's  process  of  training  the  educator  must  prepare 
the  child's  mental,  moral  and  physical  capabilities  to  meet  any 
situation...  Needless  to  say,  this  is...  the  hallmark  of  a  liberal 
education,  and  we  are  indebted  to  Locke  for  helping  to  carry  that 
ancient  tradition  across  the  centuries  from  its  home  in  classical 
Greece.  10 
Despite  James  Axtell's  somewhat  romanticised  turn  of  phrase,  his  point  is  valid:  Locke's 
educational  texts  promote  a  view  of  classical  liberal  education  which  had  been  shaped  during 
the  Renaissance  and  subsequently  popularised  and  modified. 
As  with  Erasmus  and  Vives,  Locke's  belief  is  that  a  child  can  be  trained  towards  becoming 
virtuous.  Crucial  to  this  outcome  is  the  denial  of  the  individual's  desires:  the  child  must  be 
taught  "purely  to  follow  what  Reason  directs  as  best,  tho'  the  Appetite  lean  the  other 
way"".  If  a  child's  whims  and  demands  are  indulged  he  will  become  wayward  and 
uncontrolable.  Locke  regards  the  issue  of  control  in  much  the  same  way  as  earlier  authors 
like  Vives:  it  is  a  crucial  concept,  of  fundamental  importance  to  the  cultivation  of  self- 
discipline.  Without  control  there  will  be  anarchy,  and  anarchy  begins  with  the  individual. 
By  curbing  individual  desires  when  a  child  is  beginning  to  become  `willful',  a  habit  of 
control  might  be  engendered.  Locke  states:  "He  that  is  not  used  to  submit  his  Will  to  the 
Reason  of  others,  when  he  is  Young,  will  scarce  hearken  or  submit  to  his  own  Reason, 
when  he  is  of  an  Age  to  make  use  of  it.  "''  Locke's  educational  theories  imply  distaste  for, 
if  not  fear  of,  unreasonableness.  Reason  was  the  bedrock  of  society  and  so  the  training  of 
young  gentlemen  who  would  govern  society  was  of  no  small  importance.  It  is  in  this 
context  that  Locke's  comments  on  training  should  be  seen.  He  advises  that  training  must 
246 begin  when  the  mind  of  the  child  is  "most  tender,  most  easy  to  be  bowed""3,  while  parents 
must  not  indulge  children's  appetites  out  of  'fondness'  for  their  offspring.  At  a  practical 
level  he  is  all  too  aware  of  the  `dangers'  of  giving  in  to  a  child's  tantrum  with  the  result  that 
the  child  learns  that  a  tantrum  is  the  means  to  getting  his  own  way.  But  he  regards  control  as 
necessary  to  the  process  of  curbing  children's  behaviour  without  addressing  the  problematic 
aspects  of  control  and  enforcement  except  when  force  becomes  excessive.  (For  instance,  he 
does  not  favour  "vicious"  corporal  punishment  14.  )  Neither  does  Locke  explain  why  it  is  that 
willfulness  militates  against  rationality.  A  causal  link  is  assumed  rather  than  proven. 
It  has  been  pointed  out''  that  Locke's  educational  philosophy  contains  tensions  between  the 
concepts  of  autonomy  and  `habituation'  (the  internalisation  of  control,  effecting  self- 
discipline).  As  has  been  suggested,  the  inculcation  of  `reasonable'  habits  is  of  paramount 
concern  to  Locke,  but  does  not  such  habituation  run  counter  to  the  cultivation  of  epistemic 
autonomy  which  he  implies  is  desirable?  Locke's  concept  of  teaching  does  not  hold  as 
crucial  the  memorisation  of  facts  but  gives  preference  to  the  encouragement  of  habits  which 
will  allow  development  of  skills.  These  skills  will  enable  the  child  to  learn  any  subject  area 
more  successfully  than  reliance  on  rote  learning  would  allow.  Thus  the  child  will  be 
encouraged  to  think  for  himself.  Quite  how  this  transformation  is  produced  is  not  discussed 
in  depth  by  Locke.  Indeed,  there  may  well  be  an  irresolvable  paradox  in  his  theory16,  and  it 
is  a  matter  of  question  how  truly  autonomous  an  individual's  thoughts  and  behaviour  ever 
are.  But  the  paradox  is  not  an  issue  for  Locke. 
247 The  method  and  content  of  education 
Locke  considers  that  a  child  is  to  be  taught  as  few  rules  as  possible'7,  and  notes  that  a  fault 
in  the  "ordinary  Method  of  Education"  is  the  "Charging  of  Children's  Memories,  upon  all 
Occasions,  with  Rules  and  Precepts,  which  they  often  do  not  understand,  and  constantly  as 
soon  forget  as  given""'.  The  pupils'  capabilities  must  also  be  considered  to  ensure  that  tasks 
are  not  too  advanced  for  the  child's  developmental  stake.  It  has  been  stated  in  Chapter  5  that 
Vives  advised  similarly  and  suggested  that  teachers  assess  pupils'  abilities.  Locke  likewise 
insists  that  the  teacher  should  study  children's  "Natures  and  Aptitudes"  to  determine  "what 
turn  they  easily  take  and  what  becomes  them"  with  regard  to  study"".  He  writes  that 
children's  dispositions  will  dictate  what  subjects  they  study  at  a  particular  time.  They  may 
be  disposed  to  study  reading  one  day  and  not  the  next.  However,  he  advocates  that  if  a  child 
does  not  display  a  "good  Disposition"  towards  a  subject  he  must  be  "talked  into  one"20. 
Children  can  therefore  be  excused  study  of  a  subject  if  they  are  intellectually  unsuited  to  it, 
but  not  where  they  simply  dislike  it. 
On  the  content  of  a  course  of  education,  Locke  argues  that  children  should  be  taught  to  read 
as  soon  as  they  can  talk'  '.  Teaching  is  not  to  be  conducted  in  a  "tiresome"  manner:  "Learning 
might  be  made  a  Play  and  Recreation  to  Children"  so  that  they  will  "desire  to  be  taught"". 
With  regard  to  this  aspect  of  Locke's  education,  Margaret  Ezell  comments  that  he  is 
emphasizing  the  "rights  of  the  governed"  in  the  educative  process23.  She  views  Locke's 
advocacy  that  children  should  not  "be  hindered  from  being  Children,  or  from  playing"2  as 
demonstrating  his  recognition  of  a  "nature  peculiar  to  children"25.  That  is,  she  sees  in  Some 
Thoughts  Concerning  Education  a  recognition  of  childhood  as  a  distinct  stage  of 
development,  having  its  own  characteristics.  She  argues  that  Locke's  remarks  contain  a 
"tacit  assertion  of  the  existence  of  a  distinct  period  between  infancy  and  maturity  which  must 
248 be  permitted  to  run  its  course  with  no  unnatural  or  forcible  shortening"26.  This  is  perhaps  to 
read  into  Locke's  work  the  acceptance  of  too  modern  an  interpretation  of  childhood. 
Moreover,  the  recognition  of  play  as  being  important  in  child  development  dates  at  least  to 
Quintilian.  It  was  certainly  something  which  Vives  understood,  as  was  the  importance  of 
making  learning  enjoyable.  Vives  writes,  in  De  tradendis  di.  vciplinis,  that  teaching  - 
especially  of  grammar-  should  not  be  "wearily  troublesome"". 
Reading,  the  learning  of  languages,  and  the  sciences. 
Locke  maintains  that  children  are  to  learn  to  read  the  vernacular  before  learning  Latin.  The 
alphabet  is  to  be  taught  first  before  syllables  are  introduced.  Thereafter  "some  easy  pleasant 
Book  suited  to  (the  child's)  Capacity,  should  be  put  into  his  Hands,  wherein  the 
entertainment,  that  he  finds,  might  draw  him  on,  and  reward  his  Pains  in  Reading...  "28.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  Vives  felt  that  textbooks  should  be,  initially,  "pleasant"  and 
"easy"29,  while  recommending  for  young  children  authors  whom  he  thought  to  be 
"uncommonly  entertaining"  0. 
Locke  advises  that  once  the  child  is  proficient  in  speaking  English  he  should  learn  another 
language.  He  prefers  French  for  the  first  choice,  then  Latin31.  When  mentioning  Latin  he 
echoes  Vives'  recommendation  in  De  tradendis  that  Latin  is  best  learned  by  speaking  it 
rather  than  by  writing  alone.  Locke  states  that  Latin  is  "absolutely  necessary  to  a 
Gentleman"32,  but  that  when  teaching  it  to  a  child  recourse  should  not  initially  be  made  to  a 
grammar  book.  He  would  rather  have  Latin  taught  "as  English  has  been,  without  the 
perplexity  of  Rules"  and  primarily  through  the  medium  of  speech33.  Vives  may,  then,  have 
249 been  somewhat  ahead  of  his  time  as  he  goes  into  detail  on  this  matter  more  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  years  earlier  than  Locke.  In  De  tradenclis,  Vives  writes  that  pupils  are  to  be  taught 
Latin  through  the  medium  of  their  first  language: 
[Pupils)  should  first  speak  their  mother-tongue,  which  is  born 
with  them  and  the  teacher  should  correct  their  mistakes.  Then 
they  should,  little  by  little,  learn  Latin...  [Liet  them  intermingle 
with  the  vernacular  what  they  have  heard  in  Latin...  But  outside 
the  school  they  should  speak  the  mother-tongue  so  that  they 
should  not  become  accustomed  to  a  hotch-potch  of  languages...;  4 
The  teacher  must  "know  the  mother-tongue"  of  the  pupils  so  that  "by  this  means,  with  more 
case  and  readiness,  he  may  teach  the  learned  languages"3s 
Once  a  child  has  studied  a  foreign  language,  Locke  thinks  that  they  should  be  introduced  to 
the  natural  sciences.  Pupils  are  to  be  taught  'knowledge'  of 
[t]hings,  that  fall  under  the  senses,  and  require  little  more  than 
Memory.  For  there,  if  we  would  take  the  true  way,  our 
Knowledge  should  begin,  and  in  those  Things  be  laid  the 
Foundation;  and  not  in  the  abstract  notions  of  Logick  and 
Metaphysicks,  which  are  fitter  to  amuze,  than  inform  the 
Understanding  in  its  first  setting  out  towards  Knowledge.  36 
Vives  also  advocated  that  after  pupils  begin  the  learning  of  languages  they  should  study 
natural  science.  He  termed  this  a  pursuit  of  the  "knowledge  of  nature"  and  deemed  it  to  be 
"easier"  than  "an  abstract  subject  dealing  with  experiences  of  life"37.  Moreover,  knowledge 
of  nature  is  acquired  with  the  "natural  senses"38;  accordingly,  students  are  to  commence 
study  of  nature  with  "those  things  that  are  evident  to  the  senses.  For  the  senses  open  up  the 
way  to  all  knowledge"-19.  In  Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Education,  Locke  writes  that, 
where  teaching  of  "general"  knowledge  of  nature  is  concerned,  the  tutor  is  to  begin  with 
"that  which  lies  most  obvious  to  the  senses"40. 
250 Older  pupils  are  to  study  rhetoric  and  logic,  but  Locke  warns  against  these  subjects  being 
the  mainstays  of  education  because  they  are  of  "little  advantage  to  young  People"41.  He  fears 
that  studying  logic  will  lead  to  the  student  being  subjected  to  scholastic  method,  which  he 
opposes.  Furthermore,  he  would  have  a  young  man  "learn  a  Trade,  a  Manual  Trade"  even 
though  this  seems  inconsistent  with  an  education  "tending  towards  a  Gentleman's  calling  "42. 
In  a  letter  of  1688  to  Edward  Clarke,  Locke  suggests  that  it  might  be  fitting  fora  young  man 
to  spend  a  year  abroad  perhaps  with  "some  sober  and  skilful  jeweller,  either  in  Holland,  or 
in  some  other  convenient  country...  that  there  he  may  learn  that  trade"43.  He  also  mentions 
gardening  and  carpentry  for  a  youth  destined  to  be  a  "country  gentleman"'-'.  Vives 
recommends  a  similar  course:  where  a  student  wishes  to  learn  "practical  arts"  he  must  learn 
from  a  craftsman  who  practices  it45. 
It  is  evident  that  little  of  Locke's  treatise  on  education  rests  upon  his  work  on  psychology 
apart  from  the  concern  that  tutors  take  account  of  pupils'  development  and  suit  materials  to 
their  maturational  stage,  the  suggestion  that  early  learning  be  made  enjoyable,  and  that  the 
natural  sciences  are  at  first  to  be  taught  with  regard  to  pupils'  sensate  experience.  Locke's 
work  on  psychology  does  not,  then,  overly  inform  his  pedagogy.  However,  his  Essay 
Concerning  Human  Understanding  is  a  substantial  work  in  its  own  right,  and  like  Some 
Thoughts  it  was  written  in  stages  over  a  period  of  time. 
In  the  Essay,  Locke  enquires  into  the  nature  and  scope  of  understanding,  something  he  had 
explicitly  wondered  about  in  his  essay  Of  Study  in  which  he  wrote:  "It  would  be  of  great 
service  to  us  to  know  how  far  our  faculties  can  reach...  "46.  In  this  earlier  essay  he  contends 
that  the  "essences...  of  substantial  beings  are  beyond  our  ken"47;  only  some  things  are  "the 
proper  objects  of  our  enquiries  and  understanding"4H.  These  points  were  to  be  central  to  the 
Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding.  James  Axtell  comments  that  in  this  work  Locke 
displays  a  "seeming  disregard  of  anything  the  preceding  philosophical  traditions  - 
251 Aristotelian,  Hobbesian,  Cartesian  -  had  done"49.  But  Axtell's  point  extends  only  so  far, 
and  his  qualifying  words  ("seeming  disregard")  are  well  chosen.  Locke,  in  fact,  relied  on  a 
variety  of  previous  philosophers  including  those  named  by  Axtell.  That  said,  the  Essay  has 
traditionally  been  described  as  contributing  "as  much  to  psychology  as  to  philosophy"5", 
and  stands  at  the  centre  of  Locke's  reputation.  But  as  will  be  made  clear  in  the  next  section, 
Locke's  contribution  to  psychology  had  been  somewhat  anticipated  by  Vives'  Deanimu. 
Locke's  "survey  of  our  understandings" 
[Locke]  has  been  generally  credited  with  laying  the 
intellectual  foundations  both  of  liberal  democracy 
and  of  modern  empirical  philosophy.  An  empiricist 
is  someone  who  believes  that  our  conceptions  about 
what  exists  can  never  pass  entirely  beyond  the 
bounds  of  experience  -  that  everything  we  can 
conceive  of  has  either  been  experienced  or  is 
constructed  out  of  elements  which  have  been 
experienced.  Some  version  of  this  doctrine  has  been 
accepted  by  many  of  the  greatest  philosophers  since 
Locke,  and  philosophy  in  the  English-speaking 
world  has  never  escaped  its  dominance  for  long.  So 
familiar  has  it  become  that  many  people  nowadays 
regard  it  as  obvious  -just  plain  common  sense  -  but 
when  Locke  propounded  it  it  was  an  idea  with 
revolutionary  implications...  51 
Despite  any  revolutionary  implications  which  may  be  ascribed  to  empirical  philosophy  at  the 
time  of  the  writing  of  the  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  many  aspects  of 
Locke's  epistemology  had  been  outlined  by  earlier  thinkers  such  as  Pierre  Gassendi  and 
Luis  Vives;  for  instance,  the  theory  of  sensitive  knowledge  and  the  place  of  the  senses  in 
acquiring  the  'information'  which  makes  up  the  contents  of  the  intellect.  In  the  classical 
252 world,  Aristotle  did  recognise  the  important  role  of  the  senses,  but  believed  that  certain 
knowledge  of  substantial  essences  could  be  had.  Nor  could  Aristotle  be  termed  an 
"empiricist"  with  respect  to  his  philosophical  method,  or  to  the  content  of  his 
epistemological  theory.  Mere  recognition  that  the  senses  have  some  role  in  perception  does 
not  make  an  empiricist.  Locke  undoubtedly  went  further  than  this,  and  does  warrant  credit 
for  having  a  part  in  the  promotion  of  an  early  version  of  what  is  now  termed  "empirical 
philosophy". 
Although  Locke  is  fairly  described  as  one  of  the  most  influential  Western  philosophers,  it  is 
patent  that  "anyone  studying  the  history  of  philosophy  chronologically,  and  therefore 
coming  to  Locke  after  studying  his  predecessors,  cannot  but  be  struck  by  how  much  of 
what  Locke  said  had  already  been  said  by  his  predecessors"52.  While  similarities  in  the 
Essay  to  the  work  of  both  Descartes  and  Gassendi  have  been  recognised,  similarities 
between  the  essay  and  what  Vives  writes  in  Book  11  of  Deanima  have  not  been  considered 
in  depth.  Much  of  Locke's  analysis  of  the  understanding  has  parallels  with  the  preceding 
theories  of  De  anima  et  vita,  beginning  with  the  very  parameters  set  for  the  investigation. 
Like  Vives,  Locke  is  explicit  in  the  limitations  of  an  inquiry  into  the  mind/soul.  (Locke 
predominantly  uses  the  term  "mind",  but  does  refer  to  it  as  "soul".  )  He  is  not  going  to 
examine  "wherein  [the  mind's]  essence  consists"53.  As  with  Vives,  Locke  does  not  believe 
that  we  can  have  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  any  thing;  instead  he  will  enquire  into  the 
origin  of  ideas  and  "the  ways  whereby  the  understanding  comes  to  be  furnished  with 
them"54.  Unlike  Vives,  Locke  does  not  accord  space  to  a  discussion  of  the  passions.  His 
main  task  is  to  determine  how  ideas  come  to  exist  in  the  mind.  He  defines  an  idea  as 
"whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the  understanding  when  a  man  thinks",  and  uses  the  term  idea 
"to  express  whatever  is  meant  by  phantasm,  notion,  species,  or  whatever  it  is  which  the 
mind  can  be  employed  about  in  thinking"55.  Vives  uses  the  term  "notions"56,  but  more 
253 regularly  refers  to  "things"  which  are  "present  to  the  senses"57.  Locke  gives  a  definition  of 
the  term  "idea"  as  a  signification  for  mental  contents,  and  attempts  to  use  it  consistently 
throughout  the  Essay,  though  he  does  not  always  succeed.  His  definition  approximates  that 
given  by  Gassendi  who  stated  that  the  term  "idea"  suffers  "less  from  ambiguity"  than  terms 
such  as  "species",  "notion",  "phantasm"  or  "concept"511.  Michael  Ayers  points  out  that 
although  "idea"  had  been  in  use  as  a  technical  term,  with  various  meanings,  there  was  a  shift 
in  the  connotations  associated  with  the  word.  This  was  particularly  apparent  during  the 
seventeenth  century. 
Then,  largely  perhaps  because  of  the  way  it  was  taken  up  by 
Descartes,  it  became  an  extremely  popular  term  for  what  one 
might  in  general  call  a  'mental  content'.  But  despite  this  broad 
agreement  in  their  usage  of  the  term,  Descartes  and  Locke  hold 
very  different  views  on  the  nature  of  ideas  or  mental  contents. 
For  Descartes,  the  idea  is  something  fundamentally  intellectual. 
For  Locke  it  is  something  fundamentally  sensory.  51 
As  we  have  seen,  a  "notion"  (idea)  begins  for  Vives  with  perception:  "In  the  first 
consideration,  the  soul  follows  the  report  of  the  sense"660.  The  imagination  receives  this 
initial  sensory  information,  the  memory  retains  it,  and  percepts  thereafter  are  dealt  with  by 
"internal  consciousness"6  1.  Correspondingly,  Locke  states  that  the  senses  "at  first  let  in 
particular  ideas,  and  furnish  the  yet  empty  cabinet"62.  These  ideas  are  then  "lodged  in  the 
memory,  and  names  got  to  them"63.  However,  whereas  Vives  refers  in  general  terms  to 
"things  got"  by  the  senses,  or  to  the  "report  of  the  sense"  (implying  sensate  information  of 
some  sort),  Locke  regards  the  sensate  information  as  "ideas".  Hence  Ayers'  statement  that 
the  idea  is  fundamentally  sensory  for  Locke. 
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Locke  believes  that  "qualities"  in  a  sensible  object  affect  the  senses  and  produce  ideas  in  the 
mind'''.  This  follows  the  stance  taken  by  earlier  writers  like  Gassendi  and  Vives,  as  does  his 
insistence  that  knowledge  of  objects  cannot  extend  to  essences.  Knowledge  of  objects 
depends  on  "simple  ideas"  received  from  sensate  information.  Vives  also  maintains  that  the 
external  senses  cannot  perceive  that  which  lacks  "extension  and  quantity"n5.  For  Locke,  all 
ideas  stern  either  from  reflection  on  ideas  or  from  simple  ideas  acquired  through  the  senses 
(in  a  process  similar  to  Vives'  "simple  apprehension"o6).  He  comments: 
I  pretend  not  to  teach,  but  to  inquire;  and  therefore  cannot  but 
confess  here  again  that  external  and  internal  sensation  are  the  only 
passages  that  I  can  find  of  knowledge  to  the  understanding. 
These  alone,  as  far  as  I  can  discover,  are  the  windows  by  which 
light  is  let  into  this  dark  room.  For,  methinks,  the  understanding 
is  not  much  unlike  a  closet  wholly  shut  from  light,  with  only 
some  little  opening  left,  to  let  in  external  visible  resemblances,  or 
ideas  of  things  without...  67 
As  we  have  seen,  Vives  uses  the  same  metaphor  in  his  description  of  the  relationship 
between  sensation  and  knowledge  acquisition: 
Like  those  who  live  in  a  basement,  with  only  one  little  window  to 
the  outside,  do  not  see  except  through  our  senses,  thus  we  see 
nothing  except  through  our  senses.  Nevertheless,  we  peep  into 
the  outside  and  with  our  mind  we  infer  the  existence  of  something 
beyond  our  senses,  but  only  as  much  as  our  senses  permit  us  to 
do.  Our  mind  rises  upon  the  senses,  but  is  based  on  [them]...  68 
Both  writers  are  in  accord  as  to  how  they  conceptualise  the  mechanics  of  sensation. 
Locke,  does  not  accept  that  there  are  innate  ideas  in  the  mind,  even  about  concepts  such  as 
"justice"  or  "truth"69.  Every  idea,  even  those  arising  from  reflection,  is  based  upon  a  simple 
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immediately,  but  only  by  the  Intervention  of  the  Ideas  it  has  of  them.  0ur  Knowledge 
therefore  is  real,  only  so  far  as  there  is  a  conformity  between  our  Ideas  and  the  reality  of 
Things.  "70  So,  simple  ideas,  gained  from  sensate  knowledge,  correspond  to  actual  objects. 
Vives  also  describes  a  form  of  "simple"  knowledge  gained  from  sensate  information''.  He 
writes  that  all  animals  have  this  type  of  knowledge,  but  what  sets  man  apart  from  "lesser" 
animals  is  the  ability  to  reason  in  a  structured  way,  proceeding  from  "A  to  go  to  B  to  end  in 
knowing  C"72. 
While  Locke  calls  sensate  information  "knowledge",  Vives  gives  a  comparable  description. 
Of  the  three  classes  of  knowledge  which  he  defines,  one  is  sensate:  "That  which  we  call 
corporal  [bodily)  sensation  is  none  other  than  the  knowledge  of  the  soul  through  the  external 
instrument  of  the  body.  '173  Locke  argues  that  we  have  sensitive  "knowledge"  of  the 
"particular  existence"  of  finite  beings  "without  us"74.  Sensate  knowledge  results  in  an  idea 
being  in  the  mind  -  an  idea  which  corresponds  to  an  actual  object.  Sensitive  knowledge  is 
"narrower"  than  other  forms  of  knowledge  given  that  it  reaches  "no  further  than  the 
existence  of  things  actually  present  to  the  senses"  7-5.  Vives'  thought  is  consonant:  he  speaks 
of  the  "first",  "most  simple",  kind  of  knowledge  as  coming  through  the  senses.  From  this 
knowledge  stems  all  other  forms76. 
Locke  describes  the  mind  prior  to  receiving  sensate  ideas  as  being  like  "white  paper,  void  of 
all  characters"77.  All  the  "materials  of  reason  and  knowledge"  come  from  experience:  "Our 
observation  employed  either  about  external  sensible  objects,  or  about  the  internal  operations 
of  our  minds  perceived  and  reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  what  supplies  our  understandings 
with  all  the  materials  of  thinking.  "78  Locke's  postulation  is  that  the  "soul  begins  to  have 
ideas  when  it  begins  to  perceive"79.  (Vives  calls  the  faculty  which  performs  this  operation  of 
the  soul  the  imagination.  ) 
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sense  perception  and  the  reception  of  percepts.  Locke's  "simple  idea"  equates  with  Vives' 
"simple  intelligence"  as  the  term  for  the  initial  information  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  soul/mind. 
Vives  writes  that  "things"  in  the  mind  cone  "bodily"  via  the  eyes  and  intellectually  via  the 
imagination8o:  the  distinction  between  ideas  gained  from  sensation  and  those  gained  from 
mental  operations  which  Locke  describes.  For  Vives,  the  first  stage  "simple"  concepts 
gained  from  sensation  are  transformed  into  "compound"  concepts  by  the  imagination.  Locke 
also  regards  perception  as  "the  first  faculty  of  the  mind  exercised  about  our  ideas'.  "",  a 
faculty  possessed  in  "some  degree"  by  "all  animals"8?.  Like  Vives,  Locke  regards  simple 
ideas  as  being  used  to  form  'compound'  ideas3.  Vives  argues  that  if  a  "simple  object" 
("without  combination")  is  "presented  to  the  mind",  the  imagination  receives  the  "same 
figure"  as  was  offered  to  the  senses.  If  the  object  is  not  present  to  the  senses,  but  has  been 
"impressed"  in  the  memory,  the  fantasy  reforms  the  image  taking  it  from  the  memory. 
Where  the  object  is  not  one  which  has  been  perceived  directly  by  the  senses  it  is  a  product  of 
the  intellect  which  infers  its  existence  through  reason84. 
Similarly,  Locke  speaks  of  "objects"  falling  under  the  senses  and  being  transferred  to  the 
brain,  producing  in  the  mind  the  "particular  idea  we  have  of  them""-5.  He  comments  that 
ideas  gained  by  perception  can  be  kept  in  the  memory  and  recalled86,  while  the  mind  can 
"invent"  or  enumerate  "notions  we  cannot  see"87.  Locke  calls  these  "mixed  modes"88.  He 
then  argues  that  the  'next'  mental  faculty  which  allows  progress  to  knowledge  is  called 
"retention",  which  is  the  "keeping  of  simple  ideas"89.  Retention  is  effected  in  one  of  two 
ways:  by  contemplation  (keeping  the  simple  idea  "in  view"90),  or  by  memory.  Locke  defines 
memory  as  the  power  to  "revive"  in  our  minds  ideas  which  have  been  "laid  aside"  after 
"initial  imprinting"9'.  Closer  attention  will  now  be  given  to  this  aspect  of  the  Essay. 
257 Memory 
Locke  states  that  memory  revives  stored  ideas  and  "paint[s]  them  anew  on  itself"92.  This  is 
an  analogy  familiar  to  Vives  who  twice  uses  it  to  describe  the  process  of  memory  retention: 
memory  is like  "the  panel  which  a  painter  illuminates"93.  He  writes  in  De  unima  that  in  the 
same  way  as  an  image  seen  by  the  eyes  produces  a  "notion",  so  the  memory  makes  a  notion 
for  the  "eyes  of  the  soul"`'4.  Memory  loss  occurs  when  an  image  "painted"  on  the  memory  is 
erased  before  it  is  complete". 
Locke  calls  the  memory  the  "storehouse"  of  our  ideas,  a  "repository"  in  which  they  are 
kept".  Vives,  too,  calls  the  memory  a  "storehouse"  (depr  situ)  when  discussing  memory 
failure97,  and  in  the  introduction  to  Book  ü  of  De  anima  he  refers  to  the  memory  as  a 
"receptacle  or  storehouse  (a/Hauen)"  for  ideas98.  It  may  be  that  this  similarity  is  due  to  the 
effects  of  translation  (from  Latin  to  Spanish  in  the  case  of  Deanima).  It  may  also  be  the  case 
that  "storehouse"/"repository"  was  a  common  simile  for  the  memory.  Juan  Huarte,  who  is 
acknowledged  to  have  been  influenced  by  Vives'  DeanimaD9,  does  not  compare  memory  to 
a  "storehouse"  but  does  choose  to  quote  Galen's  use  of  the  similar  term  "repository"  100. 
Locke  had  a  copy  of  Huarte's  only  book  Examen  de  Ingenios  (the  Tryal  of  Wits)'"  but  in 
this  instance  it  does  not  explain  the  similarity  in  Locke's  and  Vives'  terminology.  Both  use  a 
comparison  which  could  well  have  been  a  commonplace. 
Locke  depicts  two  ways  in  which  memory  can  be  adversely  affected:  "Oblivion  and 
Slowness"102.  With  oblivion,  memory  "loses  the  idea";  with  slowness,  the  memory 
retrieves  the  idea  too  slowly  to  "serve  the  mind"  103;  Vives  mentions  things  which  produce 
"oblivion"  in  the  memory104.  Locke  and  Vives  note  that  disease  and  illness  can  "influence 
the  memory"  (as  Locke  puts  it)105.  And,  for  both  writers,  the  discussion  on  memory  is 
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to  "composition"  or  "compounding"  as  being  the  most  important  mental  operation  (that  is, 
the  forming  of  complex  ideas  from  simple  ones)'°h.  Vives  terms  this  mental  operation 
"compound  intelligence"  and  describes  it  as  being  a  comparative  function  as  well  as  having 
the  ability  to  classify  "elements"  arising  from  sensate  information107. 
A  final  point  of  comparison  between  the  descriptions  of  memory  in  Locke's  Es.  sayy  and 
Vives'  De  anima  concerns  their  discussion  of  the  association  of  ideas.  Locke  believes  that 
some  of  our  ideas  have  a  "natural  correspondence  and  connexion  one  with  another"  and  that 
it  is  the  "office  and  excellency  of  our  reason  to  trace  these,  and  hold  them  together"10x. 
Connection  between  ideas  can  occur  through  "chance"  or  "custom".  He  gives  this  example: 
A  grown  person  surfeiting  with  honey  no  sooner  hears  the  name 
of  it,  but  his  fancy  immediately  carries  sickness  and  qualms  to  his 
stomach,  and  he  cannot  bear  the  very  idea  of  it;  other  ideas  of 
dislike,  and  sickness...  presently  accompany  it,  and  he  is 
disturbed;  but  he  knows  from  whence  to  date  this  weakness... 
Had  this  happened  to  him  by  an  over-dose  of  honey  when  a 
child,  all  the  same  effects  would  have  followed;  but  the  cause 
would  have  been  mistaken,  and  the  antipathy  counted  natural.  '°9 
It  has  been  mentioned  that  Vives  noted  association  of  ideas  in  De  anima,  giving  as  examples 
his  aversion  to  cherries  which  dated  to  a  childhood  illness,  and  the  memories  of  his  friend 
Idiaquez  prompted  by  seeing  his  friend's  house  in  Brussels'  10. 
Although  Locke's  descriptions  of  these  aspects  of  "human  understanding"  have  their 
corollaries  in  earlier  works,  notably  in  De  anima  et  vita,  his  discussion  of  ideas  entered 
philosophical  territory  into  which  an  earlier  author  such  as  Vives  would  not  have  strayed. 
The  final  section  of  this  chapter  will  look  briefly  at  the  logical  consequences  arising  from 
Locke's  discussion  of  ideas  and  sensate  knowledge.  This  will  give  an  indication  of  how 
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different  intellectual  climate  and  may  be  of  help  in  relation  to  the  question  of  intellectual 
influence  as  a  whole.  It  will  also  give  insight  into  aspects  arising  from  Locke's  Essay  which 
did  have  'revolutionary'  ramifications  (for  instance,  atheism  as  a  consequence  of  adopting 
the  materialist  position). 
Locke's  theories:  some  implications 
One  area  of  particular  interest  emerging  from  the  Essay  concerns  how  we  can  be  sure  of 
material  objects  if  we  have  no  direct  knowledge  of  essences.  We  can  only  speculate  about 
such  things  and  rely  on  our  observation  of  appearances  to  do  so.  Superficially,  Vives' 
argument  on  this  issue  is  similar  to  Locke's:  we  reason  based  on  sensate  information  about 
perceptible  objects,  but  this  information  cannot  extend  to  essences.  However,  Vives  does 
not  go  into  detail  about  how  an  "idea"  might  be  said  to  correspond  to  reality  and  so  his 
theory  does  not  succumb  to  the  position  of  scepticism  in  the  same  way  as  does  Locke's 
theory.  Locke  devotes  much  of  the  Essay  to  explaining  his  thinking  about  ideas,  and  how 
they  correspond  to  'reality'.  He  decides  that  some  ideas  resemble  what  they  represent  in 
actuality,  while  others  bear  no  such  relation. 
There  is  a  problem  with  Locke's  argument  that  essence  or  "hidden"  substance  cannot  be 
known  yet  is  not  unknowable  in  principle.  (That  is,  essence  can  be  speculated  about,  based 
on  observation.  )  He  states  that  we  can  define  the  nominal  essence  of  an  object  but  that  we 
"know  not"  the  "real"  essence'  l'.  Our  faculties  carry  us  no  further  towards  knowledge  of 
corporeal  substances  than  the  apprehension  of  sensible  ideas  about  those  substances.  Such 
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derive  from  Gassendi's  position  that  observation  of  an  object  can  allow  us  to  give  a  detailed 
account  of  the  sensible  qualities  of  the  object  but  that  the  "alleged  naked,  or  rather  hidden, 
substance  is  something  we  can  neither  conceive  ourselves  nor  explain  to  others.  ",  12 
Contemporary  critics  of  Locke  argued  that  his  position  might  be  taken  as  implying  that 
certain  knowledge  about  "reality"  is  impossible,  and  that  he  adopts  a  "materialist"  position 
with  possible  logical  consequences  resulting  in  the  denial  of  immaterial  substance  (such  as 
the  soul).  This  latter  stance  is  not  one  which  Locke  adopts:  the  Essay  argues,  quite 
categorically,  for  the  immateriality  of  the  soul.  Nevertheless,  in  Locke's  theory  percipients 
do  not  directly  perceive  the  world.  Instead  they  have  ideas  in  their  minds  which  conform  to 
real  objects,  and  which  represent  real  objects.  The  percipient  perceives  the  world  'mediately' 
rather  than  'immediately'.  Given  Locke's  premise  it  is  questionable  that  we  can  know  with 
certainty  that  an  object  exists  independently  of  our  minds  because  the  immediate  object  of 
knowledge  is  the  idea  of  the  object  (not  the  object  itself).  However,  Locke  remains 
convinced  of  the  existence  of  objective  reality,  although  his  epistemology  is  prey  to  - 
philosophical  questioning  about  the  role  of  the  perceiver  and  her/his  relationship  with 
reality. 
Locke  does  confer  a  degree  of  certainty  upon  sensate  knowledge,  and  in  so  doing  his 
philosophical  position  may  be  labelled  'limited'  empiricism.  What  we  know  is  derived  partly 
from  sensate  experience,  and  partly  from  reflection  based  on  abstract  ideas.  Because  Locke 
grants  sensate  experience  some  certainty,  his  scheme  allows  percipients  to  have  a  measure 
of  certainty  that  sensate  experience  of  the  world  corresponds  to  actual  objects  being 
perceived.  Locke  argues  that  some  certainty  about  knowledge  is  also  facilitated  by  the 
faculty  of  reason.  He  claims  that  the  "greatest  part"  of  our  knowledge 
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cases  where  we  are  fain  to  substitute  assent  instead  of  knowledge, 
and  take  propositions  for  true,  without  being  certain  they  are  so, 
we  have  need  to  find  out,  examine  and  compare  the  grounds  of 
their  probability.  In  both  these  cases,  the  faculty  which  finds  out 
the  means  and  rightly  applies  them,  to  discover  certainty  in  the  one 
and  probability  in  the  other,  is  that  which  we  call  reason.  1  13 
If  carefully  carried  out,  reasoning  can  lead  us  to  make  inferences  about  the  unobservable 
which  are  probably  correct.  On  the  other  hand,  if  "probably  correct"  is  the  closest 
approximation  we  can  achieve  about  unobservable  things,  how  can  we  be  sure  of  the 
correctness  of  concepts  such  as  morality  or  of  the  existence  of  God? 
Locke  does  not  give  a  cogent  answer  in  defence  of  belief  in  moral  imperatives,  though  he  is 
careful  to  defend  the  'reality'  of  the  existence  of  God'  14.  In  order  to  remain  consistent  with 
his  epistemological  position  he  has  to  contend  that  knowledge  of  God,  being  immaterial,  is 
not  innate'  15.  It  could  be  argued  that  this  logically  implies  that  "knowledge"  of  God  is  a 
human  construct.  Even  if  Locke  holds  that  knowledge  of  God  can  be  gained  through 
observing  reality,  he  has  declared  that  we  can  only  have  concepts  of  the  nominal  essences  of 
substances.  God  is  insubstantial,  so  how  can  Locke  (or  anyone)  be  certain  of  His  existence? 
Locke's  answer  is  that  we  can  reason,  founded  on  the  "intuitive  certainty"  of  our  own 
existence'  16.  If  we  exist,  some  greater  power  must  have  created  us  since  man  knows  -  again 
with  "intuitive  certainty"  -  that  "Nothing  cannot  produce  a  Being",  1'.  Furthermore,  because 
we  are  thinking  beings,  it  can  be  deduced  that  another  "cogitative"  being  had  to  produce 
us'  Is.  Actually,  Locke  is  not  really  providing  us  with  much  other  than  dogmatic  assertion  in 
support  of  a  priori  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  Like  Vives,  he  accepts  a  priori  belief  in 
God's  existence,  and  for  Locke  this  leads  to  a  lack  of  fit  between  his  epistemology  (with  its 
partial  empiricism)  and  his  acceptance  of  the  certain  reality  of  God.  Locke's  justification  of 
the  existence  of  God  is  by  appeal  to  faith  however  much  he  attempts  "reasonable"  argument 
in  the  Essay.  But  then  the  alternative  was  the  promotion  of  atheism. 
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What  Locke  attempts  in  the  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding  is  to  give  a 
"psychological  account  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas",  which  includes  appeal  to  experience  as 
the  means  of  gaining  sense-based  knowledge'  19.  Belief  in  the  existence  of  sensitive 
knowledge  is  "central  to  his  philosophical  position",  as  we  have  seen,  and  his  "counting  it 
as  knowledge  at  all  placed  him  with  Gassendi  and  Hobbes,  against  Descartes""20. 
Moreover,  it  has  been  argued  here  that  important  concepts  in  the  Essay  echo  the  earlier 
theories  of  Vives. 
While  readings  of  the  Essav  and  De  anima  suggest  similarities,  there  is  no  direct  evidence  to 
prove  that  Locke  had  read  Vives'  work.  Given  Huarte's  reliance  on  Vives,  and  Locke's 
ownership  of  Huarte's  Examen,  it  might  be  postulated  as  a  possible  source.  However, 
Huarte's  Eramen  is  substantially  different  in  content  from  Locke's  Essay,  and  a  reading  of 
Huarte  does  not  support  the  argument  that  it  is  a  clear  link  between  Locke  and  Vives.  The 
only  aspect  which  all  three  authors  share  is  the  insistence  on  sensate  information  as  the  basis 
of  all  knowledge,  and  Huarte  does  not  give  as  sophisticated  a  rendition  of  this  as  do  the 
other  men. 
Having  said  that  elements  of  Locke's  work  are  either  derivative  or  had  been  predated  by 
earlier  thought,  he  can  nonetheless  be  credited  as  being  one  of  the  founders  of  modern 
empirical  philosophy.  His  work  in  the  Essay  also  suited  what  he  saw  as  a  necessary 
purpose:  his  attempt  to  "cut  down  the  pretensions  of  philosophers  like  Descartes  who 
thought  that  they  had  already  arrived  at  a  deductive  science  of  things"  2t.  In  addition,  the 
Essay,  together  with  Some  Thoughts  Concerning  Education,  reflects  Locke's  advocacy  of 
self-mastery.  Rationality  and  education  are  to  be  utilised  in  the  process  of  mastery  of  the 
263 self,  and  ultimately  of  the  environment'".  To  renounce  the  rule  of  reason  was  to  have  "quit 
the  Principles  of  Human  Nature"  123,  to  have  become  degenerate  and  bestial.  Locke's  work 
reflects  late  Renaissance  moves  towards  mastery  of  the  environment,  developed  by  writers 
like  Francis  Bacon  and  transformed  by  the  'new'  science  of  Locke's  contemporary  Isaac 
Newton.  Newtonian  physics  would  alter  the  way  in  which  the  natural  world  was  seen:  it 
made  modern  physics  possible  and  effected  the  separation  of  philosophy  from  "science"  as 
the  most  apt  means  of  describing  physical  phenomena.  Locke's  advocacy  of  self-mastery 
emerges  from  a  tradition  of  belief  in  the  superiority  of  the  intellect  over  the  emotions,  but 
points  to  the  championing  of  rationality  which  exemplified  the  Age  of  Reason. 
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Although  little  of  what  was  believed  to  be  scientific  in 
the  past  would  be  reconcilable  to  our  own 
construction  of  scientific  reality,  the  claim  of  'science' 
to  'truth'  became  firmly  established  by  the  eighteenth 
century.  That  science  became  equivalent  to  truth  in  a 
world  which  was  primarily  religiously  oriented  was  a 
major  shift  in  the  Weltanschauung  of  an  age  and  much 
more  important  than  the'decline  of  magic'.  ' 
The  Renaissance  marked  the  beginning  of  declining  belief  in  magic,  as  experiment  became 
allied  less  to  magical  practice  and  more  to'scientific'  endeavour.  While  Luis  Vives  could  as 
yet  warn  against  dabbling  in  the  magical  arts,  a  philosopher  like  Locke  worked  in  a  time 
when  science  was  being  linked  conceptually  to  claims  of'truth'.  But  it  should  be  noted  that 
the  interest  in  magic  had  not  declined  altogether  by  the  time  of  the  'new'  science:  Isaac 
Newton  retained  an  interest  in  alchemy.  And,  as  has  been  seen,  the  legacy  of  renaissance 
interest  in  the  soul  lingered  in  the  work  of  Descartes. 
With  respect  to  the  history  of  ideas,  this  thesis  has  drawn  parallels  between  Vives'  texts  and 
the  work  of  Pierre  Gassendi,  Rene  Descartes  and  John  Locke.  In  each  instance  it  is  evident 
that  aspects  of  Vives'  theories  predate  those  of  the  later  philosophers.  Moreover,  it  has  been 
the  intention  to  illustrate  the  development  of  philosophical  approaches  to  epistemology  and 
psychology  from  the  renaissance  to  the  early  eighteenth  century.  A  case  has  been  made  that 
the  development  of  philosophical  thought  outlined  in  the  works  of  these  authors  took  place 
against  a  background  of  the  growth  of  a  'scientific'  approach  to  natural  philosophy  which 
would  culminate  in  the  'scientific  revolution'.  Of  particular  significance  to  this  issue  has 
been  a  comparison  of  Vives'  approach  to  the  study  of  the  soul  (in  the  sixteenth  century) 
265 with  that  of  Descartes  (in  the  seventeenth).  This  aspect  is indicative  of  the  nonlinearity  to  be 
found  in  the  attempts  to  develop  it  method  other  than  metaphysics  for  examining  physical 
and  psychological  phenomena.  In  part  it  was  the  theories  of  perception  arising  from 
inquiries  like  that  contained  in  De  anima  ei  vita  which  would  precipitate  a  philosophical 
atmosphere  in  which  observation  and  reliance  on  inquiry  (rather  than  on  apwiori  deduction) 
became  taken  for  granted  as  a  means  to  investigate  the  physical  world.  But  while  Descartes 
accepted  the  epistemic  limitations  arising  from  the  need  to  rely  on  sensate  information  as  the 
first  stage  in  perceptual  awareness,  he  remained  loyal  to  metaphysics  as  the  agent  for  the 
discovery  of  incontrovertible  knowledge.  Indeed, Descartes  "at  no  time...  put  into  question 
that  the  primary  function  of  philosophy  is  to  know  what  there  is"'  in  reality,  nor  did  he 
question  "the  human  capacity  to  know  and  to  do  so  with  certainty";.  In  his  work,  therefore, 
forms  of  proof  do  not  rest  principally  on  appeal  to  evidence  gained  empirically  and 
demonstrated  a  posteriori.  He  remained  faithful  to  the  idea  that  intuition  and  deduction  were 
the  only  mental  operations  requisite  to  scientific  enquiry;.  Descartes  does  refer  to  the  need  to 
observe  physical  phenomena  in  a  few  isolated  instances  in  his  works  on  the  soul  and  the 
intellects,  but  in  this  respect  he  does  not  advocate  the  requirement  that  hypothetical 
deduction  about  the  soul  or  intellect  be  founded  on  and  considered  against  empirical  data. 
And,  as  Ernan  McMullin  arguesfi,  where  data  gained  via  observation  of  physical  phenomena 
contradicted  Descartes'  apriori  deductions  he  usually  explained  the  contradictions  away  and 
adhered  to  his  original  postulations.  Tellingly,  in  a  response  to  Beekman's  experimental 
data  which  contradicted  Descartes'  theory  of  the  pendulum,  Descartes  wrote  that  even  were 
Beekman  to  make  "a  thousand  experiments  to  find  (the  pendulum  acceleration  j  more 
exactly,  I  do  not  have  to  take  the  trouble  to  do  these  myself,  if  they  cannot  be  explained  by 
reason.  "7 
This  thesis  has  argued  that  such  a  methodological  perspective  differs  from  that  implied  by 
Vives'  directive  in  Dcanimuet  vita  that  (he  soul  cannot  be  studied  directly.  In  what  he  has  to 
266 say  on  the  functions  of  the  soul,  lie  writes  from  a  position  which  acknowledges  the 
limitations  placed  by  reliance  on  sensate  impressions,  most  notably  from  observation,  on 
the  nature  of  our  knowledge.  Thus  Vives  links  knowing  to  sensing/observing  in  a  type  of 
causal  relation:  what  we  observe  and  sense  determines  both  the  extent  to  which  we  can 
understand  physical  and  psychological  phenomena,  and  the  remit  we  can  properly  set  for 
any  investigation  of  the  physical  world.  It  is  apparent,  then,  that  the  place  of  doubt  is  central 
to  the  methodological  differences  found  in  De  anima  et  vita  and  Le.  %  Pas.  vion.  c  cle  !  'Aide.  For 
Descartes'  method,  doubt  is  "instrumental  rather  than  final  and  its  primary  function  (is)  to 
ensure  that  the  piece  of  knowledge  that  survives  it  is  established  with  absolute  certainty"". 
Descartes'  doubt  is  an  explicit  part  of  his  metaphysics  and  is  intended  to  facilitate  certainty. 
In  Vives'  Deaninia,  however,  doubt  has  a  different  (implicit)  function:  it  limits  how  much 
can  be  understood  about  the  world  and  it  arises  from  the  epistemic  consequences  of  our 
needing  to  rely  on  sensate  information  as  the  basis  of  our  understanding,. 
Of  importance  to  the  discussion  has  been  Vives'  theory  of  soul  because  it  stands  as  an  early 
inquiry  into  what  would  now  be  termed  'psychology'.  In  addition,  as  Stephen  Gaukroger 
points  out,  Vives  was,  with  Descartes,  one  of  the  "two  most  influential  later  writers  on  the 
passions"'".  In  the  late  twentieth  century  we  may  not  recognise  the  complexity  of  such  early 
theories  of  psychology.  Aspects  of  Vives'  search  to  understand  the  soul  may  now  seem 
naive,  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  even  in  this  age  we  struggle  to  define  neurological 
and  psychological  processes.  Indeed  as  late  as  1923  the  psychologist  and  statistician 
Charles  Spearnran  had  a  place  in  his  view  of  science  for  the  soul.  He  stated: 
Deeper  than  the  uniformities  of  occurrence  which  are  noticeable... 
without  its  aid,  [science]  discovers  others  more  abstruse,  but 
correspondingly  more  comprehensive,  upon  which  the  name  of 
laws  is  bestowed...  When  we  look  around  for  any  approach  to  this 
ideal,  something  of  the  sort  can  actually  be  found  in  the  science  of 
physics  as  based  on  the  three  primary  laws  of  motion.  Coordinate 
with  this  phvsica  corporis  [physics  of  bodies],  then,  we  are  today 
in  search  of  a  physicu  aninuae  [physics  of  the  soul  ].  ' 
267 So,  almost  four  hundred  years  after  Vives  wrote  De  anima  it  would  appear  that 
psychologists  like  Spearman  were  largely  in  the  dark  about  what  might  constitute  scientific 
research  into  the  'soul'.  Attempts  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  human  psyche  remain 
difficult  for  scientists,  but  what  connects  those  who  study  psychology  today  with 
philosophers  like  Vives  is  the  search  to  understand  the  essence  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  human 
being. 
It  has  also  been  argued  that  aspects  of  the  work  of  Luis  Vives  show  tentative  use  of 
components  which  would  come  to  be  regarded  as  cornerstones  of  empirical  methodology: 
observation  and  reliance  on  sensate  information.  What  remained  to  be  done  was  to  refine 
and  sophisticate  such  aspects  of  empirical  philosophy,  and  to  translate  empiricism  into 
experimentalism.  Thinkers  like  Newton,  Descartes  and  Leibniz  were  to  be  part  of  the 
evolution  of  method  which 
established  the  texture  of  science,  and  in  whatever  variation  [their 
work  was]  debated,  modified,  'misunderstood',  they  none  the 
less  introduced  axiomatically  the  factual  authority  of  the 
experiment,  the  division  of  spirit  from  matter  (however  tortuous 
were  the  conceptual  bridges  that  still  accounted  for  'soul')  and  of 
mechanism...  " 
However,  it  has  not  been  suggested  that  Vives'  work  is  empirical  in  the  sense  that  it  used 
experimental  methods  or  rested  upon  the  axiomatic.  It  did  not  do  so.  But  in  an  era  when 
claims  to  truth  were  tied  to  religious  belief,  he  attempted  a  description  of  mental  processes 
and  epistemology  which  relied  in  part  on  observation,  introspection  and  an  argument  for 
sensation  as  the  first  stage  in  cognition.  Significantly,  in  the  field  of  natural  philosophy, 
Vives  described  the  senses  as  receptors  of  information  issuing  from  the  outside  world;  the 
senses  emit  nothing  and  are  passive  in  the  process  of  sensation. 
268 This  thesis  has  stressed  the  need  to  understand  Vives'  theory  of  the  soul  in  order  to 
appreciate  that  his  concepts  of  psychology  informed  his  pedagogy.  It  has  been  stated  that 
the  result  was  a  more  sophisticated  approach  to  teaching  in  Vives'  work  than  is  seen  in  his 
near  contemporaries.  He  took  cognisance  of  the  maturational  stage  of  the  learner,  accorded 
an  element  of  professionalisation  to  the  role  of  the  teacher,  acknowledged  the  place  of 
enjoyment  in  early  learning,  believed  that  learners  should  begin  natural  philosophy  by 
studying  the  things  which  were  most  evident  to  the  senses,  and  underpinned  his  comments 
on  memory  with  his  analysis  in  De  uninw  el  vile.  Observation  and  experience  integrated  into 
study  of  the  arts  and  sciences  were  the  means  by  which  Vives  intended  individuals  to  gain 
knowledge.  Moreover,  it  has  been  proposed  that  Vives'  educational  plan  for  girls  and 
women  marks  a  departure  from  the  usual  narrow  'housetraining'  which  renaissance  females 
were  accorded.  Although  the  education  he  prescribed  for  girls  is  more  constrained  than  (hat 
which  he  outlined  for  boys  it  remains  broader  in  scope  than  most  contemporary  versions. 
The  work  of  Luis  Vives  provides  an  interesting  example  of  psychological  and  educational 
ideas  which  were  forward  thinking  in  many  ways.  Although  his  ideas  retain  aspects  which 
were  typical  of  renaissance  thought  he  nevertheless  "deserves  an  important  place  in  the 
intellectual  history  of  Europe"'2.  In  describing  Vives'  educational  theories  it  might  be 
argued  that  his  most  significant  contribution  lies  within  the  area  of  the  history  of  education. 
He  knew  his  limits  as  a  philosopher  and  study  of  his  work  partially  upholds  this  view;  he 
was  not  one  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  his  age  when  compared  with  the  leading  lights. 
However,  when  consideration  is  made  of  his  educational  work,  his  conscious  attempt  to 
construct  a  programme  of  learning  which  recognised  psychological  theory,  and  his 
advocacy  of  study  for  women,  it  might  fairly  be  said  of  Vives  that  he  was  an  impressive 
thinker  within  these  fields. 
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